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This dissertation explores the re-emergence of imprisonment as a major social policy and topic 
of public debate in New South Wales, Australia and Pennsylvania, USA during the late twentieth-
century. It focuses on three broad themes: (1) the increasing visibility, publicity and scandals 
involving prisons; (2) transnational relationships in penal reform and activism; and (3) the 
acceleration of the production and flow of penal knowledge. I begin by demonstrating how the 
confluence of several trends in the postwar period contributed to the deterioration of 
longstanding penal arrangements, which embodied state secrecy and the authority of 
penological expertise. The introduction of progressive reform practices after World War II in both 
states sought to reform offenders through education, training, recreation, the encouragement of 
greater self-reflection and expression and the normalization of prison environments. These 
policies proved to be very contentious with many prison staff, the judiciary and the broader 
public, however, and they also encouraged greater criticism from prisoners. These reforms 
coincided with the formation of a large, transnational, prisoners’ rights movement, influenced by 
the broader radical, political activism of the 1960s, which attempted to fundamentally redefine 
the status of confined people and in some cases, even abolish prisons entirely. Penal authorities 
struggled to reassure these multiple audiences of the efficacy of their policies and explain 
simultaneous increases in crime rates, prison unrest, escapes from custody and guard union 
militancy. These problems engulfed the penal system in both states in endemic controversy, 
leading to protracted litigation in Pennsylvania and a major royal commission in New South 
Wales. The resulting impasse created a vacuum of control and purpose within prisons and a major 
political problem for governments. The investigations and debates accelerated the transmission 
of penal knowledge and practices across jurisdictional borders, especially during the 1970s and 
1980s. To manage increasingly volatile institutions, staff resorted to more control strategies, like 
segregation and transfers. Penal bureaucracies canvased practices in other jurisdictions, 
reformed classification systems and built new prisons. By the 1990s, prison populations in both 
states grew rapidly, but there was little agreement on what prisons should do with their wards, 









I purposely did not enter any cells at that stage. I heard noises coming from cells,—yelling, 
shouting and screaming. I did not see anybody being beaten. I recall prison officers immediately 
prior to entering a cell, saying to the inmates thereof to throw all weapons out the window. I 
saw no prison officer emerge from any such cell with any weapon alleged to have been taken by 
force from a prisoner. During this time I stood with Mr Chandler at the back of the wing on the 
top landing. Chandler said to me, “They will never keep this behind four walls”. I agreed with 
him.1 
 
Maxwell Hanrahan, Corrections Officer, Bathurst Gaol 
 
 
Introduction: “They Will Never Keep This Behind Four Walls” 
 
This quotation originates from the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, which sat 
from 1976 to 1978, investigating the causes of several disturbances and the entire operations 
of the Department of Corrective Services. The event that Officer Hanrahan described – a 
systematic reprisal beating following an uprising at Bathurst Gaol – became one of the main 
areas of interest for the Royal Commission and a central focal point for the nascent prison 
movement in Australia’s most populous state. In most accounts, participants described it as 
beginning a few days beforehand with a peaceful sit-down strike by some prisoners in one of 
the recreation yards on Friday over Bathurst’s squalid living conditions and arbitrary, harsh 
                                                          
1 John F. Nagle, Report of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons (Sydney: Government Printer, 1978), 




discipline, both of which had earned the institution a notorious reputation among prisoners and 
warders alike throughout the state.2 On Monday, October 19, 1970, about sixty youthful 
prisoners absconded from a mandatory muster at Bathurst Gaol, ran into C Wing and began 
smashing cell fixtures. Several prisoners exchanged blows with guards before barricading 
themselves inside C Wing. The young prisoners withdrew from their positions several hours 
later after receiving assurances that they would not face any reprisals. Bathurst’s 
superintendent, John Winter Pallot, permitted them to share cells that night, which many 
prisoners hoped would deter potential assaults by staff. According to most accounts given to 
the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons six years later, the retaliatory actions of 
the prison’s staff began the following morning. Superintendent Pallot delivered the first blow, 
striking an inmate in the face in front of assembled guards after taunting him about the events 
of the previous day. Guards then extracted people from the cells and forced them to strip 
naked while also repeatedly kicking, punching and beating them with batons. Some of the 
inmate’s injuries were so severe that they were rendered unconscious and laid bleeding on the 
cellblock floors before guards dragged them back into their own cells. Many prisoners later 
recounted the terror of waiting in their cells, listening to the screams and cries in the cellblock 
grow louder as the guards moved closer to them, cell by cell. 
The inquiry’s sole Royal Commissioner, Justice John F. Nagle, highlighted Hanrahan’s 
testimony at the beginning of one of the final reports chapters, because it disclosed, not only 
the violence against prisoners, but the overall petty authoritarianism of the prison’s 
management, the resistance of prisoners, the dissent among some staff members, the routine 
                                                          




conspiracies of silence among penal officials and the likelihood that such concealments would 
not work this time.3 It was a telling comment about the deteriorating routines and protocols 
governing imprisonment in New South Wales as they entered a period of transition, undoing 
and reconstitution. In many respects, the truths the inquiry established and the politics 
surrounding the investigation and its products paralleled similar investigations of penal 
practices in other jurisdictions in many different parts of the contemporary world. The language 
of crisis abounds in the widely read penal commentary and interpretations of this era, 
especially by the mid-1970s, whether it was in the reports of inquiries, the products of 
research, journalism, administrative writings, activist literatures or the personal testimonies of 
prisoners. These statements bespoke of an awareness that something was wrong, that the 
previous methods and assumptions about punishment, which had been relatively stable for 
decades were now shifting and reformulating, losing their some of their unreflective, taken-for-
granted assurance and often their legitimacy. Instead, prisons became contentious places, both 
internally and in wider publics beyond prison walls. 
A prisoner from another time and place once remarked, “A crisis consists precisely in 
the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of 
morbid symptoms appear.”4 This dissertation is about the emergence of what appeared to 
many people at the time as the morbid symptoms of a crisis in imprisonment, but it also 
explores the hopefulness that sustained some people and groups in New South Wales and 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 82. 
4 Antonio Gramsci, “‘Wave of Materialism’ and ‘Crisis of Authority,’” in Selections from the Prison Notebooks of 





Pennsylvania in this moment between the late 1960s and 1980s. The bulk of this narrative 
spans the decline of practices influenced by the progressive therapeutic penological reforms of 
the immediate post-World War II years through their dissolution in the 1970s to the official 
commitment to policies in the 1990s, dedicated to unprecedented levels of exclusionary 
incarceration and classification. The chapters analyze two separate, yet interconnected, 
histories of social change and its relationship to penal policy and prison life during this period, 
focusing on three broad themes: (1) the increasing visibility, publicity and scandals involving 
prisons; (2) transnational relationships in the history of penal reform and activism; and (3) the 
acceleration of the production and flow of penal knowledge. I elaborate these themes below, 
but in the next two sections, I dicuss the methods and rationale for this comparative and 
transnational project and briefly describe the two jurisdictions I choose for this study – New 
South Wales and Pennsylvania.  
 
A Brief for Comparison in a Transnational World  
 
While I am interested in the widespread transformation of imprisonment in the late 
twentieth century, I grounded my empirical research in New South Wales and Pennsylvania for 
several reasons, both intellectual and practical. I am from Pennsylvania and was already familiar 
with its criminal justice system from past work. However, I also knew, especially after reading 
David Garland’s Culture of Control, that the changes I saw in Pennsylvania’s prisons were much 




consequences.5 I wanted to produce an ethnographically-informed, social history attuned to 
this larger process while also respectful of the uniqueness of local manifestations. In addition to 
Pennsylvania, I felt I needed to select another location, outside of the United States, to 
comparatively explore this larger process, which affected both places. On a trip to Australia, I 
decided on New South Wales as this other place, largely because of the vast archival resources 
produced by the Royal Commission into New South Wales in the 1970s and the vibrancy of its 
prison activist movement. I will discuss each state and their global relationships in more detail 
in the next section. First, however, I want to discuss how I have approached the issues of 
comparison and transnationalism in this project. 
I situate my research in the current re-evaluation of the role of comparison in 
ethnographic and historical scholarship on transnationalism, globalization and networks.6 While 
                                                          
5 David Garland, Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001). 
6 Some work that has shaped my thinking on transnationalism and globalization includes, Martina Henze, 
“Transnational Cooperation and Criminal Policy: The Prison Reform Movement, 1820s-1950s” in Davide Rodogno, 
Bernhard Struck and Jakob Vogel (eds.), Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues from the 
1840s to the 1930s (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 197-217; Nir Shafir, “The International Congress as 
Scientific and Diplomatic Technology: Global Intellectual Exchange in the International Prison Congress, 1860–90,” 
Journal of Global History, 9 (March 2014), 72-93; Christian G. De Vito and Alex Lichtenstein, “Writing a Global 
History of Convict Labour,” International Review of Social History, 58 (August 2013), 285-324; 
Emily S. Rosenberg, “Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World” in Emily S. Rosenberg (ed.), A World Connecting, 
1870-1945 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2012), 919-959; Xiaoying Qi, “A Case Study of Globalized Knowledge Flows: 
Guanxi in Social Science and Management Theory,” International Sociology, 27 (November 2012), 707-723; Karen 
Fox, “Globalising Indigeneity? Writing Indigenous Histories in a Transnational World,” History Compass, 10 (June 
2012), 423-439; Katie Pickles, “Transnational History and Cultural Cringe: Some Issues for Consideration in New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada,” History Compass, 9 (September 2011), 657-673; Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: 
An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, “The 
Global Situation,” Cultural Anthropology, 15 (August 2000), 327-360; Taylor C. Sherman, “Tensions of Colonial 
Punishment: Perspectives on Recent Developments in the Study of Coercive Networks in Asia, Africa and the 
Caribbean,” History Compass, 7 (May 2009), 659–677; Ulf Hannerz, “Flows, Boundaries and Hybrids: Keywords in 
Transnational Anthropology” at Transnational Communities Programme, Working Paper Series. Institute of Social 
and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford, available at: 
www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/hannerz.pdf (last checked October 17, 2010); Ulf Hannerz, 
Transnational Connections. Culture, People, Places (Routledge: London, 1996); Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick and 
J.T. Way, “Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis,” American Quarterly, 60 (September 2008), 625-648; Trevor 




these latter concepts have had a major impact of recent scholarship, comparative methods 
have been less influential of late. No doubt, this is due to many of the fundamental problems 
that beset positivistic comparative methods in past research. This was especially the case in 
research that sought to construct general theories through the comparison of seemingly 
isolated, bounded social units, be these cultures, societies, states or nations.7 As 
anthropologists Andre Gingrich and Richard Fox have noted, this type of comparison became 
especially vulnerable to critiques in the 1960s and 1970s that highlighted the deeply 
interconnected and violent imperial world system that brought such presumably isolated units 
together and made them knowable as objects of research.8 Much of the work in ethnographic 
and historical literature since the 1970s has instead focused on topics and concepts antithetical 
to general theory and has been more sensitive to questions about the role of disparate power 
relations in the production of knowledge. Nevertheless, nearly all ethnographic and historical 
research involves some level of comparison, but it often remains implicit and unacknowledged.9 
In fact, “whenever comparison was turned into an explicit, conscious and systematic method,” 
                                                          
Policy (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2007); Diane Stone, “Introduction: Global Knowledge and Advocacy 
Networks,” Global Networks, 2 (January 2002), 1-12; John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998); Arjun Appadurai, Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Michael Kearney, “The Local and the Global: The Anthropology 
of Globalization and Transnationalism,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 24 (October 1995), 547-565. 
7 Prominent examples of these trends in anthropology and history explicitly based on comparison and 
commensuration would include A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s quest to build general theory through comparative 
taxonomies, the construction of the Human Relations Area Files and holocultural studies and influence of 
cliometric historiography in the 1970s and 1980s.     
8 Richard G. Fox and Andre Gingrich, “Introduction,” in Gingrich and Fox (eds.), Anthropology, by Comparison 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 1-2. 
9 Michael Herzfeld, “Performing Comparisons: Ethnography, Globetrotting, and the Spaces of Social Knowledge,” 
Journal of Anthropological Research, 57 (Autumn 2001), 259-276; Fox and Gingrich, “Introduction,” 1-24; Aram A. 
Yengoyan, “Introduction: On the Issue of Comparison” in Yengoyan (ed.), Modes of Comparison: Theory & Practice 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 1-27; Jörg Niewöhner and Thomas Scheffer, “Introduction: 
Thickening Comparison: On the Multiple Facets of Comparability,” in Niewöhner and Scheffer (eds.), Thick 




according to Jörg Niewöhner and Thomas Scheffer, “it was subjected to harsh critique, which 
often led to paradigmatic debates.”10 The eschewal of most explicit forms of comparison 
peaked during the 1980s and 1990s as the influence of post-colonialism, post-structuralism and 
post-modernism further undercut the remaining presumptions of cross-cultural comparison.  
Yet, as scholars began to explore the concepts of globalization, transnationalism and 
networks after the end of the Cold War, comparison tentatively returned as both a research 
strategy and a fundamental problem in the research process and production of scholarly 
knowledge.11 A number of people working in the disciplines of anthropology, history, sociology 
and law among others have recently called upon scholars to actively rethink the role of 
comparison in research and writing, not in an effort to re-establish a standard method, but to 
develop multiple approaches while exploring what can be retained from previous practices.12 
Micol Seigel has also urged researchers to examine the comparative work of historical subjects 
because such “comparisons are both a site and a motor of transnational exchange.”13 These 
new “modes of comparison” are thus varied in respect to the scales and objects of study and 
                                                          
10 Niewöhner and Scheffer, “Introduction: Thickening Comparison,” 7. 
11 Andre Gingrich, “When Ethnic Majorities are ‘Dethroned’: Towards a Methodology of Self-Reflexive, Controlled 
Macrocomparison” in Anthropology, by Comparison, 225-248; Micol Seigel, “Beyond Compare: Comparative 
Method after the Transnational Turn,” Radical History Review, 91 (Winter 2005), 62-90; Frederick Cooper, “Review 
Essay: Race, Ideology and the Perils of Comparative History,” American Historical Review, 101 (October 1996), 
1122-1138; George E. Marcus, “Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 24 (October 1995), 95-117; Ananta Giri, “Critique of the Comparative Method and 
the Challenges of a Transnational World,” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 27 (July 1993), 267-289; Ian Tyrrell, 
“American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” American Historical Review, 96 (October 1991), 
1031-55, 1068-72; Ian Tyrrell, “Beyond the View from Euro-America: Environment, Settler Societies and 
Internationalization of American History,” in Thomas Bender (ed.), Rethinking American History in a Global Age 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 168-92; Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, "Where in the World Is 
America? The History of the United States in the. Global Age," in Bender (ed.), Rethinking American History in a 
Global Age, 63-99. Michael Herzfeld argues that ethnographic research always involves an interplay between 
reflexivity and comparison and that each concept means “little in isolation from each other.” See Herzfeld, 
“Performing Comparisons,” 260. 
12 See citations in last note. 




the role of the analyst in constructing and performing comparative frameworks.14 Following 
this, I adopt multiple registers of comparison and also explore how historical actors themselves 
constructed comparative projects in their efforts to reform prisons that brought them into 
contact with similarly situated people in different jurisdictions.  
Yet, I refrain from thinking of New South Wales and Pennsylvania as “cases.” This term, 
and its association with positivistic comparative methods, implies far more separateness and 
isolation between New South Wales and Pennsylvania than actually exists. The danger in 
comparing penal politics in parallel in this manner lies in the risk of naturalizing the units of 
analysis — subnational political jurisdictions, i.e. states. This is, of course, a familiar problem in 
history of anthropological comparison and resembles arguments against comparisons that 
privilege the nation-state as a given unit of analysis, albeit on a smaller scale.15 One of the 
earlier advocates of comparison, the Annales School historian Marc Bloch, was well aware of 
this problem when he advocated “a parallel study of societies that are at once neighboring and 
contemporary, exercising a constant mutual influence, exposed through their development to 
the action of the same broad causes just because they are close and contemporaneous, and 
owing their existence in part at least to a common origin.”16 The boundaries of New South 
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Wales and Pennsylvania were, in fact, always porous, and there are historical connections 
between each jurisdiction despite considerable local variations between them. Any comparison 
of them, therefore, must underscore the role of “mutual influence” and “the same broad 
causes” that affected both places. Comparisons that focus on differences between states, like 
New South Wales and Pennsylvania, also need to be mindful of how the boundedness of the 
state, or the perception of such, was created and how it facilitated interconnections between 
other states and actors. It may be, as Micol Seigel suggests, that the perception and reality of 
differences between places and other objects of study, like race relations, is as much the 
product of previous comparative work as anything else.17 
I have tried to avoid the pitfalls of comparison in four ways. First, while I locate my 
analysis in two states, I focus more on the flow of carceral practices and discourse as well as the 
strategies actors employed in their encounters with them. Not only did such things often travel 
from place to place, traversing jurisdictional borders, they also had amorphous qualities, 
changing as actors inserted them into new environments, but transforming these new contexts 
as well. Second, in addition to demonstrating the permeability of such borders, I also highlight 
their localizing powers. I do not treat them as given, but illustrate how they articulated penal 
practices, which in turn constituted and sustained such borders.18 Jurisdictional borders shaped 
and spatially encompassed practices, which over time differentiated them from corresponding 
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policies and practices in other jurisdictions.19 They provided platforms for experimentation with 
penal practices, which often attracted the interest of prison officials and researchers elsewhere 
who evaluated their transferability and reproducibility.  
Third, while I located this research in two places, I pursued it in an open-ended fashion, 
continuously revising the objects of comparison, based on both the similarity and alterity of 
issues and events. In this regard, my research process involved an active juxtaposition of 
objects as I encountered them. It became increasingly apparent during the research process 
that many of the issues and events I examined differed greatly in both places, but I would have 
not been aware of this had I not already been consciously thinking comparatively. The concept 
of juxtaposition, currently finding a place in the ethnographer’s toolkit, underlines the role of 
the analyst and their knowledge in forging comparisons and bringing objects (places, events, 
etc.) together.20 It also provides a productive way to think about times when such comparisons 
simply fail to produce the desired results. Thinking this way during the research process 
highlighted the absence or silence about certain matters, like race or violence against prisoners, 
and parameters of acceptable or mentionable discourse. Perhaps the most powerful example 
of this was in the differences in punitive sensibilities and how policies either constrained or 
augmented them. For instance, it became apparent in the course of research that sentencing 
                                                          
19 James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality,” 
American Ethnologist, 29 (November 2002), 981-1002.  
20 Nyíri Pál, “Lateral Vision: Juxtaposition as a Method,” Ethnography, 14 (September 2013), 369-383. 
Giovanni Picker, “Rethinking Ethnographic Comparison Two Cities, Five Years, One Ethnographer,” Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, Published online before print August 19, 2014, doi: 10.1177/0891241614548105, 1-
22. Although not called juxtaposition, similar points can be found in Sverre Molland, Tandem Ethnography: On 
Researching ‘Trafficking’ and ‘Anti-Trafficking,’” Ethnography, 14 (September 2013), 300–323; Niewöhner and 





practices in Pennsylvania, and the U.S. more generally, departed drastically from past practice 
and that of New South Wales. The current sentencing regime in Pennsylvania, which has now 
existed for a generation, has oriented normative understandings of penal severity (mine 
included) in such a way that corresponding practices in New South Wales often appear mild or 
even strange. My sense of the harshening of sentencing in Pennsylvania now owes a lot to 
seeing how differently sentencing severity increased in New South Wales.     
Lastly, I explore how historical actors themselves constructed comparative projects in 
their efforts to make sense of their current situation and discover different penal reform ideas 
and political strategies. Such projects are not new to prisons and penal reform. As Michel 
Foucault’s analysis of the modern prison indicates, the institution itself has always relied on 
multiple forms of comparison and evaluation. While Foucault’s interest largely focused on 
internal manifestations of these disciplinary techniques, these practices also facilitated broader 
comparisons, extending well beyond prison walls. Offender classification – perhaps the 
preeminent example of Foucault’s point – played a crucial role in the constitution of different 
institutional regimes, the deployment of resources and strategies of prisoner and guard 
resistance.21 Yet, it was also one of the most widely circulating practices across the globe and 
facilitated numerous overseas study tours and knowledge exchanges.  
During the immediate post-World War II decade, the comparison of penal practices 
increased considerably as numerous jurisdictions adopted a series of new practices designed to 
rehabilitate offenders. When rehabilitation fell into crisis and numerous prison scandals 
                                                          
21 Sociologists Michael Adler and Brian Longhurst refer to offender classification as the “the core of the prison 
system. Adler and Longhurst, Discourse, Power and Justice: Towards a New Sociology of Imprisonment (London: 




erupted in the 1970s, events like public inquires created urgent calls and new vectors for 
greater comparison and the transmission of penal knowledge and practices across jurisdictional 
borders. Sometimes, these comparisons informed decisions to deliberately avoid what some 
people saw as mistakes by others. At other times, debates raged over the appropriateness of 
comparison, its ends and unresolvable questions about what was and was not comparable. I 
have noticed that there is a tendency in both academic and lay understandings of comparison 
to insist on establishing a baseline of similarity before the subsequent work of distinguishing 
finer differences and explanation can commence. This means that objects, which some people 
considered to be too dissimilar, were resistant to comparison and hence simply ruled out of 
bounds.22 On more than one occasion, I heard comments by legislators, correctional officers, 
activists and prisoners that certain statements or proposals were inappropriate because it 
involved “comparing apples and oranges.” Insisting on difference, whether local, distant or in 
between, limited or delegitimized comparisons. Nevertheless, it’s clear that, much like 
arguments for national exceptionalism, claims like these always already involved comparison in 
establishing such difference.23 
 
Locating New South Wales and Pennsylvania in the Contemporary World System 
 
To begin a historical narrative mainly in the post-World War II period, as I do here, of 
course, runs the risk of obscuring the deep historical relationships between New South Wales 
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and Pennsylvania and the projects of penal reformers. These two subnational states shared 
many interconnections but were quite different in their historical development, institutional 
structures and governing capacities as well as their relationships with the national state. Both 
states originated from British colonial projects between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries and inherited British common law and many routine criminal justice practices. Over 
time, each state and their respective national countries diverged from British practice in 
significant ways. Nevertheless, it was common for government officials and criminal justice 
researchers to maintain connections with other similarly position people in other countries. 
Representatives of the penal systems in New South Wales and Pennsylvania continuously 
interacted with experts, discourses, reform projects from afar and even at times with each 
other. The shared colonial heritage and language enabled much of this traffic, as many of the 
discourses, people, and practices circulated throughout the British Empire and later the 
Commonwealth. 
Perhaps the most well-known aspect of this history of punishment was the British 
practice of transporting convicted offenders to both the American and Australian colonies 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Prior to this practice ending in the 
American colonies during the War of Independence, Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania 
received most of these transportees. During and after the war, British convicts remained in the 
severely overcrowded prison hulks anchored in English and Irish metropolitan harbors. In 1788, 
the British sent the First Fleet to Botany Bay, commencing roughly seventy years of convict 
transportation to Australia with most going to New South Wales. Unlike the fledgling republic in 




described as a “military dictatorship.”24 This had dramatic institutional consequences that 
survived into the era of democratic self-government a century later. Perhaps one of the most 
glaring differences in the penal politics of New South Wales and Pennsylvania in the late 
twentieth century involved institutional legacies like this. The intervention of the U.S. federal 
judiciary into prison matters from the 1960s onward was virtually absent in New South Wales. 
The latter state’s institutional centralization created fewer opportunities for the courts to 
intercede on behalf of prisoners. Courts in New South Wales deferred to the state executive 
(including the prisons department) far more readily than their American counterparts. The flip 
side of this coin was that government appointed inquiries in New South Wales had far greater 
investigatory powers than any inquiry in Pennsylvania. This was especially apparent in the 
breadth of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, which simply had no 
counterpart in Pennsylvania.  
Penal practices in both New South Wales and Pennsylvania have captured the 
comparative interest of a number of travelers and writers in the past, which brought these 
places into connection. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, several European 
observers visited or corresponded with people in both places specifically to collect information 
on their penal systems, which they reported to government officials and the broader public.25 
Jeremy Bentham, for instance, vehemently criticized the foundation of the New South Wales 
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penal colony. In his campaign to convince the British government to build a panopticon prison, 
he frequently cited the experiences of American prison reformers, especially in Philadelphia, 
who created a program of reformative incarceration at the Walnut Street Jail.26 By the 1830s, 
Pennsylvania had become well-known as well for the Eastern State Penitentiary, which 
operated a regime of total, cellular isolation and silence. Among its many visitors were two 
representatives from France, Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont, who produced a 
major comparative study of the various systems of prison discipline in the United States.27 They 
advocated adopting the Pennsylvania model of cellular isolation as exemplified by Eastern State 
Penitentiary, and in a separate appendix implored the French government not to pursue penal 
colonies like New South Wales.28 Yet, by the early twentieth century, neither state had what 
would have been considered innovative or state-of-the-art prison systems by the standards of 
the growing international correctional community. As study tours to each state tapered off, 
penal reformers and prison officials from New South Wales and Pennsylvania began 
participating more in the growing global networks of penal expertise. By the dawn of the 
twentieth century, such connections facilitated the adoption and parallel development of 
similar practices in each place. 
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The post-World War II history of New South Wales and Pennsylvania demonstrated a 
remarkable degree of convergence on many issues, which also occurred at the national level. 
This facilitated the development of similar penal regimes in each place. Such convergence, in 
part, reflected the incorporation of both states into a broadly shared regulatory regime of 
political economy.29 Over the course of the postwar period, it also would demonstrate the 
gradual growth of American influence on Australian politics and society, which soon displaced 
the role of the United Kingdom.30 Unlike Western European social democracies, both the 
United States and Australia and their respective subnational states had far less extensive forms 
of social welfare and nationalized services. Yet, they still practiced a form of Keynesian 
economic management and provided limited welfare supports to the populace. The New Deal 
coalition between unionized labor and the Democratic Party, which held enormous influence in 
postwar Pennsylvania politics, resembled the labor protectionist and welfare policies 
championed by the Australian Labor Party and the extensively unionized labor force in New 
South Wales. Each of these systems of economic management, state governance and political 
mobilization underwrote sustained postwar economic growth and suburbanization. This model 
of political economy also sustained the development of reformative penological practices after 
World War II. 
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However, both New South Wales and Pennsylvania showed signs of economic weakness 
in certain areas that became more pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s. Pennsylvania’s 
economy and New Deal-style politics depended heavily on manufacturing, mining and 
unionized labor, all of which declined a few decades after World War II. The manufacturing 
sector suffered enormous shocks in the late 1970s and especially the 1980s, as thousands of 
jobs disappeared overnight. This was particularly apparent in the steel industry, but it also 
affected numerous other manufacturing enterprises. These declines, coupled with the rise of 
non-unionized service sector employment, weakened labor’s role in Democratic Party policy, 
which gradually lessened its focus on class-based appeals. Similarly, the Australian 
government’s abandonment of most tariff protections played a dramatic role in the decimation 
of manufacturing and extraction industries in New South Wales. While the overall Australian 
economy was much more reliant on mineral commodity exports, New South Wales had the 
country’s largest concentration of manufacturing jobs with numerous heavy industries 
stretching from Newcastle north of Sydney to the country’s largest steel mills in Wollongong 
south of Sydney. Between 1968 and 1984, New South Wales lost roughly 27 percent of its 
manufacturing employment, nearly 138,000 jobs.31 In 1969, Pennsylvania’s manufacturing 
sector accounted for nearly 1.58 million workers; this fell by 40 percent by 1990.32 
This decline in manufacturing jobs and a rise in lower-paying, service sector 
employment eroded the trade union movement in both New South Wales and Pennsylvania 
                                                          
31 Peter Murphy and Sophie Watson, “Social Polarization and Australian Cities,” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 18 (December 1994), 575; David C. Rich, The Industrial Geography of Australia (London: Croom 
Helm, 1987), 152-155. 
32 Philip Jenkins, “The Postindustrial Age: 1950-2000” in Randall Miller and William Pencak (eds.), Pennsylvania: A 




and undercut much of the longstanding support unions provided to the Democratic Party in 
Pennsylvania and the Labor Party in New South Wales. As a result, party politics became more 
competitive in each state since the 1970s as the major parties now vied to build new coalitions 
and appeal to new constituencies through different issues.33 This process also brought these 
parties closer to their conservative opponents on many policies, particularly in regard to free 
market reforms. In this political climate, certain issues, like crime, rose to prominence in state 
politics and became a major concern for most voters during this period. Being tough on crime 
appealed across traditional party lines and provided a way for political candidates and parties 
to distinguish themselves, denounce their opponents and demonstrate resolve at a time of 
massive socioeconomic uncertainty. 
While post-war trends appeared similar in both settings, there are substantial 
differences that complicate a comparative and transnational project. These differences directly 
affected the size and scope of imprisonment in each state and the way the actors deployed 
similar techniques and strategies of prison reform. To begin with, Pennsylvania is nearly twice 
as populous as New South Wales even though the latter is geographically much larger. In 1980, 
the U.S. Census reported Pennsylvania’s population at 11,864,720 people; whereas the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics determined the population of New South Wales in the same year 
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to be 5,171,527 people.34 Just this difference alone meant that the size of prison populations 
and prisons themselves often varied a great deal. New South Wales and Pennsylvania also have 
different relationships with their respective national governments and other states in the 
federal system that are significant for this study. New South Wales was the founding British 
colony and has always been the most populous state in Australia. Sydney, the capital city of 
New South Wales is the country’s largest city and a major regional and global financial center. 
Australia’s capital, Canberra (in the Australian Capital Territory), lies entirely within the state of 
New South Wales and the latter’s policies and politics play a larger role in national affairs than 
the other states and territories. Until very recently, most imprisoned criminal offenders from 
the Australian Capital Territory served their time in the prisons of New South Wales.  
Conversely, Pennsylvania’s national influence declined over the course of the late 
twentieth century as outmigration shrank the size of its population and Congressional 
representation. Its once central importance to the republic has long since passed as many 
states from the west and south have grown in wealth, population and political clout. During the 
1960s and 1970s, a number of Pennsylvanian politicians, notably Gov. Milton Shapp, 
complained about federal policies, which subsidized growth in the south and west with tax 
revenues disproportionately drawn from northern states like Pennsylvania. Even though 
Philadelphia is one of the country’s largest cities, Pennsylvania does not contain a major 
financial center like New York City, its neighbor to the north, or like Sydney in Australia. These 
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differences are important because unlike Pennsylvania in the late twentieth century, people in 
other Australian jurisdictions and even nearby countries like Papua New Guinea and New 
Zealand look to New South Wales as a trend-setter in many matters of social policy like 
imprisonment. 
Racial and ethnic exclusion in both states also has immediate relevance for a 
comparative study of imprisonment, since non-European peoples were imprisoned at 
disproportionate rates in each state. Yet, these patterns cannot be easily equated as each was 
very distinctive with its own historical antecedents and currents practices. Just in terms of sheer 
numbers, the size of the African American and Latino population in Pennsylvania dwarfed the 
size of the Aboriginal population in New South Wales. This was also apparent in the racialized, 
postwar geography of both places. In New South Wales, most Aboriginal people still lived in 
rural areas, especially on or near reservations and stations that gradually became less 
restrictive after the 1960s.35 Most urban areas did not have large concentration of Aboriginal 
people. Conversely, some of the city neighborhoods and inner suburbs around places like 
Sydney had greater concentrations of European immigrants in the first few decades after World 
War II and later immigrants from Asia and the Middle East. Consequently, state officials 
punished many Aboriginal offenders through the disciplinary apparatus developed since the 
colonial era to manage the remaining Aboriginal population in rural areas. Many of the rural 
gaols held a lot of Aboriginal people, but they were less common in the state’s main penal 
institutions near the coastal area. 
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By contrast, pronounced, racially segregated neighborhoods developed in the urban 
areas of Pennsylvania in the postwar years as millions of African Americans migrated from the 
rural South to industrial centers in the North, like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. The intersection 
of a series of restrictive housing, employment and welfare policies, coupled with capital flight 
created poor, African American ghettos in Pennsylvania’s cities during the mid-twentieth 
century.36 As employment opportunities dwindled, urban poverty, crime and inequities in 
public services increased.37 So too did local officials’ overreliance on police and prisons to 
manage such areas. 
While there certainly are major class, ethnic and racial differences in urban areas in New 
South Wales, Australia’s more unified system of governance and revenue distribution 
prevented the development of the extreme disparities seen in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. 
While Australia's commonwealth federalism resembles that of the United States, Australian 
states and territories wield much more power than American state governments. Sub-state 
governance units in Australia are relatively weak and cannot exert the same administrative and 
exclusionary force that a county or city government can in many places in the U.S. This 
difference, and the very limited use of local taxation, permitted Australian states and territories 
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to pursue more equitable distribution of tax revenues than American states.38 Stephan Mugford 
has argued that this structural difference was one of the main reasons for the lack of 
concentrated crime and drug trade networks in Australian cities comparable to the United 
States.39 Nevertheless, there has been an increasing trend in Australia toward greater social 
inequality since the 1960s, much like in the U.S.40 Likewise, even though both Pennsylvania and 
New South Wales have had strong labor movements and class-based politics, labor gained 
much more of an institutional influence in New South Wales, which created a stronger 
protectionist and social provision regime than Pennsylvania did.41  
These divergent histories complicate a comparison of imprisonment because the 
differences in the political framings of social problems in each state molded the range of 
possible penal policies and anti-crime programs. Difference in punitive attitudes, the scale of 
permissible punishments and the incidence and acceptability of violence owe a lot to how social 
policies become deeply enmeshed in social arrangements, institutional structures and 
normative expectations. Even when states are structurally similar, they may still hold very 
different meanings for the people they govern. Christopher Lloyd has argued that comparisons 
between Australia and the United States need to take into account the very different cultural 
views about the state in both places.42 Australia has had less of an anti-statist and individualist 
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aspect to its politics than its American counterpart. Thus, Australian constituencies have more 
frequently portrayed the state as a guarantor of security in many different forms rather than as 
a threat or ineffectual behemoth as it often appears in American political discourse. These 
differences contributed to the variation in prison expansion and law and order politics between 
the two states since the 1960s. Just in terms of the size of their prison systems, New South 
Wales and Pennsylvania are markedly different. Moreover, the prison population in New South 
Wales dipped in the late 1970s and early 1980s, during the aftermath of major riots and a royal 
commission investigation. Whereas Pennsylvania’s prison population showed steady growth 
after the 1972. By the mid-1980s, the political establishments in both states were committed to 
the greater use of imprisonment, even if many leaders criticized such policies. However, as 
Tables A.1 and A.2 illustrate, it was obvious that this process skyrocketed in Pennsylvania. 
Victor Hassine, who had been serving life imprisonment in Pennsylvania, described this policy 
as a “runaway train.”43 It may be the case that the more centralized administrative structure in 
New South Wales and the prerogatives of its representatives created a defensive redoubt 
around the penal system, preventing this runaway train from getting too far down the track as 
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Table 1: Daily average prison population: New South Wales and Pennsylvania, 1970-2000 
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Table 2: Incarceration rate per 100,000 people: New South Wales and Pennsylvania, 1970-2000 
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Annual Report; New South Wales Department of Corrective Services, Annual Report, 1973; New 
South Wales Department of Corrective Services, Report of the Department of Corrective 
Services, 1972. 
 
Visibility, Publicity and Scandal in Recent Penal Change 
                    
Within New South Wales and Pennsyvlania and many other juridictions, a large 
transformation in imprisonment occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Prisons in many parts of the world became highly visible and unstable places from the 1960s 
onward. This period saw an upsurge in violence between staff and prisoners and among 
prisoners as well as the formation of a large prisoners’ rights movements, which shared 
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affinities with broader civil rights movements, black power activism and even some 
insurgencies. Yet, this was not the first time that prisons were such controversial and public 
institutions. Criminologist John Pratt has argued that in the Anglophone jurisdictions he 
studied, prisons were highly public, politicized institutions when they were first established in 
the early-to-mid nineteenth-century, but by the end of the century, through strict control, 
bureaucratization and growing public indifference, state penal authorities “were able [to] 
proclaim their truth as ‘the truth’” on penal matters. In subsequent decades, they were able to 
either “silence or discredit competing versions.”45 According to Pratt, state penal authorities 
rarely faced the same level of intense public scrutiny during much of the twentieth-century. 
Even after the severe disturbances that swept across prison systems in the 1940s and early 
1950s, the fledgling penal bureaucracies weathered the scandals, enhanced their power and 
reconstituted prison regimes often by adopting aspects of rehabilitative reforms proposals, 
which had been circulating in professional penological circles since the 1920s.  
This is not to say that prisons were completely unknowable or invisible from the late-
nineteenth to late-twentieth centuries. Historian Mark Finnane has argued that even during the 
period most marked by enclosure and the control of penal authorities, prisons and those held 
inside them routinely appeared in public representations beyond prison walls.46 At times, this 
was a deliberate tactic used by authorities, who occasionally exposed aspects of the prisons for 
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political purposes or to remind audiences of the power and legitimacy of the state and its 
modern methods of crime-control. At other times, however, different sources of knowledge 
about prisons, especially the prisoner memoir or the writings of prison employees, circulated, 
which were often more critical of the institution and frequently situated its routines and abuses 
within a larger social commentary.47 Since punishment disappeared behind prison walls, its 
symbolic power has perhaps even grown. When fewer and fewer people came into direct 
contact with punishment, its representations assumed even greater significance in a broader 
social imaginary about morality, authority, the law and a host of other matters.48 I argue that 
the late-1960s and 1970s marked an important turning point for this arrangement of penal 
power in places like New South Wales and Pennsylvania. Long removed from direct public view, 
prisons suddenly appeared in public debate and political dispute in a way that they had not in 
many decades. Moreover, this transformation in the visibility and publicity of prison issues was 
concomitant to, and in fact inseparable from, changes in the routines and conditions of 
imprisonment itself. Two major, interlocking causes of this reemergence of the prison in public 
discourse stand out – one was the adoption of progressive penal reforms after World War II 
and the kinds of resistances and critique it generated and the other was the prisoners’ rights 
movement.   
 
Progressive Penal Reform: Rehabilitation, Decarceration, Normalization 
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The first involved the efforts of penal reformers after World War II to ameliorate some 
of the harsh conditions of prewar prisons and introduce a series of recuperative practices, 
designed to transform criminal offenders into productive law-abiding citizens. Much like other 
contemporary, liberal, strategies of inclusion, the therapeutic discourse animating these 
reforms portrayed offenders as deficient in many of the basic normative values and habits of 
white, industrious, middle class citizens.49 Rather than viewing criminal offenders as 
irredeemably different, this progressive form of othering marked its subjects instead by their 
incompleteness, their lack of appropriate values and habits.50 Most criminal offenders were sick 
or improperly-socialized people, but otherwise normal, and could be treated, raised to normal 
standards and returned to society as law-abiding citizens.51 Various practices supported this 
project, which penal reformers and professional associations often simply called 
“rehabilitation.” Indeterminate sentencing, parole and inmate classification, often influenced 
by the social sciences, formed the backbone of this new regime, but administrators also 
introduced a series of institutional programs designed to educate and resocialize offenders. 
Prison administrators supplemented inmate labor, which was increasingly scarce, with basic 
education, correspondence courses, individual and group counseling and accesses to reading 
materials and libraries as well as numerous other recreational activities and sports. Advocates 
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of these programs believed that the normalization of institutional life, or blurring some of the 
exclusionary boundaries of imprisonment, enhanced the possibly of resocializing offenders and 
reintegrating them upon release. In practice, this narrowed some of the differences in social 
status and between prisoners and guards as well as the outside world.52 In some respects many 
of these interventions were simply current iterations of longstanding prison practices, but 
rehabilitation’s therapeutic framing as well as the presence of its associated college-educated, 
social science experts, like social workers, rearranged previous lines of authority inside prisons, 
often displacing the influence of guards.53  
As a number of scholars have argued, many jurisdictions simply did not accept these 
reforms, and in places where they were adopted, their resemblance in actual practice to their 
stated goals and rationales can be easily overstated.54 Nevertheless, they were far reaching in 
their effect. Many places that did not adopt these practices whole-heartedly still emulated the 
modernizing language of penal reform as well as some of the practices, which like classification, 
were flexible enough to be aligned with a range of different purposes. Professional and 
international penal reform organizations refined and debated these reforms extensively, 
extending the vibrant penal knowledge production and circulation that had been disrupted by 
World War II. Surveys and conferences on prisons and penal reform sponsored by International 
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Penal and Penitentiary Commission and later the Social Commission of the United Nations 
helped disseminate many of these ideas and practices and legitimate them as essential features 
of modern state-building. They also became one of the primary areas of interest for study tours 
by prison officials seeking out examples of state-of-the-art penology for emulation. The most 
widespread effect of these practices may, in fact, be the configuration of penal power they 
enabled. In the wake of the holocaust, “corrections” expressed a modern, non-punitive and 
responsible method of both addressing crime and building a productive citizenry. These 
reforms, so often associated with social science and expert knowledge, bolstered the authority 
of penal officials whose voice on such matters was without rival in the first two decades after 
the war. 
In places were these reforms were more extensive, however, like California and the U.S. 
federal Bureau of Prisons, they often conveyed contradictory messages to prisoners and guards 
in practice. For instance, education and recreational activities, like debating societies, created 
greater openings for prisoner self-expression yet often severely curtailed the substance of such 
expression. These difficulties underscored the fundamental exclusionary qualities still retained 
in the liberal form of othering that informed rehabilitation. As Tony Ward and Shadd Maruna 
have argued, penal authorities never really considered offenders as full participants in most of 
these programs: 
 
The rehabilitation client, after all, is not the real focus of the intervention, only 
his or her outward behavior. In fact, offender rehabilitation may be one of the 
only forms of treatment in existence that is explicitly intended for the benefit of 
others (the “community”) rather than for the person undergoing the counseling 




proved themselves to be untrustworthy by virtue of their past actions, and surely 
the experts know what is needed more than this cast of characters.55 
 
 
Ward and Maruna, citing Michael Ignatieff’s discussion of “the needs of strangers,” claim that 
the arrogance of this expertise, its presumption of knowledge about what is best for prisoners, 
is intrinsically dangerous.56 Indeed, in many ways, it embodied an ethical distance between 
penal authorities and prisoners, which elided the fact that it was in fact a form of punishment – 
a central feature of a cultural framework that sociologist Michele Brown calls “penal 
spectatorship.”57  
Thus, while the affordances created by the inclusionary therapeutic and later 
community-based reforms reduced many previous exclusionary practices, they simultaneously 
reinforced them, highlighting for prisoners the inconsistencies in the reform project, the 
capriciousness of penal authorities and the intrinsic, authoritarian nature of the prison.58 In 
jurisdictions that invested heavily in therapeutic programing, the specific practices themselves 
often enabled participants to publicize and critique these frustrations. Historians, Eric Cummins 
and Theodore Hamm, for instance, demonstrate how numerous California prisoners used 
education and writing programs to raise public awareness of their own particular legal cases, 
criticize penal authorities and organize a larger community of prison activists.59 Even in many 
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jurisdictions that lacked these kinds of programs, the efforts of prison administrators to 
ameliorate some aspects of prison life, tended to underscore how spartan and brutal prison 
conditions actually remained.60 These changes sowed the seeds of resentment and greater self-
awareness among prisoners about their situation and fomented similar displeasure among 
guards, whose custodial prerogatives diminished with the introduction of these reforms. 
By the late 1960s, many of the leading research organizations and penal agencies in the 
world began advocating less use of institutional settings and the development of alternatives to 
incarceration. The community corrections, or decarceration, movement among penal 
administrators, correctional staff, social welfare organizations and researchers also became 
associated with an often college-educated, generation of correctional officials, who developed 
new discretionary release programs and low-security facilities that brought the practices of 
punishment into greater contact with members of the wider public. Some officials, like Allyn 
Sielaff in Pennsylvania and Walter McGeechan in New South Wales, also tried to garner greater 
public support for new correctional programs by reaching out to other state institutions, civic 
organizations, the media and the general public. These efforts were often tightly controlled, 
and even disingenuous, but along with community corrections programs, they brought the 
actual practices of punishment closer to many people who had little prior contact with prisons 
and penal agencies. 
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The Prisoners’ Rights Movement: Race, Resistance, Rebellion 
 
The prisoners’ rights movement, as the second major cause of the increased visibility of 
the prison in the late twentieth-century, publicized the anger of prisoners, the brutality of penal 
authorities and the dearth of citizenship rights for confined people. As a number of scholars 
have argued, the prisoners’ rights movement needs to be understood not just as a series of 
legal challenges, but as a broader social movement, which sought to fundamentally transform 
normative understandings of the personhood and status of prisoners and criminal offenders as 
well as question the methods and rationales of punishment.61 These qualities, and the 
movement’s relationship to other social movements, differentiated it from the much longer 
history of prisoner resistance and rebellion. However, when viewed broadly, questions abound 
about the location and periodization of the prisoners’ rights movement, resembling in many 
ways similar historiographic debates about postwar civil rights movements.62 This is no 
coincidence since the prisoners’ rights movement can easily be seen as part of these broader 
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efforts to expand and redefine the civil rights of numerous excluded groups, whether this was 
women, African Americans, Indigenous Australians or mental health patients. 
As such, the increased visibility of prisoners and their views cannot be neatly separated 
from the issue of race as it coincided with and formed part of the broader civil rights 
movements of the 1960s. This was especially apparent in the United States where many 
prisoners deeply identified with civil rights and Black Power activism or drew inspiration from 
these causes in their actions against prison authorities and the broader criminal justice system. 
However, the issue of race has deeper roots in the formation of the prisoners’ rights movement 
in the U.S. During World War II, the American government imprisoned numerous members of 
the relatively new, racial-separatist, religious organization, the Nation of Islam, as conscientious 
objectors, including their leader Elijah Muhammad. While imprisoned, they began proselytizing 
to black inmates, recruiting thousands of new members. By the late 1950s, imprisoned African 
Americans composed a significant portion of the Nation of Islam’s overall membership, and 
they began to challenge certain prison rules, which interfered with their religious practices.63 
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While American prisoners had attempted rights-based challenges against prison authorities in 
the past, it was not until the Black Muslims began petitioning federal courts in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s that the judiciary began to show a greater willingness to intervene in prison 
matters based.64 In addition to the court’s emerging openness to civil rights cases, it was 
especially pertinent that the early successes of the Black Muslims involved questions of 
religious freedom, whether they could worship as a group and read religious texts. As 
sociologist James Jacobs pointed out, unlike other bases for prisoners’ claims, religious freedom 
rights “are fundamental in American values and constitutional history and difficult to deny.”65 
As such, they provided a beachhead for further claims by establishing the precedent that the 
judiciary would consider petitions by inmates concerning prison rules and conditions. 
The Black Muslims’ success also underscored the use of constitutional provisions for 
claims-making, which were not present in many other countries. The Black Muslims 
demonstrated that prisoners could collectively pursue litigation against prison authorities over 
constitutional violations of group interests. Soon, other prisoners and organizations learned 
from these successful examples and began collectively petitioning federal courts over prison 
practices and the infringement of their rights. However, they were more likely to attack general 
prison conditions, endemic racism or practices that potentially affected all prisoners than to 
focus solely on the interests of a self-defined, smaller group, like the Black Muslims. These later 
cases focused on different constitutional provisions as well usually claiming violations of the 
                                                          
Colley, “All America Is a Prison”: The Nation of Islam and the Politicization of African American Prisoners, 1955–
1965,” Journal of American Studies, 48 (May 2014), 393-415. 
64 For an assessment of these earlier cases, see David P. Flint, “Justice Through Litigation: 1929-1970,” The Prison 
Journal, 51 (October 1971), 15-36. 




prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth Amendment) and the due process and 
equal protection clauses (Fourteenth Amendment).  
These latter cases also directly engaged with the broader civil rights movement beyond 
the prisons. In fact, two of the major organizations involved in prison litigation, the Legal 
Defense Fund of the NAACP and the ACLU, brought many of the initial lawsuits against southern 
prisons and penal farms cases, drawing on their experiences fighting segregation and 
disfranchisement, and filed similar suits in jurisdictions outside the south. Political scientist 
Marie Gottschalk has argued that this articulation with race and established civil rights 
movement activists, organizations and political discourse was the major reason why the topic of 
prisoners’ rights and prison conditions became such a highly visible political issue in the 1960s 
and 1970s.66 She also argues that this was the reason why the prisoners’ rights movement did 
not become as prominent or challenging in places like the U.K. Yet, civil rights movements 
occurred elsewhere. In Australia, the 1960s also marked an important decade of change in the 
status of Indigenous Australians.67 They had similarly experienced profound criminalization 
throughout the country’s history, but during the 1960s and 1970s, transformations in economic 
opportunities, migration patterns and government Indigenous policies led to increasing 
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Indigenous contact with criminal justice agencies and their increasing presence in custody.68 
This was especially the case in places like the Northern Territory and Western Australia. In New 
South Wales, however, Aboriginal offenders were still a minority in the state’s prisons even if 
they were incarcerated at a disproportionate rate. Their presence behinds bars did not 
approach the level of African-American incarceration,69 but it grew rapidly in the 1980s and 
they often died in custody at a rate exceeding that of other people.70 The long history of 
Australian Aboriginal criminalization and harsh punishment did not become as salient a focal 
point for the prisoners’ rights movement in Australia in the 1970s as it did in the United States. 
Nevertheless, penal authorities, the press and academic researchers in both the U.S. 
and Australia were often slow to incorporate questions about race into their practices and 
analyses. Until the late 1960s and 1970s, most penal reformers in both places rarely 
acknowledged the extent of the criminalization of people of color, their overrepresentation in 
prison and how this connected with each country’s history of racial discrimination, slavery and 
colonization.71 But, these issues soon became unavoidable. Many investigations, court cases, 
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media accounts and research involving prisons began to address how race related to patterns 
of prison violence, squalid living conditions, classification, disciplinary infractions and 
administrative punishments. Authors often framed these observations with reference to the 
general state of race relations and the racial policies and strategies, like assimilation, 
integration, segregation and recognition.  
Although hardly unprecedented, the interconnections of race, crime and punishment 
also provided a way to disparage and resist contemporary civil rights projects and neutralize 
challenges to white privilege in a seemingly, race-neutral manner.72 The racialization of crime 
and the criminalization of African-Americans has a long history, but it appeared with renewed 
vigor during the late 1960s and 1970s as African-Americans’ presence in places of confinement, 
particularly in northern, urban centers grew dramatically after World War II. Media 
representations often conflated blackness, indigeneity, and immigrant status with criminality. 
Many newspapers, for instance, ran articles that dwelt on the marked, racial “otherness” of 
offenders and prisoners even if they did not explicitly attribute causal connections between 
these categories and criminal conduct. The image of the unrepentant, incorrigible inmate or 
perpetrator of terrible crimes gradually became less white over this period and less amenable 
to rehabilitation and societal reinclusion upon release.73 These latter aspects pointed up how 
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deeply the postwar therapeutic penal reforms rested on the assumption of the whiteness of 
offenders as the preferred targets of social reform and recuperation. Moreover, this whiteness, 
while in many respects the product of local relations and perceptions, was also, in the words of 
Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, “a transnational form of identification.”74 The revalorization 
of incarceration as a major social policy across the globe since the 1970s occurred at precisely 
the same time that global racial formations underwent massive transformation and must be 
seen, at least in part, as a response by dominant, white elites and constituencies to these 
changes.75 The outpouring of penal knowledge at this time was, in this sense, also part of the 
discourse on race in the wake of civil rights movements. 
Much like the effects of the civil rights movements of the late-twentieth century on 
many other institutions, the influence of prisoners’ rights and rehabilitation produced long-
lasting effects in the arrangement of penal power. While not unraveling entirely, the reforms of 
the 1940s and 1950s, which had insulated penal bureaucracies and introduced various 
recuperative penal practices, nevertheless loosened significantly from the late 1960s onward as 
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penal authorities in numerous jurisdictions struggled to reassure the general public of the 
efficacy of their policies and convincingly explain simultaneous increases in crime rates, prison 
unrest and escapes from custody. These problems engulfed penal systems in endemic 
controversy that did not fade away as it had done during the wave of unrest in the early 1950s. 
In John Pratt’s words, “it was as if scandal had become systematic, symptomatic of the way in 
which prisons were no longer performing the functions the public expected of them.”76 This 
situation had two effects: it eroded the hegemonic voice of leading penal officials, especially 
those most closely identified with the postwar reforms and created deep fissures in the 
legitimacy of state penal arrangements. 
This crisis had even more profound effects within prisons. As challenges from politicized 
prisoners and unionized guard forces mounted, the project of rehabilitation also suffered 
devastating critiques from scholars, activists and politicians on both the political right (who saw 
it as naïve and lenient) and left (who claimed it was repressive and racist). Many of its previous 
advocates openly admitted to its flaws, especially its apparent inability to reduce recidivism.77 
This rather sudden shift left prisons without a plausible, organizing discourse, which resonated 
with actors both inside and outside the prison. Such attacks on rehabilitation disrupted penal 
authorities’ ability to craft “meaningful account of itself, of what is being done in prison, how, 
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and with what effect.”78 This problem extended from leadership positions in penal agencies and 
executive cabinets down to the cellblock. Any review of the sociologies of prisons published 
during the 1970s and early 1980s reveals the profound pessimism that surrounded the field. 
Hopeful statements about the potential to reform offenders, so common a few decades before, 
still existed among some practitioners in the mid-1970s, but rehabilitation advocates were far 
more defensive and modest about its prospects.79 More significant, the resources dedicated to 
rehabilitation and community corrections programs, already insufficient according to many 
advocates, dwindled as custodial concerns became more prominent. 
Writing in 1980, sociologist and former prisoner John Irwin claimed that once the 
unifying discourse of rehabilitation declined, prison society drastically changed: prisons 
fragmented internally, with prisoners forming numerous smaller cliques and gangs and even 
smaller groups of friends and associates who withdrew from public spaces in prisons out of 
fear.80 Guards also withdrew. As the system of rewards and punishments associated with 
rehabilitation receded, guards increasingly lacked ways to control prisoners short of punishing 
or isolating their bodies. This fragmented prison became more unstable, violent and difficult to 
control. Prison administrators, especially at the prodding of guards, came rely more on various 
forms of segregation and isolation to control prisons. As scholar Jonathan Simon has argued, 
the resulting prison resembled more of a “toxic-waste dump” where prisoners are simply 
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managed according to the dictates of security.81 Such a “prison lacks an internal regime,” 
according to Simon.82  
Another sign of this fragementation was the increasingly prominent presence of 
unionized guard forces in each state. Prior to the 1970s, the influence of officer unions was 
either subdued (New South Wales) or simply non-existant (Pennsylvania). While many guards 
did not accept the claims of rehabilitation advocates, the postwar reforms were initially flexible 
enough to accommodate many of their traditional control perogatives. By the late 1960s, 
however, the trajectory of rehabilitation and improvements in the status of prisoners directly 
conflicted with many officers’ sense of proper prison order. In many cases, the recent changes 
threatened officers’ sense of safety. These concerns, coupled with demands for greater 
remuneration, became powerful organzing messages for officers. In Pennsylvania, officers were 
not permitted to form a collective bargaining unit until the early 1970s. Prior to that time they 
had an unofficial, but influential trade association. Once they gained this right, along with other 
public employees, the immediately formed a union and began to press their objections to 
official policy. Throughout the ensuing years, the officers’ union exerted a powerful 
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counterweight to any reform proposal or policy change emanating from the leadership of the 
Bureau of Correction. 
In New South Wales, the prison officers’ union was arguably even stronger. It also had 
much deeper historical roots.83 By the late 1960s, the union had become increasinly 
confrontational with the Department of Corrective Services. During Walter McGeechan’s entire 
tenure as Commissioner of Corrective Services and those of his succesors, Tony Vinson and 
Vern Dalton, the officers’ union blocked substantive prison reform. The union staged numerous 
industrial actions, like labor strikes or mass sick leave calloffs, at both the state and local level. 
Often times, union locals walked off the job, protesting classfiicaiton decisions or transfers 
involving specific prisoners. After 1970, no change in the prison system occurred without the 
active, vocal involvement of the officers’ union. Many of the reforms recommended by a major 
royal commission in the 1970s were never implemented because of the opposition of militant 
unionized guards. 
As these arrangements deteriorated and, a highly contentious public debate on prisons 
and punishment emerged, which reflected and informed the social and political struggles of the 
1960s and 1970s. This visibility often exacerbated the sense of crisis inside prisons, propelling a 
debate on penal affairs and a massive burst in the production of penal knowledge. The vacuum 
of control and purpose within prisons created by the decline of rehabilitation opened the way 
for numerous new experiments in prison order, both official and informal as well as legal and 
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illicit. Most of these experiments were endogenous, or mainly so, developing from existing 
practices and localized disputes, compromises and agreements. However, this carceral impasse 
also fostered greater communication between experts, administrators and activists in different 
jurisdictions in an effort to find new penal techniques and strategies or resistance.  
 
The Structures and Strategies of Penal Transnationalism 
 
The postwar project of penal reform and the prisoners’ rights movement each had profound 
transnational qualities that were also dependent on specific structures of localization. 
Jurisdictional borders provided semi-closed spaces for the differentiation of penal policy and 
practice, but facilitated their circulation because they provided actors with a ready-made 
category of comparison and research. Such borders helped actors comparatively assess the 
value of their own practices, mark their relationship to global standards, and search for new 
methods to emulate or avoid. This global patchwork of borders produced a specific version of 
penal transnationalism, but also often involved interactions between subnational jurisdictions. 
This spatialization of punishment has historically oscillated between periods of intense, even 
parochial, differentiation and moments of greater openness and exchange. These 
countervailing forces often occurred in different ways at the same time within a state’s prison 
system. Comparisons across borders raised questions about the flexibility of imported 
techniques, whether they adequately fit existing legal and administrative regimes and whether 
local actors would accommodate or reject them. These activities, thus, reaffirmed the 




The rehabilitation practices adopted after World War II fostered the growth of networks 
of exchange, influence and esteem among penal professionals across the globe who amassed a 
body of comparative penal knowledge. This progressive reform project empowered a new 
generation of penal reformers and administrators in specific jurisdictions and increased the 
influence of professional associations, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental 
organizations, like the American Correctional Association, the International Penal and 
Penitentiary Commission and the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders. These people and organizations spread many ideas and practices of 
associated with rehabilitation, like classification, individualized treatment, group therapy and 
prison-based education. The core practices in this reformative project, especially classification, 
generated enormous amounts of data, which fed research projects and supported the growth 
of the publishing capacity of penal bureaucracies and these related organizations. 
This flow of this traffic in practices and knowledge, crosscutting jurisdictions, was highly 
disparate in the directions and channels it followed and clearly reflecting the disproportionate 
influence of some actors over others. Much like the endpoint of Daniel Rodgers’s examination 
of transnational public of social politics in Atlantic Crossings, researchers and state officials in 
most jurisdictions in the United States were either unaware of developments in penal practices 
beyond American borders or saw them as being of little significance for addressing problems in 
the U.S.84 However, within American borders, certain jurisdictions within the U.S. that had 
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reputations as penal innovators exerted disproportionate influence on penal systems in most of 
the other American states and counties. Likewise, some private consultants, like the Kansas 
City-based, Correctional Service Group, and public research institutes, like the National Institute 
of Corrections, helped spread many classification and prison management techniques that 
become commonplace by the 1990s. For a state like New South Wales, however, the practice of 
looking overseas for examples of political and policy innovation, was longstanding, reflecting a 
colonial relationship with the U.K. and its attendant asymmetric effects of knowledge 
production.85 Over the course of the late-twentieth century, the lure of American penal 
practices became stronger in New South Wales than they had ever been. Correctional officials 
began to see penal practices and experiences in American jurisdictions as holding greater value 
and resonance with local concerns than examples in the United Kingdom. Correctional officials 
and investigators representing official inquiries undertook numerous study tours of the U.S., 
the U.K., Canada and a few other European countries in search of new penal techniques. By the 
1980s, these trips focused more on American jurisdictions, especially California and the U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons. 
The prisoners’ rights movement was also a global phenomenon, appearing in numerous 
places around the world, but also drawing sustenance and inspiration from similar 
democratizing and anti-colonial forces. The visibility of the prisoners’ rights movement in 
certain American states, especially California and New York, focused the attention activists and 
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confined people in other American states and countries with the hope that similar strategies 
could be developed in their jurisdictions. The symbolic significance of some figures and events, 
like the prison radical George Jackson and the rebellion and massacre at Attica, travelled far 
beyond American borders.86 Prison activist publications in New South Wales for instance, 
regularly reported on prominent American prisoners’ rights cases and the efforts of prisoners 
trying to forge other methods of collective resistance. Prison activists in Pennsylvania often 
framed their activities as part of a global fight against capitalist and racist oppression. 
Challenging racist prison practices in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was part of the same struggle 
against the forces of oppression in Vietnam. Opening up a narrative of recent penal change to 
the role of global connections and influences like these reveals larger, diverse audiences for 
many familiar texts, inquiries and events that writers have often situated too tightly within 
narratives shaped by an uncritical methodological nationalism.87  
The comparative vision that some contemporary actors developed also highlighted the 
limits of borrowing from the American prisoners’ rights movement and underscored the need 
to pursue more fruitful strategies, attuned to local circumstances. As George Zdenkowski and 
David Brown argued in 1970s and 1980s, prison activists in New South Wales, and Australia in 
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general, encountered a number of hurdles that were not present in the United States.88 Chief 
among them was the lack of any constitutional provisions like Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution that provided the basis for the type of litigation that had 
become a central strategy in American prisoner activism. Although prisoners petitioned courts 
for help in a number of different ways, the conditions underwriting the successes of this 
strategy in the U.S. were simply incommensurate with the legal environment of New South 
Wales. Thus, prison activists in New South Wales often campaigned for the establishment of 
inquiries, especially royal commissions, to investigate abuses in prison. Depending on the 
breadth of their terms of reference, royal commissions had greater license to investigate 
matters than courts involved in most prison litigation. They could compel testimony from a 
potentially limitless range of people, access official records and conduct broader research than 
one would typically find in a civil suit in the U.S. or Australia. Activists in New South Wales also 
pushed for lesser official inquiries and investigations, especially through the state’s 
ombudsman’s office. These avenues were largely unavailable to activists in the U.S., and it 
meant that the Australian activists’ organizing strategies differed, especially in the types of 
knowledge they produced for inquiries and the examples they drew upon from inquiries in 
other countries, particularly the United Kingdom. Yet, it was not the case that these activists 
uncritically used these established institutional structures. For example, the Prisoners Action 
Group, the main activist organization of former prisoners in New South Wales, considered 
creating their own inquiry to operate parallel to the Royal Commission into New South Wales 
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Prisons because they did not trust an official inquiry established by the same government that 
controlled the prisons. Even though they eventually participated, they were mindful of the 
duplicity and depoliticizing qualities of official inquiries from their readings of examples of riot 
commissions in the U.S. and Northern Ireland. This transnational traffic, lesson-drawing and 
inspiration, means that the prisoners’ rights movement, in its many iterations and 
interrelationships, should be considered a part of the recent reimaginings of the activism of this 
era as the “global 1960s.”89  
However, crafting an account of recent penal change attentive to these larger 
transjurisdictional and transnational qualities is challenging because of the persistence of 
narrative frameworks organized by national and jurisdictional borders. Even many works that 
do consider changes across multiple countries have a tendency to rely on frameworks that 
downplay or simple ignore evidence of past or contemporary interconnections. A recent 
example of this is in Marie Gottschalk’s excellent account of the rise of the American carceral 
state since the 1970s, The Prison and the Gallows.90 Gottschalk reviews recent changes in penal 
politics in a number of other countries, especially the U.K., as a way to highlight the unique 
determinants of mass imprisonment in the U.S. For instance, she argues that the main reason 
why the prisoners’ rights movement in other countries presented less of a challenge for well-
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entrenched penal authorities was because they lacked a large civil rights movement and racial 
framings in penal politics, which amplified the issue of prisons in the U.S. For the most part, I 
agree with this assessment.91 However, Gottschalk relies heavily on a concept of American 
exceptionalism and a comparative method, which leaves the global aspects of the penal 
transformations she describes unexplored. There can be no doubt about the sheer size and 
rapid growth of imprisonment in the U.S. during the period Gottschalk describes, and she 
correctly points out, as many others have, that the American penal leviathan is unparalleled in 
Western democracies.92 Yet, the methodological choices she makes obscure the movement of 
carceral discourse and practices across international borders and does not account for how 
actors perceived these relationships.  
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There are very few works in the interdisciplinary field of contemporary prison studies 
that empirically trace the politics and processes involved in the circulation of penal practices. 
Most extant examples of penal history that address this concern much earlier periods, 
analyzing, for instance, the spread of the prison itself.93 Since these earlier works are often 
situated in broader transformational moments (like the late eighteenth century), it is somewhat 
curious that there are not many similar works for our current moment of profound 
socioeconomic and cultural change. There are a number of recent studies that explore the 
reasons for the exceptional of scale of imprisonment in the U.S.94 as well as some that analyze 
broad transformations across different countries that shaped current penal policy, but they 
often do so at an abstract level of analysis. Like Gottschalk, they also tend to treat these various 
places as self-contained units, while noting similarities across them.95 Works, like David 
Garland’s Culture of Control and John Pratt’s Punishment and Civilization, for instance, 
emphasize the parallel development of many penal practices, while failing to explore how such 
practices also traveled from place and how actors interacted concerning these issues.96 While 
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these authors rightly cite many broadly shared aspects of political economy, social policies, 
imperial histories and language as crucial determinants of penal similarities, they often make 
specific claims about penal practices based on their reading of some of the very material that 
increasingly circulated at this time – the reports of penal bureaucracies and prison inquiries.  
Specific institutional structures, legal frameworks and political contexts varied 
considerably between jurisdictions and shaped the local character of penal reform and prisoner 
activism, but it did not isolate these actors who consistently looked afar for solutions to vexing 
problems and situations, which perhaps more than anything, propelled the movement of penal 
knowledge and practice. Contextual differences, their limits and affordances, were in fact well-
known to many actors at the time and subject to considerable debate and comparative analysis 
in their projects of either challenging penal authorities or reasserting control and authoritative 
expertise.  
 
The Production and Flow of Penal Knowledge 
 
From the mid-1960s onward, however, the range of people creating, reading and 
exchanging a growing body of penal knowledge grew considerably and outstripped the control 
of penal agencies. This diversity of participants (and their differing standpoints) included many 
individuals, organizations and coalitions that had previously not worked on prison matters. 
Perhaps the most important of these new voices belonged to imprisoned people themselves. Of 




twentieth-century, their voices were subject to suffocating control by prison administrators.97 
The venerable, common law notion of attainder or civil death, hindered the ability of prisoners 
to legally challenge prison authorities or simply to be acknowledged in public forums like the 
press.98 Ironically, many of the new postwar rehabilitation programs and privileges, which 
aimed to normalize prisons and encouraged greater self-reflection and expression, also 
provided incarcerated people with tools to criticize their confinement. The extent of such 
reforms and the availability of programs can easily be overstated, but they increasingly opened 
avenues for incarcerated people to voice their concerns through writing and education.99 
Judicial proceedings and prison inquiries not only became more frequent during this 
period, but also demonstrated a greater openness toward prisoner testimony. Prisoners 
frequently testified during litigation or at inquiries in ways that had not occurred for many 
decades. Yet, being given the chance to testify did not end the efforts of some people to 
discredit prisoners accounts based on their personal histories of criminal behavior. Certain 
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topics covered in such proceedings, especially accounts of violence and official misconduct, also 
raised difficult epistemological questions about the nature of truth, power and vulnerability in 
prison and the interests served by such forums.100 If one believed an inquiry was merely an 
officious cover-up, a means to depoliticize an incidence of official misconduct or abuse, what 
did it then mean to testify to such abuse? What were the risks? Violence, like sexual assault, 
stabbings and beatings, which often came up in prisoner testimony, were often difficult to 
represent even if they were acknowledged at all. As historian Bain Attwood has argued, “The 
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very nature of trauma means that such an event or experience cannot be registered properly at 
the time it occurs but only later, often much later; thus, retrospective rather than 
contemporary sources are often the truest archive of the past.”101 It is perhaps not surprising 
then that many of the tumultuous events of the 1970s became the subject of prisoner 
memoirs, often written long after the events in question. Despite the inherent limitations of 
accounts produced by inquiries, just the activity of these inquisitive processes and the 
testimony they produced was significant for the novelty of its breadth and the interest it 
generated. Compared with the stifling practices of the previous decades, forums like courts and 
inquiries provided prisoners with a means to exercise a limited, but novel “discursive 
citizenship.”102 
 In addition to acknowledging prisoners’ views and experiences, judicial proceedings and 
inquiries influenced many contemporary understandings of prisons, those who spend time in 
them and the limits and possibilities for future change. The proceedings of the 1970s were 
certainly not unprecedented, but they were more conflictual and controversial than the 
relatively few investigations that had occurred since World War II, and they drew greater 
sustained attention from print and broadcast media. Moreover, unlike press coverage of the 
mid-century riot investigations, journalists and media organizations in the 1960s and 1970s 
were much more thorough and critical in their coverage of prisons. In addition to traditional 
media sources, numerous alternative press titles and activist publications emerged during this 
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time, some of which were entirely dedicated to penal issues and far more outspoken and 
radical. Together, these official proceedings and media placed numerous aspects of the 
contemporary conditions of confinement up for public debate and inspection. The narratives 
they generated thrust many of the routine dilemmas, concerns, tasks and fears that confined 
people dealt with on a daily basis into broader circulation for audiences often ignorant of such 
matters. The level of detail in such accounts and the incorporation of the perspectives of 
confined people and prison guards departed significantly from the tightly-controlled public 
statements and publications of state penal bureaucracies. The threat of rape and sexual 
exploitation, living with or in the presence of profound mental illness or even the difficulties of 
satiating hunger and thirst while imprisoned became topics of public knowledge about prisons 
during these years, disrupting the anodyne veneer of official reports and mission statements.  
These critical forums and their products formed highly productive nodes in a rapidly 
growing public of penal discourse during the 1970s and early 1980s, often summarizing critical 
trends in professional circles, granting legitimacy to new advocates and their views and 
providing platforms to directly challenge established penal authorities. These forums were also 
deeply interconnected and their products imbricated with links to events and practices over 
multiple jurisdictions and many years. Legal cases and official inquiries arose out of unique local 
histories and circumstances, but they also formed constitutive parts of a larger transnational 
governance structure, a network of similar institutional forums, canvassing similar issues in 
diverse locales.103 Written documents, reports from inquiries and penal agencies, published 
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scholarly and journalistic articles and books, the memoirs of prisoners and activist publications, 
often circulated through these forums. In a formal submission to the Royal Commission into 
New South Wales Prisons, for instance, prisoner Bernie Matthews, who was housed in a control 
unit, summarized numerous American and British legal cases he had collected and described 
the formation of the Imprisoned Citizens Union in Pennsylvania in an effort to persuade the 
Royal Commissioner of the need to create a greater institutional space for prisoners’ voices and 
concerns. These documents attained a certain level authority, legitimacy and prestige as valued 
penological items in a way that they would not have had in the recent past, which aided in their 
movement, propelling them though social and physical space.104 
Many of the reports written by inquiries, bureaucracies, researchers and other 
interested parties, resembled documents produced in previous periods of heightened penal 
reform in that they had reflexive and critical qualities, offering a guide for perceiving and 
understanding prisons and penal policy as well as their problems and possible remedies. In 
addition, penal bureaucracies, like many other public agencies at this time, came under 
increasing pressure to create uniform standards, formally document their activities, 
disseminate annual reports and budgets and submit to independent audits. Such documents 
included commentary, analysis and explanations about the state of penal philosophy and 
practice, the organizational structure and management procedures as well as proscriptive 
advice and recommendations for new normative standards. Linguistic anthropologist Greg 
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Urban refers to discourse like this as “metaculture” or “culture that is about culture.”105 As 
Urban argues, “The interpretation of culture that is intrinsic to metaculture…focuses attention 
on the cultural thing, helps to make it an object of interest, and, hence, facilitates its 
circulation.”106 Like previous moments of significant penal reform, critiques, new proposals and 
evaluations abounded with metacultural aspects, explicitly offering models to emulate or avoid, 
interpretive schema for thinking about policies and practices and a lexicon of words and 
phrases that conceptualized the issues at hand. This kind of knowledge attracted larger 
audiences because it addressed problems in penal arrangements, which had become 
widespread in many parts of the world in the 1960s and 1970s, and it canvassed numerous, 
possible interventions and solutions.  
This “meshing of archives” over large geographic distances was especially apparent in 
how litigation, inquiries and commissions created opportunities for surveying practices in other 
jurisdictions and soliciting advice from other experts.107 The visibility of certain events, 
especially disturbances and scandals, attracted the attention of actors in other jurisdictions 
who faced similar situations and concerns. Correctional officials and inmates in New South 
Wales and Pennsylvania sought to reconstitute order in volatile prisons by drawing lessons from 
other places in the wake of disruptions and scandals, which discredited local practices. This 
entailed extensive comparative work by prison staff and inmates, evident in the enormous 
quantities of knowledge they produced and transferred. The trajectories and ambit of this 
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circulation of penal knowledge resembled Tony Ballantyne’s description of colonial knowledge 
production in the British empire “as a series of archives, each arising out of local concerns, but 
braided together, however imperfectly, by institutional exchanges, webs of personal 
correspondence and shared bodies of knowledge.”108 As this material circulated and accrued in 
penal archives, it shaped the parameters of future penal discourse and the imaginaries of 
possible reform. Every new judicial intervention or inquiry reviewed the products of previous 
interventions, in essence thickening the lines of influence and often increasing the authority of 
certain proceedings and documents over time. Historian and anthropologist, Ann Stoler, 
similarly argued that the products of inquiries in Dutch colonial archives “were not dead matter 
once the moment of their making had passed,” but together formed “an arsenal of sorts that 
were reactivated to suit new governing strategies” whether in the locale of their production or 
by officials in other jurisdictions who drew upon them.109  
However, this activity also raised questions about the flexibility of imported techniques, 
whether they adequately fit local conditions, whether existing regulations and statues could 
accommodate certain changes and whether the specific political histories and intersections of 
race, class and punishment easily aligned over the disparate contexts of their formation. This 
process also highlighted how the reputation and authority of certain models and jurisdictions 
influenced and limited this flow of penal knowledge and practice. Reading inquiry reports from 
New South Wales in the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, one is immediately struck by the 
prominence of American penological practice at this time, evident in multiple citations and the 
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presence of certain widely-circulating texts from the United States. Similarly, a correctional 
consultant contracted to reform Pennsylvania’s classification system, noted that many state 
penal agencies created unworkable classification procedures by uncritically adopting models 
used by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons based solely on the reputation of the federal prison agency. 
These processes, whether in production or exchange, clearly favored more powerful 
actors and hegemonic ways of understanding crime, punishment, law and governance. 
Prisoners and their advocates constantly had to overcome the tendency of investigators and 
judges to defer to the professional judgment of penal authorities or to simply think like them. 
Nevertheless, they recognized the authority attending to these critical forums and their 
products and how it could affect future prospects. Consequently, they competed for 
vindication, official sanction and the power to establish penal truth in these forums.  
Organization of the Chapters  
 
 The following chapters consider these themes by analyzing the development of specific 
contexts of penal reform and disputes as well as some of the problems and solutions actors 
explored. Some chapters address events and practices in both New South Wales and 
Pennsylvania, while other focus more on developments in one place. Chapter 1 examines the 
context and development of the postwar rehabilitation project in both New South Wales and 
Pennsylvania. I emphasize the flexibility and diversity of the language of rehabilitation and the 
many practices that it entailed, and also show that this project enhanced the authority of penal 
experts and social science, but also contained many of the seeds of its own demise. The latter 




becoming more critical of institutional confinement and attempting to create alternatives to 
custody and move punishment out into “the community.”  The project of rehabilitation and 
later decarceration both had some major conflicting assumptions, which became flashpoints for 
scandals and helped hasten their undoing. Penal experts labeled prisoners as socially deficient 
and irrational but encouraged their self-expression, which they could ultimately not control. 
They also wanted to harness reformative and socializing forces in communities, which often 
lacked them or refused the task, for decarceration programs that often became adjuncts of the 
prison rather than alternatives.  
In Chapter 2, I analyze the interrelationship of crime, imprisonment, race and radical 
activism in Pennsylvania. In July 1970, a large riot at an urban Philadelphia prison exposed the 
poor conditions of prisons, the lack of control by authorities and cemented the image of 
unrepentant, black offenders into public discourse. While state and county penal authorities 
tried to implement liberalizing changes in prison regimes they could not quell more radical 
demands by prisoners and a backlash by increasingly militant, unionized guards. A series of 
prison staff killings by prisoners in 1973 tipped the balance of this struggled toward greater 
security and the use of prolonged segregation to contain dangerous prisoners and activists. In 
the process, prisons became highly visible, controversial institutions and the center of political 
disputes in the state capital and streets of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. 
I trace the development of contentious penal politics in New South Wales during the 
same period in Chapter 3. Much like Pennsylvania, a riot and series of reprisals at Bathurst Gaol 
in 1970 became the focal point for the development of a prisoners’ rights movement and 




investigation into the events of 1970 shaped the contours of penal politics, but did little to quell 
more direct resistance by prisoners. The destruction of Bathurst Gaol by fire in 1974 and the 
subsequent Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons exposed the brutality of the 
state’s prisons and created an huge opening for debate and experimentation about how the 
state should punish, if at all. The Royal Commission was notable for the intense publicity it 
generated, the forum it provided for prisoners and others and the exploration of overseas penal 
practices it undertook. 
Overcrowding became one of the central problems besetting Pennsylvania’s prisons 
from the late 1970s onwards. Chapter 4 focuses on this issue and how it came to be understood 
and experienced by state officials, prisoners and many residents living near proposed new 
prisons, designed to accommodate the increasing number of incarcerated people. I analyze the 
causes of this phenomenon as actors understood them at the time. I believe this focus helps 
situate the actions they took to address overcrowding and the ones they refused to consider. 
The location of Chapter 5 switches back to New South Wales. It addresses the increased 
use of prison transfers by guards, senior prison officers, superintendents and the leadership of 
the Department of Corrective Services. By the late 1970s, the state constantly had a large 
number of prisoners in transit. In most cases, this reflected the normal operation of the 
classification system, but as prisons became more volatile during the 1960s and 1970s, guards 
began using transfers more as discipline and a way to separate prisoner activists. The routine 
nature of this level of movement meant that many prisoners often experienced transfers and 
sometimes harsh treatment during them. Yet, they also found ways to subvert this process, 




 In Chapter 6, I bring both New South Wales and Pennsylvania back into focus and 
analyze the transformation of classification practices during the 1970s and 1980s. As 
rehabilitation declined, many of its core practices, like classification, also entered a period of 
crisis and became subject to the scrutiny of courts and inquiries. Prison officials in both 
jurisdictions reconstituted classification practices by searching for examples and soliciting the 
advice of correctional experts from beyond their borders. Classification, once a central part of 
treatment regimes, now became a tool for enhanced security, prison population management 
and the rational use of limited resources. As prisons entered into a period of increasing 
violence, population growth and litigation, penal authorities in both New South Wales and 
Pennsylvania redirected more resources toward creating robust, “objective” classification 
systems, but they often had to contend with challenges from groups like prison guards and 
people living near prisons over the power to make classification decisions. I conclude with a 




















Chapter 1: The Circuits of Penal Expertise and the Project of Prison Reform, 1940-1970 
 
 
Introduction: The Prospects of Reform 
 
In April 1947, Leslie Nott, a senior official in the New South Wales Department of Prisons, 
embarked on a three month tour of penal establishments in the United Kingdom, Scotland and 
United States. Nott’s itinerary included visits to twelve prison facilities in the U.K., four in 
Scotland and another twelve in the U.S. He met with a wide range of penal officials, researchers 
and members of professional associations before returning to Australia in July 1947. At the time 
of Nott’s tour, the penal administration in New South Wales was in the midst of major changes, 
following over a decade of deterioration during the Depression and World War II.110 Nott, who 
had been the de facto leader of Department of Prisons during the war, was leading candidate to 
become the new Comptroller-General of Prisons upon his return.111 Nott’s trip, taken at the 
behest of the state’s Minister of Justice, enhanced his already formable professional standing 
and was the first study tour taken by someone in his position since 1904. When he returned in 
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July 1947, he carried with him bundles of penological literature, lists of new professional and 
personal contacts in prison circles and first-hand observation of penal practices in each place he 
visited.  
During his overseas tour, Nott compared the current state of prison reform abroad with 
his intimate knowledge of prisons in New South Wales fully aware that the responsibly for the 
state’s penal reform project largely rested with him when he returned. Based on the advice of 
professional colleagues, Nott visited jurisdictions with a reputation for innovation and reform, 
seeking new, modern, penal knowledge and techniques, which could potentially be applied to 
New South Wales. As he explained:  
 
The Institutions which I saw were those suggested to me as presenting a fair 
cross-section of the newer and better types of prisons. There seemed to be no 




Thus, Nott’s study tour followed and re-inscribed an uneven geography of penal practices and 
knowledge in current and former areas of the British Empire during the years immediately 
following World War II. Nott’s excursion followed well-worn paths of exchange between 
Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and several other members of the British 
Commonwealth, like Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.  
As number of scholars of British imperialism have recently demonstrated, study tours 
and correspondence concerning the management of subject populations was commonplace in 
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the empire and among former colonies.113 They shared an imperial language, history of settler 
colonialism and familiarity with administrative practices, which enabled numerous exchanges 
and visits over the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Such connections also frequently 
crossed the boundaries of other empires as well.114 The issues of crime and punishment 
became one of the most fertile areas of government activity and exchange. They helped forge 
and maintain connections with penal authorities across the globe, and the traffic of influence 
often flowed in multidirectional way, despite disparities in power between colonies and 
metropol.115 Early experiments in solitary confinement in Pennsylvania, for instance, drew 
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visitors from around the world, including European capitals, as did the British penal colonies in 
Australia.116 International debates concerning the best methods for combating crime and 
punishing or reforming offenders raged over much of the nineteenth century, forming a 
transjurisdictional public of penal politics, traversing colonies, imperial centers and new 
sovereign states.117  
These exchanges, however, often came in bursts of intensity, marking transitional 
moments of decline and reform in penal discourse and social policy.  As Leslie Nott noted in his 
report, nearly fifty years had elapsed since a senior prison official from New South Wales last 
embarked on a large study tour similar to Nott’s.118 That last itinerate official—Frederick 
Neitenstein—oversaw the establishment of penal practices in the first decade of the twentieth 
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century, which corresponded with reform efforts in several European and North American 
countries. The bulk of Neitenstein’s reforms remained largely unchanged when Nott took 
office. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, however, many people in state government felt that 
state’s prisons were deeply troubled and needed substantial change.119 The reduced availability 
of work for imprisoned people, caused by the global depression, left many prisoners idel and 
corresponded with an increase in violent confrontations between warders and inmates. 
Clamping down on violence was one of Leslie Nott’s first major policy decisions. With the 
minister’s permission, he established an austere punishment regime for “intractable” prisoners 
at Grafton Gaol based on a similar practice recently adopted in Canada. Grafton would 
forcefully suppress difficutl prisoners with brutal beatings.120 By the end of World War II, the 
Labor government led by Premier William McKell outlined a series of broad reform principles 
they wished implement in many of the state’s penal and mental health institutions.121 Nott’s 
tour in 1947 was intended to supply the specific penal models, knowledge and practices based 
on the experience of penal experts abroad that would infuse and guide their reform agenda. 
Upon his return, Nott impressed upon his readers that the most significant difference 
between penal operations in the United Kingdom and especially the United States, was the 
massive size of penal populations and prisons in these places.122 Nott noted that this limited the 
                                                          
119 Mark Finnane, Punishment in Australian Society (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 68-75, 82-83, 89-
92; Frederick William Neitenstein (1850-1921) was New South Wales Comptroller-General of Prisons from 1896 to 
1909. See Neitenstein, Report by the Comptroller-General of Prisons on Prisons, Reformatories and Asylums and 
Other Institutions Recently Visited by Him, in Europe and America (Sydney: New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, 
1904); Merrilyn Lee Sernack-Cruise, “Penal Reform in NSW: Frederick William Neitenstein, 1896-1909,” Ph.D. 
dissertation (Sydney: University of Sydney, 1980). 
120 Ramsland, With Just But Relentless Discipline, 266-267. 
121 John F. Nagle, Report of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons (Sydney: Government Printer, 
1978), 566. 




ability of prison authorities back home to simply emulate these prison operations and even 
certain practices. The scale of prison industry in a place like California, for instance, could never 
be achieved in New South Wales. Nott argued that the state could not reasonably be expected 
to purchase and operate the types and quality of industrial machinery that he observed in 
California.  
Nevertheless, Nott maintained that many features of the prison operations he inspected 
were transferrable to New South Wales. Adaptations of certain practices not only seemed 
appropriate, but as Nott argued, occurred frequently in the various jurisdictions and facilities he 
toured. He focused especially on how prison authorities abroad viewed the people in their 
custody, how they categorized them in various offender types, age cohorts, and other more 
specific groupings. These categories were more than simply a descriptive analysis of people 
entering prison, but deeply tied to the arrangement of penal spaces and routines. Nott argued 
that the new procedures for classifying inmates, especially in the United States, might achieve 
their fullest potential when applied to large prison populations, but that this did not diminish 
their usefulness for reconstituting penal regimes and training inmates in a much smaller penal 
system like that in New South Wales. Therefore, Nott recommended that the Department of 
Prisons establish a centralized Classification Committee to evaluate all incoming prisoners and 
assign them to prisons according to their security needs and potential for reform.123  
Nott emphasized the importance of remaining abreast of current penal practices and 
research. He mentioned that he had discussions with the current and previous presidents of the 
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, the American, Sanford Bates, and 
                                                          




Englishman, Lionel Fox, respectively.124 The Commission had been in existence for over seventy 
years at that time and held regular meetings that drew penal experts from around the world.125 
Nott recommended that New South Wales consider joining the commission. At the time, no 
government in Australia, whether state or federal, belonged to the organization. Nott believed 
this was not acceptable, especially since two other Commonwealth countries often considered 
peers—New Zealand and South Africa—were already members.126 Historian Frank Dikötter has 
argued that this type of global awareness about penal practices and standards played a large 
role in how they circulated throughout the world. The global spread of prison during the 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries was often not the result of imposition by colonial 
powers, according to Dikötter, but rather the active adoption of the institution by local elites 
who desired a claim to modernity and sovereignty.127 Such elites pursued penal reform “within 
a global frame of reference in which emulation and competition led to ever shifting standards, 
innovations and expectations.”128  
Leslie Nott’s message after his return was clear: if New South Wales, the leading 
Australian state, wished to maintain its claim on modern government and keep pace with 
trends in London and Washington, it needed to drastically reform its prison system by adopting 
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practices and techniques of modern progressive penology. Establishing and maintaining 
contacts with global penological authorities and organizations was crucial to this task. 
This chapter provides a general history of the period immediately preceding what’s 
often referred to as the crisis in corrections during the 1970s and serves as a background for 
the chapters that will follow. My hope is to give both a general overview of some of the major 
themes of penality during the years between the end of World War II and early 1970s that 
affected many jurisdictions with special attention their local articulations in both Pennsylvania 
and New South Wales. I will do so by discussing the broad, national and transnational 
characteristics of this penal agenda while switching back and forth between practices in 
Pennsylvania and New South Wales. My narrative is organized in three major sections: the first 
covering events in the 1940s and 1950s, and the latter two dealing with developments in the 
1960s and early 1970s.  
The first period concerns the emergence of a relatively stable set of practices, which 
structured prison life for several decades and arguably continues today in somewhat different 
forms. These practices comprised central aspects of what many later prison reformers and their 
critics called the therapeutic or medical model of inmate rehabilitation. Often times, simply the 
term rehabilitation sufficed to signal a commitment to a shared, but highly variegated, 
discourse and set of practices, which sought to reform criminal offenders through various forms 
of classification, education, training and programing informing by the social sciences. These 
practices and the language of penal reform were highly elastic, encompassing a wide range of 
actual prison regimes and routines. If some practices, like inmate classification and the 




imprisonment, others, like psychological counseling, could be widely divergent, appearing in 
some places and not in others.  
The point needs to be emphasized. All too often, narratives of penal change generalize 
the specific arrangements of one highly influential jurisdiction, such as California during this 
period, across different jurisdictions, which may or may not have followed similar practices. It is 
perhaps better to think of rehabilitation during his period as a discourse, or narrative, of reform 
directed at inmates, prison employees and the state that was also coupled to a limited set of 
highly flexible, multi-purpose practices, like classification, to which a larger range of more 
idiosyncratic or local practices could be sutured, adapted or discarded over time.129 However, I 
hope to avoid the pitfalls of reifying this phenomenon by describing it as a “model,” even 
though such terms (e.g. “therapeutic model”) became more common by the late 1950s. I ask 
the reader to keep in mind the structured, yet unsettled nature of these bundles or 
assemblages of practices and language, which appeared in numerous penal systems around the 
world during and after World War II. Thinking of these approaches as a model retroactively 
constitutes them and grants them far more coherence and unity than they actually had.130 
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In the pages that follow, I use several terms to denote this set of practices, such as 
rehabilitation, postwar reforms or postwar penology. This in part reflects how actors spoke of 
this agenda at the time. During the 1940s, prison reformers were just as likely to refer to this 
emerging set of practices as “modern penology” as they were to use the term rehabilitation. 
The invocation of “modern” by advocates of this approach reflected the struggles they faced in 
the prison service with security-minded rivals as they sought to establish a new basis for penal 
policy after the Depression and war. Prison reform and rehabilitation constituted one of the 
many sites and techniques of what state theorists often refer to as the emerging postwar social 
democratic or Keynesian welfare state.131 Prison reformers aligned themselves, their practices 
and language with the growing confidence in policy and administrative circles that the state 
could effectively regulate economic and social life with the aid of scientific and administrative 
expertise.  
The second period, roughly spanning the mid-1960s to the late-1970s, addresses a 
broad rethinking of rehabilitation, which shared many of the commitments and assumptions of 
the immediate postwar reforms, but departed from them in significant ways. Specific iterations 
of these changes these meant different things in different situations and could incorporate 
many seemingly unrelated or older practices in a new guise. This movement manifested in two 
basic ways: one outward, away from the prison; the other directed inward toward life inside 
prisons.  
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The first involved a re-discovery of the “community.” Known by various names, such as 
community corrections, decarceration and destructuring, this movement became prevalent in 
the late 1960s and especially during the early-to-mid 1970s. At its core, the various 
manifestations of the decarceration movement shared the belief that, at best, the massive 
prisons of the state’s penal apparatus (and even some aspects of the postwar reforms) stifled 
the possibilities of rehabilitation. At worse, such institutions directly contributed to reoffending 
by released inmates. Prisons – even those institutions dedicated to rehabilitation – harmed 
people confined in them and diminished their possibilities for (re)establishing a normal, law-
abiding life upon release. Much of the academic penological thinking during the 1960s stressed 
that establishing secure, normalizing connections outside prison, like stable employment and 
family support, did far more to lessen recidivism than institutional interventions. The 
community corrections movement sought to bridge the existing penal apparatus with a 
nebulously defined “community” through transitional programs designed to normalize the 
activities and expectations of offenders. Prison officials also tried enlist the active support of 
employers and civil society organizations interested in social welfare for these community 
corrections programs. 
While this view of the socializing prowess of the community certainly had adherents 
outside prison administration, including in some radical, anti-authoritarian movements of the 
time, it also appealed – perhaps in a more muted form – to a surprising number of senior prison 
bureaucrats who recognized the limits of their capacity to change people held in confinement. 
In openly acknowledged these limits, penal officials undercut the institutional basis for many of 




penal practices, and some more liberal prison officials actually invited greater public 
participation and comment. However, this proved at times to be a double-edged sword. 
Greater publicity also often brought condemnation, especially when community corrections 
programs became embroiled in scandals involving escapes and other criminal behavior. Despite 
the desire to move rehabilitation into the community, decarceration programs, by their very 
nature as “programs,” began and remained adjuncts to the existing prison system. Work 
release, furloughs, community treatment centers and periodic detention and many other 
programs originated within the penal apparatus itself or in conjunction with functionally-
related state agencies, like those dealing with mental health, education and vocational services.  
Much like they viewed past forms of discretionary release, many incarcerated people 
supported decarceration programs and wished to participate in them, even if they often saw 
them as mainly a way out of prison. However, the restrictions placed on program inclusion and 
screening protocols often confounded inmates who exchanged ideas among themselves about 
the best way to gain acceptance into these programs. Those denied entry into community 
correction programs often accused the authorities with of favoritism, racial discrimination or 
making hollow promises in announcing such innovative programs. Many prisoners, especially 
those in maximum security prisons who were often not eligible for these programs, derided 
them as simply another farce of disingenuous prison administrators. As beneficial as these 
programs were for some inmates, the way the authorities managed them fostered resentment 
and tension among those denied access to them. In addition, some people claimed these 




The second reformulation of rehabilitation addressed precisely these internal prison 
conditions. Efforts to “normalize” life inside secure facilities, in theory making them resemble 
life outside in the wider society as much as possible, paralleled the decarceration movement 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but it often lagged behind as a secondary priority for 
penal agencies. As part of this movement, “prison conditions” became a major topic of dispute, 
litigation and reform among prison staff, inmates, the judiciary and a host of civil society 
organizations and activist groups. At the crux of such disputes and agendas rested beliefs about 
the destructive aspects of confinement, which resembed those emphasized in community 
corrections discourse. Attempts to normalize of prison life differed from decarceration, 
however, in the explicit, if at times forlorn, endorsement of the prison as the only possible 
means to deal with certain people. The normalization of prison life and community corrections 
should, nevertheless, be seen as flips side of the same coin. They shared a dismal view of the 
prison, but each targeted different clients in their programs. Much like the decarceration 
movement echoed earlier innovations, prison normalization had numerous antecedents, 
including many practices associated with the immediate postwar rehabilitation project like 
education and increased leisure activities for inmates.  
Normalizing changes, like granting inmates greater religious freedom, access to 
literature and greater freedom of movement within institutions, disrupted longstanding prison 
routines and the prisoner management strategies of guards. Many staff members disliked these 
changes, arguing that they redefined their roles without their consent and diminished their 
traditional authority over inmates. In some cases, these changes also received a great deal of 




aftermath of disturbances. Like decarceration programs, this publicity was double-edged, at 
times generating more criticism than support among the reading public and political leaders. 
Many readers interpreted normalization initiatives as unwarranted leinecy that undermined the 
deterrent power of harsh confinement. 
In detailing decarceration and normalization strategies, I am interested in how they 
affected penal politics and prison order, as each in different ways contributed to both the 
increased visibility of punishment and counterstrategies designed to reassert strict conceptions 
of what sociologist Phillippe Combessie calls the “sensitive perimeter” separating convicts from 
the agents of punishments, whether this was inside or outside the prisons.132 These penal 
projects intersected with the politics of race and rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s, both inside 
and outside penal institutions in a way the further drew attention to them and facilitated a 
broad reassertion of custodial authority by the mid-1970s. As will become clear, officials in 
Pennsylvania deployed these penal strategies across a highly charged racial order, the borders 
of which were also in contention. This played a large role in the fate of these programs in that 
state. 
 
                                                          
132 Philippe Combessie, “The ‘Sensitive Perimeter’ of the Prison: A Key to Understanding the Durability of the Penal 
Institution” in Vincenzo Ruggiero, Nigel South and Ian Taylor (eds.), The New European Criminology: Crime and 
Social Order in Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), 125-135; Philippe Combessie, “Marking the Carceral Boundary: 
Penal Stigma in the Long Shadow of the Prison,” Ethnography, 3, trans. Richard Nice and Loïc Wacquant (December 
2002), 535–555. As will become clear, my analysis here draws on, but departs from some of the very influential 
critical texts of the 1970s and 1980s that analyzed these trends, especially decarceration. See, Andrew T. Scull, 
Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant—A Radical View (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1977); Scull, “Humanitarianism or Control?: Some Observations on the Historiography of Anglo-American 
Psychiatry,”  in Stanley Cohen and Andrew T. Scull (eds.), Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative 
Essays (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 118-140; Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment 
and Classification (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); Cohen, "The Punitive City: Notes on the Dispersal of Social 




Postwar Penology, Rehabilitation and Bureaucratic Transformation  
 
During the 1940s and 1950s, a loose set of penological policies and practices developed 
in a number of Western European and North American countries that focused on reforming 
criminal offenders through individualized assessment and treatment. This movement de-
emphasized previous repressive practices in the hopes of eliciting introspection and change in 
offenders through a variety of techniques supported by the social sciences as well as education 
and vocational training. This postwar movement brought together several trends that had been 
growing in international penology circles since the 1890s, but only became prominent in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. Social theorist David Garland has called this longer-term 
complex of discourse, practices and institutional arrangements the “penal-welfarism,” because 
of its dual, flexible character that emphasized both treatment and punishment.133 In Garland’s 
view, penal-welfarism spanned numerous government institutions, like mental and other state 
hospitals, juvenile courts, public assistance programs, and of course, the more austere, 
traditional prisons dating from the nineteenth century. Penal welfarism can also be seen as a 
constituent part of a larger set of postwar assumptions about the nature and role of the state 
and social policy, which like many Progressive era reforms, attempted to mitigate some of the 
destructive aspects of capitalism, industrialization and war.134 While there were wide 
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divergences in the provision of social services and market regulation between places such as 
the United States, Western Europe, Australasia and Japan, they shared a common commitment 
to a broadly conceived Keynesian economic policy of counter-cyclical demand management, 
public support of education and research and the partial decommodification of many aspects of 
social life through an array of social insurance programs and public services.135 These attributes 
formed the broad common core of welfare state governance concerns and techniques, and 
they relied heavily on social sciences and state-sponsored research, both of which emerged 
from World War II as respected, authoritative means of establishing truth, protecting the public 
and fostering affluence.136 The influence of social science in penology, in the form of 
classification, planning, treatment programs and evaluations, was therefore part of this new 
constellation of research, science and government that emerged in many parts of the world 
after World War II and enabled the circulation of carceral knowledge and techniques. 
The strongest group of advocates of these new penological views was located in the 
United States. More specifically, the language and practices associated with what came to be 
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known as the “therapeutic model” reflected the influence of several jurisdictions, like California 
and the U.S. federal prison system, and professional groups, like the American Prison 
Association. Some of the institutions that prompted greater global conformity on penal matters 
like the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission and later the Social Commission of the 
United Nations, also helped spread these innovative penal programs and philosophies 
throughout the world. In the wake of World War II, powerful, influential counties, like the 
United States and the United Kingdom, both of which had a century-long reputation for penal 
innovation, dominated these organizations.137 Such influence was, of course, much more direct 
in the colonial policies of these countries and several others. Nevertheless, officials in such 
colonial states developed their own versions of incarceration and did not simply import 
metropolitan penal practices wholesale.138 
Between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, many of the routine practices within prisons 
and assumptions in penal policy changed considerably from pre-war patterns in many parts of 
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the world.  Like earlier periods of rapid change in penal practices, the similarity of these 
transformations revealed an often unspoken degree of connection and agreement about the 
problems of imprisonment and the range of possible reforms.139 There were also renewed 
efforts by many reformers to develop international standards for penal practices. In 1946, the 
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission convened its first session in eleven years in 
Berne, Switzerland.140 The attendees of this congress agreed that prisons throughout many 
parts of the world and criminal justice in general was in deep crisis and needed a drastic 
reorientation after over fifteen years of depression and war.141  
Prison labor formed a major area of concern, especially in the wake of the extensive use 
of slave labor during the war. Whether actually profitable or not, labor formed the mainstay of 
prison life in many in parts of the world from the mid-nineteenth century until the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Such labor took many different forms in various jurisdictions reflecting 
prevailing the possibilities and limits of specific political-economic circumstances. Agricultural 
production, contract piece-work and large-scale state-operated industry occupied thousands of 
prisoners and organized prison regimes in numerous institutions throughout North and South 
America, Europe, and parts of Africa, Asia and Australasia.142 The global effects of the 
Depression drastically reduced the availability of work for prisoners and intensified competition 
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with workers in the free labor market. Idleness became commonplace in many prisons during 
the 1930s and early 1940s, much like it was in industrial labor markets in many parts of the 
world.143 For many decades, free workers and unions harbored resentments among toward 
prisoner labor, but the economic hardship of the 1930s intensified this opposition.144 
Resistance from organized labor and many businesses led to restrictive laws, which limited 
prisoner-produced goods from private markets, and by the 1940s, much of the industrial 
machinery in prisons worldwide was in disrepair or simply obsolete.145  
It was apparent to many people knowledgable about prisons in the United States that 
industries would never recover their past importance to prison regimes.146 A nationwide survey 
of penal practices conducted in the late 1930s by the U.S. Department of Justice, noted this 
displacement: 
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From a place of domination in prison programs, prison industries have gone to 
the other extreme where idleness due to their absence is the outstanding 
feature of prison life in sixty-six prisons and a major problem in all but six. The 
industrial prison as such exists in only a few places. In its stead is developing a 
prison in which industry will play only one part, although an important one, in 
the daily program.147 
 
American prison administrators worried that the remaining industry would collapse after the 
end of World War II. So, they began devising new ways to organize prison life, occupy inmates 
and hopefully reform them. Labor would remained a central aspect of incarceration, but the 
nature of work changed, becoming more diversified, less profit-motivated and viewed 
increasingly by reformers as supplemental to other activities and programs for inmates. 
Historian Charles Bright has argued that while labor continued, “training, rather than 
production, had become the central rationale for prison industries by 1945, and its principal 
intent was not to discipline the body to industrial work but, instead, to prepare the inmate, in 
an ‘integrated total program’ that combined education, training, religious instruction, and 
counseling, for a successful life as a free citizen.”148  
In addition to greater vocational training and elementary education, some of the more 
innovative and well-funded penal agencies began offering courses in humanities and sciences 
and loosened some restrictions on reading material. Leisurely activities, like reading, art and 
crafts, and especially sports, became increasingly common in prison life after World War II, 
mirroring similar social trends in the organization of work and leisure in the consumption-
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driven, Keynesian, national welfare states that emerged from the war in several parts of the 
world.149 
Perhaps the most fundamental change after the war was the growing influence of 
professional social scientists and the creation of centralized, formal classification procedures in 
several jurisdictions. However, like many other aspects of penal change, this transformation 
was uneven in both its successes and application from place to place. Subsequent academic 
literature on postwar inmate rehabilitation has focused perhaps too much on what was 
considered by many contemporaries to be state-of-the-art programs in jurisdictions like 
California and the federal Bureau of Prisons. Historian Eric Cummins’s claim that “the gates 
opened up, and the experts poured in,” might be a fitting description for his study of 
California’s prisons after World War II and possibly some similar jurisdictions, but it would be an 
exaggeration for many other state prisons in the United States and abroad.150 Few state penal 
bureaucracies, some only fledgling agencies, had the financial resources or personnel to 
implement such practices and many places lacked the political support from state government 
and prison employees for instituting such reforms.  Attempts to so often created resentment 
among some staff members, especially guards. Successes in places like California can be easily 
overstated too. Nevertheless, such transformations reverberated throughout national and 
global penological circles. Rather than generalize from cases such as California, it is better to 
situate them in an uneven geography of penal reform in the postwar period, highlighting how 
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such exemplary jurisdictions formed and how they influenced the way numerous prison 
administrators, reformers and inmates conceptualized problems and solutions in other places.  
Reflecting the ascendancy of social science expertise in aftermath of World War II, 
prison authorities in numerous jurisdictions began hiring or contracting more professional 
social scientists to evaluate prisoners’ behavior, prospects for reform or parole consideration, 
possible work assignments, education, and transfer to different institutions.151 Several large 
professional associations, like the American Prison Association, the Howard League of Penal 
Reform and the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, advocated major changes to 
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classification procedures and argued that the entirety of prison operations should be structured 
around the planning capacities of centralized classification bodies.152 Penologists, sociologists, 
psychologists, among others, believed that the longstanding goal of reforming inmates could be 
best achieved through properly identifying and sorting inmates, matching them to array of 
envisioned services and programs and monitoring their individual progress through case 
management techniques. Contrary to some later accounts, these reform advocates recognized 
that even the best interventions would fall short with some offenders. The common belief 
among reformers that younger inmates were more amenable to reform efforts than older, 
habitual offenders informed how they created programs and allocated funds.153 In his travels, 
Leslie Nott noted that this view informed nearly all the prison reform agendas he encountered 
and he recommended directing new training programs more toward younger inmates.154 
The prison unrest that swept over numerous jurisdictions in North America and Europe 
during the 1940s and early 1950s, pushed many political leaders and prison bureaucrats to 
adopt some aspects of the reformers recommendations, like classification and training, but 
many of the recommendations of professional bodies like the American Prison Association 
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often remained more aspirational than actual.155 It would take years to establish many of the 
reforms in some jurisdictions affected by rioting. Nevertheless, the discourse of prison reform, 
rehabilitation or therapy, was an especially elastic discourse that prison administrators, 
politicians and inmates often easily stretched to accommodate a variety of programs, proposals 
and activities. While some innovative penal bureaucracies produced programs based on 
psychological testing and group counseling, other jurisdictions like New South Wales framed 
the basis of their reformative project more around education and training with much less 
emphasis on psychological interventions.156 Specific programs differed from place to place, but 
many of the organizing practices, especially centralized inmate classification, intra-system 
variation in institutional regimes and programs, indeterminate sentencing and parole, formed a 
common scaffolding, or perhaps metapractices, supporting differing accounts of rehabilitation 
and reform in postwar penology. 
 
New South Wales     
 
Mid-twentieth-century prison reform in New South Wales began with a custodial 
crackdown. After years of increasing violence in several maximum security prisons in the early 
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1940s, particularly at Bathurst Gaol, the Minister for Justice New South Wales, Reginald 
Downing, followed Leslie Nott’s advice and set aside Grafton Gaol as a punitive, segregation 
institution in 1943.157 Nott borrowed the concept for this regime, which concentrated and 
violently repressed “intractable” prisoners in one institution, from a similar plan developed in 
Canada during the 1930s.158 Questions and accusations about the official violence at Grafton 
periodically percolated in the press or Parliament in the ensuing years, only to disappear shortly 
thereafter, with little or no change to the prison’s regime.159 Often less noted in historical 
accounts of the establishment of Grafton’s intractable regime was how Nott and his colleagues 
in the Department of Prisons and government viewed Grafton as part of a broader reform 
agenda for the all of the state’s prisons. In their reasoning, Grafton’s brutal containment of 
certain prisoners, coupled with finer security gradations in other prisons, enabled them to relax 
regimes elsewhere and develop a range of new work, training and education programs for 
other prisoners in these penal spaces.  
The unrest in the prisons and increasing crime during the war convinced a number of 
leaders in state government that that major changes were needed in the state’s prisons.160 
Many of the official routines of prison life and administrative regulations had largely remained 
unchanged since the first decade of the twentieth century, but the economic woes of the 1930s 
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eviscerated work opportunities and other activities for inmates.161 Prison order deteriorated 
into numerous confrontations in secure facilities in the early 1940s.162 The Labor government, 
under Premier William McKell, himself a former Minister for Justice, initiated a series of studies 
of the state’s institutions of confinement, including juvenile and mental health facilities as well 
as adult prisons with the aim of building blueprints for reconstituting these institutions after the 
end of the war.163 Immediate legislative action on these studies, which recommended adopting 
some recent British practices, stalled, but the Department of Prisons moved forward with a 
plan to re-open the old nineteenth-century Berrima Gaol with a modern regime. The 
department razed the entire structure behind the walls and rebuilt it for use as a new 
experimental institution for offenders between the ages of 18 to 23 years.164 Reopened in 1949 
as the Berrima Training Centre, the reborn-facility and Grafton’s regime both exemplified Nott’s 
reform principles.  
Leslie Nott ascended to the post of Comptroller-General of Prisons shortly after he 
returned from his trip overseas in the July 1947.165 His trip formed the first part of an extensive 
plan to refashion the state’s prison management by collecting knowledge on the best current 
penal practices in North America and the United Kingdom. Although it had been decades since 
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a high-ranking prison official from New South Wales embarked on such a trip, this kind of 
governmental study tour was not unusual for an Australian state official. The appeal of overseas 
administrative models and techniques periodically drew Australian officials abroad on study 
tours, which reflected colonial and post-colonial disparities in knowledge production and 
prestige. When the state government finally announced its sweeping reforms, the media 
coverage highlighted Nott’s trip and the authority of these overseas practices. The Labor 
government’s prison modernization program thus drew heavily from the reputation of 
American and British penology and also recommended ongoing participation the international 
penology community by joining the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission and 
cooperating with a new effort by the United Nations to collect extensive national criminological 
data.166 
The changes introduced into the state’s prisons focused heavily on “treatment” rather 
than punishment or immediate control of the inmates.167 This did not necessarily preclude 
these other penal purposes as Grafton’s regime surely indicated. Instead, Nott’s plans 
specifically addressed the youthful or first-time offender and potential other inmates who 
showed similar possibilities of reform. The favored interventions in this new scheme sought to 
rescue such people from becoming hardened, habitual offenders as much as possible. The 
reforms largely bypassed short-term prisoners as well, even thought they usually served time in 
the same institutions as people particapting in the new reforms.168 Officials in the prison 
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department argued that their interventions would simply be wasted on those serving short 
sentences. The editor of The Medical Journal of Australia, who toured some of the state’s 
prisons in 1955 with Comptroller-General Nott, informed his readers that “experience has 
shown that nothing much can be done in the way of training for rehabilitation in less than 
about nine months.”169 Penological expertise, therefore, was temporarily sensitive. 
Interventions required sufficient time in custody if they were to be effective.   
  Nott, like many other penologists of his era, believed that the most promising 
technique of the treatment paradigm lay in the new methods of inmate classification. The 
classification practices he observed abroad focused identifying which offenders were or were 
not amenable to intervention and facilitated a system of differential assignment, work and 
training for inmates in the various institutions. According to John Morony, who served as 
Comptroller-General of Prisons from 1960 to 1968, American penological thinking and practice 
especially influenced Nott’s plans after his overseas trip, particularly the work of Frank 
Loveland, the Assistant Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons and author of an authoritative 
manual on classification.170 The American federal system established a state-of-the-art 
classification system that influenced numerous jurisdictions in the United States and abroad, 
producing numerous tracts on how to create classification committees and deal with the 
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practical problems of implementation and program integration.171 While Nott felt that the 
much smaller prisoner population of New South Wales precluded some of the highly 
specialization and differentiated prisons and units he toured in places like California and the 
American federal penitentiaries, he nevertheless recommended instituting similar methods of 
sorting inmates and penal spaces.172  
The Department of Prisons established a centralized Classification Committee in 1950, 
which included an education officer, prison chaplain, a psychologist, industries officer and a 
medical officer in addition to custodial staff and the Deputy Comptroller.173 This committee 
evaluated newly committed prisoners upon reception at the Long Bay prison complex, south of 
Sydney, determining the best placement and program available for any particular inmate. By 
1952, the department also hired a consulting psychiatrist for the Long Bay facility to evaluate 
inmates with suspected mentally illness.174 Despite its rehabilitative framings, classification 
retained significant custodial aspects in practice. The repression of Grafton and the new 
reformative or training agenda both relied on the cornerstone of inmate classification.  
Nott significantly altered other aspects of the overseas models to fit prevailing regimes 
in New South Wales. Certain therapeutic practices more prominent overseas, like various forms 
of group or individual counseling and artistic programs, were not as prominent in New South 
Wales at first, although they started to gain inroads at certain prisons in the Sydney area by the 
1960s.175 It was more common to assign remediable prisoners to certain forms of industrial, 
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agricultural or domestic training, especially in lower-security, enclosed facilities, like Goulburn 
and Bathurst, or in the department’s series of open, afforestation camps, like Emu Plains.176 
Many of the facilities also began offering a range of academic and remedial evening classes and 
increased leisure activities for youthful or first time offenders. Education spanned basic literacy 
and vocational programs in areas such as brick-laying and automotive mechanics to more 
advanced certificates in topics like accounting and physics from correspondence school courses 
from the Sydney Technical College.177 In addition to programing, the department attempted to 
improve certain aspects of daily life behind bars in some of the prisons making living conditions 
more closely resemble those beyond the walls. In practical terms, this translated to modest 
improvements in food and clothing as well as replacing hammocks with beds.178 
However, the role of social sciences experts in the state’s prisons grew throughout the 
1950s. Nott hired two professional social workers as Parole Officers to work specifically with 
people considered to be remediable.179 These officers conducted initial interviews with 
prisoners, prepared case histories and worked alongside the Classification Committee at Long 
Bay, but they also serviced numerous institutions throughout the state and re-interviewed 
inmates months after their assignment. With hundreds of miles to cover and numerous cases, 
the effectiveness of two parole officers was open to question. Nevertheless, it would be the 
beginning of a greater effort to develop services for some lesser or younger offenders. By the 
late 1950s, seven parole officers worked in the prisons department.180 With the assistance of 
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outside penal reform and social welfare organizations, like the Salvation Army, Howard Prison 
Reform League and the Prisoner’s Aid Association, these officers developed a few after-care 
services for recently-released inmates. Eventually this collaboration resulted in a network of 
regional Civil Rehabilitation Committees.181 
Indicative of the articulation of postwar penal discourse in New South Wales was Nott’s 
decision to rename certain prisons for remediable youthful prisoners and adult first-offenders, 
“Training Centres.”182 If the California prisons visited by Nott focused on “rehabilitation” and 
“therapy” through education, and psychological interventions, like group counseling, Nott’s 
adaptation involved the framework of classification, with psychological testing and expertise, 
but he placed a greater emphasis on re-training some prisoners for life as laborers. Thus, the 
dominant reformative, penal discourse in New South Wales during the 1950s often highlighted 
“training” or “retraining” in addition to education while downplaying, if not entirely rejecting, 
terms like “rehabilitation,” “corrections” and “reformation,” which were more common in the 
United States. Yet, the prison department was often cautious about what these terms meant. 
While there was certainly a growing need for certain types of trades in the postwar economy, 
especially in the construction sector, prison administrators, like their counterparts in the U.S., 
knew that teaching inmates a trade that would immediately translated into employment upon 
release was increasingly unlikely. Instead, they hoped to reorient the wayward toward 
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industrious habits and discipline while also imparting some trade skills that could be further 
developed with additional training and employment outside the prison system.183  
In both places, however, advocates of the new penology wished to recast prisons with a 
new purpose and language. In 1952, the New South Wales Parliament updated its penal 
legislation to reflect many of the changes that Nott had already instituted through 
administrative initiative.184 This was the first time the state’s legislature undertook this task 
since 1899, during the last era of major penal reform.185 The new Prisons Act granted the 
Department of Prisons wide latitude in how it operated its affairs, with much of the language in 
the act being ambiguous or deferential to expertise of penal administrators. Perhaps, the most 
significant passage in the new legislation reflecting Nott’s agenda was the incorporation of nine 
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These groupings mapped the managerial visions of Nott and his subordinates, how they 
conceived the inmate population and its contours, and channeled the flows of reformative 
intervention, repression and neglect. Categories (a) through (e) and (h) and (i) were not eligible 
for participation in the new treatment programs and routines. The first five categories simply 
did not meet the threshold (yet) for intervention. Officials viewed people in these categories 
more as detainees or temporarily imprisoned, even if in some cases people labeled as such 
would later become longer-term prisoners. The prospects for reform for these inmates was 
temporally or legally constrained or negated by other considerations. Debtors and maintenance 
confines, for instance, were not generally considered to be offenders in the postwar 
criminological discourse. Nott’s prisons may have fulfilled legal obligations to the state’s courts 
to manage people sentenced for failing to pay debts or family support, but they were not the 
subjects of expert invention.  
If they did not meet this threshold, then category (h)—intractable—exceeded it. Those 
labeled intractable spent their time at Grafton or in slightly less austere prisons, beyond the 
reach of training and education programs and many of the amenities provided to those in 
category (f) and even category (g). The latter group—recidivists—abutted the remediable and 
intractable classes, sharing in some limited access to the new programs, but always exposed to 
harsher discipline and security arrangements and always under threat of being reclassified as 
intractable. The bulk of the new penology, its claims, promises and techniques rested largely on 
those who fell within category (f). The format of the list belied the wide disparities in 
assignment, treatment and consideration that separated category (f) from the others in the 







n 1944, Pennsylvania’s governor, Edward Martin, empaneled a five-member committee 
under the chairmanship of Stanley P. Ashe, the warden of the Western State Penitentiary in 
Pittsburgh, to investigate the best way to reorganize the state’s penal apparatus.187 Gov. 
Martin, like his counterpart Premier William McKell in New South Wales, feared a possible 
increase in crime following the end of the war when millions of soldiers would be demobilized 
and employment might decline.188 Like other states in the country, Pennsylvania’s prison 
industries, already in serious decline, faced more cutbacks with the eventual end of war 
production. The Ashe Committee’s survey built on a similar report written the year before by 
criminologist Harry Elmer Barnes for the War Production Board.189 Both Barnes and Ashe 
criticized what they believed was an unmanageable fragmented penal system and they 
emphasized the need for greater centralized oversight. Barnes had recommended that the 
state government establish a cabinet-level department to administer the prisons. Perhaps due 
to need for expediency and the possibility of legislative delay, the Ashe Committee settled on 
investing more authority in the existing Bureau of Correction within the Department of Welfare 
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under the sole leadership of a professional penologist as Commissioner of Correction.190 
Despite this disagreement over the bureaucratic structure, both studies concluded that many of 
the problems caused by fragmentation and poor coordination could be remedied with a 
comprehensive, centralized classification system to control prison assignments and transfers, 
categorize all of the state’s institutions and better allocate resources. Over time, the 
classification system itself would do as much to consolidate the penal bureaucracy as the 
recommendations of experts like Barnes and Ashe or subsequent legislation. 
 Despite the official studies and recommendations, the Pennsylvania’s prisons received 
little legislative attention for a nearly a decade following the war, even though the expected 
increase in prisoners occurred.191 The nationally-known prison expert Austin MacCormick 
argued that the lack of a centralized prisons department in Pennsylvannia (he advocated a 
cabinet-level position) effectively blocked all of the other progressive reforms recommended by 
the Ashe Committee, like a state-wide classification system. This lack of leadership, especially 
by a respected professional penologist, played a large role in the years of official inaction on the 
Ashe Committee’s suggestions.192 This changed abruptly in January 1953, when disturbances 
engulfed Pittsburgh’s Western State Penitentiary and its satellite institution, Rockview 
Penitentiary in central Pennsylvania. Several days of rioting and fires in each prison lead to a 
major inquiry and transformation of the state’s penal bureaucracy. Unlike later inquires, 
however, the tenor of the investigation, debate in the state legislature and media coverage was 
                                                          
190 See the comments of the the well-known penologist, Austin H. MacCormick, who served as a consultant to the 
Ashe Committee. MacCormick, “Why Pennsylvania Needs a State Department of Correction,” The Prison Journal, 
29 (January 1949), 1-6. 
191 There were occasional reminders of the Ashe Committee’s work, but state leaders expended little effort on this 
topic. See, “Duff Asked to Modernize State’s Penal System,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (January 12, 1950). 




generally supportive of the state’s leadership and penal authorities. Following the resolution of 
the disturbances the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorialized that violence revealed the 
longstanding need for changes in the state’s prisons, citing the deplorable conditions and 
administrative deficiencies previously noted by the Ashe Committee nine years before. 193 The 
daily’s editor chided state leaders for their years of inaction on this issue, but emphasized the 
wisdom and thoroughness of the Ashe Committee’s investigation and hoped that a similar “full-
scale survey of Pennsylvania’ penal system” would result. 194 The newspaper called for “a 
sweeping long-range study of the State Penal and parole systems by the best available 
authorities,” and specifically argued that it must include “outstanding penologists.”195  
The newspaper’s level of deference and respect shown to penal experts underscored 
the prestige and authority that professional penologists had acquired in recent years. By 
comparison, the Post-Gazette showed much less enthusiasm for calls for prison reform and 
investigation by prisoners at the Allegheny County Workhouse at Blawnox, which also 
experienced a large, related disturbance at about the same time.196 The lawyer representing 
the prisoners in court, Hymen Schlesinger, was widely known in Pittsburgh as a fellow traveler 
and member of the leftist National Lawyer’s Guide. He recently represented Communists in a 
high-profile sedition case and was the subject of repeated disbarment campaigns by anti-
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communists.197 The penal authorities portrayed the disturbance and the request for a hearing 
as “an overall plot to disrupt the operation of the workhouse,” a conspiracy between 
Schlesinger and “incorrigible prisoners” to generate radical propaganda.198 The Post-Gazette 
further discredited the inmates by reminding readers that “in the past Schlesinger has 
represented many Communist causes.”199 The newspaper showed little sympathy for the rights 
of inmates and their radical lawyer. However, the paper publishe editorials calling for orderly, 
modern prison regime supported by penal expertise. 
Gov. John S. Fine appointed a committee, led by Gen. Jacob L. Devers, to investigate the 
state of the entire prison system, leaving much of the specific details of the riots to inquiries of 
the Attorney-General and state police. 200 The Devers Committee, which included prison 
officials from the states of Illinois and Wisconsin, reiterated many of the findings of the Ashe 
Committee, especially in regard to fragmented nature of Pennsylvania’s penal apparatus, the 
pressing need for centralized prison administration and a state-wide classification system to 
integrate operations.201 The Devers Committee recommended transferring the Bureau of 
Correction from the Department of Welfare to the Department of Justice, but they did not 
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endorse creating a separate, cabinet-level department. After the violence of early 1953, the 
state’s governor and General Assembly quickly moved legislation, establishing the statutory 
authority for the administrative changes.202 Arthur Prasse, warden of the Pennsylvania 
Industrial School at Camp Hill (often also called White Hill), assumed the new office of 
Commissioner of Correction in the consolidated agency, a post he would hold until 1970.  
Under Prasse’s leadership, the Bureau instituted many of the changes recommended by 
the Devers Committee and the Ashe Committee. Prasse’s selection was a telling sign of the 
effort to push the penal agency in a new direction. Prasse’s past experience departed from the 
more traditional custodial background of many of his contemporaries. He began his career in 
corrections as an instructor at the Pennsylvania Training School (commonly referred to as 
Morganza) in 1925.203 In 1940, he helped establish a new George Junior Republic in Grove City, 
Pennsylvania.204 Both institutions were part of the state’s juvenile justice system, holding 
children under the age of 21. In 1950, Prasse assumed to position of superintendent of the 
much larger Pennsylvania Industrial School at Camp Hill, which originally held inmates between 
the ages of 15 and 25.205 The legislature reduced the age ceiling to 21 years of age in the early 
1950s.206 These institutions, Morganza especially, occasionally attracted negative attention for 
mistreating their charges, sometimes severely. Despite this, the routines and administrative 
assumptions of these juvenile facilities resonated far more with the rehabilitative priorities 
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informing the work of the Devers Committee and much of professional penology at the time.207 
The college-educated Prasse developed the habitus of a progressive penologist in these 
institutions with a thorough knowledge of institutional organization designed around a 
reformative total program of work, education, classification, psychological treatment and case 
work under the guidance of professional penologists and social scientists.  
The Camp Hill facility Prasse commanded prior to his promotion was relatively new, 
having been constructed only in 1941. It held young adults and offered greater reformative 
programs and training than many secure facilities for older prisoners and recidivists.208 During 
the 1940s, Camp Hill’s Director of Classification, E.R. East, conducted research on classification 
that gained national penological audiences.209 The Classification Clinic at White Hill did not just 
sort new arrivals. It became a vehicle for achieving numerous penal goals, including ritually 
marking hierarchy, prison order and expertise. As Prasse described the institution’s operational 
philosophy, “the procedures set up for the reception of new admissions are of vital importance. 
The boy’s idea of what his new experience of incarceration may mean to him should be formed 
from his meeting, at his entrance, those qualified to interpret our policy and program.”210 The 
reception center at the industrial school was thus a critical site for establishing the authority of 
this new penal expertise. It was the initial performative venue of this expertise, where the “new 
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Citizen” (Prasse’s term) entered the penal apparatus and came into being before the authority 
and control of “those qualified” administrators.211  
In the wake of the riots of 1953, the Bureau of Correction finally established the state-
wide classification program that reformers and investigators had dreamed of for the better part 
of two decades.212 The Bureau created two new Diagnostic and Classification Centers at the 
Eastern State Penitentiary and the Western State Penitentiary in Pittsburgh.213 In addition to 
empowering the Commissioner of Correction, the enabling legislation also created a deputy 
position whose official title was Deputy Commissioner for Treatment.214 Kenneth E. Taylor, PhD, 
assumed this position after ten years as the staff psychologist at the Western Penitentiary and 
four years in the U.S. Army as a Classification and Assignment Officer.215 The press ran 
numerous articles on the new penal philosophy and regimes emerging from the riots, 
investigation and legislation. Elaborate classification and individualized programs addressing 
the problems that led offenders astray would “cure” criminals (Figures 1:1 and 1:2).216  
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As part of this refashioning of the penal apparatus, the Bureau of Correction followed 
the lead of the American Correctional Association and altered its longstanding penal 
nomenclature to reflect the official emphasis on treatment. Thus, “penitentiaries” became 
“state correctional institutions” and the Bureau replaced the titles “warden” and “prison guard” 
with “superintendent” and “corrections officer.”217 These nomenclature changes did little to 
alter the basic job duties of such prison staff, but they heralded an emerging professionalization 
of the prison service, which was also apparent in a greater commitment to staff training 
following the bureaucratic reorganization.218 Such training introduced many of the new 
concepts of postwar penology to new recruits. While it would be naïve to read training course 
material as an indication of the attitudes or practices of guards, it nevertheless established the 
terms and language of much of the postwar penal practice, reflecting the hegemonic place of 
the new treatment discourse.219 
The new legislative mandate for the Bureau of Correction also entailed greater 
administrative centralization, which created a unified prison “system” and insulated it from the 
disruptions of state politics. The new statutory authority for the Bureau of Correction elevated 
it above the boards of supervisors for each prison. In the past, these latter bodies had effectly 
controlled semi-autonomous prisons. Even though the Bureau of Correction had existed since 
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1921, its role had largely been advisory until 1953.220 Real decision-making and policy matters 
rested with the boards of supervisors, with the rival boards of Eastern State Penitentiary 
(Philadelphia) and Western State Penitentiary (Pittsburgh) being the most powerful.  
To many professional penologists, Pennsylvania’s bureaucratic reform appeared long 
overdue. The state was an outlier among other large states in this fragmentation, something 
Pennsylvanian prison reformers frequently pointed out. Two of Pennsylvania’s neighboring 
states, New York and New Jersey, had illustrious reputations in national and international penal 
reform circles for their comprehensive approach to penal administration. Their bureaucratic 
arrangements were widely seen as enabling experimentation with new progressive penal 
practices.221 This was, perhaps, more true of classification than any other practice. As a penal 
technique, classification hinges upon the creation of some central point of remove, where 
experts—whoever they may be—can view and access spatially distributed facilities, personnel, 
capacities, inmates and other resources. Once classification moves beyond internal 
applications, i.e. within a particular prison, to encompass several different prisons scattered 
throughout a jurisdiction, it became much harder to coordinate without creating another 
vantage point that could consolidate the various prisons through its operations. Although 
Michel Foucault rightly pointed out that classification, in general, has been part of 
imprisonment since its inception, the iteration of this practice that emboldened the dreams and 
hopes of mid-twentieth-century penologists was predicated as much on the governing power 
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that had accrued in centralized bureaucratic formations in addition to the specific penological 
techniques and sciences animating classification practices.  
The existing centralized, bureaucratic structure in New South Wales facilitated the 
introduction of many new practices during Leslie Nott’s tenure. Unlike Pennsylvania and most 
American states, New South Wales inherited a state system designed originally to manage 
convicts. Ruled throughout much of the nineteenth century by military governors, the state’s 
political system, while based on Westminster parliamentary practice, nevertheless retained a 
degree of centralization in executive agencies and a reliance on certain practices, like the use of 
royal commissions, that would have appeared authoritarian to many American audiences prior 
to the 1930s.222 The allure of bureaucratic consolidation, which appeared increasingly 
throughout many parts of the world in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, also animated the 
possibilities of treatment and rehabilitation in the penological imaginaries or progressive 
reformers. If centralized bureaucratic arrangements and institutional treatment provided 
answers to the failures of imprisonment after World War II, by the late 1960s, these practices 
appeared to hinder the goal of reforming inmates and reintegrating them back into society.  
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Figure 2: Convicts Are Classified: Grouping Vital In Prison Plan 
                         
Examples of press accounts of the new rehabilitation regime emerging in Pennsylvania’s prison 
system in the aftermath of riots. Figure 1: “Rehabilitation Chief Goal: New State Prison Reforms 
Under Way,” Sun-Telegraph (January 10, 1954), newsclipping. Figure 2: “Convicts Are Classified: 
Grouping Vital In Prison Plan,” Sun-Telegraph (January 11, 1954), newsclipping NEWSPAPER 
CLIPPINGS, 1953-1987, September 1953-September 1954, 14-1555 carton 1, RG-58: Records of 








The Limits of the Postwar Penal Bureaucracy: Decarceration and Normalization  
 
By the mid-to-late 1960s, the postwar reforms to the penal apparatus began to lose their 
appeal and authority. Many inmates and people working in prisons viewed the reforms as false 
promises or deeply compromised by the custodial realities of prisons and the resistance of 
many of the prison staff to the goals and techniques of inmate reform. Some segments of the 
penal establishment, especially guards,223 never entirely agreed with many of the postwar 
changes, which undermined their previously exclusive authority over inmates. Yet, by the late 
1960s, some senior prison administrators, treatment staff and academic researchers—the very 
groups of people empowered by the postwar changes—began to shift their views about the 
appropriateness of many practices in the postwar prison, including even the notion of 
confinement itself. Numerous plans to de-center the prison as the major site of punishment 
appeared in multiple jurisdictions and academic publications during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. These new ideas did not reject the goal of rehabilitation, but recognized the limits of 
achieving this goal within prisons. Consequently, the spatial locus of the therapeutic model in 
these new views moved further away from maximum-security prisons and custodial institutions 
in general.  
                                                          




Under the rubric of community corrections or decarceration, various new programs and 
status-levels for inmates swept over correctional practice between 1965 and 1975. Within a 
span of about five years—from 1968 to 1973—prison and parole authorities in New South 
Wales and Pennsylvania developed programs like work or education release, temporary 
furloughs, periodic detention, community correction centers, regional jails for lesser offenders, 
and community service orders in an effort to move away from the use of the maximum-
security, fortress- or factory-like prisons. At the same time, similar criticism of the prison 
mounted from other quarters.  These far more contentious critiques and actions, undertaken 
by courts, inmates, some staff and prison reformers outside the apparatus, also targeted many 
aspects of life inside maximum-security institutions. Both of these areas of reform shared a 
common theme that the very nature of institutional life in a maximum security prison (the 
predominate type of prison in New South Wales and Pennsylvania) negated reform efforts and 
damaged the people subjected to it. It was also extremely expensive to operate these massive 
institutions.  
Yet, such criticisms were hardly new. As a number of writers have pointed out, certain 
critiques of the prison (e.g. that it damages people or further inures them to criminality) 
developed in tandem with the institution since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.224 
Such arguments became more convincing to people in this field during the 1960s because they 
resonated with other immanent critiques of government programs, especially in the area of 
social welfare, and in the United States, where the community corrections movement first 
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gained widespread traction.225 Political scientist Sidney Milkis has argued that many reformers 
of the Great Society era shared an uneasiness about the administrative power of their New 
Deal predecessors who had fewer qualms about centralized authority. The emphasis on “public 
participation” in numerous American federal programs in the 1960s and 1970s stemmed from 
this paradoxical desire among governing liberals to use executive administrative means to 
achieve social policies goals (and more ambitiously, social change) while simultaneously 
developing methods to blunt the bureaucratic remoteness and unaccountability they saw in the 
same executive institutions.226 227 
The most explicit expression of this liberal governing disposition in the United States 
was the development the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Community Action Program 
during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.228 The Community Action Program sought to 
address problems like juvenile delinquency and poverty partly though facilitating active 
community involvement in the provision of services like education, mentoring and job-training. 
The designers of the Community Action Program perceived powerful integrating and socializing 
forces in these localities that they believed could be harnessed to federal funding and expertise 
to ameliorate social problems in ways beyond the normal capacities of a more socially-distant 
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government.229 Moreover, reformers argued that active participation itself had community-
building and empowering qualities which, it was hoped could overcome destructive patterns of 
economic inequality, racism and crime. 
As historian Howard Brick has noted, the concept of “community” held a wide appeal 
beyond just these areas of social policy during the 1960s. It had utopian qualities and was often 
deeply ambiguous, at times even contradictory.230 More than establishing a clear vision of what 
constituted a community or what counted as participation in the development and operation of 
government programs, this discourse directed deep criticism at longstanding institutions and 
the prevailing bureaucratic conceptualization of social problems and solutions.231 The creation 
of community treatment centers and related programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s most 
clearly embodied a penological version of the community-focused governance of 1960s-era 
American liberalism.  
Community corrections programs were hardly confined to the United States. Much like 
the earlier moment of postwar reform, the decarceration movement was a transnational 
phenomenon, also occurring in multiple different jurisdictions, especially in Western Europe 
and Australasia. Yet, the appearance of such programs and discourse flowed in waves across 
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different jurisdictions, often acquiring and discarding certain aspects, critiques and forms in the 
process. These different waves of decarceration programs occurred well into the early 1980s, 
with certain programs appearing in some jurisdictions long after others had abandoned or 
reduced such efforts.232  Sociologist Janet Chan has argued that the decarceration movement 
has always had this patterning of temporal and spatial diversity and that as an object of 
research, it changes while being studied. This complicates the notion of a unitary definition of 
the decarceration movement.233 Whatever the analytical utility of such definitions, these 
practices were clearly interrelated and informed each other in the ebb and flow of penal 
discourse, circulating in professional societies, study tours, training programs and international 
governance organizations devoted to criminal justice matters.234 The creation of such programs 
in both Pennsylvania and New South Wales formed part of a major shift in each state’s penal 
system and were often marked by the ascension of new administrators in each state’s 
respective penal bureaucracy. These younger leaders, who were more dedicated to these new 
programs, replaced older senior penal bureaucrats within these penal bureaucracies and 
became closely identified with these programs, for better or worse. 
Since the mid-1970s, the decarceration movement has attracted a lot of critical 
scholarship. Sociologist Stanley Cohen has claimed the various programs and interventions in 
                                                          
232 Janet Chan notes that many officers in the Department of Corrective Services were well aware of some of the 
poor results of American and British decarceration programs as well as the critiques of the net-widening aspects of 
these programs. Such knowledge factored into the design of their programs. See Chan, Doing Less Time: Penal 
Reform in Crisis (Sydney: Institute of Criminology, 1992), 15. 
233 Ibid. 
234 See, for instance, descriptions of non-institutional approaches to punishment and offender reform as well as 
community involvement in the reports and proceedings of the Third and Forth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, (Stockholm, Sweden 9 - 18 August 1965 and Kyoto, Japan 17 - 26 





the community corrections movement should be recognized definitively as state projects 
regardless of their adulation for the socializing powers of the community.235 In fact, Cohen 
argues, “most attempts to recreate community [through such programs] in fact constitute 
evidence of the end of community.”236 The very informal social practices, stemming from such 
things like family and work structures, were often missing or declining in the areas where many 
inmates had lived. Alternatively, such offenders might have actually been well socialized in 
communities that tolerated, encouraged or perpetrated criminal behavior.237  Many critics have 
also pointed out that instead of replacing imprisonment or reducing its use, the range of lesser, 
community penalties increased the penal apparatus’s ability to absorb more offenders, often 
referred to as the “net-widening” phenomenon.238 Rather than reduce levels of imprisonment, 
these programs created new penal populations. Low-level offenders, who previously would not 
have received much more than a fine, were now sentenced to harsher, community penalties. 
Even with the movement of some previously imprisoned offenders from secure institutions into 
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pre-release programs, the level of imprisonment did not drop as drastically as reformers would 
have hoped.239 
There are two other important aspects of community corrections programs that are 
often undeveloped in this critical literature, which I want to highlight. First, implicit (and 
sometimes explicit) in the community corrections agenda was a critique of the criminal justice 
system, especially the prison, which emphasized the destructive aspects of confinement. 
Whatever the truthfulness of such claims, these criticisms usually came directly from state 
officials—senior prison bureaucrats—and described the failure of their own areas of 
administration. If in the early 1950s prison authorities presented a confident appraisal of their 
work and the potential innovations and successes to come from the new focus on treatment, 
by the late 1960s, these penal authorities painted a bleak picture of the same institutions and 
programs. While still supporting the use of confinement, their statements indicated, directly or 
indirectly, that prisons were to be reserved for violent offenders and those beyond the reach of 
reformative efforts.  
Secondly, the community corrections movement expanded the arena of public debate 
and participation over penal policy and was ironically often the source of friction with people 
beyond the prison system (i.e. the community). Much of the academic literature on 
decarceration has focused on how the disciplinary powers of the prison system seeped into 
areas of social life “outside” the criminal justice system. Penal discipline, in effect, overran 
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people and places far beyond the walls, turning half-way houses and various other support 
institutions in lesser forms of prisons. However, the community correction movement also 
sought to enroll communities, organization and prominent or even ordinary citizens into this 
project. Such programs relied on the capabilities and willingness of groups and individuals 
representing the “community” to assist in their operations. Such community groups often 
consisted of organizations already well-informed about criminal justice or social welfare 
matters and those possessing forms of expertise in this area. This increased the penal 
bureaucracies’ interactions with civil society organizations in the coordination and operation of 
new community corrections programs. In many such arrangements, the line between state and 
civil society, which previously may have been clearer, became much more porous. These new 
groups and individuals now became greater participants in a public of penal policy matters and 
often disagreed with the official state agencies. This was in marked contrast to how penal 
bureaucracies controlled such issues for decades. This issue became even more pronounced 
when other agencies (the police and judiciary) and people not so closely aligned with 
rehabilitative goals or opposed to them openly criticized such programs and sought to block 
their implementation.     
In addition to these reform projects outside secure prisons, conflicts ensued inside each 
state’s secure prisons over declining living conditions and what appeared to many inmates (and 
some staff) as anachronistic and unnecessary practices. While senior officials and some 
superintendents in New South Wales and Pennsylvania ameliorated a few of the harsh aspects 
of prison life, these changes were piecemeal and often too slow or partial for the people 




increased leisure and sporting activities, the creation of debating and writing societies, 
increased religious freedom the publication of inmate newsletters, less censorship restrictions 
on mail and literature and less insistence on uniform haircuts and attire. Prison administrators 
often described these changes as “normalizing” institutional life, in essence making it 
correspond more with life outside prison. More often than not, however, the changes approved 
by prison officials fell short of the rising expectations of inmates, who insisted on greater 
openness and fewer restrictions. In Pennsylvania and the United States in general, judicial 
intervention, prompted by inmates’ lawsuits, forced many of these changes on prison system. 
In other cases, state governments and leaders of prison agencies pursued reforms in an effort 
to ward off inmate lawsuits and pre-empt judicial intervention. The judiciary did not intervene 
to nearly same extent in New South Wales and Australia in general, but there were a few 
significant rulings that ensured greater access to due process.  
As much as such changes improved life behind bars for inmates, they also formed 
intense sites of dispute between staff and inmates and often between different groups of 
inmates. Prison officers in particular resented many of these changes, which they considered 
direct assaults on their authority to manage inmates, enforce discipline and control the 
institutions. Between these disputes and resentments over being excluded from community 
corrections programs, inmates became more openly critical and challenging about their status 
and rights. 
 





In October 1970, Pennsylvania’s Republican Gov. Raymond Shafer replaced Arthur 
Prasse, the state’s Commissioner of Correction for the last seventeen years, with the 38 year-
old Allyn Sielaff. Prasse worked in the state’s prisons and juvenile institutions for forty years 
and directed the introduction of progressive penological reforms in the decades following 
World War II. Despite these credentials, newspaper editorials in 1970 painted him as a 
“traditionalist” compared to the “progressive” Sielaff.240 Many people within state government 
shared a similar view. As William Carlin, Director of the Bureau of Systems Analysis, put it, 
Commissioner Prasse had a reputation for “independence and strong ideas concerning the 
operation of the prison system” and would “resist real innovation and restructuring of the 
prison program.”241  
In many ways, Prasse resembled one his more well-known contemporaries—Joseph E. 
Ragen, warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary Joliet-Stateville in and later director of that 
state’s Department of Public Safety. Ragen, like Prasse, had a reputation for reform—both men 
served as presidents of the American Correctional Association—and authoritarian control over 
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the institutions under their command.242 The Devers Committee, which investigated 
Pennsylvania’s prison riots of 1953 and lead to Prasse’s appointment as Commissioner of 
Correction, actually included Ragen as one of its members. Much like Ragen, Prasse 
represented many of the postwar changes, but likewise would never have been considered a 
liberal in penological circles. Both men exemplified the elastic nature of reform discourse 
during this period; their mixture of believable accounts and principles of reform with 
authoritarian control sat comfortably within the postwar penological establishment. 
However, by the late 1960s, new views of the proper role of prisons were becoming 
more prominent in national and international penology, which undermined Prasse’s status as a 
prison reformer. A younger cohort of correctional officials, empowered by the postwar reforms, 
embodied many of these new trends in penological common sense. Allyn Sielaff distinguished 
himself as Prasse’s deputy for two years prior to his promotion by developing new community 
corrections programs, particularly establishing pre-release centers, which helped inmates 
transition to less restrictive settings with greater privileges prior to their release to the 
community.243 While Prasse had also favored such programs and was instrumental in their 
development, Sielaff was clearly the greater advocate of non-institutional approaches and 
alternatives to incarceration. A generation younger than Prasse, he exemplified the training and 
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views of a new cohort of correctional professionals who came to see prisons as deeply 
problematic and compromised institutions that were nevertheless necessary.244 As much as 
Sielaff and like-minded reformers in the Bureau of Correction, like SCI Graterford’s 
superintendent, Robert Johnson, held such dim views of the penal system, they were also 
deeply dependent on it. Certain postwar innovations, especially in the area of classification, 
were simply indispensable to their penological objects and programs.245 Nevertheless, Sielaff 
was far more open to considering changes to the prisons and exploring the nature of prisoners’ 
rights in the day-to-day affairs of institutional life. To Prasse, such questions would have meant 
a loss of control over the institutions.246 
Prasse’s dismissal also happened amidst reports of rising crime and in the aftermath of 
serious urban disorder in several Pennsylvania cities. Urban rioting247 occurred in Philadelphia 
in 1964, Pittsburgh in 1968, and York in 1969, as well as in many other American cities, 
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especially following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1968.248 Local officials in 
these cities and their respective counties responded to the disturbances with a mixture of 
reform efforts and security crackdowns.249 Police forces in major cities like Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh expected the unrest to continue and purchased more heavy, military-style 
equipment, undertook tactical training for urban unrest, and re-envisioned their presence and 
duties in urban areas.250 This increased operational capacity of law enforcement accompanied 
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more aggressive policing strategies, which soon led to greater arrests and overcrowding 
pressures on local jails.251 This influx of people into these lower ends of the state’s criminal 
justice system eventually increased the number of commitments to state prisons in the late 
1960s as more and more people, especially the poor and young, African-American and Latino 
men, accumulated arrest and conviction records, making them more vulnerable afterward to 
being sentenced to time in state prison.252  
The prevalence of urban disturbances and changes in policing exposed deeper changes 
in many Northern urban areas that directly impacted criminal justice practices. Racial disparities 
had been apparent in arrest and institutional population statistics for decades. Until the second 
half of the twentieth century, this usually meant that while legal authorities disproportionately 
targeted, convicted, sentenced and incarcerated African-Americans their relatively small 
numbers in the state meant that the total number of incarcerated African Americans remained 
small compared to the far more numerous white inmates.253 By mid-century, however, this 
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disproportionate representation and the ratio of white to black inmates steadily rose as millions 
of African Americans migrated northward toward industrial urban centers like Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh.254 By the 1950s, migrants from Puerto Rico, many of whom came to the 
Philadelphia in the 1950s and 1960s, also began to appear disproportionately in city, county 
and state penal institutions at roughly the same time, although in smaller overall numbers than 
African Americans and white inmates.255 Notwithstanding earlier manifestations of racial 
discrimination in the criminal justice systems of Northern cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, 
the population changes in these urban centers and the emergence of deeply segregated 
residential patterns and concentrations of poverty in such cities after 1950256 fueled a process 
that historian Heather Thompson has referred to as the “criminalization of urban space.” This 
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propelled racial disparities in prisons to the degree that the topic of race and racism permeated 
and structured discussions of penal reform, policing and sentencing from this point onward in a 
much more visible manner than previously.257  
During the 1960s, “non-white” inmates displaced white inmates as the largest 
demographic racial group in the state’s prisons.258 Over 54 percent of Pennsylvania’s state 
prisoners in a June 1970 population report were officially categorized as “Negro,” which was a 
catch-all racial designation for those not considered “White.”259 Within a few years, the 
category “Non-white” actually superseded the category “Negro” in statistical publications of 
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the Bureau of Correction. This designation by exclusion symbolized an emerging tension in the 
post war reform agenda. Although addressed to a far different penal and political situation, 
John DiIulio’s remark that “At the core of every penology is some understanding of what the 
‘typical’ prisoner is like” is particularly instructive here.260 Most of the reforms of the 1940s and 
1950s, which sought to reform wayward offenders through training or treatment, were tacitly 
predicated on the penal authorities’ assumption that the subject of reform was a white male. 
This meant that the governing narrative of how offenders were to be reformed and returned to 
society in the immediate postwar decades was a far more believable account when the subject 
was a white man who, almost by default, would be expected to enjoy the full benefits of 
citizenship and stable employment. This account could not be sustained for “non-white” and 
female inmates, especially at a time when civil rights movements beyond the walls of the 
prisons protested racist and sexist barriers to just these very aspects of full citizenship. This 
whiteness of the penal subject invested many of the reforms, programs and prison routines 
established in the decades following World War II. If this meant difficulties and exclusions for 
the fewer numbers of non-whites in the state’s penal system early on, by the mid-1960s, the 
tacit whiteness of the progressive penological reforms produced intense friction in the prisons 
when the number of non-white inmates surpassed the number of white inmates. 
 
Pennsylvania: Whose Community?: The Promise and Perils of Community Corrections  
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While most police forces became more aggressive in their approach to crime and 
policing urban areas, Gov. Raymond Shafer endorsed plans under development in Bureau of 
Correction for less punitive approaches reducing offending and in particular, recidivism. This 
included an expansion of a number of community corrections programs and the establishment 
of minimum security community service centers. This approached narrowed the intended 
subjects of reform in the sense that unlike the emphasis on reformative programs in the 1950s, 
which sought to rehabilitate the offenders while they were in prison, community corrections 
programs focused more on those inmates nearing the end of their time in custody or those who 
were diverted away from prison all together. This is not to argue that interventions simply 
ceased inside prisons. This was certainly not the case. Federal social programs, like the 
Economic Opportunity Act, actually helped Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Correction extend many 
prison-based programs, particularly in English literacy education.261 Various other federal 
initiatives, like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Manpower Development 
and Training Act, provided additional funds for training and education courses in several 
Pennsylvanian prisons.262 The emphasis on community corrections instead marked a 
recognition among prison officials and members of Gov. Shafer’s administration that there 
were limits to the effectiveness of rehabilitation inside institutions and that some offenders 
were far less amenable to reform.   
This position directed a great deal of attention on the routine failures of the prison 
system to live up to its postwar reform agenda. Many correctional administrators were quite 
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blunt in their admissions of the failures of the prison to reform its charges, but often attempted 
to absolve themselves by 1). citing numerous resistences in the prison environment, especially 
from guards and 2). relocating the social space and responsibilities for reform outside the 
prison walls in the new programs. In a letter to Attorney-General William Sennett concerning an 
upcoming speech by the governor on corrections, Richard Lindsey, a member of the Board of 
Probation and Parole, summarized the administration’s penal philosophy: 
 
Men and women who are imprisoned return to their communities. It is good 
common sense to change them into law-abiding citizens. Punishment alone has 
failed. Most individuals given the right type of help can change. We need, 
therefore, to emphasize rehabilitating those salvageable. Not to do so is a 
serious shortcoming of our system, for 80% of those arrested have been arrested 
before and are responsible for a large share of crime. At the same, time we must 
not return to the community those who remain dangerous. Because the answer 
to controlling crimes lies in the local community, and because most offenders 
return, we must emphasize community programs.263 
 
Most of Lindsey’s comment would have sounded familiar to penologists of Prasse’s generation. 
Many prison reformers writing in the 1940s echoed most of these sentiments. The notion that 
punishment alone was an ineffective response to crime was a widely-held belief among prison 
reformers from well before World War II. The main difference between these earlier reform 
projects and those of the late 1960s were indicated in Lindsey’s last sentence. The locus of 
effective reform lay outside the prison system in the community; prison authorities needed to 
harness the potentialities of communities if they hoped to reform as many offenders as 
possible. 





Upon assuming the leadership of the Bureau of Correction, Sielaff pushed forward with 
programs like temporary home furloughs, work release and educational release. While 
legislative approval for such programs had been granted in 1968, it took many more months of 
planning for these programs to become operational. This involved purchasing or leasing land to 
established new community service centers as well as create program inclusion screening 
procedures. The Democratic Majority Leader, Rep. K. Leroy Irvis (D-Pittsburgh), sponsored 
several pieces of legislation during the early 1970s in support of Sielaff’s agenda. He also 
advocated several other changes, like a good-time incentive system for prisoners to earn time 
off their sentences for good behavior in prison, a proposal that ultimately failed to gain 
legislative approval.264  
The tenor of prison reform proposals at time actually emphasized more treatment, 
education and work opportunities. In some ways this was a recommitment or intensification of 
the progressive postwar reform project. However, the emphasis on targeting the young and 
lesser offenders became even more pronounced. It was not just that these offenders were 
more remediable, as reformers a generation earlier argued. Rather, programs and interventions 
needed to be directed at preventing such offenders from becoming institutionalized.265 In other 
words, interventions were needed to prevent prison environemnts from inflicting lasting harm 
on these younger inmates. Sielaff, his political supporters in the General Assembly, Gov. Shafer 
and later Gov. Milton Shapp argued that programs like these were necessary because of the 
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state’s prisons and the penal bureaucracy, as currently constituted, simply failed to fulfill their 
mission of reforming their wards and appeared to many observers to simply make them worse. 
If most offenders who would eventually return to the community, programs needed to not only 
address criminal behavior that might lead to recidivism, but also neutralize the destructive and 
criminogenic propensities of the prison. New programs in prison would facilitate the transition 
to community corrections centers. 
However, administration officials often had a very difficult time convincing members of 
the public and especially other law enforcement officials, like the police, district attorneys and 
members of the judiciary, of the benefits and wisdom of community corrections programs. 
Sielaff often sounded on the defensive in his public statements about such programs, which 
departed significantly from the authoritative pronouncements of prison officials like 
Commissioner Prasse a decade or two earlier. In an interview with the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
Sielaff tried to explain some of the reasoning underpinning the new furlough program. He 
acknowledged that the Bureau was receiving a lot of public criticism over the program, but 
argued that “was not set up to make the administration look like a good guy, but to answer 
some rehabilitative problems.”266 Beyond the oft-repeated notion that most offenders would 
eventual return to the community, Sielaff returned to a central problem in correctional 
treatment, one raised by Donald Clemmer in 1940, namely how the social system of the prison 
molds the reactions of inmates toward prison authorities. Sielaff claimed that “many inmates 
seemed to fit in, but they are really manipulating their reactions to please those who keep 
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watch on them.”267 This phenomenon was widely known by prison staff and often conditioned 
how they viewed the statements of individuals involved in treatment programs or when they 
appeared before classification committees or the parole board. The furlough program 
addressed this issue, according to Sielaff, by disrupting this interpersonal dynamic between 
staff and inmates and also removing some inmates from the immediate influence of other 
prisoners in secure confinement. Community corrections would dispel the corruption of the 
prison community. 
For those eligible to participating in the program, furloughs placed much of the 
responsibility for change and after-care plans on the particular inmate in question. Furloughed 
inmates spent only a few days outside the prison before having to return to either pre-release 
center or a secure prison. The Bureau made no arrangements for supervising inmates on 
furloughs. Participants did not even have to report to parole agents. In fact, many parole 
agents, police and sentencing judges had no knowledge that these furloughed inmates were at 
large, a fact that enraged these other officials as they gradually came to understand the nature 
of these programs.268 While this lack of supervision appeared irresponsible to many in the law 
enforcement community, Sielaff argued that it actually empowered inmates to deal with their 
own problems and take ownership of their plans for post-prison life. “Tom K.,” an inmate on 
                                                          
267 Ibid. 
268 See some of the newsclippings in K. Leroy Irvis Papers, specifically, “Inmates ‘Furloughed’ in New Reform 
Program: Most State Judge Oppose Priosner Release Plan,” The Morning Call, (January 20, 1972), newsclipping; 
“Tight Con Release Code Urged,” Pittsburgh Press, (March 15, 1972); “Pre-Release: Concept is Carried Too Far,” 
Patriot-News, (May 30, 1972), newsclipping; “Despite Philadelphia Complaints, Prisoner Furlough Program 
Defended,” Sunday Patriot-News, (November 26, 1972), newsclipping; “Prisons Chief Defends Furlough Plan,” 
Patriot-News, (November 11, 1972), newsclipping; “Furlough Plan ‘Absurd,’ Sprague Tells Parley,” Bulletin, (January 
14, 1972), newsclipping. K. Leroy Irvis Papers, 1979 Addition, 1945-1979 Political Subject Files, 1945-1978, box 5, 




furlough, also interviewed by the Post-Gazette, explained that he visited a barber school to 
discuss the possibilities of a job once he had completed his sentence and also explored 
community treatment options for his admitted difficulties with alcohol.269 The reporter quoted 
Tom’s understanding of rehabilitation, “you’re the only one who can solve your problems. You 
know? That’s why this furlough program is good for me.”270 Another furloughed inmate 
described working the garden of his family home and talking to his ill father. Maintaining these 
family relationships and duties through the furlough gave him hope, “something to continue to 
look forward to” when he returned to prison.  
The use of inmate voices in such new stories lent credence to the wisdom and 
consensus on such programs; inmates supported such programs in these statements and 
aligned their reasoning with penal reformers like Sielaff.271 Yet, these depictions of the furlough 
program also lent credence to the claims of many inmates that confinement was simply 
destructive. These accounts also appeared unusual in that they gave the appearance of 
cooperation between penal reformers and inmates and did not feature prison officers or the 
police. Such a depiction would not have been well received by all readers of the daily. 
Whatever its merits, the Bureau of Correction premised the furlough program on the 
notion that their own institutions and expertise could not fulfill one of the major the tasks 
historically assigned to them—adequately reform the reformable in prison. This official 
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admission, embedded in the very nature of the program, spoke volumes about the changes in 
penal expertise, its reflexive self-assessment and willingness to concede some of the authority 
and responsibility for inmate reform—to nebulously-defined “community” and in some 
respects inmates themselves. The goal of individualizing treatment, which animated the 
classification practices established in the early 1950s, remained a major aspect of how 
reformers, like Sielaff, understood these programs, but as his explanation to the Post-Gazette 
revealed, part of this process involved removing direct control or facilitating reform and 
reintegration through encouragement and trust. This strategy sat at the outer edge of penal 
expertise and control, simultaneously marking its own limits within a program that it ultimately 
controlled with inmates whose participation in such programs could be revoked at will be the 
authorities.272 This humbling position was also very public because of the community 
corrections programs were visible by their very nature compared with imprisonment and 
because the Bureau of Correction, the Shafer administration and its Democratic successor 
under Gov. Milton Shapp, publicly emphasized the importance of such programs. As such, they 
also became sources of critical media commentary and dispute among other state and county 
officials.  
                                                          
272 The rationale underpinning these programs resembles David Garland’s description of the “responsibilization 
strategy” pursued by many criminal justice agencies since the 1970s and 1980s, which “involves the central 
government seeking to act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social 
work, etc.) but instead by acting indirectly, seeking to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and 
organizations.” I would, nevertheless, argue that programs like furloughs retained a significant degree of direct 
control while placing a large amount of responsibility for success in the hands of the specific individuals in these 
programs. David Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society,” 




While often supportive of pretrial diversion options, like the new Accelerated 
Rehabilitation Disposition program,273 members of the state’s judiciary and police forces almost 
immediately began criticizing the various prison release programs.274 Judges resented having 
the sentences they handed down being modified by discretionary release, and police claimed 
that they were not notified about the release of inmates back into communities. Both judges 
and police also argued that the programs suffered from extremely poor screening procedures 
and claimed that the Bureau permitted far too many undeserving or dangerous inmates to 
participate in such programs.275 Such disputes often encompassed several days or weeks’ worth 
of new coverage as district attorneys, judges, senior police commanders (like Philadelphia’s 
outspoken Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo), police union officials and mayors sparred with the 
Bureau of Correction over the benefits and unnecessary risks of furloughs and other forms of 
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conditional release.276 Such criticism placed the Bureau of Corrections continually in the 
position of defending and justifying its programs in the face of accusations of irresponsible risks 
to public safety.  
When Frank Rizzo became mayor of Philadelphia in 1972, he periodically lambasted 
Allyn Sielfaff and Gov. Shapp over the furlough program. Rizzo, a conservative Democrat who 
spent nearly thirty years as a Philadelphia police officer, was well-known for his law and order 
positions and difficult relationship with Philadelphia’s African American community. It was not 
necessarily surprising that he opposed a liberal penal reform program. However, his intentions 
to run for governor in the next election also played a role in his public opposition to the 
furlough program. His criticism allowed him to attack his future opponent for the Democratic 
primary from a position where his law enforcement credentials weighed heavily. Although, 
Rizzo was not alone in this campaign against furloughs. Philadelphia’s District Attorney Richard 
Sprague and Common Pleas Court Judge James T. McDermott joined Mayor Rizzo at press 
conference on Tuesday, November 21, 1972 to announce the finding of a report produced by 
the mayor detailing lapses in security in the furlough program, including the escape of twelve 
men from SCI Graterford while they were on furlough.277  
All three officials argued that the program was irresponsible and a threat to public 
safety. Several of the escapees had records of violent crime, including participation in the 
massive July 4, 1970 disturbance at Holmesburg Prison.278 Judge McDermott and District 
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Attorney Sprague each called for a special grand jury investigation into the escapes from 
Graterford and Rizzo threatened to pursue a federal grand jury is this failed.279 Commissioner 
Sielaff and Gov. Shapp responded soon afterward, but they avoided discussing the specific 
escapes or how the furlough program operated at Graterford.280 Instead, they both claimed 
that the program was an overwhelming success with 98 percent of furloughed inmates 
returning. The program’s benefits outweighed the few inevitable failures.281 Gov. Shapp 
announced that he would ask the State Supreme Court create “a panel of citizens” to evaluate 
the furlough program.282 He felt that to convene a grand jury in Montgomery County, where 
Graterford was located, would simply invite other counties to do the same. Shapp predicted 
that then, “Our prison officials would be required to spend much time appearing for 
questioning and would not be able to concentrate their efforts as they should on improving the 
programs.”283 Nevertheless, Rizzo returned to the topic of the furlough program the following 
year in a speech considered to be his opening statement for the coming gubernatorial election: 
 
Remember, it was Gov. Shapp who literally threw open the gates of our prisons, 
freeing hardened, vicious criminals to prey on our citizens. Gov. Shapp 
accomplished this through a furlough system whereby hardened criminals were 
sent home on weekend passes.284 
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Whatever the furlough programs success, it was politically toxic and its benefits hard to 
articulate in a convincing manner in the political discourse of the news media.   
In some case, the Bureau of Correction’s plans community corrections programs drew 
sharp opposition from the very communities that the penal authorities viewed as ultimately the 
best place for inmate reform. In 1969, the Bureau moved forward with a plan to create several 
pre-release in several urban centers across the state. Bureau officials intended these facilities to 
help inmates nearing the end of their sentences readjust to an unstructured and hopefully law-
abiding life upon release.285 Bureau officials considered the first center in Harrisburg a success 
and planned more for Erie, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Spearheaded by the Task Force for 
Community Treatment Center Planning, a coalition of numerous professionals and social justice 
organizations across the state worked with the Bureau and Department of Justice to establish a 
“Model Community Treatment Center for Southwestern Pennsylvania” for women in 
Pittsburgh.286 This joint planning process, involving a coalition of local and interested leaders 
and state agencies, reflected a common pattern of social policy formation and implementation 
mid-1960s American liberalism. However, in Philadelphia, the local community actually 
picketed the proposed site of one of pre-lease centers at the intersection of Island Road and 
Saybrook Avenue.287  
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Lead by future Philadelphia Mayor, W. Wilson Goode, the Paschal Betterment League 
organized the protest and lobbied city and state officials with their concerns about the pre-
release center. The building at Island Road and Saybrook Avenue had already been a home for 
recently-released prisoners, a private philanthropic venture by a local contractor named Joseph 
Liberati.288 The Bureau purchased the site, believing that there would be little or no objections 
because of this prior project.289 Wilson Goode told the Southwest Globe Times, “’Of course, 
we’re concerned with helping people who are coming out of prison, but we have a real 
question of priorities here.’”290 He explained that Paschal residents had been pleading with the 
city for years for increased services in their area, which had grown considerably with the 
opening of several new housing projects. Writing for the Paschal Betterment League, Goode 
demanded that the preparations for the pre-release center cease immediately and the site be 
used for a “comprehensive multi-purpose center that would serve the many needs of the 
community.”291 The Paschal Betterment League’s activities pushed Philadelphia’s Managing 
Director, Fred Corleto, to also contact the Bureau of Correction and demand that they halt their 
plans.292 The Bureau abandoned its plans for the facility on the condition that Philadelphia 
officials would help them locate an alternative site.293  
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Perhaps the biggest difference between the fates of the initial pre-release center 
planning in Pittsburgh, Harrisburg and Philadelphia was degree or lack of local support and the 
nature of both the opposition and coalitions, which supported the Bureau’s plans. The 
advocates for the Pittsburgh plan clearly represent better educated, white, middle class 
reformers. One of the most active members of this coalition, Margaret S. Cyert, was active in 
the League of Women Voters, the spouse of a Carnegie Mellon University professor, and a local 
child care reformer.294 By comparison, the Paschal Betterment League represented a largely 
African-American, neighborhood, poor in comparison to many other areas of the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania-Philadelphia area. The Bureau’s facility would have directly affected their 
neighborhood, and even though there had already been a transitional living house for ex-
prisoners at the site, representatives of the Paschal Betterment League argued that their 
community had many other unfulfilled needs that simply superseded the desires of the distant 
Bureau of Correction. Despite the initial success of the planning operation in Pittsburgh, the 
actual proposed location of the facility (near the campus of Carnegie Mellon University and the 
wealthy neighborhood of Shadyside) also generated enough resistance from prominent city 
residents (the Mellon and Scaife families), that the Bureau of Correction abandoned its plans.295 
The Bureau eventually found alternative sites in both cities for these centers. They spent more 
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time planning their operations, including accommodating local officials more in locating 
politically suitable sites thereafter.296 
While many prisoners benefited from the furlough program and assignment to pre-
release centers, these programs nevertheless created tensions in many of the state’s 
maximum-security prisons. It took very little to excite resentments in such prisons. During the 
course of the 1960s, the racial composition of the state’s prison population shifted 
dramatically, with white inmates becoming a minority in 1965.297 Racial discourse and the topic 
of racial discrimination permeated nearly every interaction and practice in prison during this 
period and many inmate complaints about the furlough and pre-release programs reflected 
this. The fact that such programs were fundamentally restrictive and did not include all 
prisoners meant that questions of race and discrimination adhered to many inmates’ views of 
the selection process. Prolonged, coerced familiarity with so many people generates an unusual 
degree of comparison and evaluation among and between inmates and staff, which became 
deeply racialized in this context. Many prisoners who were not included in the furlough 
program deeply resented it, its screening procedures, those who designed and operated it, 
seeing in their exclusion unfairness, arbitrary decisions, discrimination and secretive 
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conspiracies designed to frustrate or oppress them. The furlough program, selective as it was, 
could not accommodate the unusually high importance attached to notions of fairness among 
inmates.298 The furlough program soon acerbated jealousies and racial tension.  
In a letter to the Prisoners’ Right Council, a Philadelphia-based organization of prisoner 
activists, Joseph Molter, an inmate at SCI Graterford, acknowledged many of the recent 
improvements under Commissioner Sielaff, but expressed a common complaint about the 
furlough program: 
 
I have served six years of a life sentence, and although I am truly grateful for the 
benefits afforded me through the new administration, I get quite depressed 
every weekend when passing all the empty cells (those inmates on furlough) 
knowing that I am not included in this wonderful benefit. 
 
True, I am serving a life sentence, but prior to this, I have never spent a day in 
jail. So I don’t consider myself a ‘hardened criminal.’ 
 
If rehabilitation involves passes and furloughs, are we to be denied this merely 
because of a ‘big bit?’299 
 
As Molter indicated, inmates carrying life sentences were excluded from the furlough program 
even though it was not unusual for such inmates to eventually become eligible for parole after 
gaining executive commutation of their life sentence.300 Willie Hargrove agreed that there had 
been some improvements at Graterford, but also told to the Prisoners’ Rights Council that the 
exclusion of lifers from the community corrections programs was creating tension, especially 
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when a “short timer” came back from a furlough. Hargrove claimed that the furlough policy “is 
like the two Law they have one for the white and one for the colored people. It seems the same 
way.”301 
 Another Graterford inmate, John Myers, explained his frustrating experience applying 
for placement in a community treatment center in a letter addressed to the Prisoners’ Rights 
Council and Commissioner Sielaff.302 Myers claimed that despite the fact that he felt he easily 
met all the program’s inclusion criteria in the Bureau’s administrative directives, which had 
been posted on the prison’s inmate bulletin board, Graterford’s classification committee still 
denied his application for transfer. Myers asked Commissioner Sielaff in his letter if there were 
separate criteria that he did not know about, perhaps issued locally by Graterford’s 
administration. He, nevertheless, surmised that if the classification committee was sending 
other inmates with worse criminal records and fewer family obligations to community 
treatment centers, he must have angered some of the prison’s staff who were now purposely 
undermining his case. After voicing this complaint, Myers received a “disciplinary write up,” 
which he feared only worsened his future chances for inclusion in community corrections 
programs.303 Myers claimed that his experience was hardly unique, but reflected “the general 
feeling of most of the residents of this institution.”304 
 Another person serving time at Graterford, Allan Lawson, questioned the actual 
effectiveness of community corrections programs, their selection criteria and how well the 
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prison system prepared most inmates for such programs.305 In a letter to Arthur Clark, a 
member of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of of the Religious Society of Friends, Lawson 
explained the central flaw in the work-release program: “inmates are motivated to work by the 
fact that work release means limited freedom…Determining the sincerity of a work release 
applicant seems nearly impossible to me. The incentive factor here is limited freedom. Most, if 
not all, inmates would apply.”306 Lawson argued that “relevant” counseling needed to precede 
work release and that inmate must choose to work. The requirement to maintain employment, 
in both community corrections program and parole, was simply coercive and actually 
counterproductive. “Thus,” claimed Lawson, “the fires which feed recidivism are fueled.”307 
Lawson, who would later become the leader of the Prisoners’ Right Council after his release 
from Graterford, concluded his letter with a “query,” which haunted the community corrections 
program and perhaps the project of reformative imprisonment as well: 
 
If one of the aims of a work-release program is to prepare an inmate to work, 
and to stick to work, is it feasible to provide a means whereby anti-work 
attitudes may be erased (without the means leaning towards coercion)?308 
 
 
Prison officers also expressed displeasure with the furlough program. Their concerns 
echoed those by the police, the judiciary and many people in the general public, but they also 
often revealed more personal animosities, fears and resentments resulting from their working 
conditions and greater familiarity with prisoners. After meeting with guards at SCI Graterford 
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on March 16, 1972, Assistant Attorney-General Thomas Jennings reported to Deputy Attorney-
General Dante Mattioni that most officers disliked many of the recent changes in inmate 
management, programs and amenities.309 His impression was that more than anything their 
resistance stemmed from the fact that they felt abandoned by officials in Harrisburg who never 
consulted with them prior to making the recent changes, which greatly affected their daily 
routines. Jennings stressed that the officers worried about their personal safety: “Inextricably 
interwoven throughout the entire meeting was this sense of insecurity which permeated every 
issue that arose.”310 This included their opposition to the furlough program. The officers 
complained to Jennings that they worried about encountering furloughed inmates in their 
neighborhoods, near their families. One guard told Jennings that a furloughed inmate 
personally attacked him while he was off duty.311 Many officers also told Jennings that spending 
on furlough seemed frivolous or wasteful considering the disrepair of Graterford and many 
other areas of need at the institution.312 Jennings left the meeting concerned that the low 
morale of the guard force, caused at least party by their exclusion from decision-making about 
changes that directly affected them, imperiled the administration’s prison reform agenda.  
 
Pennsylvania: A New Normal? The Loosening of Prison Regimes 
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In addition to the community corrections programs, the Bureau of Correction changed a 
number of policies and practices within the institutions, liberalizing some of the routines and 
rules that affected prisoners’ daily lives. While some leaders in the Bureau of Correction, like 
Sielaff and his deputy Stewart Werner, believed that humanizing prisons would reduce tensions 
in such institutions, the likelihood that the courts would eventually ordered the Bureau to 
implement changes, also motivated their actions. Some recent cases in particular, like Holt v. 
Sarver (1969), focused on “prison conditions,” which touched on nearly every aspect of life in 
confinement, from food quality, discipline, ventilation, inmate safety and violence.313 Facing a 
totality of conditions case would force many states to drastically improve their entire prison 
system. Many correctional officials in the county preferred to make (perhaps lesser) changes on 
their own than contend with the costs and loss of control entailed in judicial intervention and 
oversight.  
While the courts had not yet intervened in Pennsylvania prisons to this degree, there 
were signs that such oversight could eventuate. In November 1970, U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania consolidated numerous smaller cases against the Bureau filled 
by prisoners into a large, system-wide complaint filed by the Imprisoned Citizens Union, a loose 
organization of jailhouse lawyers and sympathizers, primarily led Richard O.J. Mayberry who 
was renown among prisoners for his legal acumen and success.314 In addition, prisoners at 
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several institutions forced concessions from the superintendents with sit-down strikes that 
loosened some of the restrictions on reading materials, religious practices, attire, 
communication and visits with people outside prison.315 
The decision by Pennsylvania senior penal officials to address some of these issues 
closely followed current thinking in professional penological societies and international 
organizations. The Bureau sent a delegate to the Forth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders that was held in Kyoto, Japan in 1970 where 
the topic of minimum prison standards was debated extensively.316 Shortly afterward, 
Pennsylvania’s Attorney-General J. Shane Creamer (of the Shapp administration) announced 
that it was instituting a “Bill of Rights” for prisoners in all of the state’s prisons based explicitly 
on the current Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners that had been 
produced over successive meetings of the American Correctional Association, the International 
Penal and Penitentiary Commission, and the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders.317 Creamer noted that no American state or country had yet 
to enact these standards into law, but that they had been posted to the bulletin boards of state 
prisons under the orders of Commissioner Sielaff.318 Creamer explained that these standards 
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were intended to be the bedrock of good practice, which would serve as a guide and 
justification for specific changes in the routine practices in the state’s prisons.  
Prisoners, of course, saw such standards on the bulletin boards and were well aware of 
the recent court decisions concerning a variety of prisoners’ rights and prison conditions. One 
of the primary changes that occurred during this period was the decision by the Bureau to lift 
most of the restrictions of mail and access to publications normally available outside the prison. 
Under court pressure, the Bureau also permitted the establishment of law libraries to provide 
access to legal material, like writ forms, to inmates who wished to prepare their own petitions 
to the courts. Such changes meant that inmates in state and county institutions began to gain 
greater access to literature on prison reform, prison abolition, and a host of other civil rights, 
anti-colonial and anti-war movements. Penal authorities still banned some of this literature if 
they considered it too inflammatory or disruptive to the order of the institutions.319  
Nevertheless, much of the literature on prison reform that circulated through the 
institutions informed inmates of their newfound rights and how they could frame disputes or 
frustrations with prison staff and rules in rights discourse and legal language to challenge such 
practices. The Prisoners’ Rights Council, in particular, produced brochures about the range of 
rights that inmates still held while confined.320 Their archives are filled with letters from 
prisoners in county and state facilities asking for copies of these brochures, especially 
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“Disciplinary Procedures in State and County Prisons” and “Your Rights to Access the Courts.”321 
Some inmate newsletters carried verbatim copies of the minimum standards for prisoners, but 
as the Prisoners’ Rights Council noted many times, since the minimum standards were not 
incorporated into Pennsylvania’s law, the Bureau and prisoners lacked a way to actually enforce 
them.322 
In addition to less restrictions on publications and mail, the Bureau permitted greater 
variety in clothing, hair length and personal attire as well as increased access to a various 
personal items, which could be ordered through the institutions commissary or mail-order 
catalogues and kept in a person’s cell.323 Prison administrators also extended visiting hours and 
improved visiting facilities. Executive Deputy Attorney-General Walter Foulke remarked on an 
inspection of SCI Pittsburgh that “the visiting room is a tremendous improvement over the 
situation that existed several years ago and it really a step in the right direction.”324 The 
superintendent of SCI Dallas, Leonard Mack, permitted visitors to bring in small food items for 
picnics during these visits with their imprisoned loved ones.325 Prison administrators also 
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granted inmates the rights to have radios and televisions in their possession, provided that they 
purchased them with their own funds. Superintendent Mack permitted inmates to use these 
items for extended hours and ordered the television in the dayroom to remain on throughout 
the day.326 Inmates enjoyed more time out of their cells and greater ability to move about many 
institutions. Such changes, which might appear minor, were major departures from past 
practice. That the superintendent of a prison, like Leonard Mack, would inform prisoners that 
their cells were to be repainted and that they could choose from a variety of “10 different 
pastel shades” would probably have struck prison staff and prisoners as ridiculous not that long 
ago.327  
Sielaff also tried to enhance prisoners’ rights in a few other ways that were potentially 
more significant and controversial among prison staff. For instance, he instructed institutions to 
discontinue the use of some types of segregation, like the use of lightless, underground 
“dungeons” at the bottom of the old Western Penitentiary in Pittsburgh.328 Nevertheless, 
inspections at Pittsburgh prison revealed that these seclusion areas were still in use well after 
Commissioner Sielaff had issued his directive.329   
Much like the issue of furloughs, many prison guards disagreed with the new liberalized 
regimes, especially since the Bureau’s senior leaders did not consult them on the changes. 
Guards at SCI Graterford impressed this upon Assistant Attorney-General Thomas Jennings 
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during a visit in March 1972.  Jennings informed his superioirs that guards told him the changes 
had “increased the difficulty of maintaining order and discipline in the institution.”330 The 
officers told Jennings that the greater amount of personal property inmates could keep in their 
cells and inability of inmates to lock their cells lead to “a rash of thefts which have resulted in 
violence or near violence.”331 The officers argued that extending these privileges to inmates 
being punished in segregation meant that this penalty had lost a lot of its deterrent quality. The 
guards felt this resulted in greater disciplinary problems throughout the entire population.332 
The officer also told Jennings that recent changes in procedures for escapes had placed them in 
a difficult position. The had two sets of rules addressing the use of force in such situations, but 
they contradicted each other.333 Officers wanted the Bureau to clarify when they could use 
“killing force,” when they could not, and what the potential ramifications were. As it stood, one 
set of rules stated that if they used killing force to prevent an escape they would be prosecuted 
for murder, but other set of rules stated that they would lose their job if they did not use killing 
force to prevent an escape.334  
 
New South Wales: The Decomposition of Prison Routines and Growing Unrest 
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Most people who described the transformation of prison routines and order during and 
after the 1970s cited the appointment of Walter McGeechan as Comptroller-General of Prisons 
in 1968 as a significant break with past practices. McGeechan became a lightning rod for 
criticism from penal reformers, prisoners and officers. His ten year tenure as head of the 
prisons department was marked by major investigations, guard union militancy and violent 
confrontations between staff and inmates in many prisons. Yet, he oversaw the introduction of 
a number of alternatives to imprisonment that outlasted his time in office and formed the basis 
of future programs. Without dismissing the significance of changes during McGeechan’s time in 
office, it is important to keep in mind that they built on trends that were already apparent in 
the state’s prisons prior to 1968. The immediate postwar changes blended elements of 
progressive penal strategies common in international penological circles, like the greater use of 
open institutions, and authoritarian containment policies, like the intractable section at Grafton 
Gaol. After Leslie Nott’s retirement in 1955, the next two leaders of the Department of Prisons, 
Harold Vagg and John Morony, further developed this array of options in the prison system, 
extending the training, education and recreation activities available to prisoners at lower 
security institutions, like Berrima and Goulburn,335 while also maintaining austere regimes at 
other facilities.  
John Morony, who led prisons department from 1960 to 1968, spoke in the idiom of 
progressive penal reform that was common in many parts of the world during the decades 
following World War II, but eventuallu expressed pessimism over its current effectiveness. In 
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his study of the Michigan State Prison in Jackson, Charles Bright has argued that the organizing 
and performative aspects of such penal reform language should be emphasized “as a process of 
formulating plausible accounts of carceral control in changing circumstances.”336 This view of 
penal reform language and practice highlights its intrinsic flexibility and ability to accommodate 
what might in some cases appear as contradictory positions. Like many contemporary penal 
administrators, Morony supported rehabilitation in writings and public statements, but often 
qualified it by warning of the need to further develop the research, training and programming 
capacities his department and placing the success of any reformative effort with the attitude of 
individual inmates and their willingness to change themselves.337 Morony spoke convincingly 
about the attributes of offenders that lead them to crime, but like his contemporaries, he often 
had little to offer as a solution to the litanty of problems that led to recidivism.  
If inmate reform, as a goal of punishment, was intrinsically prospective, the actual 
means to achieve it often also appeared to lie in the future. For Morony, this mean that more 
resources needed to devoted to research to develop a better scientific and technical basis for 
reformative interventions. Like Leslie Nott and Harold Vagg before him, Morony undertook an 
overseas study tour prior to assuming office. He noted that one of the major differences 
between practices in New South Wales and those in the United Kingdom and United States was 
presence of penological research in the reform projects of the penal systems he observed.338 
Once he assumed the leadership of the New South Wales Department of Prisons, Morony 
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began an intensive research program. Morony noted in several annual reports that the 
department’s new research efforts drew from the vast case files produced by the Classification 
Committee over the ten years of its existence.339 Early research initiatives focused on the 
etiology of homosexuality and the distinguishing attributes of recidivists.340 Despite Morony’s 
belief in the promise such research, he was far from sanguine about the actual effectiveness of 
the rehabilitative capacities of the department he oversaw. As much as Morony recognized the 
limits of present practices, his use of the language of progressive prison reform contained the 
unpleasantness of them, de-emphasizing or euphemizing continued repression in many prisons 
while promoting the potential of better penological methods on the horizon.  
Perhaps the clearest expression of the latter phenomenon and the blending of purposes 
and practices in reform discourse was the decision to hold a major conference on the state of 
inmate reform and penology in New South Wales with national and international attendees in 
the city of Grafton in 1963.341 The two-day long conference “Prisoner Rehabilitation,” 
sponsored by the University of New England, took place in the immediate vicinity of the state’s 
most repressive, brutal prison where offciers routinely flogged prisoners into submission as a 
matter of official policy. Yet, the published proceedings of the conference adressed questions of 
classification, adequate programing and training, increasing public knowledge of the penal 
system and practical support for released inmates to help prevent recidivism. Only the Minister 
for Justice, Jack Mannix referred to Graton Gaol’s role as “a disciplinary prison – a prison within 
                                                          
339 Ibid.; Report of the Comptroller-General of Prisons (Sydney: New South Wales, Department of Prisons, 1961), 
12. 
340 Ibid., 12-13. 




a prison to which persons are sent for secondary punishment.”342 He stated that rehabilitation 
was not possible in old institutions like Graton, but he immediately qualified this this by noting 
that Grafton’s regime did not involve prolonged solitary confinement. 
Regardless of whether the successive leaders of the department personally supported 
the violence at Grafton, they did little to stop the physical abuse that was commonplace there. 
Mainline prison staff widely supported its continued use as a disciplinary prison. They believed 
it anchored discipline throughout the entire prison system.343 The silence of Vagg and Morony 
on the issue of Grafton was one of many ways in which the postwar reform agenda of the 
Department of Prisons and the Ministers of Justice did not directly challenge the authority of 
superintendents and guards in the day-to-day management of prisons. This was perhaps one of 
the reasons why prison staff accepted other changes in the postwar years. Senior officers in the 
department recognized that there were limits to how far these other reform efforts could go 
before they provoke reactions from custodial staff. Morony abstractly referred to this dilemma 
in the annual report of 1960 as the conflict “between the interests of security and the interests 
of rehabilitation.”344 Then again in the next report for 1961: 
 
Much is being done in the field of rehabilitation, much remains to be done. But 
too much emphasis in this area may tend to increase the conflict with the 
security of the institutions and there is a constant need to balance the two 
elements in the best interest of the public.345   
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David Grant, Deputy Chairman of the Corrective Services Commission in the late 1980s, 
recounted how a prison officer, who later became a superintendent, described Morony’s 
balancing act with prison management prior to 1968.  
 
Morony, or Honest John as he was known, was respected but he was a remote 
figure; he did formal visits to gaols but he didn’t interfere. There was no prison 
system as such, just a series of independent gaols. In each of these it was the 
Governor who had total authority—he was an awesome figure.346 
 
But, if there was an effort to maintain a balance, the entire field of penological discourse had 
shifted dramatically since World War II and with it came a series of often small transformations 
in routine, everyday practices within many of the state’s prisons.  
By the 1960s, some attempts to “normalize” prison life, especially through the extension 
of sports and various leisure activities began altering the relationship between inmates and 
staff, bringing them in closer physical and social proximity.347 More than anything, department 
administrators intended these changes to occupy prisoners in the absence of sufficient 
employment opportunities for all inmates. Morony argued that such activities reduced tension, 
lessened the effects of institutionalization and probably assisted in more direct reformative 
interventions.348 For guards, however, such activities changed their supervision routines and 
indirectly increased the level of communication they had with inmates. At first, such changes 
might appear minor or insignificant, but they departed from a strict form of proximate non-
association between staff and inmates that had distinguished the authority and disposition of 
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prison guards and had existed for decades. In fact, officers also worked under strict rules and 
could be disciplined for minor infractions. According to the uniform prison rules of 1956, for 
instance, they were not permitted to communicate unnecessarily with prisoners.349  
Such strict regulations governing the interactions between inmates and staff highlight 
the significance of seemingly minor changes, like having staff facilitate rugby league matches 
for inmates. Within a short period of time, inmates began to view these activities as 
entitlements rather than privileges as the administration had intended them. This situation 
gradually reduced the vast social distance between guards and inmates that had been the 
hallmark of most of the state’s prison regimes in the recent past, and it also increased the level 
of disagreement and friction attending these new activities and interactions between staff and 
prisoners. Despite this emerging issue, the department did little to officially change the 
management role, compensation, and training of guards. While some staff accommodated 
these changes better than others, many guards, especially in the state’s maximum security 
prisons, resented such changes and simply maintained their management style and strict 
disposition toward inmates. The break with the past that McGeechan represented for many 
people once he assumed leadership of department consisted of poorly planned and executed 
polices that accelerated these existing changes or accentuated their tensions. 
McGeechan summed up his dissatisfaction with the prisoner management approach 
common among officers in his initial submission to the Royal Commission into New South 
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Wales Prisons in 1976. Under a section subtitled, “the trauma of change,” McGeechan argued 
that: 
 
For some years the department has taken the view that the stereotype 
authoritarian role in the custodial division was no longer appropriate, and could 
not be sustained or validated in the light of emerging criminal cultures and social 
attitudes, i.e., the programmes which may have been effective in the 1960’s 
could not be moved to the 1970’s350 
 
 
Yet, McGeechan's penal philosophy lacked clarity, and this became evident in practice. In his 
submission, McGeechan argued that the past emphasis on authority and discipline in the prison 
officer’s role needed to be loosened, if not outright abandoned, and supplemented by other 
dispositions and techniques. He saw these new roles as being embedded in the different 
program and custody levels. Thus, guards working in control units had to balance their 
authoritarian “attitude” with “persuasive and intellectual techniques.” Lower security 
institutions required either a “supportive guidance role with overtones of parental 
relationships” (medium security) or “a wholly persuasive man-management role, i.e. one of 
equality.”351 Yet, McGeechan and his subordinates failed to describe what these roles and their 
differences actually meant in practice or provide guidance to the guard force.352 Justice Nagle 
would later argue that McGeechan thwarted the potential, if any, of the new initiatives by "the 
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use of abstruse and inexact jargon and meaningless clichés" and failure to formulate, 
communicate, and implement policies. 353  
McGeechan can surely be faulted for poor writing and communication; it is evident in 
most of his policy statements. His managerial skills were also found to be seriously lacking by 
the inquiry. However, focusing too much on this obscures the fact that McGeechan and all of 
his management staff faced a series of challenges and problems that could not be domesticated 
within the prevailing discourse and practices of inmate reform, which had been hegemonic 
since the end of World War II. McGeechan, for all his faults, was not that dissimilar from his 
predecessors, but he struggled to formulate “plausible accounts of carceral control” that were 
flexible enough to accommodate the rapidly changing circumstances and the proliferation of 
challenges from various groups of staff, inmates and their respective allies.354 One of the 
greatest strengths of the postwar reforms was that for roughly two-to-three decades, they 
proved capable of domesticating most disruptions, pulling challenges back within the ambit of 
containment, classification and correctional treatment. However, like in Pennsylvania, the 
plausible accounts of these postwar reforms were now under question and many of the routine 
practices associated with them were becoming controversial and contested.355 McGeechan 
certainly did not help matters with confusing policies. 
Uncertainty crept into prison operations in numerous different ways. Sometimes, the 
central office introduced new reforms without making corresponding changes in training, or 
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protocols governing guard behavior or official prison rules for inmates.356 One of the worse 
examples of this problem, pointed out many times during hearings of the Royal Commission 
into new South Wales in the late 1970s, consisted of the use of two different versions of the 
basic guide manual for officers.357 The department issued an updated set of prison rules in 1970 
titled, the Manual of General Information, Custodial Division, which was intended to replace a 
similar document from 1956 titled, Manual for Staff Instruction and Guidance.358 Yet after the 
publication of the 1970 volume, often called the “black book,” the central office failed to 
completely pull the 1956 rule book from circulation even though there were wide discrepancies 
between the two manuals.359 As it became clear during the Royal Commission hearings, some 
prisons operated according to the 1956 rules while other facilities used the updated manual.360 
Moreover, the central office appeared to be aware of this competing set of standards governing 
the prisons.361 Unsurprisingly, Bathurst Gaol, with its reputation as being rigid and 
anachronistic, strictly enforced the “brown book,” the 1956 rules. John Winter Pallot, Bathurst’s 
superintendent, stated during the Royal Commission hearings that the brown book was “spot 
on” and that preferred it to the black book, which he found confusing.362 Conflicts like this 
indicated deeper problems than simple failures to properly distribute current policy documents. 
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They revealed fundamental disagreements between powerful constituencies within 
department and its institutions the about penal policy, how prisons should be run, the authority 
of warders and what respect or rights prisoners had, if any. 
Such inconsistencies spread across the prison system and created discord among 
prisoners and officers alike, especially if they moved between prisons: actions that were 
permitted at one prison could, at another facility, lead to official charges and administrative 
punishment for inmates or a dressing down by superior officers and demotion for guards.363 
Bathurst Gaol, which experienced several disturbances and organized inmate demonstrations 
between the mid-1960s and 1974, was notorious for its harsh regime and strict adherence to 
old rules.364 Inmates’ views of Bathurst, which only received extended publicity during the 
Royal Commission, painted the picture of petty guards and superintendents who enforced 
anachronistic rules concerning the visits, access to reading material, cell property and 
decorations, postal privileges, personal attire, and hair length to name just a few concerns. One 
of the differences between the two different manuals of prison rules was a stipulation from 
1956 that prohibited inmates from sitting down or smoking while in the prison yard. Inmates 
spent many hours a day locked in Bathurst yard, but they faced misconduct charges for sitting 
down during weekdays.365 New inmates and prisoners transferred to Bathurst from other 
institutions ran afoul of some guards who strictly enforced this rule. Other guards were more 
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lax with this rule, but the discrepancy between how guards enforced this rulw only added to a 
sense of frustration among inmates who could lose privileges and parole consideration by 
sitting down during a hot summer day. Some prison officers who transferred between 
institutions also noted differences between the various prisons in this regard. Allan Thompson, 
an officer who worked at Bathurst Gaol and later Parramatta Gaol, noted that: 
 
Petty discipline at Bathurst was the cause of considerable trouble. This built up a 
resentment in the prisoners. This was particularly noticeable when the prisoners 
came from prisons such as Parramatta to Bathurst. Rules in Bathurst relating to 
visits, letter writing, and photo in cells were according to the Book, and were 
rigidly applied. At Parramatta the rules were interpreted differently and were 
more up to date…Old-fashioned ideas seemed to prevail at Bathurst. Because a 
thing was done in a certain way 30 years ago, that was the way it had to be done 
today.366 
 
As much as these accounts indicted practices at Bathurst and explained much of that prison’s 
tension, they also indicated that regimes at otherwise similar maximum-security prisons had 
diverged significantly enough from each other to create discord among inmates and staff 
moving between them. Several other prisons had reputations for harsh regimes: Grafton (in the 
intractable section), Goulburn, and Maitland commonly fell into this category. Prisons nearer to 
metropolitan Sydney (like Parramatta) had the reputation as being more relaxed by 
comparison. While the spectrum of carceral spaces constituting the prison system always 
entailed variability in the regimes of different institutions, these differences were either more 
formal in the sense that they were an integral aspect of a prison’s security classification and 
programs or the differences were sufficiently communicated to new arrivals. The differences 
                                                          




between a maximum security prison and minimum security afforestation camp were 
longstanding, but the growing heterogeneity among maximum security institutions, often 
holding the same prisoners at various times, created new tensions and resentments among 
both staff and inmates who were confused about the expected routines and rule enforcement.  
In addition to this, Corrective Services experimented with several new penal options, 
which also highlight differences between institutions, regimes and the opportunities available 
some inmates. The first was the new Cessnock Corrective Centre located in the northern part of 
the state. Originally planned in the late 1950s, the long-delayed, medium-security facility finally 
opened in 1972 with an alternative regime intended for inmates who otherwise would have 
been placed in maximum-security facilities. Cessnock’s regime, which implicitly competed with 
existing arrangements in maximum-security prisons, stressed greater cooperation between 
staff and inmates and provided more opportunities and responsibilities for inmates.367 In the 
hierarchy of penal spaces, Cessnock became a step-down institution from maximum security 
prisons. Its first superintendent, Noel Day, later claimed that department leaders also thought 
of it as a pilot project to test new inmate management techniques that they hoped would 
eventually spread to other facilities.368 Many inmates took a much more cynical view of the 
claims being made by Corrective Services about Cessnock (its new “showpiece”369), but 
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recognized that it operated a more relaxed regime than other secure prisons.370 For instance, 
Cessnock’s timetable permitted inmates much more time out of cells than other secure prisons 
in the state as well as much greater freedom in movement around the prison.371 
The enthusiasm of the department’s official publications about Cessnock was also 
evident in its public statements concerning a variety of other alternative penalties and 
community corrections programs established in the early 1970s.372 While New South Wales 
created a parole system after Leslie Nott returned from his overseas study tour, it was very 
limited in comparison with what he had observed abroad.373 In 1966, the Parliament expanded 
the parole system, giving it statutory standing and consolidating it with the probation service 
into one independent agency.374 Following McGeechan’s appointment as Comptroller-General 
of Prisons in 1968, the Department of Prisons absorbed the previously independent parole and 
probation service with the entire department undergoing a rebranding as the new Department 
of Corrective Services in 1970.375 The department’s annual report for 1969-1970 explained, in 
tortuous prose, that the new official title “places emphasis on its theme of corrective, re-
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educational-treatment programmes for offenders rather than the historically adopted concept 
of a simple punitive detention.”376 During McGeechan’s first year in office, the new department 
established a committee to study community corrections and alternative sentencing, which 
were emerging in international penological practice.377 Shortly afterward, the department 
created a work release program (later called Work Release I) based in the Sydney area at the 
Silverwater Complex of Prisons.378 Much like similar programs abroad, prisoners accepted into 
this program worked unsupervised during the day in the community and returned to the 
Silverwater Work Release Centre in the evening. In addition to this program, the department 
also developed the Parramatta Linen Service in conjunction with the New South Wales Health 
Commission, which employed low security inmates from various prisons washing and pressing 
laundry for use in state hospitals and other institutions. This facility also supported a later work 
release program (Work Release II) in which participants lived at home and worked second shift 
at the Parramatta Linen Service from 3:30 to 11:30, receiving the prevailing wage award for free 
workers.379  
Work release and the parole system also supported an unusual pre-lease program called 
Project Survival. Intended for young adults nearing consideration for parole or the Work 
Release I program, Project Survival was based on a similar program in the Canadian province of 
British Columbia that the Minister of Justice, John Maddison, had learned of at the Forth United 
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Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held in Japan in 
1970.380 The program resembled the Outward Bound programs for youth and consisted of 
outdoors team-building exercises and forestry work for young inmates who met certain 
inclusion criteria.381 The department also created periodic detention centres near existing 
prisons to facilitate a new sentencing option (periodic detention), which was basically weekend 
incarceration for lesser offenders.382 By 1974, McGeechan would argue “that between 1969 
and 1974 the proportions of those people in custody as compared with those on conditional 
liberty programmes have been reversed.”383  
Despite these new programs, the department still greatly overused maximum-security 
institutions, having far fewer options for secure placement beyond Cessnock and several 
medium- and minimum-security wings in several prisons.384 McGeechan’s claim about the 
reversal of the proportions of people in custody and on conditional liberty elided the fact that 
more people where being committed to the department’s care in 1974 than was the case in 
1969. Largely because of general population growth, the number of people in the state’s 
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prisons increased during this time even if the overall incarceration rate had declined.385 The 
final report of Royal Commission into New Wales Prisons criticized the department for 
underutilizing many of these decarceration programs, and it was evident during the 
commission’s proceedings that some of the department’s staff felt that these programs were 
supplementary at best, nuisances at worst.386 For instance, the superintendent of the Goulburn 
Training Centre, John Barry, objected to instituting work release under his command, including 
even in the minimum-security X-wing.387 Barry’s main concern was security; he feared that 
prisoners on work release would interact with the public and smuggle contraband back inside 
prison. Although Barry said he would support work release if it was operated from an entirely 
separate unit, which had no connection to Goulburn existing facilities, he nevertheless argued 
that the program was still unrealistic given the poor state of the economy in the area near the 
prison. There were simply too few employment opportunities for work release to function 
properly.  
Most of the work release programs were in fact based in urban areas, especially in or 
near Sydney. The department’s work release programs also only catered to male offenders, 
which caused resentment among female inmates. Assistant Commissioner Barry Barrier, who 
had previous overseen the management of the work release programs, claimed that location of 
the new, high-security Mulawa Training and Detention Centre next to the Silverwater Work 
Release Center created unrest among the women who knew the nature of the programs that 
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they were excluded from that lied just beyond the walls.388 Harsher critics of the department 
and the sitting government saw many of these limited programs as “simply public relations 
exercises” especially when compared with the magnitude of serious problems elsewhere in the 
state’s prison system.389  
While the Royal Commission was not so blunt in its criticism, it nevertheless faulted the 
department, and McGeechan in particular, for expending time and resources on plans that 
were of limited use or never fully implemented.390 McGeechan also attempted to ensure that 
the department had uniform policies that were followed by staff, but as the example of the 
conflicting rule books demonstrated, his administration was inconsistent and often simply 
incompetent in this regard. This was especially the case with his efforts to reign in the 
independence of superintendents and local sub-branches of prison officers’ union. Despite 
repeated, but half-hearted, attempts by McGeechan to get Superintendent Pallot to relax the 
rules at Bathurst Gaol, petty enforcement of the 1956 rules continued until the prison was 
rendered inoperable by a massive uprising in February 1974.391  
Pallot’s resistance to the central administration was perhaps only the most flagrant 
example to come to light in the mid-1970s. Superintendents and local branches of the prison 
officers’ union resisted McGeechan’s push for greater centralization and adherence to new 
department policy as it eroded their longstanding authority and local control. This lead to what 
was at the time the greatest incidence of industrial actions by the prison officers union. 
                                                          
388 Testimony of Barry Barrier, Proceedings of the Royal Commission, 3128.  
389 George Petersen, “Bathurst Prison Bashings Expose N.S.W. Prison System,” unpublished conference paper, 
Alternatives to Prisons, Sydney 1975, in unprocessed records of the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties, 
box 107. NSWCCL office, Suite 203, 105 Pitt Street Sydney NSW 2000. 
390 Nagle, Report of the Royal Commission, 460. 




Walkouts occurred throughout McGeechan’s tenure over work conditions, security, wage 
awards, and general resistance to departmental policy.392 As the Royal Commission revealed, 
many of the accomplishments or even basic descriptions of the department’s policies listed in 
official publications belied this routine resistance by superintendents and guards, which was so 
pervasive that it simply negated many of McGeechan’s polices and plans.393  
Ambivalent and inconsistent policies stoked resentments among inmates in many 
prisons who felt that they were being unjustly denied certain amenities and rights enjoyed by 
inmates in different prisons. Some vocal inmates criticized the department’s tendency to 
describe the mild loosenings and minor changes as “privileges” rather than “rights.” Many 
inmates actually considered the new changes as merely cosmetic, intended more to placate 
and divide them than to actually recognize them as being deserving of such considerations.394 
Inmate activist Brett Collins argued in the late 1970s that there was actually a deeply 
manipulative aspect to be granted certain amenities, especially if the authorities considered 
them privileges. This practice actually augmented the power of penal authorities, according to 
Collins, who could then use such favors as a means of coercing compliance, collecting 
information, or fomenting discord among inmates. “It [was] the incentive scheme by which 
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traitors [were] nurtured.”395 “Aware crims” understood this tactic, Collins said, and lived by the 
motto: “Give me nothing you needn’t.”396  
Sometimes certain amenities conflicted with established prison rules. Prison guards 
often destroyed or confiscated items that were actually permitted during the cell searches 
(called “ramps” by inmates).397 These frustrations often stemmed from the fact that prison staff 
varied in their adherence to the official prison rules between institutions, shifts and at times 
between specific officers. Inmates at Bathurst, for instance, complained especially about the 
destruction of family photographs during cell searches.398 Although they were permitted to 
have six photographs and picture frames, guards routinely destroyed the frames inmates had in 
their cells, looking for contraband hidden therein, and ripped up photographs. While the long-
term trend since World War II had been to ameliorate certain aspects of institutional life, like 
granting access to small items of property, local prison staff often constituted a bulkward 
against this trend. The Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons found inmate 
complaints over cell searches widespread and noted: “In some gaols, notably Bathurst, searches 
were used as a means of punishing prisoners and settling scores.”399 
Many inmates viewed such inconsistency as simply hypocrisy on the part of the prison 
administration, but many others realized that such discrepancies in policies about inmates’ 
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personal property and cell searches often reflected disputes between the guard force and 
senior administrators in the department. Inmates were often caught in the middle of these 
conflicts over prison management and nature of penal authority in the state. Some 
superintendents and their senior officers also stood between the central administration and the 
mainline guard force in these disputes. For many inmates, this state of affairs became 
intolerable, a constant source of friction between themselves and the officers that they 
interacted with on a daily basis. Reflecting on this time years later, David Grant, once a senior 
official in the Department of Corrective Services, summed up these discrepancies: 
 
Prisoners were receiving greater entitlements but there was no relaxation of 
Prison Rules. Prison officers continued to enforce control in accordance with 
these Rules but prisoners saw this as interference, “bastardry”, and they reacted 
accordingly.400  
 
These discrepancies between practice and rhetoric, and between some otherwise similar 
prisons, worsened during the early 1970s and played a prominent part in the unrest that 
afflicted the penal apparatus in the 1970s and early 1980s.401 
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New South Wales: The Status of the Aggrieved: Prisoner Grievance Committees 
 
In 1975, the Industrial Commission of New South Wales took evidence from prison 
officers about the changes they experienced in their work roles over the preceding decade in an 
effort to establish a new compensation award.402 The officers argued that more than any other 
cause, the introduction of rehabilitative programs, education opportunities and numerous 
privileges for inmates had fundamentally altered the nature of their work. While the gradual 
amelioration of prison conditions began before World War II, the pace of change accelerated 
after the war and became especially by the 1960s. Comptroller-General John Morony 
encouraged the greater use of leisure and recreational activities to occupy prisoners, which 
often placed prison staff and inmates in more relaxed, informal situations than had been 
previous been the case. Yet, most of the guards’ criticism centered on changes introduced by 
Walter McGeechan, which they argued, dangerously reduced the social distance between 
inmates and staff. Prison officers and their union deeply resented the leveling-effect entailed in 
many of the new reforms. The struggle over the introduction of prisoner grievance committees 
in the early 1970s condensed many of the officers’ resentments. 
 In 1972, McGeechan informed all the state's prison superintendents about a pilot 
program at Parramatta Gaol, involving the use of an elected committee representing prisoners 
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as a grievance mechanism.403 Such organizations provided a legitimate outlet for airing and 
resolving complaints, according to the commissioner, which would reduce institutional tension 
and might even prevent disturbances.404 McGeechan ordered all superintendents to establish 
such committees by permitting inmates to elect committee members representing three broad 
classes of the prison population: long-term recidivists, intermediate-sentenced prisoners, and 
remandees.405 A number of prisons, especially those with poor reputations for conflict between 
staff and inmates, failed to comply with McGeechan’s order, most notably Bathurst Gaol.  
McGeechan later told the Royal Commission that Bathurst’s failure to establish such a 
committee stemmed from deliberate resistance by prison staff who viewed it “as a break-down 
in their authority.”406 Bathurst’s guard force and the superintendent, John Winter Pallot, had a 
reputation for resisting McGeechan’s orders, but most officers and some superintendents at 
other establishments shared their views. These personnel believed that such bodies would 
empower certain inmate leaders ("heavies") who were already difficult to control and would 
create more dissention and conflict rather than prevent it.407 Moreover, McGeechan issued this 
order without much consultation with staff and it struck the latter as an indictment of their 
abilities to manage inmates as they always had—with strict discipline. In prisons where the 
committees were established, prison officers negated their original purpose by selecting the 
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inmate members rather having them elected by inmates. This practice reduced or eliminated 
the legitimacy of the committees in the eyes of most inmates. While McGeechan did little to 
actually enforce the new policy, prison officers, and to a lesser extent superintendents, still 
resented that it was ever attempted.408  
In some instances, it appears that inmates used these committees as a vehicle to whittle 
away some of the routine restrictions placed on them.409 Inmates improved their mailing 
privileges and visiting hours in some prisons this way.410 When compared with some of the 
reforms in the late 1970s following the Royal Commission, these changes appear as meager 
victories, but because many officers felt that even the suggestion of loosened censorship of 
mail, for instance, weakened their authority and their ability to control inmates, such minor 
changes were actually quite significant. More common was the decision on the part of most 
inmates to simply ignore the committees. Most of them saw the committees as a completely 
ineffective attempt to placate them, little more than window-dressing.411 The fact that prison 
officers insisted on selecting members of these committees certainly contributed to widespread 
distrust among inmates about them.412  
 Most prison officers, especially those with a lot of experience in the custodial division 
rather than industrial or education divisions, drew a sharp line between themselves and 
                                                          
408 Justice Nagle criticized McGeechan for failing to follow through on the proposed grievance committees and 
ensure that they were established and functioning as intended. See Nagle, Report of the Royal Commission, 364-
366. 
409 See, for instance, Exhibit 29: “Minutes of the Inmate Advisory Committee held at Cessnock on Thursday, 5th 
August, 1976.” Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, Series 1601: Exhibits, 5/9305. SANSW. 
410 New South Wales Department of Corrective Services, Report of the Department of Corrective Services for the 
year ended 30 June, 1974 (Sydney: Government Printer, 1975), 39. 





inmates, which they vigorously maintained. The statement of Neville Griffiths, a senior prison 
officer at Maitland Gaol, before the Royal Commission, succinctly encapsulated this stance and 
how it related to inmates: 
 
Any leniency or relaxation of discipline is regarded immediately as a sign of 
weakness. If a Prison Officer loses his authority over the prisoners, then the 
prisoners will walk all over him. At all times you have to try to be firm but fair. 
But this is not always easy. Some prisoners simply will not obey rules and, of 
course, every gaol has its stirrers and agitators.413 
 
Griffiths’s statement exemplified a work disposition shared by many guards in secure 
institutions, which conflicted with McGeechan's desire to lessen the social distance between 
officers and inmates through reforms like grievances committees.414 
Ironically, Griffiths advocated the use of such committees, although only after some 
initial resistance.415 As he told the Royal Commission he viewed them mainly as a management 
tool, a source of information and advanced warning for potential problems. This actually 
seemed to be close to McGeechan's own views.416 It is telling, however, that Griffith balked at 
the idea that the organizations should be called "grievance" committees. He felt that it was not 
appropriate to concede that inmates could or should have "grievances." In his eyes, this simply 
granted too much legitimacy to their complaints and how they voiced them. Prison inmates 
should not be aggrieved because whatever their suffering, it was the rightful result of their own 
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criminal conduct. Griffith preferred the name "Problems and Needs Committees," which is what 
it was officially called at Maitland.417 
 
New South Wales: Enemies at the Gates 
  
Until the late 1960s and early 1970s, prison officers strictly managed a very limited 
range of inmate movement within the state’s secure institutions.418 During the late 1960s, the 
acceptable parameters for inmate movement within the prisons became more controversial 
both in its own right and in the ways it registered other areas of disagreement between staff 
and inmates. A series of locked internal gates with posted guards prevent movement inside 
wings (cellblocks) and the main buildings of all the state’s secure prisons. Inmates were not 
permitted to be in their cells or the wings during certain parts of the day, spending most of 
their days locked into workshops or outside yards. Groups of officers roamed the cellblocks 
during the day, searching cells for contraband and signs of escape plans and preparations. The 
penal authorities combined other restrictions on movements with the internal gates as well.419  
Inmates who needed to move about the prison for various reasons needed to obtain a written 
pass to proceed through the array of internal gates and guard posts. Inmates often complained 
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about unnecessary delays in passing through these internal checkpoints, which they described 
as simply punitive.420 A common predicament detailed by inmates during the Royal Commission 
involved approaching a locked gate with pass in hand, making numerous attempts to hail a 
guard to unlock the gate, but being forced to wait without explanation even though the guard 
could see and hear the inmate. Guards who testified at the Royal Commission’s public hearings 
disputed this characterization, but given the sharp social line separating guards and inmates, it 
is unlikely that guards would have, at the very least, hurried to let an inmate pass a gate. In fact, 
one of the submissions the Prison Officers Vocational Branch made to the Royal Commission 
agreed that the dull prison routine often contributed to purposeful petty rule enforcement on 
the part of guards.421  
Passing through the internal gates formed a daily ritual reinforcing the social hierarchy 
of the prison, which became even more significant as this authority was challenged in other 
ways by the early 1970s. Deliberate delays in opening the gates profoundly enacted and 
reminded prisoners of the social inequality structuring the prison at a time when most guards 
realized that their “authority was rapidly diminishing.”422 The close proximity of all participants, 
the obvious control aspects of the gates, and the opportunities this provided for guards to 
make inmates wait for seemingly minor or petty reasons all contributed a heighted sense of 
tension at these points inside the secure prisons. It is indicative of the problems adhering to the 
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internal gates that Cessnock’s architecture relied less on them for supervising inmate 
movements as part of its effort to create a less hostile prison regime. 
Some of these movement rules eased in certain sections of some prisons in the early 
1970s.423 A guard testifying at the Industrial Commission of New South Wales in 1975 said that 
they relaxed and even abandoned the practice of searching prisoners passing through some, if 
not all, gate posts.424 Maitland Gaol apparently abandoned the practice of issuing written 
passes in the early 1970s, as it seemed ineffective and unnecessary in the relatively smaller 
secure prison.425 Raymond Kirkman, an officer at Cessnock, also agreed that there was too 
many restrictions placed on the movements of inmates within the prisons, but this was still 
necessary at older prisons because, unlike Cessnock, they had very poor sightlines for 
monitoring inmates.426 At other prisons, like Goulburn and Bathurst, conflicts frequently arose 
from extensive waiting times, searches, and other tense interactions at these internal gates. 
These latter institutions, especially Bathurst, were also well-known for their anachronistic and 
petty enforcement of prison rules.  
 It must be stressed that where staff relaxed certain rules or did not enforced them as 
strictly, these were still mild alterations of an otherwise rigid system of discipline. The lifting of 
many of the restrictions on inmate movements after the Royal Commission released its report 
in 1978 indicated that despite some prior moderation, staff still enforced movement 
restrictions in many prisons, often quite rigidly.  
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 Between the end of World War II and the mid-1950s, the governments of both 
Pennsylvania and New South Wales reorganized their penal bureaucracies in accordance with 
penological reform proposals that had been developing for several decades in professional 
organizations and academic research. The timing of these changes coincided with similar 
administrative undertakings in other areas of government, reflecting an increased confidence 
about the benefits and capabilities of state regulation. In the prison systems of each state, this 
meant that centralized leadership and most local prison regimes became infused with a new 
technocratic language of reform that was both deeply indebted to social science and flexible 
enough to incorporate many longstanding security practices.  
 Significantly, this reform language and its associated practices also spoke to prisoners. 
The narrative of how one could reform oneself in prison, through the acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing and active participation in the various programs, mapped out a way for prisoners 
to earn their release on parole. Whether prisoners genuinely attempted to reform themselves 
or simply performed as if they were, the language and rituals of rehabilitation structured their 
lives behind bars, orienting their daily routines in the quest for obtaining parole. These new 
regimes also provided far greater activities and amenities than most pre-war prisons.  
These same features, which made rehabilitation “work” as a coherent carceral narrative, 
simultaneously made it inherently unstable. Advocates’ confidence in rehabilitation’s potential 




programs and training would reduce recidivism, penal reformers set themselves up for failure 
before many audiences, both internal and external, when this claim failed to eventuate and 
crime indicators actually increased in the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, in showing inmates how 
they could earn their way out of prison by participating in programs, penal reformers eventually 
faced indignant prisoners after parole boards rejected their applications. Parole consideration 
was always mysterious and frustrating to prisoners and the indeterminate sentencing system 
left them constantly uncertain about their fates.  
 When it became abundantly clear that the postwar reforms had failed to achieve many 
of their goals, a new generation of correctional officials attempted to save rehabilitation by 
shifting it away from prisons to the community in the form of various decarceration programs. 
While some participants successfully completed these programs, community corrections was 
extremely unpopular with the public, the judiciary and the police. These programs were highly 
visible and generated continual scandals for prison officials. By the time community corrections 
became a major focus of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction and to a lesser extent, the New 
South Wales Department of Corrective Services, the prisons themselves were becoming 
increasingly turbulent. Longstanding routines deteriorated with the introduction of new 
privileges, which often created new resentments among prisoners and staff alike. In 
Pennsylvania this process was also compounded by larger shifts in the racial composition of 
prison populations and increased racial conflict between inmates and staff and among 
prisoners.     
 The rehabilitation regimes set the stage for major transformations in prisons during the 




survived in altered forms. Struggles over classification and work release, for instance, remain to 
this day. However, the language of reform, so central to the success of rehabilitation fell apart 
in dramatic fashion as it increasingly could not convincingly address multiple audiences the way 
it initially had. By the late 1960s, the prisons in both New South Wales and Pennsylvania 
became embroiled in constant conflicts between the administration, unionized guards and 






























Introduction: Publicity, Postwar Reform and Resistance 
 
In 1983, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction issued an official history marking the thirtieth 
anniversary of its inception following the riots that swept across the state in the early 1950s.427 
The 56-page history detailed the growth and progressive administration of the Bureau, how it 
adopted new reforms in the 1960s and early 1970s during the height of the rehabilitation era 
and how it was meeting the current challenges posed by overcrowding. The commemorative 
history appeared at a moment early in Gov. Dick Thornburgh’s second term, when the Bureau 
of Correction was on the cusp of being elevated to a new cabinet-level Department of 
Corrections. The document, in this sense, marked the closure of period of penal reform and the 
beginning of new era of expanded prominence for the field of corrections. 
Since 1970, there had been numerous attempts to create a Department of Corrections 
and consolidate Pennsylvania’s fragmentary penal apparatus, but they foundered on legislative 
disputes over the nature of penal treatment and discipline in the state prison system and the 
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proper scope of state authority vis-à-vis the smaller counties. The first major push to create 
thenew department came on the heels of a major disturbance in July 1970 at Holmesburg 
Prison, the main institution in Philadelphia’s county prisons. Republican governor, Raymond 
Shafer, implored the state’s General Assembly to approve legislation to raise the Bureau of 
Correction to the departmental level, consolidate numerous state penal agencies and absorb all 
of the county prisons and jails throughout the state. Despite the publicity and violence of the 
Holmesburg riot, Shafer’s plan failed. His successor, Democrat Milton Shapp also could not 
convince the legislature to approve the plan over two terms; neither could Gov. Dick 
Thornburgh who followed him during his first term. Nevertheless, the continual effort to bring 
this plan to fruition kept the notion that something was seriously wrong with the state’s 
existing penal system in wide circulation. Supporters of a new department from both parties 
continuously returned to the argument that crime and punishment were now pressing issues in 
way that they had not been for many years and that they could no longer be addressed 
adequately with the fragmented machinery of state government. The state’s penal authority 
required the visibility, prestige and resources of any of the state’s other major cabinet-level 
departments, according these advocates. 
Initially, the people who undertook this project also supported increasing the array of 
rehabilitation and training programs inside prisons and discretionary release and work 
programs outside in the community. By the late 1960s, these supporters, from a younger, 
college-educated and liberal generation of correctional officials, began to replace older 
administrators, like Commissioner Arthur Prasse, and exerted greater influence on penal 




especially Allyn Sielaff who succeeded Prasse, also tried to cultivate more public support for 
new correctional programs by reaching out to other state agencies, civic organizations, the 
media and the general public. These efforts were often tightly controlled and at times even 
disingenuous, but along with the community corrections programs that Sielaff championed, 
they brought the actual practices of punishment closer to many people who had little direct 
contact with prisons and penal agencies before. The 1983 commemorative history described 
this as Sielaff’s effort to “open up the system.”428  
 
 
Figure 3: Allyn Sielaff (Second from left) meeting with public 
Figure 3 Allyn Sielaff (Second from left) meeting with public. Source: Judith R. Smith, 30th 
Anniversary Commemorative History: The Bureau of Correction and Its Institutions (Harrisburg: 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Correction, 1983), 10. 
 
From the mid-1960s onward, however, the growing number of people interested in 
criminal justice reform and producing penal knowledge outstripped the control of criminal 
                                                          




justice agencies. This diversity of participants (and their differing standpoints) included many 
individuals, organizations and coalitions that had previously not worked on prison matters. 
Perhaps the most important of these new voices belonged to imprisoned people themselves. Of 
course, some incarcerated people had always commented on their plight, but until the late 
twentieth-century, their voices were subject to suffocating control by prison administrators and 
often held little appeal for many outside audiences.429 Criminologist John Pratt has convincingly 
argued that by the late nineteenth-century penal authorities in most Anglophone countries had 
securely established themselves as experts on crime and punishment and “were able [to] 
proclaim their truth as ‘the truth,’” and either “silence or discredit competing versions.”430 State 
penal authorities in the jurisdictions Pratt studied rarely faced intense public scrutiny during 
much of the twentieth-century.431 Even when severe disturbances swept across prison systems 
in the early 1950s, the fledgling penal bureaucracies weathered scandals and reconstituted 
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prison regimes, often by adopting aspects of rehabilitative reforms proposals, which had been 
circulating in professional penological circles since the 1920s.  
As a large literature now attests, the late 1960s and 1970s marked an important turning 
point for this arrangement of penal power in places like Pennsylvania.432 While not unraveling 
entirely, the contentious situation from the late-1960s onward eroded the hegemonic voice of 
leading penal officials, especially those most closely identified with reformative programs, like 
Sielaff and his successor Stewart Werner, and it created deep fissures in the legitimacy of state 
penal arrangements. Penal officials faced challenges within the prisons from both inmates and 
guards and from beyond the walls as they struggled to reassure the general public of the 
efficacy of their policies and convincingly explain simultaneous increases in crime rates, prison 
unrest and escapes. According to Pratt, “it was as if scandal had become systematic, 
symptomatic of the way in which prisons were no longer performing the functions the public 
expected of them.”433 Inside prisons, many of the new rehabilitation programs and privileges, 
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which aimed to normalize prisons and encouraged greater self-reflection and expression among 
prisoners, also provided incarcerated people with tools to criticize their confinement and reach 
larger audiences. The extent and availability of these programs can be easily overstated, but 
they increasingly opened avenues for incarcerated people to voice their concerns through 
writing and education.434   
This increasing outspokenness of prisoners attests to the powerful influence exerted by 
the broader civil rights movements of the 1960s. Many prisoners, especially those from the 
state’s major urban areas of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, deeply identified with civil rights 
protests, Black Power activism, decolonialism and a host of other radical and anti-authoritarian 
political movements, often drawing inspiration from these causes in their challenges to prison 
regimes and the legal and social status of a prisoner. The successful litigation and collective 
actions by imprisoned Black Muslims from the late 1950s onward explicitly drew the lines of 
racial identity, prisoners’ rights and civil rights together, initiating many of the legal strategies 
that were soon adopted by other groups of prisoners and addressed to different concerns.435 In 
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some cases, the discourse of contemporary social movements also organized and provided a 
cover for illicit networks and activities within prisons.  This was especially the case with many 
Black Muslims associated with Philadelphia’s Mosque No. 12 in state and county prisons after 
1970.436 
Yet, until the late 1960s, penal authorities, the media and researchers in Pennsylvania, 
and the United States more generally, rarely acknowledged the extent of the criminalization of 
people of color, their overrepresentation in prison and how this connected to the history of 
racial discrimination.437 But, these issues became unavoidable with the upsurge of civil rights 
protests and nationalist politics sweeping over the globe during the 1960s. The racialization of 
crime and the criminalization of race both have long histories in Pennsylvania, but they now 
appeared with renewed vigor.438 Many investigations, court cases, media accounts and 
research involving prisons now forthrightly addressed how race related to patterns of prison 
violence, squalid living conditions, classification decisions, disciplinary infractions and 
administrative punishments. Authors often situated their observations in reference to the 
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general state of race relations, official racial policies and the strategies of social movements’ 
challenges to racial norms.  
Although hardly unprecedented, the interconnections of race, crime and punishment 
also provided a seemingly, race-neutral way for some actors to disparage and resist 
contemporary civil rights projects through appeals for law and order policies.439 Media 
representations often conflated blackness with criminality, which became more salient as the 
proportion of people of color in prisons and jails grew from the 1960s onward. Many urban 
newspapers in Pennsylvania, for instance, ran articles that dwelled on the marked, racial 
“otherness” of offenders and prisoners even if they did not explicitly attribute causal 
connections between these categories and criminal conduct. As a number of scholars have 
shown, the image of an unrepentant, incorrigible inmate or a perpetrator of terrible crimes 
gradually became less white over this period and less amenable to penal strategies of 
rehabilitation and societal re-inclusion. This accentuated how deeply the postwar, therapeutic 
reforms rested on the assumption of the whiteness of the targets of reform and 
recuperation.440 Thus, the revalorization of incarceration as a major social policy since the 
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1970s, its attendant refashioning of prison regimes and the outpouring of penal knowledge 
should all be read as much as a discourse on race.441 
I focus on several interrelated ways this racialized penal discourse appeared in 
Pennsylvania during the 1970s. First, I discuss how rebellious, violent black prisoners featured 
prominently in several prison narratives surrounding Philadelphia’s prisons, especially 
Holmesburg, from the late 1960s onward. In 1968, an unprecedented judicial investigation of 
sexual violence in the county prisons determined that older black inmates, often with extensive 
institutional histories, committed the vast majority of sexual assaults and that most of their 
victims were young, frail, inexperienced white prisoners. Two years later, several city officials, 
notably Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo, portrayed the July 1970 rebellion at Holmesburg as a 
race riot. Although, subsequent investigations painted a much more complex picture, it was 
clear that race played an enormous part in patterns of discriminatory imprisonment, violence 
and victimization that the riot revealed.  
Second, I examine how racial politics grounded prisoner activism in the state prison at 
SCI Pittsburgh, the state’s oldest prison and main maximum-security facility after the closure of 
SCI Philadelphia in 1970. After the appointment of a liberal, reformist superintendent in 1968, 
black prisoners engaged in several strikes and demonstrations with the help of outside allies in 
                                                          
441 For recent works addressing this theme, see Amy E. Lerman and Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The 
Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014);Becky Pettit, 
Invisible Men: Mass Incarceration and the Myth of Black Progress (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2012); 
Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Alexander, The New Jim Crow; Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters”; Wacquant, Punishing the Poor; 
Glenn C. Loury, Pamela S. Karlan, Loïc Wacquant and Tommie Shelby, Race, Incarceration, and American Values 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation Publications, 2007); Vesla Mae Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime 




an attempt to force greater recognition of the rights and cultural identity of the prison’s large 
black population. This led to a prolonged three-way struggle between prisoner activists, the 
prison’s administration (and to some degree, the Bureau’s central office) and the guard force 
who resisted both the activists and the liberal superintendent. Activists saw the 
administration’s eventual crackdown on their activities as emblematic of the American state’s 
disingenuous commitment to civil rights and the enforcement of rigid racial hierarchy. 
Finally, I analyze how race factored into the turn toward greater custodial control in 
prisons in 1973 after a series of killings of staff members. The deaths of four staff members in 
Holmesburg, SCI Graterford and SCI Pittsburgh led to an immediate crackdown by guards in 
each institution and the tightening of prison security across the state. In three of the killings, 
the perpetrators were African American and the victims white. In the last instance at 
Pittsburgh, the victim, a senior officer, was black and the assailants were white and 
unabashedly racist. In response to the deaths, the guards’ union pushed for the creation of a 
separate, high-security “maxi-max” unit in an isolated area of the state to confine 
“incorrigibles.” The administration of Gov. Shapp initially supported this idea, but the proposal 
provoked strong resistance from penal reform groups, radical activists and liberal and African 
American members of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the nature of penal debate at this 
point shifted decisively toward questions of maintaining order and isolating difficult inmates. 
The imagined target of this intervention was not just incorrigible, but the black, radical prisoner 
who defied penal authorities and occupied a space beyond the reach of therapeutic and 




extensive use of isolation became a legal battleground during much of the decade as 
segregated prisoners petitioned courts for release.  
The confluence of all these trends amplified the visibility of prisons and the people who 
lived and worked inside of them. It simultaneously increased prison unrest, which led to more 
systematic judicial intervention, public inquires, and similar, if less public, internal investigations 
in an effort to quell mounting turmoil. Since these kinds of forums provided platforms for 
critics, they often sparked more controversy, unrest and change. It is hard to overstate the 
effects of these interventions and the activities that prompted them. For better or worse, most 
of the transformations in prison conditions, institutional management and inmate reform in 
Pennsylvania during the last half century occurred precisely because of the volatile mix of 
collective resistance by prisoners, legal mandates and inquiries. More often, simply the threat 
posed these factors was enough to spur drastic change.442  
Even as the creation of the new penal agency stalled throughout the 1970s, the plan 
formed a backdrop to these other problems in both the state’s prison system and the extensive 
network of county jails scattered across the state. Centralizing the state’s fragmentary penal 
agencies into a unified system appeared to many supporters as the only way to feasibly address 
all of these problems and restore order and purpose to the state’s penal institutions. Officials in 
the Bureau of Correction and governor’s office claimed that only they had the jurisdiction, 
expertise and resources to rectify widespread dilemmas like squalid conditions in jails, lax 
security and a lack of activities and programs for prisoners. By the mid-to-late 1970s, however, 
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the many supporters of the new department, from both parties, had become much more 
cynical about the efficacy of the types of reintegration programs that had been a crucial part of 
the initial effort to create the new department. Increasingly, many state officials saw the 
penological value of the prison lying more in its ability to simply incapacitate offenders for long 
periods of time rather than transform them.  
This well-known departure in penal policy during the 1970s, from a therapeutic or 
reintegration approach to a more retributive or incapacitating rationale, often tends to obscure 
how the state-crafting project of increasing the scope and grandeur of penal authority 
straddled both these positions and was shared by liberals and conservatives, Democrats and 
Republicans, alike. Sociologist Loïc Wacquant has recently argued that the massive growth of 
the penal estate in the United States in the last thirty years underscores the level of agreement 
between competing parties on the value of imprisonment as social policy and ruling strategy as 
opposed to the pre-1970s, welfarist approaches to managing market-generated social 
problems.443 In Pennsylvania, there was in fact a remarkable level of agreement across the 
political spectrum about the wisdom of expanding the state’s role in the administration of 
justice in general and prisons in particular.  
However, I argue that the initial effort to augment the state’s penal capacity in the late 
1960s through the early 1970s was, less punitive on the part of leading correctional officials, like 
Allyn Sielaff, and many of their supporters in the legislature than Wacquant’s account suggests. 
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Sielaff and his colleagues saw many of the state’s prisons as brutal, criminogenic dungeons that 
simply needed to be dismantled. Whether or not they were effective or widely available, the 
types of correctional programs these officials supported focused more on reintegrating and 
normalizing offenders, often in the community, or even in programs that diverted them away 
from correctional agencies altogether. Yet, the increased reach of the penal bureaucracy that 
these reformers saw as necessary to implement such policies was also shared by many people 
who deeply opposed their penological visions and could easily be redeployed for different, 
more punitive, purposes while still selectively targeting the same population. Senior penal 
bureaucrats, administration officials, legislators, the judiciary, guards, police and reform groups 
fought over such policies but were, nevertheless, in Wacquant’s words, “enmeshed in relations 
of antagonistic cooperation as they vie[d] for preeminence inside the bureaucratic field.”444 This 
highly public competition further diminished the authority of the prison officials, who appeared 
overwhelmed by endemic controversy surrounding the state prisons and county jails. As the 
post-1953 penal arrangements deteriorated, a highly contentious public debate on prisons and 
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punishment emerged and widened, often reflecting and informing many of the social and 
political struggles over the nature of citizenship in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The Urban Crisis and County Prisons in Philadelphia 
 
From the late 1960s onward, violence, charges of mismanagement, investigation and 
scandalous media coverage haunted the three local county prisons of Philadelphia: the 
Detention Center, the House of Correction and especially Holmesburg Prison.445 The troubles 
besetting these prisons formed the basis for several different investigations and lawsuits 
brought by current and former inmates and their allies in both state and federal courts, and 
collectively they had a major influence on activities in Pennsylvania’s state prison, which was 
jurisdictionally-separate from the numerous county penal systems throughout the state. Such 
problems also informed several highly-publicized media narratives, which largely defined the 
public image of Philadelphia’s prison system, both locally and nationally, and arguably 
contributed to ongoing tension within these institutions.  
While the press often mentioned these prisons in articles about particular crimes and 
criminals or even in stories about trends in offending, this was usually in passing. In contrast, 
the exposé of the problems confronting the county prisons, which began appearing more 
frequently in the late 1960s and especially after July 1970, focused more on the dilemmas and 
difficulties of criminal justice administration, highlighting state and local penal policy and 
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specific aspects of the local prisons. The Philadelphia press, as well as dailies elsewhere in the 
state, became far more critical than in previous years, painting an overall picture of crisis and 
institutionalized disorder with certain topics like mismanagement, medical testing on inmates, 
overcrowding, racism and sexual violence featuring prominently in many stories. Such critical 
media accounts were deeply interwoven; journalists braided articles and narratives together 
over many incidents and years, with later articles often explicitly referencing the coverage of 
past disclosures, narratives and actors.446 Such accounts did not stop at the prison gates. 
Journalists followed the institutional lives of people inside, detailing relationships between 
people organized through their institutional roles, like “inmates,” “officers,” and 
“superintendents,” as well as the nature of differences among and within these groups. By the 
mid-1970s, a thick, public complex of penal knowledge about Philadelphia’s prisons, composed 
of news accounts, interviews with officials, guards and inmates, and increasingly, publications 
by current and former inmates and prisoners’ rights organizations, circulated throughout the 
state and well beyond. This activity dramatically increased the awareness of the city’s prisons 
(and penal policy more generally) as a political issue and major aspect of the city’s discordant 
racial politics. 
Philadelphia’s prisons rivaled the size of state prisons and often suffered from problems 
not seen in smaller county jails.447 Unlike state prisons, however, county institutions usually 
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only held short-term inmates, whether sentenced or awaiting legal disposition.448 Since most 
county prisoners spent less than a year in custody, prisoner populations in county prisons and 
jails often fluctuated rapidly.449 Such features and the lack of stable routines and programs 
made prisoners in these facilities unsettled and restless in comparison to their counterparts in 
state prisons. The volume of people passing through Philadelphia’s prisons compounded these 
issues. As of February 20, 1964, for instance, Philadelphia County held 3,266 prisoners or 46.6 
percent of the total county prison population in the entire state.450 Even Allegheny County 
(Pittsburgh), the second largest county system in the state, could not rival its eastern 
counterpart, holding only 14.5 percent of Pennsylvania’s total county prison population. No 
other county came close to either Philadelphia or Allegheny in this regard.451 It’s worth noting 
that Philadelphia penal officials housed a population of over three thousand imprisoned people 
in three facilities. At rough the same time, the state of Pennsylvania held 7,788 prisoners in 
eight state correctional institutions.452 Twenty-seven Pennsylvania counties had less than ten 
prisoners each.453   
The difficulties in managing such a large concentration of people and services in 
Philadelphia meant that the county’s prison authorities worked more closely with the state’s 
Bureau of Correction on a number of matters. A large portion of the people committed to the 
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state’s prisons came directly from Philadelphia, which meant that they often spent the initial 
period of their time in custody in county facilities before being sentenced and transferred to 
state prisons. County officials compiled many of the initial dossiers on inmates, which they 
transferred to staff at the state’s Eastern Diagnostic and Classification Center at SCI Philadelphia 
several miles from Detention Center, the House of Correction and Holmesburg Prison. The state 
also temporarily transferred sentenced, state prisoners to county facilities for court 
appearances or while they were evaluated or treated at city hospitals.454 
During the 1960s, the relationship between the state and county penal agencies grew 
more complex as the state hoped to increase its presence in the city with new specialized 
facilities and community corrections programs.455 The emerging functional diversity of penal 
operations in Philadelphia created more avenues for contact, practical integration and formal 
agreements between the state and county penal agencies. Because of the size and scope of 
these interactions, many policy changes and events in one agency often reverberated in the 
other. Perhaps the most obvious indicator of this relationship was the large number of people 
that passed through both systems during their time in custody.  
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By the mid-1960s, Philadelphia’s prison system began a long period of persistent 
overcrowding, which lasted for decades.456 The prisons’ population still fluctuated, but within 
the overall growth trend. The large increase in Philadelphia County’s prison populations 
eventually appeared in other counties, albeit to a lesser degree, and also spread to the state 
system as well. When the problem first appeared in the early 1960s, the county responded 
much as it had during previous population upswings by assigning more than one person to a cell 
and temporarily transferring prisoners to nearby state prisons while retaining legal authority 
over them.457 By 1966, however, the sheer number of people committed to Philadelphia county 
prisons overwhelmed these options and seriously strained the supervisory abilities of the prison 
staff.458 Inspectors from the state’s Bureau of Correction noted in 1966 that Holmesburg Prison 
had, at most, only 33 staff members on duty during the day, managing 1,252 prisoners - a guard 
to inmate ratio of 1 to 38.459  
As the prison population grew, its racial composition also shifted with African Americans 
prisoners surpassing white prisoners during the decade.460 The increased presence of African 
Americans within the county’s penal institutions reflected a broad racial and political-economic 
transformation in postwar, urban geography in Philadelphia and many other metropolitan 
centers in the United States. As a number of scholars have demonstrated since the 1990s, a 
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combination of migration, federal and local policies and capital flight created poor, densely 
populated African American ghettos in many urban centers during the mid-twentieth 
century.461 As manufacturing industry moved away from urban areas, especially in the northern 
part of the U.S., employment opportunities in these emerging African American neighborhoods 
dwindled while poverty, crime and inequities in public services increased.462 Philadelphia’s 
deeply racialized and discriminatory, postwar residential patterns and labor market 
concentrated African Americans within the northern and western areas of city.463 Since the city 
and county of Philadelphia have coterminous borders, African Americans represented a much 
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larger segment of the population than in other Pennsylvania counties, a fact that alone would 
have led to their greater presence in Philadelphia County prisons. 
Yet, even taking into account these broader structures of racialized space and 
population distribution, the number of African Americans in Philadelphia’s prisons far 
outstripped their proportionate population in the city and county – a fact that was obvious to 
law enforcement officials, prisoners and Philadelphia’s African American community. 
Philadelphia incarcerated black men at a much greater rate than either white or Hispanic 
Philadelphians relative to each group’s population in the county. By 1968, African Americans 
accounting for 80.5 percent of Holmesburg’s prison population.464 A confluence of trends 
contributed this disproportionate increase. Many people, especially the police and major 
Philadelphia news dailies often attributed the growing prison population to patterns of 
dangerous and disorderly behavior by young, African American males who engaged in reckless 
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civil rights activism, gang activity and crime.465 Widely-cited research circulating among policy-
makers also suggested that prison populations were likely to rise simply because the large, 
postwar, Baby Boom birth cohort was beginning to enter the age range (teens and early 
twenties) most susceptible for both criminal behavior and incarceration.466  
Still others argued that overcrowding was a much more direct result of the behavior law 
enforcement agencies, the judiciary and state and local government. Philadelphia’s largely 
white police force, especially under the direction of Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo, was well-
known for its heavy-handed approach to policing African American neighborhood.467 Rizzo 
often publicly equated civil rights activism with lawlessness and violent crime in statements to 
the press and his actions, and those of his officers’, became a continual source of racial friction 
in the city. Throughout the decade, the Philadelphia police arrested a large number of young, 
black men. Even those lucky enough to avoid immediate detention or initial sentences of 
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confinement, nevertheless, entered police records and became more susceptible to future 
imprisonment. 
 Philadelphia’s judiciary also created overcrowding pressures at the county’s prisons as 
the number of untried and unsentenced prisoners grew throughout the 1960s.468 Extended 
delays and continuances in processing cases, understaffing in the judiciary and public 
defender’s office, and high bail requirements led to unnecessarily long periods in detention for 
many people, especially poor, people of color, as they awaited preliminary hearings or trials.469 
These practices and policies kept many people in county custody for months even in cases 
where the district attorney’s office decided ultimately to not pursue criminal charges against 
particular people. Convicted, but unsentenced, people also spent long periods of time in county 
institutions prior to sentencing even if the nature of their conviction meant that they would 
serve their sentence in the state’s prison system.470 While all these various factors fed into the 
swelling prison population, city and county officials spent a considerable amount of time 
blaming each other for the mounting problem, often through the press, rather than jointly 
devising a method for containing the prison population or finding other alternative capacity 
solutions. Mayor James Tate and District Attorney Arlen Specter, for instance, both criticized 
the courts for the unnecessarily long delays in processing cases, but they also did little to 
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alleviate the problem with the administrative tools available to them, such as expanded use of 
early release procedures or alterations in policing practices.471 
By the latter half of the decade, the Philadelphia press reported increasing tensions, 
violent altercations and organized protests by inmates at the county’s institutions.472 Many of 
these incidents echoed the changing tenor of civil rights activism in Philadelphia, which became 
more confrontational over the course of the decade.473 The hostility and mistrust between 
many of the city’s African American residents and the law enforcement extended to the cell 
blocks of the county prisons, but in a much more condensed, volatile form. Mutual 
incriminations, resentments, fears and anger, cultivated in urban political disputes over space 
and resources, permeated the relationships and daily interactions of white members of the 
guard force and the mainly African American prison population, with the former in a position to 
coercing and disciplining the latter.  
This made Philadelphia’s prisons, like many other prisons and jails in the midwest and 
northeast at the time, fertile recruiting ground for the Nation of Islam from the 1940s onward 
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and eventually other Black Power organizations by the mid-to-late 1960s.474 The Nation of 
Islam, which focused many of its proselytizing and recruiting activities within prisons, largely 
began what would later become known as the prisoners’ right movement through its successful 
litigation challenging prison administrations with religious discrimination.475 In Pennsylvania, 
Black Muslims, mainly from Philadelphia, engaged in a long campaign against state and county 
prison officials over the acceptable parameters of their religious and organizational practices 
while extending their influence among black prisoners.476 The organization, discipline and 
solidarity of the Black Muslims provided a collective model for action by prisoners and as a 
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number of sources attested, the Black Muslims controlled large segments of prison population 
in all Philadelphia area prisons, state and county alike.477 Turner DeVaughn, who had been 
recently released from Holmesburg, told a journalist that “Islam as a way of life or religion is 
basically taboo to prison officials. Yet, more than half the black inmates claim Islam as their 
religion.”478 Even among African Americans who did not join the Nation of Islam, the latter’s 
interpretation of American history and contemporary society offered inmates a way to explicitly 
connect their own imprisonment and the overwhelming presence of other African Americans 
Philadelphia’s prisons to the long history of slavery.  
Thus, race was the central interpretive category for the emerging narrative of difficulties 
in Philadelphia’s prisons, echoing similar accounts of incarceration, crime and civil rights protest 
in many other northern urban centers throughout the country. As discriminatory public policies 
and employment patterns forged large African American enclaves in Philadelphia, the city’s 
criminal justice system formed a second order of racial discrimination and segregation, in 
essence feeding off the spatial concentration of Philadelphia’s African American population and 
the social problems created by it growing impoverishment and isolation. The combination of 
discriminatory law enforcement, prison overcrowding, racial tensions in the county’s prisons 
and the receptiveness of many African American inmates to increasingly radical, civil rights and 
Black Power forms of protest catapulted the problems of Philadelphia’s prisons into the public 
sphere. A series of disruptions and investigations punctuated this growing visibility of the 
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turmoil engulfing the county’s prisons, and a steady stream of news articles thrust a litany of 
prison management problems into public discourse. These events influenced debates about 
penal policy and practice in Pennsylvania’s larger state prison system as it became increasingly 
clear that Philadelphia officials were ill-equipped to deal with their strife in the county prisons 
alone. 
 
The Davis Report: Penal Subjects and Sexual Violence 
 
The problems of overcrowding and racial conflicts between staff and inmates and 
among inmates were well-known to many city officials, especially those working in the criminal 
justice system, but they became much more publically prominent through a series of 
newspaper articles on overcrowding and especially with the publication of a report in 1968 by 
Allan Davis, the Chief Assistant District Attorney for Philadelphia, detailing an “epidemic” of 
sexual assault in Philadelphia’s three prisons.479 Davis’s investigation, which soon attracted 
national attention, came at the behest of Judge Alexander Barbieri, after two inmates told him 
that they had been raped while in custody. Police Commissioner Rizzo soon began a similar 
inquiry, which eventually merged with the district attorney’s project.480 Davis examined 
evidence from a two year period between 1966 and 1968, interviewing thousands of inmates 
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and reviewing administrative reports and other documents. In addition to his official report to 
Judge Barbieri, Davis also published a more accessible summary of his work for the journal, 
Trans-action, which would become one of the more widely cited studies of sexual violence in 
prison over the next two decades.481  
Perhaps more than any other contemporary account, Davis’s two reports, but especially 
the Trans-action piece, cemented the image of African American inmates and sexual violence in 
prison. Both reports depicted numerous instances of brutal sexual violence in the county’s 
penal institutions and prisoner transportation vans. Davis argued that the county’s prisons had 
extremely high rates of sexual assaults, including gang rape, and claimed that much of the 
violence was interracial. The report contained numerous descriptions of vicious criminal activity 
and inexcusable neglect by authorities. Most of the victims identified by Davis were white, 
youthful prisoners, who were of small physical stature, often “better-looking,” and for the most 
part inexperienced with prison life.482 The assailants, however, were usually older, black 
inmates who had previous records of imprisonment. Despite discussing numerous deficiencies 
in the management of the prisons as well as larger problems of racial discrimination in the 
broader administration of justice in the larger, original report, Davis’s condensed version in 
Trans-action centered on sexual violence and largely became known for the brutality of the 
rapes he discussed. In this article, Davis deliberately eschewed social scientific, medical and 
legal language in favor of “the raw, ugly language used by the witness[es] and victims.”483 The 
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cruelty and racialized nature of sexual violence in Davis’s description undoubtedly contributed 
to the text’s notoriety and broad circulation in a variety of press and professional accounts.  
According to communications theorist, John Sloop, and historian, Regina Kunzel, many 
American media portrayals of sex and sexuality in prison shifted dramatically during the 
1960s.484 In the immediate postwar years, most penal experts claimed that homosexual 
behavior demonstrated a stunting or reversal of the normal linear process of sexual and 
psychological maturation.485 While they believed that for some prisoners homosexual behavior 
indicated a pre-existing homosexual preference and identity, they also considered it to be an 
adaption to prison life for many others. The adaptive-response theory suggested that sexuality 
was unstable and that institutionalization could produce a shift toward homosexuality in a 
person who had been heterosexual prior to incarceration.486 In other words, the deprivation of 
heterosexual sex in prisons produced what was often referred to as “situational 
homosexuality,” but this could easily become fixed as prisoners gradually drifted further from 
normative, heterosexual sex.487 Prison authorities also believed homosexuality and homosexual 
behavior were connected to violence among inmates.488 Despite these views, few prison 
administrators and researchers believed even during the height of the rehabilitation era that 
“true” homosexuals could be reformed or cured of either their sexual identity or their 
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propensities toward crime.489 Prison staff often separated known homosexual prisoners from 
the general population, containing them in homosexual units.490  
Partly because of the widely-publicized accounts of Philadelphia’s prisons, depictions of 
homosexual sex between inmates in the press, law and social science literature became far 
more violent after the late 1960s – much more a matter of rape and interpersonal violence 
between inmates than an indication of mental illness, non-normative sexuality or the effects of 
institutionalization. Additionally, the tendency of earlier accounts to deemphasize or ignore the 
race of the prisoners gave way to more explicit discussion of race by the late 1960s. Not only 
did racial categories become more prominent, authors frequently positioned African Americans 
as assailants and white inmates as victims of sexual violence.491 Such accounts drew on the 
well-established trope of “black degeneracy and…the predatory black male rapist,” yet they 
also departed from previous iterations of this image.492 Perhaps the most obvious difference 
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being that white women were not immediately present in discussions of violence in male 
prisons even if white victims were said to be transformed into women by the violence. Davis’s 
report became widely influential in this new conceptualization of the nexus between inmate 
sexuality, race and violence.493  
Contrary to earlier accounts, Davis de-emphasized the issue of sexuality, focusing more 
on the violence and what he claimed was the willful attempt by predominantly African 
American aggressors to dominate and humiliate white victims. Davis argued that these rapes 
did not involve questions of sexual gratification, sexual prowess or sexuality for the assailants, 
but were better understood as attempts by black inmates to recuperate a sense of masculinity 
that had been profoundly diminished by the racism and economic disadvantage marring urban 
life in Philadelphia.494 Rape offered some black inmates a way of forcefully asserting their 
masculinity through victimizing—and feminizing—white inmates. Davis’s line of argument 
resonated with other contemporary understandings of race, masculinity and sex, according to 
Kunzel, especially feminist theorizations of rape as an act of power and liberal racial theories 
about the psychological damage of racism on African Americans.495 Yet, his report also 
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minimized evidence that did not neatly fit into this narrative. For instance, despite finding 
evidence of sexual aggression by white inmates and victimization of black inmates by black 
rapists, Davis focused his explanations on the more numerous instances of victimization of 
white inmates by African American assailants.496 He offered no explanations or gender analysis 
for the other rapes.  
Davis placed a large amount of culpability for the incidence of rape on the prisons’ 
administration, including the superintendent, the Board of Trustees and the mayor’s office, and 
he also revealed serious mismanagement and corruption in Philadelphia’s prisons. His criticism 
of the penal authorities extended from the top echelons of the command structure down to the 
actions of low-level employees, especially the guards assigned to escort prisoners to and from 
the city’s courts. Most lower-level staff in Davis’s narrative appeared either indifferent to the 
suffering of the victims of sexual violence or powerless to stop it. More worrisome, Davis 
indicated that some guards laughed at the victims’ abuse and seemed to have been more 
directly complicit in setting up some of the attacks.497  
Davis’s recommendations for reducing the incidence of rape consisted of a familiar list 
of pragmatic interventions, like bail reform, enhancing prison security, improving inmate 
classification and creating more work opportunities and activities for inmates.498 Yet, Davis’s 
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discussion of the aggressors in the attacks hardly made them appear amenable to many of 
these reforms. Quite the contrary, they appeared unrepentant and unreformable. Whatever 
the merits of the reforms Davis proposed, it was the image of vastly outnumber white inmates, 
futilely trying to defend themselves against an ever-growing population of incorrigible African 
Americans, determined to humiliate their victims, that became a staple of press and academic 
accounts of the racial and sexual violence in Philadelphia’s prison system.  
One of the more troubling things that Allan Davis found at Holmesburg Prison was the 
influence exerted by a research laboratory in Holmesburg Prison operated by Dr. Albert 
Klingman, a dermatologist and faculty member at University of Pennsylvania’s medical school, 
with the full support of Edward J. Hendrick, the Superintendent of Philadelphia County Prisons. 
According to historian Allan Hornblum, Dr. Klingman first began treating prisoners at the prison 
during the early 1950s, but soon envisioned future dermatological research at Holmesburg.499 
Dr. Klingman later told a reporter that upon entering Holmesburg, “All I saw was acres of skin. It 
was like a farmer seeing a fertile field for the first time.”500 Soon afterward, Dr. Klingman 
established a private dermatological business, testing pharmaceuticals on prisoners for 
companies and government agencies, including the military.501 Inmates participating in the 
program received cash payments as compensation for the skin tests that far exceeded any 
income available to them from other work at the prison.502 The Philadelphia County prison 
                                                          
499 Allen M. Hornblum, Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison (New York: Routledge, 1998), 37-
40. 
500 “Prisoners Volunteer to Save Lives,” Bulletin, (February 27, 1966) quoted in Hornblum, Acres of Skin, 37 and 
Allen M. Hornblum, Sentenced to Science: One Black Man's Story of Imprisonment in America (University Park: 
Penn State University Press, 2007), 52. 
501 Hornblum, Acres of Skin, 37-71; Thomas B. Congdon, Jr., “The Convict Volunteers,” The Saturday Evening Post, 
(March 2, 1963), 62-63. 




system, and the county’s general coffer, benefitted as well, collecting a portion of the money 
that various companies and agencies paid to Dr. Klingman for testing their products. Prison 
administrators also used inclusion into the lucrative skin studies as a disciplinary device to 
reward or punish inmates and maintain institutional control.503 
Allan Lawson and Leodus Jones, prison activists who spent time at Holmesburg, later 
recounted at a U.S. Senate hearing on human experimentation that many inmates entered 
Holmesburg in desperate need of cash and had few avenues for obtaining it.504 Newly admitted 
inmates especially had numerous immediate needs, like basic toiletries and bail money, in 
addition to multiple “free world” obligations like rent and family support that suddenly became 
much harder to meet once they were imprisoned.505 The lure of cash from Dr. Klingman’s 
experiments was simply too enticing for many prisoners in such situations, which made the 
notion of voluntary participation farcical. Subsequent research and litigation established that 
many of the experiments, like those for dioxin (an active ingredient in Agent Orange) and the 
acne medication Retin-A, were quite dangerous and many of the volunteers suffered long term 
health problems as a result of their participation.506  
Allan Davis focused less on the deleterious health consequences of Dr. Kilngman’s 
program, which were not as well-known at the time, but he accused the prisons’ senior 
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management and Dr. Klingman of fostering corrupt and abusive relationships between, and 
among, staff and inmates that undermined prison order. Davis worried that the dermatological 
laboratory had become too influential in the overall management of the county prisons: 
Because there is a dearth of alternative programming at Holmesburg, and 
because the project pays 20% of the inmates’ wages to the Prison system, prison 
administrators have allowed the project to expand to the point where it 
constitutes a separate government within the prison system.507 
 
The cash payments inmates earned in the experiments not only altered the distribution of 
wealth and power among the prisoners (something the prison administration was supposed to 
prevent in Davis’s view), but they also structured a whole range of interrelated, illicit markets 
and activities, including the coercion of sexual favors.508 Although many guards resented the 
disruption of the prison hierarchy and discipline caused by Klingman’s experiments, Davis found 
instances of guards accepting bribes from inmates involved in the experiments.509 It appeared 
to Davis that the pernicious influence of the program affected everyone. 
In many cases, bribery emanating from the experiments directly abetted sexual violence 
and exploitation. Davis illustrated this point through the activities of one inmate - Stanley 
Randall. Working as a research assistant in Dr. Klingman’s laboratory, Randall eventually gained 
the power to distribute assignments to lucrative experiments, which he used to ensnare 
unsuspecting, newly admitted inmates who desperately needed cash, guidance and protection. 
Randall bribed guards into assigning newly admitted, young inmates to bunk in his cell and he 
then provided then with access to the studies. Over time, Randall pressured them into sexual 
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services through various threats, including exclusion from the studies.510 Davis argued that 
situations like this and management’s role in blindly sustaining them subverted the prison’s 
order and lead to innumerable instances of sexual victimization.  
The Philadelphia press carried multiple stories on the county’s prisons in the wake of 
Davis’s investigation, depicting an ineffective prison administration that was simply unable or 
unwilling to control criminal behavior within the prison’s walls and appeared to harbor 
numerous corrupt employees.511 Several national media publications also reported on the 
Davis’s work, often in an uncritical, alarmist fashion, and it soon became an embarrassment for 
the city, Supt. Edward Hendrick, and Dr. Klingman.512 Both the New York Times and Time 
magazine published articles reiterating Davis’s description of the endemic sexual violence in 
Philadelphia’s prisons and the inability, and at times unwillingness, of prison officials to stop 
it.513  
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Despite these larger audiences for some of the report’s findings,514 Davis primarily 
intended it as pragmatic analysis and a proposal for reform. It immediately became a common 
reference point and source of authority for other city agencies as well as state officials and 
activists groups, like the Pennsylvania Prison Society and Prisoners’ Rights Council, who 
frequently referred to Davis’s findings while calling for dramatic changes in the county 
prisons.515 The reforms it proposed were hardly new, but the scandalous nature of the violence 
and mismanagement covered in the report provided a compelling source of moral outrage for 
pushing changes. Many different groups, sometimes ones that were deeply opposed to each 
other like prisoner advocates and guards, found valuable suggestions and proposals in the 
report. Despite the publicity surrounding Davis’s work, city officials moved slowly implementing 
toward the reforms he recommended; many of them simply languished.516 Dr. Klingman’s 
dermatological experiments at Holmesburg continued, albeit with greater oversight.517 
The Unresolved Question of Penal Jurisdiction: State or County Prisons…or Both?  
 
The problems of Philadelphia’s prisons during the 1960s renewed a longstanding debate 
in Pennsylvania about who should control local penal affairs: the state government in 
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Harrisburg or the sixty-seven county governments. Most country governments jealously 
guarded their authority vis-a-vis the state’s government on many matters, but they were often 
all too willing to cede responsibilities for prisons to the state’s Bureau of Correction or 
especially the state’s general fund. While Philadelphia’s prisons were Pennsylvania’s largest and 
most troubled county facilities, state correctional officials worried about the living conditions in 
county institutions across the state and the potential legal liabilities the state might face if such 
institutions became subject to federal judicial intervention. Most senior state correctional 
officials and professional advocacy organizations, like the Philadelphia-based Pennsylvania 
Prison Society, felt that many counties operated jails with deplorable living conditions 
substantially below the standard of the state penal system.518  
Yet, the state’s ability to rectify this was limited because constitutionally they had little 
direct authority over the penal operations in the counties.519 While the Bureau of Correction 
could inspect county facilities and investigate misconduct, it could only offer recommendations 
for changes.520 Improvements to jail programs and the physical plant were low priorities for 
county leaders with meager funds. This situation developed into a political stand-off over penal 
policy between the state and counties as the latter simply could, or would, not pay for 
improvements. Basic differences in the nature of confinement in the two different jurisdictions 
also contributed to the tension between county and state penal authorities. Consistent with 
national and international penological trends, the Bureau of Correction introduced numerous 
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new training and educational opportunities during the 1950s and 1960s as well as community 
corrections programs in the late 1960s. The relatively short periods of incarceration for county 
jail inmates, however, made such rehabilitation and training efforts difficult to implement at 
best, but Bureau officials claimed that adaptations could be made for this population.  
In the early 1960s, the Bureau of Correction undertook an ambitious plan to reduce the 
penal authority of the counties by developing a state-wide network of regional jails that would 
hold prisoners serving sentences over six months.521 This plan would have removed many 
prisoners from county institutions and placed them in large, Bureau-operated jails, with 
catchment zones encompassing several counties. Advocates of the regional jail network, and 
even some its critics, argued that the Bureau of Correction could marshal greater resources and 
expertise for work, education and rehabilitation programs in these types of institutions.522 
Several administrations pitched this plan as a way to assist financially-burdened counties, but it 
also furthered the desire of some senior staff in the Bureau of Correction to reduce the penal 
capacity of the counties, potentially eliminate some deplorable county jails and extend the 
reach and professional prestige of the Bureau.523  
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By the late 1960s, however, the regional jail plan stalled despite the successful passage 
of enabling legislation in 1965.524 The Bureau of Correction encountered numerous difficulties 
securing suitable locations for regional jails in several parts of the state and obtaining the 
necessary construction funds from the General Assembly. Similar problems haunted some of 
the Bureau of Correction’s other expansion plans, especially establishing community correction 
centers throughout the state and replacing SCI Philadelphia, the 140 year-old Eastern State 
Penitentiary, which occupied an entire city block in the middle of Fairmount, a neighborhood in 
North Philadelphia. The General Assembly authorized the construction of several new facilities 
in the Philadelphia area to replace SCI Philadelphia, but at the time of Davis’s 1968 report the 
Bureau of Correction had still not found suitable locations for the new prisons, much like the 
regional jails.525 Nevertheless, the state moved ahead with its plan to decommission SCI 
Philadelphia. Originally opened in 1829, the prison and its solitary confinement regime were 
known throughout the world as one of the most innovative penal reforms during much of the 
nineteenth-century, but by the 1960s, nearly everyone involved in the corrections field believed 
that the prison was antiquated, deteriorating and needed to be closed.526 Republican Attorney-
General, Fred Speaker, described the ancient prison as “a disgrace and a condemnation of the 
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society that permits, even perpetuates, its use.”527 Other state leaders and correctional officials 
echoed Speaker’s views as did the Pennsylvania Prison Society.528  
Philadelphia leaders, however, saw an opportunity to alleviate many of the problems 
caused by overcrowding in the county’s prisons by acquiring or leasing SCI Philadelphia from 
the state. Nearly everyone agreed that the growth of the prisoner population presented a 
serious management problem and had created a dangerous, tense atmosphere at the county 
prisons, especially Holmesburg. In addition to the sheer growth of the prison population, many 
penologists, prison staff and inmates worried about the large increase in the number of people 
confined while awaiting the disposition of their cases (“detentioners”).529 A federally-funded 
study of Philadelphia’s prisons noted in 1970 that detentioners comprised nearly a third of the 
total prison population in 1963, but surpassed two thirds by 1969.530 Penologists and prison 
staff generally considered a large detentioner population to be a serious administrative 
challenge, mainly because they lacked information about such prisoners. Pre-sentence 
information, of varying quality, usually accompanied sentenced prisoners, and prison staff had 
often already observed and interacted with many of these inmates before they were 
sentenced.531 Thus, they had a better sense of who among the sentenced group were 
vulnerable, aggressive, mentally ill, or had previous prison experience, among other concerns. 
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By contrast, the same 1970 report referred to detentioners as “unknowns” and cautioned 
about the perils of mixing them with other categories of inmates and the difficulties of housing 
them in multiple occupancy cells.532 People being held as detentioners were always haunted by 
the uncertainty of their status, making their adjustment to imprisonment particularly difficult to 
endure. This situation often left them restless, unsettled and, in the view of security-conscious 
staff members, a potentially volatile group of people who had little investment in prison order. 
Incorporating SCI Philadelphia into the county prison system would have provided more space 
to ease overcrowding, but would have also enhance the ability of prison administrators to 
separate detentioners from sentenced prisoners.  
Mayor Tate, the Philadelphia City Council and Representative Herbert Fineman, a 
prominent member of the General Assembly and senior Democratic Party leader, pressured 
Governor Raymond Shafer and Arthur Prasse, the Commissioner of Corrections, to lease, sell or 
simply grant the old prison to Philadelphia, but both Shafer and Prasse balked at the idea. Each 
man worried about the financial burden of repairing the aging institution and also believed that 
the temporary relief from overcrowding pressures would simply enable the city to avoid the 
more difficult task of reforming the legal, bureaucratic and judicial practices feeding the 
population growth. When Philadelphia’s City Council failed to commit funds toward the project, 
Shafer became even more reluctant to permit the prison to remain open. To further complicate 
matters, Philadelphia’s leaders had hindered the Bureau of Correction’s expansion plans in 
southern Pennsylvania. Despite promises of assistance, city leaders had done little to help the 
state locate suitable property for a replacement for the diagnostic and classification center that 
                                                          




had once been housed at SCI Philadelphia and a new regional jail for southeastern part of the 
state.533 Some Philadelphia officials actually openly resisted the state penal agency’s policies. 
For instance, Philadelphia’s powerful police commissioner, Frank Rizzo, vocally opposed the 
Bureau of Correction’s plans for locating a community correction center in the city.534 
This stalemate over penal matters affected more than just conditions with the county 
jails. The fragmented nature of governance between the counties and state exacerbated the 
conflict over a range penal policies as both the Shaffer administration and the Philadelphia 
leaders effectively frustrated the other’s plans and options. The conflicts between the city and 
state contributed to acute problems within each prison system that would last well over a 
decade and generated a stream of adverse media coverage, which painted a picture of poor 
overall administration of the penal apparatus and intransigence on the part of each side in the 
dispute.535 The constitutional division of jurisdictions, of course, structured the entire dispute, 
but mattered little in the public representations of penal mismanagement. Despite the formal 
separation, the Philadelphia County Prison System and Bureau of Correction were in fact deeply 
interwoven with inmates and knowledge constantly moving between them. As would soon 
become more obvious to the general reading public, serious problems with prison living 
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conditions, violence between inmates, and abuse by guards spanned county and state penal 
institutions.  
Holmesburg Prison: The Independence Day Uprising 
 
On July 4, 1970, a massive disturbance erupted at Holmesburg Prison that injured over a 
hundred people.536 Many, but not most, of the prison’s inmates participated in the melee, 
which only ended after heavily armed police and dogs stormed the prison. The police and the 
district attorney began investigating the violence and interviewing hundreds of people 
immediately at the scene of the uprising, disseminating the first and perhaps most powerful 
narrative theme of the event. Within a few hours, these officials, especially Police 
Commissioner Rizzo, declared that the uprising was caused by politicized, African American 
prisoners who attacked white inmates and guards. Several prison reform organizations and 
prisoner’s right groups countered this explanation within a few days, pointing to the 
longstanding evidence of overcrowding and the lack of meaningful activities and work at the 
prison and citing evidence of guards and police abusing prisoners after they quelled the 
uprising. They publicly criticized county officials for attempting to deflect their roles in 
permitting a volatile situation to develop over years by blaming the entire event on racial 
animosity. In addition to this disagreement, it soon became apparent that city and county 
officials were deeply divided over the problems at Holmesburg and how to deal with them. 
While many of these problems were already well known to city and county officials, no one 
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wanted to shoulder the blame for them. So, the question over who would lead the official 
investigation took on an additional political valence with several of the people involved, 
especially Commissioner Rizzo, District Attorney Arlen Specter and members of local judiciary, 
also harboring much large political ambitions 
There was little disagreement that race played a major role in the July 4th violence at 
Holmesburg, but the various officials, prisoners, guards and prison reform groups differed 
significantly in how they thought about race and its role in both the disturbance and the 
general state of the county’s prisons. Such differences shaped their response to the violence 
and the nature of changes they envisioned for the county’s prisons afterward. Many law 
enforcement officials narrowly construed race in their narratives to explain patterns of criminal 
offending and what they saw as political extremism by some members of Philadelphia’s African 
American community. Speaking shortly after police stormed the prison, Rizzo and 
Superintendent Edward Hendrick blamed the disturbance entirely on a small group of “hard-
core black militants” who had been fomenting discord between black and white inmates for 
quite some time.537 Rizzo, who was widely expected to run for mayor in 1971, dismissively 
claimed that while he was not a sociologist, he was present at the scene of the disturbance and 
from his vantage point, the racial hatred of the militants motivated the violence, which pitted 
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black and white inmates against each other.538 “Where were the so-called experts,” Rizzo 
rhetorically asked the press.539 
The tone of these statements would have been familiar to many Philadelphians. At least 
since the early 1960s, Rizzo was known for racially polarizing language and actions, which 
increasingly resonated with the city’s large white, ethnic, working-class constituency and many 
business owners.540 The outspoken police commissioner frequently warned city residents about 
violent crime in African American neighborhoods through the city’s major news dailies while 
also deriding civil rights and Black Power activism, the Police Review Board and the judiciary.541 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Rizzo argued that security needed to be restored in 
Holmesburg and the county’s other prisons and foolish penal reform experiments, especially 
forms of discretionary release, endangered the public and should be curtailed.542 In Rizzo’s 
view, many offenders and “extremists” could never be reformed, leaving long prison terms, 
isolation in prison and the death penalty as the only reasonable methods of dealing with 
them.543 Rizzo’s public statements not only established his interpretations as the dominant 
account of the problems at the county’s largest prison, but also heralded his preferred 
approach to managing the city’s prisons if he were to become mayor.  
Many people agreed that the disturbance was deeply racialized, but they disagreed with 
Rizzo and Hendrick’s account of how race factored into the violence. Much like the situation in 
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1968, over eighty-five percent of the inmates were African American, and while most of the 
low-ranking guards were also black, their superiors were white. These disparities, obvious to 
those imprisoned at Holmesburg, created seething resentments that permeated much of the 
interactions between white and black inmates and guards.544 This situation was the 
longstanding, and systemic product of multiple sites of racial discrimination in residential and 
employment patterns and the actions of criminal justice agencies and the judiciary. In other 
words, it was not something that could be reduced to the actions of a few hardcore militants, 
however much the latter eventually turned out to be responsible for attacking other inmates 
and guards.  
Moreover, as some people pointed out, “hardcore militants” and “Black Panthers and 
Black Muslims” were often simply scapegoats for Rizzo, a device he repeatedly used to justify 
authoritarian police tactics. Shortly after the riot, members of a number of civil rights, Black 
Power and anti-war organization held a demonstration outside the walls of the former SCI 
Philadelphia focusing attention on the racial discrimination in the criminal justice system and 
the county’s prisons.545 Governor Raymond Shafer had recently permitted the county to 
transfer a number of prisoners to the former SCI Philadelphia in an effort to re-establish control 
at Holmesburg. Demonstrators from the Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police 
Accountability and Responsibility (COPPAR), the Black Panthers, the Welfare Rights 
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Organization and Philadelphia Resistance demanded that these prisoners be returned to 
Holmesburg and that the city abandon the ancient SCI Philadelphia, much as the state had 
recently done. They also implored the city to end racial segregation at Holmesburg and cease 
the “political harassment and scapegoating of Black Panthers and Muslims.”546 
A number of critics argued that recourse to simplistic racial explanations for the uprising 
jeopardized the possibilities for reforming the far more serious and widespread problems with 
the county’s prisons. Robert Landis, chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association, and several 
chaplains comprising the Interfaith Chaplains Committee of the Philadelphia Prisons each 
accused Rizzo, Hendrick and Assistant Superintendent Edmund Lyons of prejudicing the inquiry 
before it was completed with reckless statements about the culpability of black militants.547 
Members of the Chaplains Committee released a statement to the press denouncing such 
statements as a “smokescreen of racism,” designed to divert attention from the need for major 
reform and public investment in the county’s prisons.548 Even District Attorney Arlen Specter, 
who worked closely with Rizzo during the investigation, distanced himself from what he felt 
were divisive comments by the police commissioner.549 
Related to the dispute over the racial contours of the riot, a public struggle also 
emerged over who would lead the investigation into the causes of the disturbance and whose 
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account of the events would prevail. Rizzo and Specter moved quickly on this matter; police 
detectives started interviewing prison employees at Holmesburg almost as soon as they 
subdued the prisoners. Chief Inspector Joseph O’Neill and Assistant District Attorney James 
Crawford led the joint investigation with the latter assigned by Specter to produce a 
comprehensive report.550 At the behest of the Judges Edmund Speath, Theodore Smith and 
Robert Nix, who together comprised the Prison Committee of the Philadelphia Common Pleas 
Court, they were soon joined by Allan Davis, the former assistant district attorney who 
completed the 1968 report on sexual assaults. At a press conference, the judges stated that 
their investigation, unlike the police and district attorney’s, was less concerned with 
ascertaining criminal culpability and more focused on assessing the state of the prisons and 
how to improve them.551   
The judges’ efforts immediately drew resistance from Rizzo and Specter who blocked 
Davis’s access to the prison. Both men had higher political ambitions and did not want to risk 
being upstaged by the judiciary, especially since they each also had longstanding disagreements 
with the courts over what they considered lenient sentencing, delays in processing cases and 
restrictions on police conduct.552 According to the judges, Specter initially told Davis that he 
would be permitted access to the evidence, allowed to interview witnesses and could produce 
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his own report. After Rizzo objected to this arrangement, Specter barred Davis’s access.553 He 
later offered a more limited, subordinate role for Davis, but only permitted the production of 
one report over which he had exclusive control.554 The judges, Specter and Rizzo traded 
accusations through the press for several weeks, with each side claiming that the other was 
politically motived, overreaching their authority and harming the public interest.555 These 
officials, along with Mayor James Tate, also tried to blame each other for the violence and 
general state of the prisons. Tate, Rizzo, and to a lesser degree Specter, admonished the courts 
for the large number of detentioners at the prison and judges’ unwillingness to send many 
inmates to state prisons.556 Judge Vincent Carrol, president of the Common Pleas Court, 
retorted that the city failed to provide funds for adequate staffing levels, work and 
rehabilitation programs and proper living conditions at the city’s prisons.557 While each party in 
the dispute had a point, the larger effect was to broadcast to the reading public the magnitude 
of the prisons’ many serious problems and at least the appearance of incompetence by public 
officials who could not work constructively together on penal matters.  
In addition to the issue of the state of the prison before the riot what followed the 
disturbance played as much of a role in the dispute. Rizzo and Specter promised a broad 
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inquiry, but nevertheless focused most of their public statements on the immediate causes of 
the violence and identifying perpetrators. Judges Speath, Smith and Nix took a much different 
tack. On July 13, 1970, a detentioner, Cephus Bryant petitioned the Court of Common Pleas, 
asking to be released pending the disposition of their cases because they claimed that being 
imprisoned at Holmesburg constituted a violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of  
“cruel and unusual punishment.”558 His case would soon be merged with a similar petition from 
another detentioner James Goldstein. Judge Carrol assigned the case to the Prison Committee 
of Speath, Smith and Nix, who promptly granted an initial hearing. Assistant District Attorney 
Richard Sprague petitioned the judges, asking them to recuse themselves from hearing the case 
since they were also attempting to investigate the riot.559 When they refused to step aside, 
Sprague asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to intervene, arguing that the judges were 
simply using the inmates’ writ of habeas corpus to pursue a wide-ranging investigation, which 
exceeded their authority and undermined the district attorney.560 The high court refused to 
take the case, and the three judges heard testimony from numerous current and former 
Holmesburg prisoners for four days in July 1970.561 
In addition to describing unsanitary, vermin-infested living and eating quarters, the two 
petitioners and numerous other current and former inmates testified about routine drug 
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trafficking and sexual violence in the prison and a lack of work, recreational activities and 
programs. Compounding the problem of idleness, the witnesses claimed that there was 
inadequate supervision by guards throughout much of the prison, making life extremely tense. 
In his testimony, Cephus Bryant also confirmed accounts of abuse by guards and police during 
and after the riot.562 He told the court that he saw guards beating prisoners several times after 
the riot and heard screams at night coming from the prison’s central control point where only 
guards were permitted during the night.563 Bryant also said he saw “Seven to eight 
guards…using table legs, sticks, broken pieces of window frames and mop handles to beat” a 
prisoner who was then forced to run back and forth in a cell block for a half an hour while 
guards continued assaulting him.564 One of the witnesses, nineteen-year-old Barry Harmon, said 
that on two separate occasions guards forced him to run a gauntlet through a cell block while 
they beat him and 20 other prisoners with “wooden table legs, billy clubs and blackjacks.”565 
Upon seeing the scars on Harmon’s body from the assault, Judge Nix arranged for a city 
employee to photograph his injuries.  
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Not all of the testimony came from people who had been imprisoned at Holmesburg. 
David Myers, a Methodist chaplain who visited prisoners at Holmesburg, recalled that on July 
4th he and several of his colleagues observed thirty to forty guards assaulting inmates with clubs 
and table legs as they forced them to run a gauntlet through a cell block.566 When one of the 
prisoners called for the chaplain to help him, the guards forced the chaplains to leave the area. 
Myers and his colleagues reported the violence to Superintendent Hendrick and Assistant 
Superintendent Edmund Lyons who equivocated and did nothing to stop the assaults. Several 
prisoners stated that the beatings by guards continued for weeks after the riot, with staff 
repeatedly assaulting some inmates during the night.567  
As these scandalous revelations mounted, the district attorney attempted to shift the 
public image of his investigation. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to halt the 
habeas corpus hearings, Specter publically named a twelve-member advisory committee of 
prominent people to aid his investigation.568 William Nagel, a former prison administrator and 
senior bureaucrat, was perhaps the only person with any specialized knowledge of penology on 
the advisory committee. Most of the other members came from other public agencies, 
education, private welfare organizations as well as the business world. 
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The participation of these respected individuals and their organizations publicly 
buttressed Specter’s position and enhanced the legitimacy of the district attorney’s 
investigation.569 According to Specter, the Advisory Committee on Prisons would help draft the 
final report and explore policy questions about “new programs, new legislation and new 
approaches to correction and rehabilitation of ‘offenders’.”570 He even suggested that the 
committee might consider similar issues in the state’s penal system because of its relationship 
to the county penal system.  
As the hearings in Bryant and Goldstein’s case recounted the horrors of the riot and life 
in Holmesburg, Specter accompanied members of his advisory committee on a tour of the 
prison, complete with a press conference and update on the progress on the investigation.571 
After blocking Allan Davis’s access to the prison, the tour reinforced the public image of 
Specter’s control over much of the material and most of the people crucial to any investigation 
of the riot. Specter positioned himself as focused on future reforms with the aid of a 
distinguished committee and subtly chided the judges knowledge of prisons and their stake in 
reform, telling the press that, “it was very refreshing to have the thinking of people who are not 
in this field every day. They have come up with some very fresh approaches.”572 
At the conclusion of the Common Pleas Court hearings, the judges issued an order 
granting Bryant’s and Goldstein’s habeas corpus request and ordered the city to transfer them 
                                                          
569 This is a frequent occurrence in the appointment of inquiries. See Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of 
Legitimation” and Gilligan, “Royal Commissions of Inquiry.” 
570 “Specter Names Committee to Aid Riot Probe,” Evening Bulletin, (July 24, 1970). 
571 “Specter Tours Prison With His Committee,” (July 29, 1970), newsclipping. Bulletin Mounted Clippings, box 100, 





out of Holmesburg.573 They also declared a thirty day moratorium on new petitions from 
inmates, which they expected to eventually receive, and gave the city the same amount of time 
to make at least some minimum progress on emergency reforms, like reducing Holmesburg’s 
detentioner population.574 Shortly after this case ended, the district attorney’s office began 
prosecuting inmates for the disturbance while also stating that they would charge guards for 
brutality if they found evidence that it occurred. 
Various versions of how the riot started began to circulate in the press as the criminal 
trials commenced, most of which attributed the violence to the extremism of a relatively small 
group of “Black Muslims and Black Panthers.”575 According to testimony from some of these 
people, they planned the uprising and staged a diversionary altercation in a separate part of the 
prison to draw security personnel away from the main scene of the uprising in Holmesburg’s 
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cafeteria.576 Witnesses, victims and assailants also confirmed the racialized nature of the 
violence, but they noted that it was not simply a matter of “blacks against whites” as 
Commissioner Rizzo insisted. The small group of African American prisoners did in fact target 
white inmates, but also attacked African American guards as well as black inmates who refused 
to join in the plot. According to Kenneth Saunders, the only African American prisoner who 
testified for the prosecution, one of the prisoners leading the riot yelled at him and other black 
inmates, “Any of you niggers who are not with us are going to die like these whites.”577  
Nevertheless, it was unclear how all of the people involved in the plot were affiliated 
with either the Black Panthers or the Black Muslims or in fact what the nature of these groups 
was in Philadelphia’s prisons by 1970. The district attorney’s office and the press simply stated 
that the perpetrators were either Black Panthers or Black Muslims. Any further explanation was 
unnecessary since these designations alone carried with them the connotations of violent 
extremism and racial hatred. Yet, people self-identifying as Black Panthers or Black Muslims or 
simply Muslims in Philadelphia’s prisons accounted for far greater numbers than the small 
group of people thought to have caused the riot. Since both groups provided a compelling, 
oppositional black nationalist interpretation of race and imprisonment, they appealed to the 
racial and masculine identifications of a large number of prisoners in Philadelphia’s prisons. 
Likewise, it was also well-known among people who lived and worked in prison that these 
affiliations were often fleeting or motivated by fear and the need for protection for many 
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inmates. The common term “jailhouse Muslim” captured this temporary identification that 
often did not survive beyond a person’s release from custody.578  
Despite major disagreements over politics and movement strategies between the Black 
Panthers and the Nation of Islam, the preliminary report produced by Assistant District 
Attorney James Crawford and the press represented these two groups as one large extremist 
tendency within the prisons. Crawford’s unpublished, but widely read, report cited many of the 
same lingering problems discussed by Allan Davis two years earlier.579 Virtually all the people 
Crawford spoke to claimed that the mixture of prolonged detention and uncertainty frustrated 
most of the men at Holmesburg and spawned a series of other problems, especially 
overcrowding.580 Crawford was careful in his discussion of race, noting especially how the 
disproportionate numbers of African Americans in the prison affected the politics of race within 
the institution. However, he accused those he considered instigators—Black Muslims and Black 
Panthers—of advocating destructive “racial hatred.”581  
In the context of the Philadelphia’s strident racial politics, which had become 
increasingly confrontational during the 1960s, the riot and the race of people accused of 
starting it provided a way for many white Philadelphians to reaffirm their stance with Rizzo’s 
law and order positions, confirming his frequent conflation of civil rights activism and 
criminality. The racial distribution of the roles of assailant and victim in accounts of the 
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Holmesburg riot are instructive in this regard. Despite evidence – even from Rizzo – that many 
African American guards were also attacked and that many African American inmates helped 
white prisoners and likewise incurred the wrath of the instigators, the press rarely depicted 
African Americans as victims. It was perhaps telling that one of the articles to do so at length 
was an extended interview with a guard who was stabbed rather than a synopsis of the events 
in the journalist’s authoritative voice. The guard in question – who was in fact white – 
acknowledged that the first person to be attacked was one of his African American colleagues. 
In most public accounts, the true criminals in Holmesburg were black radicals.  The city’s press 
portrayed the victims as less criminal despite the fact that most of them were also prisoners. 
Descriptions of the stabbing victims sometimes mentioned the reason for their current 
imprisonment, but rarely explored their pasts beyond that. In contrast, the newspapers listed 
the assailants’ current reasons for being held in Holmesburg in addition to other aspects of 
their criminal records. The articles especially noted those inmates who had convictions or 
current charges for violent crimes, like murder and assault with intent to kill.  
Along with Davis’s report on sexual assaults, the competing public statements and 
accounts emerging in the aftermath of the July 4th riot cemented the association of race, 
criminality and prisons in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania politics. Much like the broader national 
trends, the image of the prisoner became blacker, more violent and less amenable to 
rehabilitation.582 This “typical prisoner” would increasingly inform debates about prison reform 
in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania and what penal authorities could legitimately claim to 
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accomplish with people sent to prison. Many of the suggested avenues of reform following the 
riot, such as increased rehabilitation and work training programs, sat uneasily with this 
understanding of many of the people imprisoned in Holmesburg and Philadelphia’s other 
institutions. Nevertheless, advocates of these therapeutic approaches, which included the 
district attorney’s office, argued that the current regime only cultivated hopelessness, 
resentment and fear. 
Aside from Commissioner Rizzo, the prominent public officials and figures involved in 
the debate about the county penal system rarely questioned rehabilitation as a goal, set of 
interventions or a coherent penal philosophy. Instead, they depicted it as an effective penal 
strategy that was unfortunately untried in Philadelphia and to some degree in Pennsylvania in 
general. It was always at the mercy of other priorities, especially security, and hampered by a 
lack of funding, support by the city and overcrowding. The knowledge and faith that it worked 
elsewhere and reflected the consensus among national and international penological 
professionals buttressed this view. For example, when asked in a televised interview if 
rehabilitation actually worked anywhere in the world, Assistant District Attorney Crawford 
replied that it certainly did in places like California, New Jersey and the federal Bureau of 
Prisons as well as in other countries like Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden.583 All that was 
needed was the political resolve to support and fund a similar set of programs in Philadelphia’s 
prisons; the practices, expertise and evidence was already well-established. 
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At the same time, the riot and the political dispute following it eroded the authority of 
penal experts and many other public officials tasked with managing the prisons and setting 
penal policy. The events reflected poorly on Mayor Tate, the City Council, the prison’s Board of 
Trustees and Superintendent Hendrick, among others. This process opened up greater 
discursive space on penal matters for people who had previously remained largely unheard or 
unacknowledged, especially the voices and perspectives of prisoners and guards. The extensive 
publicity generated by the July 4th disturbance also spawned years’ worth of news coverage. 
The event itself provided a periodization device, which officials, activists and the press often 
used to mark the progress of penal reform or the lack of it.584 The riot and the state of affairs 
just prior to it gradually became the negative penal benchmark to evaluate the city’s reform 
project: it was either ameliorating the conditions that existed on July 4, 1971 or reverting to 
that state depending on the account, speaker and topic. Within a few months, the state 
Supreme Court upheld the Common Pleas court habeas corpus order, and several inmates 
brought another, more comprehensive Eight Amendment suit against the county prison system, 
which demand drastic intervention to alleviate the poor living conditions.585 District Attorney 
Specter decided nearly a year after the riot to drop any attempt to prosecute the guards 
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responsible for the brutal reprisals following the uprising.586 Specter publicly acknowledged that 
such assaults had in fact occurred, but that no one was willing to testify against the guards for 
fear of additional reprisals.587 Many critics felt that the district attorney had never intended to 
bring the guards to trial regardless of the circumstances.588 Perhaps one the most significant 
changes to emerge from the turmoil of the riot and the political fighting afterward was the 
increasing presence of state government in county penal policy and prison operations.  
“Corrections is an Entity within Itself”:  Expansion and Contention in State Prison 
Administration 
 
Despite the ongoing dispute between the state and Philadelphia officials over the 
disposition of the recently closed SCI Philadelphia, Gov. Shafer immediately permitted 
Philadelphia prison administrators to temporarily use the aging facility to regain control over 
the prison population, with “about 30 of Holmesburg’s ‘troublemakers’” being immediately 
transferred.589 The governor also offered to accommodate more county inmates in the state’s 
prisons until the city could provide additional space, and he outlined a plan for other areas of 
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immediate state assistance to county prison officials, including more correctional personnel and 
training, developing trade and education programs for prisoners as well as providing more 
funds and people to Philadelphia’s judiciary to reduce the number of detentioners.590 However, 
Shafer and officials in the Bureau of Correction believed that the difficulties of Philadelphia’s 
prisons and similar problems in other county facilities could only be solved by bringing county 
penal operations under state authority.591  
Gov. Shafer used the Holmesburg disturbance to highlight the widespread difficulties in 
other counties as well as in the state’s prisons. In an address to the General Assembly on July 
14th, the governor outlined a proposal for reorganizing state government by abolishing or 
consolidating some units and creating four new departments, chief among which was a new 
Department of Corrections.592 This was perhaps the most visible and controversial of his 
proposals because it involved stripping the counties of significant authority, but Shafer argued 
that the riot at Holmesburg made it imperative. "The need to create a single agency, 
responsible for the incarceration, treatment and rehabilitation of criminals, both young and old, 
has become abundantly clear,” Shafer told the legislators.593 “The recent riot at Holmesburg in 
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Philadelphia is a symptom of the failure of the present prison system."594 The violence 
underscored the bureaucratic difficulties that had hindered prison reform for years, even when 
most parties agreed that Philadelphia’s prisons were deeply troubled.  
Since people sentenced to state prison usually passed though county institutions before 
arriving in state custody, there had always been some degree of integration between the two 
levels, but counties were independent of each other as well as the state. The state legislature 
and administration set standards for county jails and the Bureau of Correction conducted 
routine inspections of county facilities, but they lacked any authority to mandate change. This 
meant that the Bureau of Correction often negotiated with 67 separate jurisdictions over both 
standards and the practical matters of inmate custody transfer, like the sharing of information 
on inmate health, classification and outstanding warrants and detainers. By the 1960s, the 
disputes between the state agency, with its new emphasis on classification, training and 
education, and the counties became more commonplace and public. As courts became more 
willing to intervene in penal matters, officials in successive administrations also began to worry 
about the potential for costly litigation that would ultimately burden state coffers.  
If one of the unspoken rationales for the regional jail plan was to tip the balance of 
correctional jurisdiction toward Harrisburg, Gov. Shafer now proposed settling the matter once 
and for all by absorbing all the county facilities scattered across the commonwealth. The new 
agency envisioned by Shafer, Prasse and his soon-to-be replacement, Allyn Sielaff, would 
consolidate several other independent agencies and functions, like probation and parole and 
juvenile justice, within a single cabinet-level Department of Corrections. Shafer argued that this 





restructuring would enhance the penal bureaucracy’s visibility vis-a-vis other cabinet 
departments, conferring upon it a degree of importance that would also prioritize its concerns, 
augment its budget and enable it to hire more and better qualified people.595 Accordingly, 
Shafer ordered a major assessment of the state’s prisons by a task force of experts drawn from 
numerous disciplines, agencies and organizations with the goal of laying the intellectual and 
pragmatic groundwork for elevating the Bureau of Correction to a cabinet level department and 
expanding the reach of its authority.596 The foreboding image of future prison turmoil 
embodied by the violence at Holmesburg, thus, became the initial impetus for a massive 
expansion and revalorization of penal authority at the state level. 
The awkwardly-named Legislative-Executive Task Force on Reorganization of 
Government (Department of Corrections) held public hearings across the state, seeking 
testimony from a wide-range of criminal justice officials, social welfare organizations, and other 
concerned groups and people. However, the composition of the Task Force and many of the 
witnesses that later appeared before it, largely came from administrative backgrounds in public 
service. The Task Force also sought statements from prominent penal experts in other states 
and national professional associations, inviting them to share their knowledge of penal 
organizations across the country. Somewhat ironically, the written statement of one such 
outside expert, Russell Oswald, the leader of New York’s State Board of Parole, would be widely 
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circulated among Task Force members.597 Oswald, who was appointed as New York’s 
Commissioner of Correctional Services soon afterward, would be publicly discredited the 
following year during the Attica rebellion and massacre. In the summer of 1970, however, he 
was widely considered to be an innovative thinker in the field of corrections and had previously 
led penal agencies in Wisconsin and Massachusetts.598 He recently co-chaired a panel in New 
York that undertook a consolidation study similar to the one in Pennsylvania. It’s clear from 
Oswald’s statement that many of the concerns about a fragmented penal apparatus expressed 
by Gov. Shafer were widely discussed among criminal justice experts across county at this time. 
Like his counterparts in Pennsylvania, Oswald argued that truly effective inmate rehabilitation 
that could reduce recidivism could only be effectuated within a unified penal bureaucracy that 
could mobilize sufficient expertise and resources, reduce bureaucratic conflicts between service 
units and eliminate the duplication of services.599  
Some employees of the Bureau of Correction, with frontline experience in the prisons, 
echoed Oswald’s views and argued that the current moment provided them with the perfect 
opportunity to enhance the place of penal knowledge and prison administration in state 
government. Psychologist Jay Roseman, for instance, complained during a hearing that 
presently there were no senior state officials with sufficient knowledge of corrections.600 
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Likewise, the Attorney-General, who was responsible for the Bureau, often knew very little 
about prison issues. This lack of senior penal expertise meant that the Bureau of Correction and 
related agencies suffered from poor political and financial support. Since “Corrections is an 
entity within itself,” Roseman argued that it required a cabinet-level expert with direct access 
to the governor.601 
However, some witnesses worried that the proposed new agency, if raised to the 
cabinet level, would become subject to the normal political conflict that came with such a 
visible position close to a governor.602 The same move to prioritize corrections, essentially 
shifting it closer to attention and funding, also meant that the penal bureaucracy would 
become an easier target for scrutiny and attacks by political opponents of the administration or 
even members of rival departments. Prison administration could become, as it was in the past, 
deeply politicized by its re-insertion into the field of political competition that surrounded 
elected officials and their high profile, proximate appointees. The Bureau of Correction, created 
in the early 1953, had been far more insulated from this type of conflict than many other state 
departments and agencies. Commissioner Prasse, more a penal expert than politician, 
remained in his position through five different administrations with both Democratic and 
Republican governors. Such tenure by a correctional expert would become simply unthinkable 
in this new environment. 
 Other people challenged the state’s effort to absorb the county penal systems. Shortly 
after Shafer appeared on a July 12th television program discussing penal policy, John Dougherty, 
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a senior probation and parole officer and past president of the Pennsylvania Association of 
Probation, Parole and Correction, wrote to the governor, disputing the wisdom of creating a 
department-level penal agency.603 Dougherty argued that the proposed absorption of county 
jails by the state would destroy local autonomy and democratic government. He claimed that in 
his home county, Berks, the local jail had instituted numerous beneficial programs with the 
consent of local taxpayers. Dougherty feared that if the state superseded such local decision-
making and funding, most of the state’s counties would, in effect, finance the penal polices of 
the state’s two largest urban counties, Philadelphia and Allegheny (Pittsburgh), with their 
comparatively much larger prisoner populations. 
 Gov. Shafer used the fallout from the Holmesburg riot to highlight the problems of 
crime and the criminal justice system for a national audience as well. Shafer was the sitting 
Chairman of the Committee on Law Enforcement, Justice and Public Safety of the National 
Governor’s Conference. This position gave him an enormous platform to push his vision of 
major public investment in law enforcement and corrections to executives from across the 
country. On August 20, 1970, he presented a discussion paper to the 62nd meeting of the 
conference at the Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri titled, “Highlighting the Significance of 
Corrections in the Criminal Justice System.” In prepared remarks, Shafer noted that the 
"Evidence of the failure is all around us…The purpose of our corrections system is to protect 
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society by deterring crime and by correcting the offender. It does neither successfully."604 
Shafer went on to argue in the paper that: 
The present system of warehousing and caging rather than curing and rebuilding 
offenders has not worked since prisons (some still being used) were established 
in the US in the 1800's, despite many reformers and dedicated prison officials' 
efforts. Consider these high-minded principles and goals: 
--Reformation, not vindictive suffering, should be the purpose of the penal  
   treatment of prisoners. 
--The prisoner should be made to realize that his destiny is in his own 
hands. 
--Prison discipline should be such as to gain the will of the prisoner and 
conserve  
   his self respect. 
--The aim of the prison should be to make industrious free men rather than 
orderly  
   and obedient prisoners. 
These principles were adopted in 1870 by the forerunner of the American 
Correctional Association. Obviously this commitment to humane, enlightened 
treatment of offenders has not resulted in the improvement of all corrections. 
Reform is possible but it will take strong political leadership at all levels of 
government.605 
 
Shafer, like many liberal penologists and criminologists, saw much of this failure stemming from 
“a peculiarly American unwillingness to base penal philosophy on reason rather than 
emotion.”606  
Seeking vengeance over everything else, penal policy across the country failed to live up 
to its stated commitment to rehabilitation and produced greater recidivism among people 
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subjected to prisons. Shafer saw the pragmatic solution to this problem in the current emphasis 
on community corrections in progressive penology circles. Citing Myrl Alexander, the former 
director of the federal Bureau of Prisons, Shafer told his colleagues that they, "‘must blur the 
line between the institution and the community’" if they were to spare people “the traumatic 
transition from prison to society”607 Shafer argued that: 
Offenders must maintain constructive community ties. The programs and 
techniques of community-based corrections are known. They include probation, 
parole, half-way houses, work release, short term-community linked residential 
facilities and special programs outside the correctional system for alcoholics, 
drug abuser and other truly sick offenders.608 
 
While he acknowledged that secure confinement was still needed for the few, truly dangerous 
offenders, the vast majority of offenders would be more effectively dealt with in the 
community. But, to achieve this, Shafer emphasized, required strong leadership by executives 
at the state-level who needed to both convince the public of the need for different rationales 
for penal policy and demand greater performance from correctional officials. Shafer’s press 
release succinctly stated that, “There must be revolutionary changes in our thinking and our 
laws. We must stop acting as though repression, legislative fulmination and long prison 
sentences will solve the crime problem.”609 
In Pennsylvania, the final report of Shafer’s Task Force, predictably, recommended a 
new cabinet-level Department of Corrections with greatly expanded powers, combing adult 
                                                          
607 Ibid., 11. 
608 Ibid., 7. 
609 News Information, P.M. News Media Release, August 12, 1970 – Governor Raymond P. Shafer, of Pennsylvania, 
Chairman, Law Enforcement, Justice, and Public Safety, National Governors’ Conference. RG-15 Dept of Justice, 





corrections, probation and parole and the juvenile justice system.610 The Task Force meetings 
and their final report brought a sustained level of public attention on corrections as a state 
activity and major priority, and it also led to more debate in the General Assembly on such 
matters. Yet, while generally supportive of Shafer’s plans, the House of Representatives failed 
to pass any legislation based on the Task Force’s work before the end of Gov. Shafer’s time in 
office.611 The legislature proved reluctant to drastically changing the structure of government in 
such a short period of time, and some members, especially K. Leroy Irvis, also wanted to tie 
administrative restructuring to a major commitment to prison-based, rehabilitation programs 
and community corrections.612 Over the course of the next decade, the General Assembly 
would consider several bills designed to create a new corrections department. Shafer’s 
successor, Gov. Milton Shapp, also supported the creation of a cabinet level penal agency as did 
Gov. Dick Thornburgh, who took office in early 1979. This debate, often mired in the details of 
administrative structure, became more polarized by the late 1970s, as sharp divisions over 
penal philosophies crystalized. 
A Public of Penality 
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The Holmesburg riot exemplified the emerging visibility of prison matters during the late 
1960s and 1970s. Controversial events like this became more common and generated 
multitudes of public accounts of life and work behind prison walls. While periods of intense 
prison unrest and rapid reform had occurred as recently as twenty years before, the public 
debate around such events and the variety of accounts were much more restrained. 
Additionally, the Bureau of Correction’s reforms of the 1950s, while framed in the humanitarian 
language of rehabilitation, relied on a tightly-controlled, authoritarian governing style, 
personified by the charismatic leadership of Commissioner Arthur Prasse.613 By the 1970s, this 
sweeping, top-down style of bureaucratic governance of penal affairs encountered explicit, and 
often public, resistance by lower level staff, prisoners, legislators, judges, the media and 
numerous interest groups. In this respect, many of the processes of past penal change 
transformed, becoming much more democratic, but simultaneously more conflictual, 
controversial and protracted.  
While these different groups held conflicting goals, the one thing they shared in 
common was the desire to craft and control public representations of what life in prison was 
like, what such institutions were supposed to do and what they failed to accomplish as a means 
of securing reform or radical change. Disagreements over policies, whether they involved major 
statewide legislation or idiosyncratic practices at a particular prison, quickly circulated in print 
and broadcast media. While journalists and editors became more interested in publishing 
prison stories, the disputants themselves also increasingly turned to a receptive media to air 
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their grievances in the hopes of forcing action by senior corrections officials, legislators, the 
governor and the broader public. The Bureau of Correction also played a large part in 
generating this new degree of publicity in the way they used the media to draw attention to the 
Bureau’s new rehabilitation and community corrections programs and invite to greater public 
participation and support. Public relations campaigns like this increased during the latter years 
of Commissioner Arthur Prasse’s time in office, but they became especially prominent in the 
reformist administrations of his immediate successors, Allyn Sielaff and Stewart Werner. 
Many of the new accounts of prison originated with the activities of incarcerated 
people, especially their efforts to organize collective forms of resistance and force change 
through litigation, legislation and more direct forms of protest, like sit-downs strikes. These 
tactics paralleled the efforts of activists outside the prison, many of whom were also former 
prisoners. Empowered by the broader civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s, several 
organizations led by former prisoners formed in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The Barbwire Society, Community Assistance for Prisoners, and the 
Prisoners’ Rights Council were perhaps the most prominent of these organization in 
Philadelphia, but there were many others active in the area.614 The Prisoners’ Rights Council’s 
Victor Taylor and Allan Lawson became especially well-known for their public education and 
media outreach efforts regarding prisoners’ rights. Taylor, Lawson and other members of the 
Prisoners’ Rights Council served time together in local Philadelphia prisons and at SCI 
Graterford, often participating in the latter prison’s inmate-operated law clinic. In Pittsburgh, 
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penal activists also formed several different groups and often worked jointly in coalition with 
many older labor activists, especially those associated the Catholic Church’s Pittsburgh Diocese 
such as Monsignor Charles Owen Rice. The most prominent organization with numerous former 
prisoners was the Vibration II Committee on Penal Reform, which emerged after the 
destruction of Vibrations, an inmate-run journalism collective at SCI Pittsburgh.   
These organizations were relatively new participants in the state’s penal politics and 
often more radical than established penal reform and civil liberties groups, like the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the American Friends Service Committee and the Pennsylvania Prison 
Society. Leaders in these older organizations were well-known to many politicians and 
bureaucrats, having cultivated government contacts over many years of lobbying and 
consultation. The newer groups, pursued quite styles of political activity, including direct forms 
of protest, and were often unknown to their political and bureaucratic adversaries.615 The 
political horizons of the more radical groups extended much further than the former 
organizations as well, often framing their activities in relation to the civil rights and Black Power 
movements in the United States and wars of decolonization abroad. A programmatic statement 
in the newsletter of Vibration II captures these views:   
Attica, San Quentin, My Lai, and Western Pennsylvania are the very same. 
Vibrations II is about progressive, positive and real change in all the colonies of 
this land. Those who are in economic, political, social and penal pr1sons need 
some measure of relief. We know that in order to remedy or correct any one 
prison, we must necessarily deal with them all!616 
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Such organizations may have pressured officials in Harrisburg and protested outside the walls 
of specific prisons within the state, but they viewed such institutions as instruments of 
oppression in service of a national and transnational ruling elite, dedicated to maintaining an 
exploitative racial and class order on a global scale. 
Despite differences with older penal reform and civil liberties groups, these newer 
organizations usually maintained working relationships with the older groups and often 
benefitted from their advice and resources. The board of directors for the Prisoners’ Rights 
Council, for instance, included numerous members of established organizations, like Spencer 
Coxe of the Philadelphia chapter of the ACLU, whose long experience and professional 
contracts facilitated some of the organization’s projects. In some cases, coalitions involving all 
of these groups over specific issues like the use of solitary confinement helped push what 
would have otherwise been marginal critiques of the prison into direct dialogue with state 
officials.   
The prominence of prison issues in public life was also apparent in the increased volume 
of news media reporting devoted to state and local prisons in Pennsylvania. Prisons articles 
mainly appeared in four broad, often interrelated areas: (1) the new community corrections 
programs and liberalization of prison regimes instituted by the liberal administrations of 
Commissioner Allyn Sielaff and later Commissioner Steward Werner; (2) descriptions of poor 
prison conditions; (3) reports of prison activism, protests and litigation by organizations and 
individual prisoners; and (4) reports of criminal activity by inmates as well as prison violence, 
especially involving riots and the deaths of inmates and staff. Many accounts included all four 




three areas. Such associations resembled the linkages many conservatives drew between 
liberal, Great Society social programs and crime, urban riots and political protest movements. 
While the diverse (and at times conflicting) penal reform agendas of liberal penologists, prison 
reform organizations, and more radical prison activists focused more of the inhumane effects of 
imprisonment and poor prison conditions, they were haunted by the issues of prison violence 
and institutional disorder, which gradually became tethered to conservative, custody-oriented 
framings and solutions.  
Long genealogies of media reports about certain prison issues and events, especially 
those involving intractable problems, stretched throughout the decade and into the 1980s with 
each successive set of articles building on preceding press accounts. For several years following 
the July 1970 disturbance at Holmesburg, for instance, the fates of its participants, litigation 
and reform efforts appeared recurrently in the city’s newspapers. Retrospective articles 
periodically punctuated these accounts, explicitly exploring what had changed since the riot, 
taking stock of the progress of reform and its frustrations. In November 1970, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer published an article tellingly titled, “Few Improvements Made Since Holmesburg 
Riot.”617 The authors, Mike Willmann and Jerry Heymsfeld recounted many of the same 
complaints that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the riot: rat infestation, beatings, non-
existent classification system for detentioners, and a lack of enough guards. However, Willmann 
and Heymsfeld also noted the positive reduction in overcrowding. A couple of years later, the 
Inquirer told readers that Holmesburg had since instituted and expanded a number of 
programs, including drug treatment and work release, with the aid of federal funds from the 
                                                          




Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.618 Nevertheless, the overall dismal assessments of 
these articles invited future reevaluations of the prison and its distance from the pre-riot status 
quo.  
These assessments, one from a few months after the riot, the other two years later, 
clearly framed the prison and its conditions within a liberal reform narrative. Holmesburg either 
made progress by modernizing its operations or it remained temporally and socially mired in 
the punitive practices of the past that simply warehoused idle prisoners in dangerous 
conditions. The administrators interviewed for the articles, especially Superintendent Hendrick 
and his successor, Louis Aytch, each described revelatory significance of the July 4th 
disturbance and the subsequent Common Pleas Court investigation in the arc of prison reform. 
They all agreed with many of the criticisms leveled at the prison system and said that the 
violence finally marshaled the political and financial support to address longstanding and well-
known problems: “According to Ernest W. Goldsborough, assistant superintendent for 
programs of the county prisons, the value of the 1970 riot was that, ‘It brought to light that 
something was very wrong.’”619 Despite this reformative framing of the disturbance, the 
Inquirer observed that, “The most visible reminder of the violence that erupted two years ago 
at Holmesburg Prison is a small, maximum-security area at the nearby Detention Center where 
seven young, white inmates now live.”620 Severely beaten on July 4, 1970, these particular 
inmates were too vulnerable to live in general population; protection through segregation was 
                                                          







the only way to address certain aspects of the prisons’ racial polarization and the realities of 
sexual violence. 
The unresolved nature of many of these specific topics, the activism and judicial action 
surrounding them and the continuing editorial decisions to highlight such issues propelled the 
continual coverage of prisons in Pennsylvania’s major dailies, television and radio journalism 
and many smaller newspapers located near state prisons during the 1970s. These accounts, 
which formed the main source of knowledge about the state’s penal system for most people in 
the state, stressed the horrific nature of the institutions, the brutality many of the people 
working or living in them and stressed the challenges and shortcomings of reform and those 
tasked with such endeavors. Even articles that favorably depicted new programs, like work 
furloughs, often framed their rationale and success as overcoming the destructive aspects of 
incarceration and the limited ability of correctional officials to reform people in institutional 
settings.  
The negative qualities of such depictions, rather than being simply a shortcoming in 
journalism as it’s often portrayed, was actually intrinsic to their newsworthiness and 
accelerated their dissemination in public discourse. According to anthropologist Andrew Arno, 
news stories appeal to interested consumers largely through mobilizing feelings of threat, fear, 
relief and security.621 Events and issues that lack these valences are largely unremarkable in this 
medium. As much as journalists and editors at major dailies showed a greater interest in 
prisons during the late 1960s and 1970s, the penal system itself became a source of increasingly 
newsworthy events by the criteria outlined by Arno. Media accounts of state and county 
                                                          




prisons emphasized institutional disorder, strife and violence, like the reporting on Holmesburg, 
or rested on the background threat of such turmoil. Because of the focus on such threats, such 
accounts also tapped into broader insecurities of white and middle class readers that had been 
nurtured by recent histories of urban rioting, similar reports of increasing street crime and high 
profile incidents of official corruption or incompetence.622 The result was a broad, diverse and 
at times deeply conflicting reform debate where nearly every participant agreed that 
something was wrong with the state of the prisons and this was reflected in negative media 
coverage. 
The thickening of prison stories in circulation during the 1970s can also be glimpsed 
behind the scenes, so to speak, in the structure and productive capacities of the archive of the 
Bulletin, one of Philadelphia’s main daily broadsheets. The Bulletin’s staff employed an 
extensive system of filing cabinets to manage the history of its reporting. Each cabinet 
contained envelopes, organized by topic, with newsclippings from the Bulletin, as well as from 
competing newspapers like the Philadelphia Inquirer, arranged in a loose chronological order.623 
From the late-1960s onward, the envelopes on prison matters in this data management system 
bulged with articles as the newspaper’s coverage of such stories increased. The number of 
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entries under established prison-related categories grew in abundance, and new penal, filing 
categories also appeared, such as a dedicated envelop for the Inmates Action Council, an 
organization of Holmesburg inmates formed in the mid-1970s, which filed several legal 
challenges against the county. 
This system enabled the Bulletin’s writers to produced densely interwoven press 
accounts of prisons and penal policy. Nearly any article on Holmesburg prison, for instance, 
contained a context or background paragraph, sometimes more than one, that summarized 
many of the main points of immediately preceding articles. With a perusal of past articles in the 
files, the Bulletin’s staff succinctly narrated complex events, like the Holmesburg riot and later 
reform efforts, setting up more current information about the prison. As journalists published 
new stories about Holmesburg, they also filed a copy in the dedicated envelopes. Since such 
stories appeared over many different issues of the newspaper, many readers might not have 
noticed this explicit, intertextual relationship, but would nevertheless recognize that this 
particular issue was the subject of previous and ongoing press coverage. The short historical 
narratives that the archive supported enabled many readers to frame any particular report 
within a contemporary penal history, which rarely stretched back beyond 1960. The shallow 
historical depth of most these articles occluded similar difficulties in past decades and thereby 
underpinned the immediacy of the present threat. Such journalistic conventions enhanced the 
sense that something profoundly new and perverse was occurring in both the criminal justice 
system and the patterns of crime itself. 





“If there is a slum within the Commonwealth's correctional system, it exists behind the walls at 
Pittsburgh.”624 
 
The numerous difficulties of Philadelphia’s prisons publicized by Allan Davis’s sexual 
violence report and the 1970 riot resembled some of the problems besetting the state’s 
prisons. However, many of the latter institutions did not receive a comparable level of publicity 
because they were located further away from large population centers, the media and urban-
based organizations with an interest in prisons. The major exceptions to this were SCI 
Graterford, located about thirty-five miles north of Philadelphia, and SCI Pittsburgh, situated on 
the north shore of the Ohio River within the city of Pittsburgh. The Bureau of Correction used 
these two maximum security institutions as terminal points for many of the prisoners that staff 
considered to be dangerous or otherwise difficult to handle.625 Many Philadelphia-based 
activists visited prisoners at SCI Graterford and journalists often covered events at the 
institution, but its distance from the city still precluded the kind of attention that its 
counterpart in the western part of the state often received.  
SCI Pittsburgh, often called the Western State Penitentiary or simply Western Pen, was 
more thoroughly enmeshed in local politics, activism and journalism as well as the city’s 
                                                          
624 Allyn R. Sielaff and Stewart Werner to J. Shane Creamer, July 13, 1972. RG-15 Dept of Justice Attorney-Gen 
Correspondence Recom to close SCI PGH 1972 Series 200 72-04-12-200. 
625 SCI Graterford was the larger of the two, capable of holding over 1,600 prisoners by the early 1970s, while SCI 
Pittsburgh, the oldest prison in use, could confine about 1,065 people at the beginning of the decade. Graterford 
was a medium-security prison for most of its operational life up until this point, but after the closure of SCI 
Philadelphia in 1970, the Bureau of Correction began the process of enhancing security at Graterford to 
accommodate prisoners classified for a maximum-security regime. During the early-to-mid-1970s, each prison had 
unused cell space, but this disappeared over the course of the decade as prisoner populations grew. By the end of 
the 1970s, Graterford would hold around 1,800 people and Pittsburgh confined nearly 1,200. See Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Correction, Monthly Populations in the Bureau of Correction, June 1970, v.16, n.4 (Camp Hill: Bureau of 
Correction, 1970), 4; Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, 1979 Annual Statistical Report (Camp Hill: Bureau of 




support infrastructures of social welfare, philanthropy, education and medicine. However, it 
was a deeply troubled facility. Built along the Ohio River, just north of downtown Pittsburgh in 
the late 19th century, the massive, fortress-like prison was excessively expensive to maintain. 
Flooding from the river was a recurrent issue, as was severe cold, ice damage, and sewage 
disposal, all of which often hampered the full use of the prison and contributed to its 
reputation for harsh living conditions.626 It was the scene of the worst rioting in the state’s 
prisons in 1952, which led to a sweeping administrative reorganization that created the Bureau 
of Correction. By the late 1960s, SCI Pittsburgh became increasingly difficult to control 
compared to many of the state’s other prisons. After the closure of SCI Philadelphia in 1970, SCI 
Pittsburgh became the oldest operational prison among the Bureau of Correction’s institutions; 
many of the same evocative images correctional officials used to describe the limitations of 
Eastern State Penitentiary’s antiquated, inhumane plant applied as well to SCI Pittsburgh. Its 
design and construction reflected the prisoner management practices of the 1870s and 1880s, 
when inmates spent considerably longer periods in cells. A hundred years later, this meant that 
previously innocuous spaces in the prison now became risky areas with poor lines of sight that 
were difficult for staff to supervise with inmates spending a greater amount of their time 
outside their cells. The prison’s two large, multi-tiered cell blocks also presented supervisory 
challenges for staff because of the numbers of prisoners held in them and the difficulty of 
traversing and securing the narrow walkways on the tiers.  
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With the appointment of a reformist superintendent, Joseph Brierley, in December 
1968, prison security became a major point of contention between the prison’s administration 
and the guard force. Brierley was considered to be a liberal penologist among many of his 
colleagues. He instituted greater recreational activities for inmates and shared the Bureau’s 
emphasis on rehabilitation, including supporting the creation of a “good time” system for 
prisoners to earn reductions in their minimum sentences through good behavior and progress 
in rehabilitation programs.627 Such views soon earned him the animus of many of the guards 
who felt that Brierley had created a dangerous situation at the prison by relaxing security too 
far. Perhaps nothing exemplified the contentious of this situation as much as Brierley’s attempt 
to establish a representative inmate organization to advise the prison’s administration, the 
Bureau of Correction, General Assembly and governor about the views of the prison’s residents. 
At the time of Brierley’s appointment, no prison in the state had such an organization. In 
fact, senior prison officials and guards routinely monitored prison social structures for signs of 
threatening inmate organization, fearing that such groups would foster collective resistance 
and violence.628 However, by the late 1960s, experiments in tightly-controlled, inmate self-
government began to appear in several jurisdictions and receive serious consideration in 
professional literature.629 Advocates saw such organizations as a possible palliative for many of 
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the routine sources of tension within prisons as prisoners could collectively raise grievances in 
these forums. Many prison administrators believed that such organizations had the potential to 
reduce or prevent more serious trouble, like uprisings. Detractors of any form of inmate self-
government feared that such policies would, in fact, inflame tensions within prisons and 
provide a collective vehicle for powerful, violent inmates and political militants.630  
On November 21, 1969, Superintendent Brierley permitted the formation of the United 
Inmate Advisory Council as a means to foster inmate participation in institutional life and 
communicate with the staff.631 In a memo distributed to inmates and staff at the prison, 
Brierley stated that the group’s functions were to be purely advisory and that he was not 
granting it any administrative authority, which was to remain exclusively with prison 
personnel.632 Given Brierley’s liberal penological inclinations, the formation of such an 
organization was not surprising, even if it was the first of its kind in Pennsylvania. However, an 
article appearing in the New Pittsburgh Courier in early December 1970 suggests that Brierley 
may have been pushed into this decision by the unofficial, but collective, actions of numerous 
inmates, many of whom were African American.633 The article reported that Brierley formed 
the body “after a three day hunger strike” by inmates protesting conditions at the prison and 
the lack of a “black culture program” at the prison. The hunger strike occurred a week after the 
first Afro-American Mass was held at the prison by Father Augustus Taylor and Father Dennis 
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Kinderman, each members of the recently formed Interdiocese Black Catholic Ministries.634 
Both priests planned to participate in the development of the new black cultural program, and 
they supported the creation of the United Inmate Advisory Council. The well-known veteran, 
labor activist Monsignor Charles Own Rice also lent his support to the prisoner activists.635  
While Superintendent Brierley permitted the formation of the inmate council, he 
banned both Taylor and Kinderman from visiting the prison in mid-December 1971.636 The 
Courier, which reported the banning, claimed that Brierley was motivated partly by their critical 
December 6th article, but subsequent litigation suggests that Brierley also disapproved of how 
the priests conducted the Mass, which he later described as more of “a political rally” than “a 
religious service.”637 According to Brierley: 
 
It did not attract Catholic inmates but rather self-proclaimed Black Nationalists 
and Black Panthers. In fact less than two per cent of the inmate population, or 
ten prisoners are Negroes who profess Roman Catholicism. Plaintiff Father 
Taylor began the Afro-American Mass by holding his clenched fist in the air. He 
said "I do not believe in a honky Christ." He went on to say that he is a 
revolutionary. The entire theme of his address to those in attendance was black 
militancy. There was little reference at all to any religious matters, with the 
exception of the receiving of communion which was indiscriminately given to 
non-Catholic prisoners. Father Taylor's speech was followed by inmates standing 
in the pulpit giving testimonials to Black Nationalism.638 
 
Brierley later readmitted the priests after personally meeting with them and Msgr. Rice at 
Brierley’s home. During the meeting, the superintendent also approved black literature 
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“without restrictions as to any titles” as well as the “wearing of tiki’s by my fellow inmate 
brothers.”639  
 These actions earned him the vocal support of at least a few members of the United 
Inmate Advisory Council. In January, one of the council members wrote a letter to the New 
Pittsburgh Courier, to clarify what occurred at the prison in November and December 1969, 
correct some of the media coverage of the events and reaffirm the supportive actions of 
Brierley.640 The writer – who remained anonymous, but self-identified as a “black man through 
and through” – did not directly address the banning of Taylor and Kinderman, but explained 
that the matter had been resolved. He assured the Courier’s readers of Brierley’s good 
intentions, stating that, “Inner City Vernacular might aptly describe Warden Brierley as 
‘together’ – and with this we all agree.” 
Such kind words about Brierley from an inmate leader and the superintendent’s 
conciliatory approach did not please many of the prison’s staff. Some of the institution’s guards 
rejected Brierley’s new policies and disciplined African American inmates for wearing or 
possessing black nationalist items and symbols during November and December 1969, after the 
superintendent officially permitted such items.641 Brierley intervened to stop such practices, 
but he was also careful to place some boundaries for his liberal policies.642 To effectively 
manage the institution’s guard force, he had to balance his liberal positions of prisoner 
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amenities and privilege with the disciplinary expectations and security concerns of the prison’s 
guards.643 The fact that much of the hunger strike, the founding of the inmate council and the 
banning of the priests played out in the pages of the Pittsburgh print media only contributed to 
some of the tension building around the fault lines of expectations of prisoners and the 
prerogatives of guards.  
Despite the Brierley’s initial support for the black cultural program, he soon objected to 
the positions espoused by visitors associated with the program and their influence on the 
institution’s residents. African American prisoners continued to write to the New Pittsburgh 
Courier, appealing for their support and publically airing their grievances in a way that they 
could not on the United Inmate Advisory Council. In March 1970, an inmate who withheld his 
name told the New Pittsburgh Courier that the administration had been whittling away these 
privilege since Brierley approved them, culminating with the banning of “several black 
Pittsburghers…who were requested by inmates to speak there on Feb. 21 during a memorial 
service for Malcolm X.”644 As evidence, the anonymous correspondent provided the newspaper 
with “several official institutional documents signed by prison official, disapproving the 
requests of the men.”645 In response, prisoners refused to attend a sports award banquet that 
included “22 prominent local sports figures,”646 which publically embarrassed the 
superintendent who had to apologize to the guests. Brierley segregated five prisoners after the 
boycott, telling the Pittsburgh Press that they had coerced others into participating in the 
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protest.647 The implication of Brierley’s comments was, of course, that the boycott was the 
work of a few troublesome, but powerful inmates and did not reflect actual broad support for 
such actions among the institution’s residents. 
Despite Brierley’s view, nearly 500 prisoners walked off their institutional jobs on March 
5th in protest over how Brierley disciplined the five men.648 The strike was peaceful, but staff 
locked the demonstrators in their cells for the duration of the demonstration. Brierley and his 
staff spoke with each participant individually trying to persuade them to abandon the strike. By 
the weekend, many of the strikers had returned to work, but 336 prisoners still held out.649 
Brierley waited out the demonstration, but disbanded the United Inmate Advisory Council on 
March 7th, citing the organization’s role in causing the disruptions and intimidating other 
prisoners.650 “Some day,” Brierley reassured the press, “all prisons will have councils of this 
kind. But when men act for their own personal glory, it destroys the concept of what really 
constitutes an inmate council. We have good inmates here but also some hard-core men who 
were intimidating others.”651 The superintendent ended up echoing the arguments of his critics 
on the guard force.   
While it would be mistaken to think that most of the conflict spanning autumn of 1969 
and spring of 1970 ever made it into public media forums, what did appear illustrated not only 
the unusual level of publicity and interest in the conflict, but also how the area’s newspapers 
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and various community members played a larger role in that way the seemingly internal prison 
conflict unfolded. African American inmates repeatedly turned to the press, especially the New 
Pittsburgh Courier, for help with the difficulties they experienced with prison officials. The New 
Pittsburgh Courier, a direct descendant of the renowned Pittsburgh Courier, was nationally 
known as one of the preeminent dailies in the black community and had a reputation for civil 
rights advocacy.652 It provided a far friendlier outlet for inmate complaints than the city’s two 
major papers, the Pittsburgh Press and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, which provided greater 
coverage of the perspectives of penal officials and contained more extensive quotes and 
information from Superintendent Brierley.      
Each side of the conflict attempted to sway or manipulate public representations, but 
the prison administration especially tried to suppress much of the criticism while also 
cultivating better relationships with press critics. William Johnson and Sylvester Lockhart, both 
members of the dissolved United Inmate Advisory Committee, described these strategies to 
Msgr. Charles Owen Rice in letters from April 1970. Each man informed Msgr. Rice that they 
faced growing harassment from guards and senior prison officials after the strike collapsed. In 
April 1970, the black culture program lost its institutional support and meeting space in the 
prison’s school house. Johnson and Lockhart noted that having no other option, the program 
organizers moved their library, a tape recorder and other materials to their individual cells. The 
tape recorder, a gift from Msgr. Rice, provided the inmates a novel way to produce their own 
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media and communicate with activists in the community. Yet, its presence in an individual’s 
cell, along with other program material, immediately rendered them potentially vulnerable to 
confiscation as contraband.653 Guards seized the recorder and several tapes, according to 
Johnson and Lockhart, but returned them after several inmates pressured them about it.654 
Johnson and Lockhart each felt that it was probably only a matter of time before it was 
permanently confiscated. Nevertheless, the fact that the guards returned it, reflected their 
hesitancy in dealing with some groups of influential prisoners and the overall tension within the 
prison population.  
Lockhart, who was the much older of the two, also informed Rice in a letter dated April 
19th that the authorities planned to transfer him to SCI Graterford the following morning.655 He 
pointed out that these retaliatory measures, targeting mainly African Americans, occurred at 
the same time that Supt. Brierley received an award at a public dinner for a blood donor drive 
held at the prison from his erstwhile critic, the New Pittsburgh Courier.656 The hypocrisy of this 
rankled Lockhart all the more so, he told Rice, because the superintendent was taking credit for 
an idea that he and other inmates had developed. Lockhart feared for his life and doubted that 
he would actually make it to Graterford. Nevertheless, he implored Rice to contact Graterford’s 
Catholic priest to inquire about his welfare, especially since he believed that the authorities 
would immediately send him to “the hole,” severing his contact with outsiders.657  
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Lockhart claimed that he was not the administration’s sole target: “the move on me is 
part of a mass move this Warden is making on all the black inmates you met here in the school 
house.”658 He noted that prison staff had already begun laying the groundwork for other 
transfers and segregation orders by disrupting social contacts between some African American 
inmates and outside friends and family: 
Mon. some of the black brothers family mail are now being returned to their 
families stamped “discharged” – possibly to isolate them from their families and 
set them up for moves such as the one I am facing tomorrow morning.659 
 
Even though white inmates participated in the strike and constituted half of the inmate council, 
Lockhart observed that, “Very few white inmates are being transferred away.”660 In addition to 
fostering racial divisions, he also believed Brierley intended to exploit standing disagreements 
within SCI Pittsburgh’s population of politicized, black inmates. Since Lockhart felt that he alone 
had “held blacks off from making violence here,” he argued that his removal would eliminate 
one of the brakes on violence among prisoners and between them and the staff.661 He cynically, 
but perhaps realistically, feared that this would create “an opportunity for officials here to 
deliberately provoke my black brothers into a violent encounter. Thus, the Warden will be able 
to discredit our black culture projects and at the same time strike back at Diane Berry [a Courier 
journalist] and the same black newspaper that gave him the recent award.”662 
Brierley, the liberal penologist, undercut some of the criticism from the black press 
while also appeasing guards who wished to eliminate the inmate council and segregate or 









transfer certain inmates. The manner in which these events unfolded over the course of the 
spring 1970 highlight the changing relationship between prison officials, inmates and the larger 
surrounding community, which became much more contentious and public than it had been 
under the direction of Brierley’s predecessor, James F. Maroney. The media and outside 
activists not only criticized the prison’s administration more intensely than in previous years, 
but prison staff and inmates alike more actively sought the support and publicity of these 
outside people, organizations and forums in their seemingly internal disputes.  
None of this is to suggest that Brierley’s policies or his mishandling of the situation was 
the sole cause of the conflict at SCI Pittsburgh. His polices certainly departed from those of the 
more conservative regime of James Maroney, but they exemplified the Bureau of Correction’s 
reform agenda and were also widely shared in many national and international penology 
circles. While the history of imprisonment is replete with examples of prisoner resistance, one 
of the distinguishing features of it during the late 1960s and 1970s was its collective and 
assertive nature, resembling similar, contemporary counter-cultural struggles. The “civil rights 
movement and Black Power era legitimized new forms of confrontational protest,” which 
appeared behinds bars as well as on the streets.663 This change became more pronounced over 
the course of the 1960s and early 1970s as the average age of the inmate population trended 
younger and the percentage of African Americans and Latino prisoners grew from the 1960s 
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onward. Brierley’s appointment occurred at roughly the same time that such changes were 
becoming a defining feature of contemporary prison life. 
The controversy over Brierley’s administration at SCI Pittsburgh did not end with the 
inmate council’s demise and the repression of its members. By September 1970, Brierley’s 
administration, the policies of the Bureau of Correction and State Representative K. Leroy Irvis 
came under criticism in the media from two different sources and for two different, but 
interrelated reasons, which reflected the diversity of competing penal agendas. During much of 
1970, K. Leroy Irvis, the state representative for the 19th District in Pittsburgh as well as the 
Democratic House Majority Leader, worked on drafting comprehensive penal reform 
legislation, which included a “good time” provision to permit inmates to earn early release 
through good behavior and progress in an individualized rehabilitation program. The legislation, 
while still formative, was contentious around the state and had numerous detractors. The 
United Inmate Advisory Council had planned to lobby the General Assembly and administration 
officials concerning penal reform legislation, and provide an inmate’s perspective on the 
matter, but with their demise, any formal collective submission from SCI Pittsburgh prisoners 
appeared less likely. Nevertheless, numerous people at the prison wrote to legislators, 
especially Rep. Irvis, asking him to visit the institution and speak with them about the “good 
time bill,” as the package was often called. Irvis made arrangements to speak with the 
prisoners, but canceled the visit three times over the summer of 1970. This prompted Rabbi 




the reform debate and to point out how the repeated snubs fostered resentment and 
restlessness among prisoners.664  
Rabbi Leiter’s criticism was especially harsh toward Brierley, Rep. Irvis and officials in 
the Bureau of Correction. Although a subsequent letter from the rabbi, published by the 
Pittsburgh Press, suggested that the reporter misleadingly used some of Leiter’s comments, the 
rabbi maintained that discontent was rife at SCI Pittsburgh, and he feared that the prison was 
drifting toward a riot.665 Leiter warned that the one of the primary sources of frustration, 
among the prisoners he had spoken to, was the widely-held view that they had not been 
sufficiently consulted about the prison reform legislation currently being debated in Harrisburg. 
The widespread nature of this view attests to the inclusive, democratic reach of the prisoners’ 
right movement and its role in crafting the political subjectivities of confined people. Leiter 
believed that Brierley and other Bureau officials pressured Irvis into postponing his visit, 
precisely to contain this political upsurge among prisoners, which they feared would jeopardize 
their preferred version of the legislation.  
Brierley and Irvis immediately rebuked Leiter in print. Brierley went so far as to suggest 
that the rabbi would be responsible for any outbreak violence at the prison after his criticism.666 
Nevertheless, both men agreed that the institution’s population was extremely frustrated and 
disgruntled – “a powder keg,” according to Brierley.667 Irvis also confirmed that Brierley and 
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Deputy Attorney-General Frank Lawley persuaded him that his visit could easily spark a major 
riot. Their concern, Irvis told the New Pittsburgh Courier, was that if he met with a deputation 
of only a few inmates, as he had planned to, the rest of the population would be incensed at 
being excluded.668 Meeting with the entire prisoner population would have also presented 
control problems for the staff, especially since the conversation was likely to be highly charged. 
Rabbi Leiter believed that security precautions could have been arranged for such an important 
meeting and argued that the Bureau of Correction’s leadership simply did not want direct 
inmate participation in creating the legislation. They mobilized fear to block a more politically-
inclusive process.669 
Resistance to Brierley also emanated from a large group of SCI Pittsburgh’s guards about 
the same time. At first, they pursued their goals relatively quietly. By the end of the summer of 
1970, several staff members, including some senior officers, contacted officials in Harrisburg, 
requesting an investigation into Brierley’s regime. In early September, the guards changed their 
tactics and made their displeasure publicly known, telling the local media that Brierley had 
created a dangerous atmosphere at the prison by loosening discipline too far and reducing 
penalties for prison offenses. Led by two lieutenants, Charles Kozakiewicz and George Kebles, 
over half the prison’s guard force urged Pennsylvania Attorney-General Fred Speaker to 
investigate what they called “the complete lack of consideration for the welfare, safety and 
well-being of employees and inmates” at SCI Pittsburgh.670 Since Brierley’s appointment, they 
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claimed that many of the prison’s 900 residents had armed themselves, mainly out of fear of 
assault, leaving the place “an armed camp.”671 The guards argued that they too wanted the new 
prison reform legislation enacted, but it appeared that their disagreement with Brierley was 
largely over security, their sense of proper prison order and their own personal safety.672 
The Bureau of Correction obliged, interviewing every member of the prison’s staff to 
ascertain the veracity of the allegations. Within a few days, Deputy Commissioner of Correction 
Kenneth Taylor announced that there would be several changes at the prison, but he did not 
elaborate. However, he described some of the guards’ claims as exaggerations. Lt. Kozakiewicz 
and Lt. Kebles also claimed that “some remedial action had already started,” but likewise 
declined to discuss the specific nature of the changes. Brierley remained in his position and 
cryptically acknowledged that the investigation enhanced the communication and 
understanding between his administration and the guards.  
Even if the nature of the immediate changes remained obscure, the confrontation 
illustrated that the growing militancy behind the institution’s walls came not just from 
prisoners, but also from prison staff, especially guards. Despite lacking a legally-recognized 
union at the time of Brierley’s appointment, guards collectively asserted their positions and 
engaged in organized protests over prison management issues at this time.673 Brierley’s policies 
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and those emanating from Harrisburg directly challenged many of the guards’ longstanding 
practices and authority over inmates. The policy of creating inmate council, for instance, stood 
in stark contrast to the guards’ practice of hindering the formation of cohesive groups of 
inmates and the belief that such practices would only empower powerful inmates and militants. 
The militancy of SCI Pittsburgh’s staff, while perhaps exceptional in its degree, nevertheless 
reflected a more general pattern among prison staff statewide and among many other public 
employees as well. 
The fact that the guards flouted the chain of command so publicly, directly appealing to 
the press and public, displayed both Brierley’s (and the Bureau’s) legitimacy deficit among the 
staff as well as the novel interest such matters held beyond prison walls. As the Pittsburgh Press 
editorialized in September 1970, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the disputes involving 
the guards, Brierley, Leiter and Irvis was their unusual publicity: “The out-in-the-open squabble 
over conditions at Western Penitentiary in the Woods Run section of Pittsburgh has produced 
both heat and light in an area where darkness and cold usually prevail.”674 The disputes quickly 
became a source of public commentary and underscored how the press participated in the 
conflict and shaped it. While left unmentioned, the recent violence at Philadelphia’s 
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Holmesburg Prison, which occurred only two months before, and possibility of another urban 
prison riot enhanced the threat and newsworthiness of the conflicts at the Woods Run facility.  
The contentious events following Brierley’s appointment displayed how much the field 
of recognition, legitimacy and public debate in penal matters had transformed since World War 
II. Criminologist John Pratt has argued that, in contrast, public disputes like this were in fact 
unusual, easily contained and short-lived for much of the twentieth-century. Senior leaders in 
penal bureaucracies dominated penal policy since the late nineteenth-century and were able to 
discursively marginalize or simply exclude the voices of prisoners, guards, activists and other 
concerned citizens in public debates. These other groups of people were obviously present in 
previous penal arrangements, but their actions and voices were often disregarded in public 
debate or constrained by the authority of penal expertise and discipline. Of course, both guards 
and inmates held far greater power within the prisons, a fact officials implicitly acknowledged 
in the types of regimes and informal orders they permitted or tolerated. Yet, such recognition 
did not extend to public statements about the methods and rationales of imprisonment. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, this relationship changed considerably. Prisoners, guards, 
activists and other concerned citizens now engaged penal authorities on a much more frequent 
basis, often in a public manner and from a much stronger position. They often employed the 
language of penal reform and drew sustenance from the postwar rehabilitation discourse and 
practice even if they did not actually share same assumptions about crime causation and 
individualized treatment. In a sense, these other groups met penal authorities in the Bureau of 




press their claims and carve out greater spaces of control within the institutions.675 Thus, the 
inmate council, long thought of among professional penologists and academics as a way to 
defuse tension in prison and encourage the creation of responsible, liberal subjects, became 
the organizational basis for further Black Power politics among SCI Pittsburgh’s residents.  
Yet, the Bureau of Correction’s leadership did not simply retreat from this debate, but 
also intensified its public relations efforts, especially when it came to defending new programs 
and reform plans for the state’s prisons. The September 1970 retirement of Arthur Prasse, the 
Commissioner of Correction since 1952, did as much as anything to mark the emergence of this 
new orientation. Prasse’s replacement, Allyn Sielaff, had a well-known reputation as a liberal 
reformer. As deputy commissioner, he had spearheaded many of the Bureau of Correction’s 
recent, new initiatives, including the community corrections programs. He embraced Gov. 
Shafer’s plans to elevate the penal agency to a cabinet level department and generally enjoyed 
the support of the governor and Attorney-General Fred Speaker who oversaw the Bureau of 
Correction. Much more than his predecessor, Sielaff engaged directly with the media, often 
holding long press conferences trying to explain and mobilize public support for controversial 
programs while responding to criticism from the judiciary and police. He also attempted to 
liberalize some prison regimes, especially in the area of censorship and personal expression by 
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prisoners, but these efforts were uneven and strenuously resisted by many staff members. 
Sielaff’s policies included granting the media greater access to the prison system than they had 
enjoyed in many years.  
In December 1970, for instance, the Pittsburgh Press ran a four-part series called 
“Behind the Walls,” which focused especially on SCI Pittsburgh.676 I dwell on these articles here 
for two reasons. First, the level of detail in the articles and the access the reporter, Jack 
Grochot, had to the prison would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. The first article in 
the series framed the entire series around this novelty, directly connecting it to Gov. Shafer’s 
call for major prison reforms in the wake of the Holmesburg disturbance: “Atty. Gen. Fred 
Speaker opened the prison doors to newsmen, permitting them for the first time to talk at 
length with inmates and administration alike.”677 Second, the articles clearly formed part of the 
public relations effort of the Bureau of Correction, especially after Sielaff assumed its top post, 
and laid out the problems with prisons like SCI Pittsburgh and the agency’s plans to change 
them. 
Grochot began the series by painting a bleak picture of the degrading life led by people 
confined at SCI Pittsburgh. Steeped in violence, idleness and boredom, most prisoners had few 
opportunities for meaningful work, education and therapeutic programming and often lived in 
fear of physical and sexual assault. Grochot described how the daily routines of most prisoners 
were born more of intense boredom than any planned program of education, training or 
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treatment. Prisoners occupied themselves training a mouse, sketching, repeatedly polishing a 
cell floor, pacing back and forth in the yards, playing bocci, producing makeshift puzzles out of 
ripped up papers and deliberating feigning mental illness in an effort to entertain themselves, 
and ironically, maintain their sanity.678 The best employment options included producing 
license plates for the state, lockers for the National Guard and bed frames for other state 
institutions. Yet, these jobs were monotonous as well and limited in number. License plate 
production required sitting “at a machine for eight hours a day and feed[ing] it a piece of tin, 
then another, then another, and another…”679 
Grochot praised Brierley’s attempts to institute greater rehabilitation options with the 
meager funds available to him. These initiatives included holding new night classes in which 
prisoners could earn college credits and having the few counselors employed by the prison visit 
inmates rather than remaining in their offices simply processing paperwork.680 Additionally, 
William Schnupp, the assistant superintendent, arranged for some mechanics to teach 
automobile repair to prisoners on donated vehicles. Nevertheless, this limited, piecemeal 
approach to rehabilitation could at most only reach about a hundred prisoners, according to 
Grochot. The more than 900 other men were simply excluded; many by their own choice. 
Grochot did not explore the question of the aims and efficacy of these efforts.  
Many of the changes under Brierley’s regime, like additional, out-of-cell recreation time 
in the evenings, still provoked resentment among guards.681 Despite the resolution reached in 
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September 1970, more than half the guard force called off with the “blue flu” a month later 
protesting new inmate privileges.682 In an interview with Grochot, Brierley claimed that such 
resentment remained a persistent disposition among the guards. While some guards supported 
greater treatment-orientated approaches to prisoner management, many still considered 
themselves as “public avengers,” surrogates for a victimized general public who desired strict, 
austere conditions for prisoners – a position that “confused discipline with dehumanization” in 
Brierley’s view.683  
Grochot explained to readers that the routine “dehumanizing process” at SCI Pittsburgh 
produced hateful, vengeful people.684 Throughout the first three articles, Grochot repeatedly 
mentioned the anger welling up in the people confined at SCI Pittsburgh, the noble efforts of 
people like Brierley notwithstanding. There were simply not enough funds, political support or 
adequate facilities to counter the hate produced by the institution and its routines. Certain 
practices in particular sharpened this pervasive anger. For instance, Grochot recounted a typical 
disciplinary incident in which a guard ordered a prisoner to visit the institution’s barber because 
his “sideburns were a half-inch too long.”685 This constituted a formal infraction of prison rules, 
which landed the prisoner in punitive segregation where he lost all privileges for the duration of 
his punishment.686 Conditions in the “hole” were spartan. The cells lacked sinks, but included a 
toilet that flushed automatically every hour. Staff restricted reading material and headphones 
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to listen to the institution’s radio system, thus harnessing and accentuating the prison’s normal 
boredom and monotony for control purposes. Grochot evocatively highlighted the social 
isolation of the hole: “For companionship, he has a glaring lightbulb and the footsteps of a 
guard bringing a meal three times a day.”687 This loss of social contact and boredom was broken 
periodically by the coyote-like howls of other isolated men. In Grochot’s view, a person 
subjected to this regime of solitary confinement simply “hates even more.”688 
 
 
Figure 4: Grochot’s portrayal of a cell at SCI Pittsburgh 
Figure 4. Grochot’s portrayal of a cell at SCI Pittsburgh from the Pittsburgh Press’s Behind the 
Wall series. Source: “Animal Howls, Attacks Fill Nightmare of Western Pen,” Pittsburgh Press, 
(December 13, 1970). 







At first blush, it may have appeared that the penal authorities, whether Supt. Brierley, 
Com. Sielaff, Attorney-Gen. Speaker or even Gov. Shafer, took a major risk in granting Grochot 
access for the articles, but they actually invited the publicity of his criticism to bolster their own 
reform program, positions which Grochot seemed to have shared. The “Behind the Walls” 
series described in fine detail many aspects of how prisoners accommodated themselves to the 
harsh conditions of the prison as well as the well-intentioned actions of embattled correctional 
officials like Brierley and a few equally humane, if paternalistic, officers who treated the 
institution’s residents with dignity.689 Grochot’s exposé was clearly critical of the current state 
of SCI Pittsburgh, but certain topics could not be raised, nor questions posed, in the analytical 
and narrative frame of the series. No doubt, his views were vetted by the penal authorities, 
who may have welcomed certain criticisms, but did not want to open the door to the types of 
challenges they faced from activist inmates on the United Inmate Advisory Council, the New 
Pittsburgh Courier reporters and the politicized clergymen. None of these people and 
organizations were interviewed or even mentioned in the “Behind the Walls” series despite the 
coverage the same newspaper (Pittsburgh Press) devoted to each in 1969 and 1970. The series 
also downplayed the guards’ militancy, and did not quote any staff member articulating views 
opposed to Brierley or Harrisburg’s current policy positions. 
Grochot’s articles could not accommodate the assertive or politicized responses of 
prisoners, which had become far more common than any time in the last few decades. 
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Although the prison administration had transferred some of the more vocal leaders on the 
inmate council, like Sylvester Lockhart, there were still plenty of similarly politicized African 
Americans held at SCI Pittsburgh who understood their imprisonment in terms far different 
from those depicted by Grochot. Even among many white inmates who did not situate their 
imprisonment in a longer narrative of racial injustice, captivity and oppression, the examples of 
successful litigation by Black Muslims encouraged similar appeals to the courts. Grochot failed 
to mention this civil litigation by prisoners or the existence of jailhouse lawyers, both of which 
had become increasingly common by 1970.690 He also largely sidestepped the issue of prison 
violence and only obliquely mentioned prisoners’ fear of rape. The articles were notably silent 
about the influence of the racially-patterned violence at Holmesburg Prison, even though that 
disturbance had occurred only a few months before.  
Instead, Grochot’s representations of the people confined at SCI Pittsburgh stressed 
their desperation and psychological deterioration, and he avoided the topic of race entirely. 
While some of this imagery would have been disturbing, it appealed more to the sympathies 
and support of white, middle class citizens, much like liberal attacks on racial discrimination 
that highlighted the psychological damage caused by white racism.691 Most inmates in the first 
three articles of the series struggled to maintain their sanity in SCI Pittsburgh by devising ways 
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to interrupt the prisons attritional boredom: one prisoner created a puzzle from ripped up 
papers, another trained one of the many mice that infested the prison, yet another privately 
entertained himself by yelling at his imaginary chess partner in the yard to elicit a wary reaction 
from his fellow prisoners. One man, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, showered repeatedly to 
ease his symptoms and threw excrement at guards when the shaking became intolerable. The 
“animal” adjective in the title of the first article – “Animal Howls, Attacks Fill Nightmare of 
Western Pen” – may have been directed more at the harsh conditions that produced the 
behavior Grochot described, but it also reduced the people he observed to simply targets of 
repressive discipline and neglect who could now only react in a primal, child-like or irrational 
manner. The fact that a common joke told among the institution’s psychologists - “it would take 
a medical expert to conclude that the 1,000 inhabitants technically classify as living human 
beings.” - also cast doubt on the effectiveness and commitment to what little rehabilitative 
interventions occurred at the prison.692 
Grochot’s “Behind the Walls” series, along with the publicity of recent events at SCI 
Pittsburgh, underscore how publicity was quickly becoming a major problem for penal 
governance. Whether at the level of a particular prison, especially a sensitive one like SCI 
Pittsburgh, or the state’s larger penal bureaucracy, destructive criticism in the press could 
hinder policy changes and adequate funding as well as foment conflict between inmates, staff 
and administrators. This is not to suggest that prisons were invulnerable to bad press or 
scandals in the past. They certainly were not. However, the penetration of public criticism and 
the dialogue between people inside and outside the prison had grown considerably within a 
                                                          




few short years. In the 1970s, sociologist James Jacobs described similar changes at Stateville 
Penitentiary in Illinois, which he saw as part of a larger process of incorporating previously 
marginalized groups and institutions into the legal standards, recognitions and accountabilities 
of “mass society.”693 Much like the situation in Illinois, the hierarchical organization of penal 
authority in Pennsylvania after World War II insulated the prisons from a lot of outside 
interference, providing brakes on the incidence and degree of scandals.694 By the late 1960s, 
the quiescence of this penal arrangement, sustained by a mixture of internal authoritarianism 
and external indifference, rapidly deteriorated.  
In such a context, prison officials like Commissioner Allyn Sielaff and his deputy, Stewart 
Werner, realized that publicity, especially through the press, was not only a considerable threat 
to their work, but also a potential political and penological resource. The “Behind the Walls” 
series was in this sense a well-managed critic of the state’s prisons, exemplified by SCI 
Pittsburgh, which aided their penological preferences and reform agenda. Grochot was not a 
mere tool for the Bureau of Correction, but the agency’s leadership had instrumental reasons 
for granting him a generous level of access, allowing him to produce long, distinctive articles. 
From some of Grochot’s commentary, it appears that he largely shared their reformist views 
and supported new penal legislation. For example, during his discussion of how a person deals 
with prolonged segregation, Grochot explicitly pointed to a possible, if currently frustrated, 
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solution to many of the problems at SCI Pittsburgh: “He can think about legislation for prison 
reform, which has been proposed to the General Assembly and has traveled no further.”695 
Grochot’s final piece in the series further articulated the wisdom of the Bureau of 
Correction’s plans for drastically altering the state’s prison system. Grochot shifted focus away 
from SCI Pittsburgh to the new Greensburg State Regional Correctional Facility (SRCF 
Greensburg), which had only been operating for about a year. Unlike the “medieval concept of 
prison” exemplified in the first three articles on the Western Penitentiary, Grochot informed his 
readers that the program at SRCF Greensburg prison emphasized “Conditioning a lawbreaker 
for the outside, but forcing him to earn his freedom. In a word, rehabilitation. It’s working”696 
The institution had more work opportunities for training and education than SCI Pittsburgh and 
a work release program, which inmates could participate in after successful performance in 
other institutional jobs and successful screening. Two of the three photographs accompanying 
the article included a corrections counselor and a psychologist; the other one showed men 
exiting the prison through a door, supposedly for their work release day jobs. Such images 
emphasized the reformative nature of the prison’s regime and its connections to world outside. 
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Figure 5: The new focus on reintegration programs at SRCF Greensburg 
Figure 5. The new focus on reintegration programs at SRCF Greensburg – a far cry from the 
despair at SCI Pittsburgh. Source: “Greensburg Jail Aim: Rehabilitation, Not Revenge,” Pittsburgh 





Figure 6: Community corrections leave at SRCF Greensburg 
Figure 6. Many people imprisoned at SRCF Greensburg people leave for work or education during 
the day in one of the Bureau of Correction’s new transitional, community corrections programs 
Source: “Greensburg Jail Aim: Rehabilitation, Not Revenge,” Pittsburgh Press, (December 16, 
1970). 
 
The article did not explore the daily institutional routines of the men confined at SRCF-
Greensburg in the same manner as their counterparts at SCI Pittsburgh. Instead, Grochot 




expanding its role. The article was more an endorsement of the aspirational potential of its 
reform program. The Bureau of Correction’s leadership still considered SRCF-Greensburg’s 
regime experimental and it only held 140 people with short sentences. Most had sentences 
under a year, according to Grochot, which was well below the normal sentence range for the 
more than 1,000 men confined at SCI Pittsburgh, many of whom were serving terms with a 
minimum of ten years. Since the closing of the old Eastern State Penitentiary earlier in the year, 
SCI Pittsburgh had become the sole facility in the state’s prison system that was entirely rated 
for maximum security.697 The difference between the regimes and the people confined at 
Greensburg and Pittsburgh made the comparisons between them somewhat misleading; a 
point which Grochot did not emphasize.698 
Nevertheless, Commissioner Sielaff told Grochot that institutions like SRCF-Greensburg 
would eventually replace “dungeons” like SCI Pittsburgh. Sielaff envisioned a future prison 
system composed mainly of similar institutions with only one maximum security prison for the 
small number of prisoners requiring higher security. He told Grochot that one of the more 
recently-constructed prisons would be converted to hold such people; massive institutions like 
SCI Pittsburgh would be decommissioned. The major obstacle to such plans, according to the 
officials Grochot spoke to, was the lack of funding. Soon, however, greater hurdles would 
appear that centered on many of the issue that Grochot left out of the “Behind the Walls” 
series: violence, staff security concerns, segregation and the rights of “dangerous” prisoners, 
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the relatively few people that many parties believed could not be held in the general 
population of any institution. 
Resistance and Control of the Dangerous 
 
As the uprising at Holmesburg indicated, many prisons in the United States became 
much more unstable, violent places during the late 1960s and 1970s.699 Although there were 
many causes for this, which varied from place to place, there is general agreement among 
contemporary and secondary sources about several of developments that contributed to the 
increasingly violent atmosphere behinds bars. Increasing racial discord among inmates and the 
growing assertiveness and political consciousness of many prisoners infused their interactions 
with guards with more hostility and undermined many of the routines and control mechanisms 
that had maintained relatively orderly prisons up to the late 1960s. As a number of researchers 
noted in the 1940s and 1950s, inmate leaders played an important informal role in maintaining 
prison order in exchange for preferential treatment by prison staff or permission to control 
illicit internal markets. The unspoken truth in these accounts was that such leaders were white 
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and a racial hierarchy structured the social order of prison, much as it did in the world beyond 
the walls. By the 1960s, a greater influx of African American and Latino prisoners challenged 
established racial hierarchies among prisoners and between them and the largely white guard 
forces. As the control exerted by elite, white prisoners waned during the 1960s, the 
predominately white prison staff also lost one of their informal methods of enforcing prison 
order and began relying more on blunt custodial practices, like segregation and transfers to 
control or punish prisoners. Unsurprisingly, prison staff disproportionately targeted African 
Americans with these tactics. By the 1970s, they also increasingly used them to manage people 
suffering from mental illness who began appearing with greater frequency in penal institutions 
as a result of hospital deinstitutionalization policies. 
 Spatial disciplinary tactics, like isolation and movement, animate the prison itself and 
predate it in other forms of punishment.700 However, they are only one of the many different 
resources for maintaining and enforcing order in prisons and arguably the least effective. Prison 
staff resorted to isolation, transfers and other harsh forms of control like beatings more often 
as more effective and benign means eliciting compliance from prisoners, if not their consent, 
either evaporated or were simply discarded. The increased prominence of these disciplinary 
methods also signaled the racial transformation of prison populations and the loss of faith in 
many of the postwar rehabilitative practices.701 They also heavily relied on these techniques to 
counter prisoner resistance and dissolve or prevent the formation of collective inmate actions.  
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Similar to a few other states, the stalking horse of this trend actually appeared before 
the late-1960s with the arrival of a greater number of followers of the Nation of Islam behind 
bars.702 The collective recruitment, prayer meetings and martial drilling of the Black Muslims on 
prison yards concerned administrators in Pennsylvania who feared that they posed a potential 
challenge to the institutional and racial order. Accordingly, prison staff often isolated or 
transferred Black Muslims in an attempt to crush their collective activities when they lacked 
other means of dissuading them from their activities.703  Similar actions awaited prisoner 
activists, like Sylvester Lockhardt, a decade later. Such men faced increasingly long periods in 
isolation and multiple transfers because of their political outspokenness and organizing. For 
prisoners like Lockhardt, it became much easier to end up in “the hole,” yet often more difficult 
to ascertain exactly why one was placed there or secure a way out. For prison administrators, 
this shift entailed a reimaging of prison space. By the mid-1970s, they began creating more 
segregation units and refurbished old ones. In Pennsylvania, such trends were apparent by 
1970, but increased throughout the decade. As they did, a whole new discourse of contention 
and activism blossomed around the use of these techniques and the procedures and 
protections attending them. Prisoner activism often focused as much on the issue of these 
control techniques as it did on other aspects of imprisonment. 
Prison administrators also used isolation and transfers to stifle the relationships prisoner 
activists had with outside supporters and organizations. As prison walls became more porous in 
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some respects from the late 1960s onward, these disciplinary techniques developed this 
duality, targeted at both the person directly subject to isolation and transfer as well as 
supporters from beyond the walls who prison staff nevertheless saw as a disruptive influence 
inside. The irony, of course, is that many prison authorities, especially senior bureaucrats, 
welcomed greater public involvement and at times even invited criticism, like that displayed in 
the “Behind the Walls” series. Prison staff and police had the legal authority to suppress outside 
demonstrations in some cases, but most gatherings were peaceful enough that law 
enforcement usually just monitored protestors. Without a direct tool to disperse crowds 
outside the urban prison, prison officials relied on their ability to move their compatriots inside. 
In December 1970, the same month that Pittsburgh Press ran the “Behind the Walls” 
series, a group of twelve prisoners at SCI Pittsburgh started a newspaper called Vibrations, 
which demonstrates the relationship of prisoner activism, outside supporters and the use of 
segregation and isolation.704 The publishers described Vibrations as more than just a 
“traditional institutional ‘gripe sheet,’” but rather a “tri-communal” newspaper aimed at 
reaching three primary audiences – inmates, prison authorities and members of “unwalled 
society.”705 Donations from outside businesses, like Copco Papers Inc., and the sponsorship of a 
few treatment staff members sustained the efforts of the twelve original members of the 
collective that produced the newspaper.706 Over the first few months of 1971, the newspaper 
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collective became more outspoken and established numerous links with community groups and 
individuals, including meeting with a group of high school students.707  
At first, the administration tolerated the uncensored newspaper, but otherwise offered 
it little support. Yet, tensions with Superintendent Brierley and SCI Pittsburgh’s line staff 
increased as the newspaper became more critical, which finally culminated on April 19, 1971, 
when the administration shuttered the Vibrations’ office, confiscated their production 
equipment and ordered an institutional shakedown. Prison staff claimed that they discovered 
illicit items in the possession of several members of the Vibrations collective and subsequently 
placed them in administrative segregation without disciplinary hearings or formal charges.708 
They were soon transferred to several different prisons.709 Over the next two weeks the 
administration targeted at least ten more prisoners with connections to Vibrations, transferring 
them to other prisons were they were immediately placed in segregation. Those affected by 
these transfers also claimed that they were not charged or tried through normal disciplinary 
procedures.710  
The newspaper’s staff and many of their supporters accused the administration of 
simply trying to suppress the controversial newspaper under the pretext of security. In the days 
following the shakedown, the Pittsburgh Press and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette both reported that 
demonstrators gathered in the streets next to the prison to voice their disapproval of 
Vibrations’ demise: “a group of hippie-type pickets marched around the area” immediately 
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outside the prison walls, “protesting ‘censorship’ of the prison newspaper.”711 Inside the prison, 
a “near revolt” and a fire temporarily delayed production in the state’s main license plate 
factory.712 Brierley and Commissioner Sielaff confirmed the delay and damage, but refused to 
publicly acknowledge prisoner resistance as the cause.713  
Brierley rejected the accusation of censorship, but said that since the newspaper had 
“an-outside-the-prison circulation” he did not “want the public misinformed”; the publication 
had to be an “’acceptable’ newspaper and not one with underground overtones.”714 He claimed 
that Vibrations was only temporarily halted until a new review board was formed to oversee 
the work of the inmate writers. The shakedown, he said, was simply a routine practice and not 
directed at the newspaper.715 This explanation did not satisfy many of the people who knew 
members of the collective and supported the publication. Denise D. Speaks, one of the high 
school students who visited members of the newspaper’s staff, later told the New Pittsburgh 
Courier, that “the realism represented in the paper frightened the prison officials, and is the 
basic cause of the discontinuation of Vibrations.”716  
The prison administration’s actions were obviously aimed at suppressing the views of 
radical prisoners, but the destruction of Vibrations and the United Inmate Advisory Council 
before it illustrates how practices like isolation and transfers were also meant to sever the 
connections that some inmates maintained with members of the “unwalled society,” 
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connections that prison staff found threatening to institutional order. The administration 
suppressed these particular challenges, but their actions fomented resentment in the 
community among supporters of both organizations who soon formed a new prison activist 
organization called Vibrations II Committee for Penal Reform. The group drew greater attention 
to problems of SCI Pittsburgh and imprisonment in Pennsylvania in general. They participated in 
numerous protests outside the prison’s walls over the next few years. 
Prison authorities, of course, prevented direct contact between inmates and certain 
outside groups and individuals through institutional bans. Brierley’s initial refusal to permit the 
two radical, Catholic priests in the autumn of 1969, for instance, appears to have been an 
attempt to set the terms of, not only their visits with inmates, but also the cultural 
programming and other activities of numerous African American prisoners. Brierley later 
renewed this particular ban in September 1971, following a public demonstration outside the 
walls of SCI Pittsburgh in the aftermath of the Attica uprising in western New York. The 
superintendent claimed that this demonstration alarmed him because of how it affected 
prisoners inside SCI Pittsburgh and by the fact that among the seventy or so protestors there 
were a number of people who had been recently imprisoned at SCI Pittsburgh. The 
demonstrators, many of whom were members of Vibrations II, professed solidarity with the 
Attica inmates and demanded greater access to SCI Pittsburgh and more information about the 
people being held there.717 One of the organizers, Boyd Puryear, summed up his frustration, 
telling a reporter: “We can’t get any news from behind those walls on what is going on inside. 
                                                          




And we can’t get people in to check on what’s happening. The only way they’ll tell us is if we 
demand to know.”718  
Brierley, who monitored the demonstration from inside the prison, claimed that 
prisoners in the facility’s South Block could hear the protesters and each group shouted back 
and forth to each other through windows.719 Brierley feared that this might spark a violent 
confrontation inside, especially since the situation was already tense following the violence at 
Attica. So, he immediately removed prisoners from the South Block of the prison near the 
street where the demonstrators were located.720 He also wrote a letter to Father Augustus 
Taylor and Father John O'Malley the same day, telling them that, “after witnessing your so very 
active part in the demonstration outside the institutional walls at noon today, I can readily see 
that it is your sole purpose to incite the prison population to riot and I am therefore forced to 
rescind the approval permitting you to enter the confines of this institution.”721 The U.S. Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals later upheld Brierley’s ban after the priests filed suit against him.722 
The location of SCI Pittsburgh within the city enabled prison activists and the family and 
friends of prisoners to stage frequent protests like this within earshot of those confined inside. 
This meant that penal reform organizations and more radical prison movement groups had a 
much greater degree of contact with prisoners at SCI Pittsburgh than they did with people 
confined in rural prisons, which were not only much further away from the urban bases of such 
activists, but also had larger, secure buffer zones outside the walls. This direct communication, 
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thus, presented staff with a series of concerns that were not present at most of the state’s 
other institutions.723 Messages and other forms of contraband were at times thrown over the 
wall by those inside and outside the prison, obviously bypassing security screening. In August 
and September 1972, a well-coordinated statewide work stoppage by prisoners in four 
institutions across the state exemplified some of patterns of communication, activism and 
subversion that was becoming increasing common in Pennsylvania prisons in general and urban 
prisons like SCI Pittsburgh in particular. 
The origins of the strike started secretly with a small group of committed prisoner 
activists, but quickly spread throughout the prison system with the aid of sympathetic lawyers, 
activists groups and, ironically, the Bureau’s practice of frequently transferring activist inmates 
to control their activities.724 Letters found by staff in the possession of several inmates at SCI 
Pittsburgh in August 1971 revealed the existence of a list of 41 demands for improvements to 
the prison system that was circulating through underground networks inside the prisons and 
outside among activists and lawyers. By late August, many of the outside groups and individuals 
openly acknowledged the efforts for a work stoppage. In Pittsburgh, representatives of the 
Vibrations II and the Western Pennsylvania Committee to Free All Political Prisoners publicly 
announced their support for a “statewide prison labor strike” aimed at forcing the state 
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government to implement reforms.725 The strike, which was to occur immediately after Labor 
Day, was also intended to mark the anniversary of the Attica uprising. The activists strategically 
held this press conference at the William Penn Hotel in downtown Pittsburgh, which was also 
hosting the annual meeting of the America Correctional Association, attended by Gov. Milton 
Shapp.726 
The ensuing strike emerged in stages across the state. The first actions appeared at SCI 
Graterford, north of Philadelphia, where nearly 750 inmates refused to work and were locked in 
their cells.727 At least 50 inmates at SCI Dallas, located in a largely rural area near Wilkes-Barre, 
also refused to work as did 30 prisoners at SCIMuncy, the state’s only women’s prison. 
Prisoners at SCI Pittsburgh did not walk off the job in the morning, according to Deputy 
Commissioner Stewart Werner, but “at noon and in concert with peaceful picket lines outside 
the institution (community groups) about 300 demonstrated in the institution yard at the 
instigation of four individuals.”728 Guards later locked about 150 inmates in their cells when 
they refused to work.  
People inside SCI Pittsburgh disputed the prison officials’ account in a handwritten note, 
which was affixed to a ball and thrown over the institution’s wall to the demonstrators. In a 
September 9th article, the New Pittsburgh Courier quoted the note as stating: “Contrary to the 
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administration official word – 90 per cent of the inmate population is on strike - please notify 
the news media – also we’d like all supporters to move onto the railroad tracks in front of the 
jail”729 Within two days, prison staff at all the affected institutions reported that only a few 
“dissidents” still refused to work and remained locked up. However, in Pittsburgh prison staff 
cited “some unconfirmed reports that community agitation will be renewed in support of ‘work 
stoppage’ this weekend, 9 and 10 September.”730  
The threat of a protests dissipated over the weekend, but the leadership of the Bureau 
of Correction was concerned about the mutual influence and communication between radical 
political groups and individuals on both sides of the walls. Deputy Commissioner Werner 
explained to Gov. Shapp on September 8th that the extent of the work stoppage and its 
coordinated statewide pattern could be traced back to these relationships: 
 
Though the ‘work stoppage’ itself started from a small inmate committee whose 
membership was spread throughout institutions of the Bureau, the effort was 
given considerable impetus by community groups and individual attorneys who 




This placed the Bureau’s relatively new leadership of Allyn Sielaff and Stewart Werner in an 
ironic quandary. During the last few years of Arthur Prasse’s tenure as commissioner, the 
Bureau had developed new community corrections programs and made numerous calls for 
greater public support and involvement in inmate reform efforts. Sielaff and Werner were 
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instrumental in the development of many of these policies and inherited and expanded them 
after Prasse’s retirement. However, the groups and individuals that showed the most interest in 
penal reform and alternatives to incarceration were in Werner’s view a source of “community 
agitation,” fomenting disorder in the state’s prisons. The increased porousness of the prison 
system’s boundaries became fraught with threats of political activism and discrediting scandals. 
 The Bureau’s reform efforts faltered in other ways as well, which revealed the outlines 
of an emerging field of partisan competition over penal policies that embroiled the state’s 
prisons in ever greater debate and controversy throughout the decade. Gov. Shafer left office in 
early 1971 without achieving the major prison reform he sought – the elevation of the Bureau 
of Correction to a cabinet level department. His successor, Milton Shapp, also supported the 
creation of a Department of Corrections but, the details of the proposal, which was redrawn 
several times, met with a lot of resistance by counties and some agencies, like the Board of 
Probation and Parole, which feared the loss of their autonomy. Many police officers and judges 
opposed versions of the plan because it included extending the Bureau’s already controversial 
community corrections programs, which they despised. Even among those who supported the 
proposal, like many members of the General Assembly’s Democratic caucus, the specific 
policies included in bills generated resistance, like the earned good time system.  
Nevertheless, Gov. Shapp was interested in major prison reform, and he retained the 
nationally well-regarded Allyn Sielaff to lead the Bureau of Correction. However, the 
administration’s effort were often presented poorly to the public and the governor himself 
occasionally stumbled through prison reform proposals, eliciting resistance and criticism from 




controversy. For instance, the governor tried to revive the idea of creating representative 
inmate councils in all the state’s prisons.732 Sielaff, the liberal penologist, adamantly opposed 
the idea citing both the danger such bodies posed and the wealth of knowledge about inmate 
views that the Bureau had already gathered in several official studies. The Bureau’s work 
furlough program and the effort to locate sites for new community corrections centers and 
regional prisons proved to be persistent sources of negative publicity, especially if it involved 
escapes. The rate of escape rose dramatically in the first years of Shapp’s administration, which 
in a letter to the governor, Sielaff attributed to among other things, the looser restrictions on 
inmate movement within prisons, outside work details and community corrections programs.733 
Other members of the administration knew that such explanations might convince penologists, 
but played poorly in press conferences. Norval Reece, Shapp’s personal assistant, succinctly 
commented on Sielaff’s letter: “This report on prisoner escapes from Allyn Sielaff is devastating. 
I find none of the reasons stated for the escape record to be convincing to the public…Let’s talk 
about this. Something has to be done.”734 
The lack of movement on the departmental consolidation further frustrated Sielaff’s 
reform agenda, in part by leaving his agency with inadequate funding and political support to 
extend community corrections programs and replace institutions like SCI Pittsburgh. Sielaff 
soon found greener pastures. On May 17, 1973, he announced that he was resigning to take a 
position as head of the Illinois’s cabinet-level Department of Corrections, which controlled both 
                                                          
732 Allyn R. Sielaff to The Honorable Ernest Kline, December 6, 1971. MG-309 Milton J. Shapp Papers, General File, 
1971-1979, box 24, folder 18. PSA. 
733 Allyn R. Sielaff to Honorable Milton J. Shapp, March 7, 1973. MG-309 Milton J. Shapp Papers, General File, 1971-
1979, box 24, folder 18. PSA. 
734 Norval Reece to the Governor and Dick Doran, March 15, 1973. MG-309 Milton J. Shapp Papers, General File, 




adult and juvenile penal institutions as well as the probation and parole service.735 Sielaff 
claimed that his decision was entirely to improve his career, but to many people in 
Pennsylvania, the message was that their state’s penal bureaucracy was so poorly structured 
and mired in legislative bickering that they could not compete with others for talented public 
administrators, like Sielaff. 
 Soon after, Shapp appointed Sielaff’s deputy, Stewart Werner, as the next 
Commissioner of Correction.736 Like Sielaff, Werner advocated offender reintegration through 
community corrections programs and the normalization of prison regimes, but public attention 
shifted during 1973 to a greater focus on prison and jail security. Several high profile murders of 
correctional staff and increasing reports of escapes and prison disturbances largely supplanted 
the discussion of many other areas of prison reform and the benefits of existing programs. 
Tightening institutional security and finding ways to control the dangerous became highly 
public, top priorities.  
The first set of murders of prison staff occurred at Philadelphia’s Holmesburg Prison 
where two prisoners stabbed the warden and deputy warden to death after a dispute over 
meeting space for Muslims.737 The two assailants, Joseph Bowen and Frederick Burton, were 
said to have smuggled shanks into a meeting with Deputy Warden Fromhold738 over space for 
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Muslim religious services and assassinated him after their meeting turned into an argument. 
The pair then stabbed Warden Curran and Capt. Leroy Taylor when they tried to come to 
Fromhold’s aid. Only Taylor survived. 
While the murders occurred in a county prison, their effects did not respect 
jurisdictional boundaries. Curran and Fromhold’s deaths made national news and overwhelmed 
prison reform narratives in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania. Philadelphia’s prison had been 
reeling from criticism, investigation, and violence for several years, but the murders of such 
senior officials called into question many of the reforms that had been implemented since the 
Independence Day riot. The deaths highlighted the vulnerabilities of all prison staff and the lack 
of institutional control that appeared to characterize not only Philadelphia County’s prisons, but 
many institutions across the country.  
The descriptions of the two men responsible for the deaths could not be easily 
accommodated with the reform discourse attending the new reintegration programs and 
policies at either the county and state level. Bowen and Burton were both awaiting trial for 
separately killing police officers and each stridently espoused Black Nationalism and Sunni 
Islam.739 Bowen, the older of the two, had a long violent criminal and prison record and Burton 
had been a member of the Black Unity Council, a short-lived splinter group of Philadelphia’s 
Black Panther Party, which fatally ambushed several police officers in 1970.740 Yet, in most 
public accounts, their social and political views remained superficial at best and neither man 
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commanded much vocal support in the wider community. In media descriptions of the men, 
their recourse to violence framed their beliefs rather than the other way around; neither man 
seemed reformable nor indeed willing to accept lawful authority. Prison staff at Holmesburg 
immediately transferred Bowen and Burton to state custody where they were placed in control 
units at SCI Graterford (Bowen) and SCI Pittsburgh (Burton).  
On September 16, 1973, another correctional staff member was killed, this time in the 
state system at SCI Graterford. Stephen P. Ary Sr., a 28-year old food service worker, was 
stabbed to death allegedly by Albert Andrew Ford, who was serving life for a 1971 double 
murder.741 This was first time a correctional employee had actually been killed at Graterford.742 
Graterford’s administration immediately placed the entire facility on total lockdown. During an 
emergency meeting of the guards’ union, American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) Local 4297, members voted to maintain the lockdown until the Bureau 
acquiesced to 20 demands for security improvements, increased staffing and the resignation of 
the Graterford’s superintendent, Robert Johnson, who was widely considered to be a liberal 
reformer.743 A union spokesman told reporters that guards were told that if the prison’s 
leadership ordered them to open a cell, "they were to hand the ' keys over and go home."744 
When a guard was suspended for doing just this on September 21st, between over 75 percent 
of the institution’s guards as well as clerical and maintenance workers walked off the job, 
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leaving Graterford manned by senior officers and small detachment of state police.745 The 
guards demanded that the Bureau hire more guards and reassign existing staff at the prison to 
purely custodial duties.  
Ary’s death occurred amid controversy over the abrupt liberalization of many routines 
and norms at Graterford.746 Although, the impetus for such moves came from the central office 
in Harrisburg, Supt. Johnson, much Like Supt. Brierley at SCI Pittsburgh, shouldered much of the 
guards’ resentment for the changes. After, Ary’s death, the guards’ animosity toward Johnson 
soared. Among their demands were many items clearly aimed at reversing some of the liberal 
reforms Johnson instituted, like permitting prisoners to wear civilian clothing instead of 
uniforms.747 Albert Ford, the man charged with stabbing Ary forty times, was confined in 
solitary where he would remain for years, either at Graterford or SCI Dallas, where he was later 
transferred.748 Ford claimed in subsequent litigation that Graterford’s guards ruthlessly beat 
him in segregation before he was finally moved to Dallas.749 
Finally, on December 10, 1973, four white inmates in the restricted housing unit at SCI 
Pittsburgh fatally beat and stabbed Lt. Walter L. Peterson, who was African American, in what 
was described by other staff as a clearly racially motivated assault. One of the assailants, 
Stanley Hoss, already had a notorious reputation inside and outside prison as an extremely 
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violent person, having been convicted of raping a woman, killing a police officer, and 
kidnapping and killing a woman and her two-year old daughter during a prison escape - facts 
that media reports of Peterson’s killing reiterated.750 Even though Hoss and his accomplices 
were segregated in the prison’s Behavioral Adjustment Unit, the design of the unit was 
vulnerable to manipulation. The prisoners clearly planned their attack. After luring Peterson 
into the unit, they tied the door handles together with sheets preventing staff from accessing 
the unit.751 All the guards could do was watch their colleague being murdered from behind a 
caged observation point near the entrance. 
Following Peterson’s death, AFSCME Local 2500, which represented guards at SCI 
Pittsburgh, sent Commissioner Stewart Werner and the prison’s new superintendent, Gilbert 
Walters, a list if twelve demands and threatened to strike if they were not met.752 Like the 
demands presented by Graterford’s staff, these involved greater security procedures and calls 
for the hiring of more staff. The guards at Pittsburgh also wanted to reopen “the Dungeon,” an 
ancient subterranean isolation unit below the Behavioral Adjustment Unit that Gov. Milton 
Shapp and former commissioner Allyn Sielaff had recently shuttered.753 Werner averted the 
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guards’ walkout by conceding to all of the demands. Gov. Shapp, who attended Peterson’s 
funeral on December 14th, personally approved the limited reopening of the Dungeon.754 
Shapp’s and Werner’s decisions significantly tightened security at the institution, something 
which the guards and Allegheny County’s district attorney, Robert Duggan, had been calling for 
since Brierley was appointed superintendent in 1968.755 Following Peterson’s murder, Duggan 
also implored leaders in the General Assembly to reinstate the death penalty to deter prisoners 
who had little left to lose in attacking prison staff.756 Asaline Peterson, the slain guard’s wife, 
told the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that her husband had, in fact, been quite upset by a the recent 
Supreme Court decision halting capital punishment, fearing that some prisoners would become 
more violent and confrontational without the deterrent of the death penalty.757 
The murders of these four correctional workers condensed many of narratives about the 
deteriorating conditions behind bars and for some people (especially guards) provided a 
compelling argument about the dangers of liberalizing prison regimes. One cannot overstate 
the combined effects of prison violence, inmate radicalization, racial polarization and the 
growing presence of gangs on the drift of penal change in the state over the ensuing weeks, 
months and years. These issues were not always or necessarily related even if they often 
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intersected, but the staff killings wove these trends together and did so in very personal 
narratives of the slain staff invoking duty, honor, family and sacrifice, which resonated with a 
much wider audience than policy and expert discourse. After the murders, security and 
custodial concerns began displacing reintegration and normalizations in many public penal 
accounts. Custody took greater precedence over programming, education and work inside the 
state’s secure institutions, and the authorities intensified the security classification process for 
participants in minimum security institutions and community corrections programs. 
Central to moment was the push to expand the use of isolation and develop new control 
units by the state’s guard force and their union. Prison authorities have historically oscillated 
between two primary philosophies – dispersal and concentration – to control a relatively small 
subset of prisoners they consider dangerous or difficult to manage with routine practices. As 
the terms suggest, the difference between the two involves the decision whether to distribute 
and integrate the target group within the broader, secure prison population or isolate them in 
dedicated facilities or units for prolonged periods. The two philosophies were often hard to 
distinguish in practice and to some degree have been used in tandem. Nevertheless, these two 
control strategies informed many of the policies and dispositions of competing sections within 
the Bureau of Correction and state government. 
The crucial difference between these strategies rested on an assumption about whether 
or not the subjects of control could be socialized into the routines of the mainline population of 
a maximum security institution. Advocates of dispersal believed that most conflicts in prison 
arose more from the specific nature of interpersonal relationships a prisoner had with staff and 




difficult prisoner would often become more compliant. Proponents of concentration disagreed, 
arguing that an increasing number of people in Pennsylvania’s prisons were rebellious and 
simply refused to respond to normal prisoner management practices. According to this view, 
such people were intrinsically disruptive or dangerous, and posed a threat to staff, other 
inmates and institutional order. They could only be controlled with the use of high security 
control units, which not only segregated difficult people for various periods of time, but also 
provided a potent deterrent in the economy of institutional penalties.  
The majority of the state’s guard force favored the implementation of concentration 
policies, and many also wanted the reinstatement of capital punishment. Most guards resented 
the loosening of prison rules under Sielaff and Werner, especially those that curtailed the use 
and duration of isolation. Their views gained increasing salience in official policies and public 
discourse during 1973, following the killings of the prison staff members. The way the press 
portrayed the assailants in these killings displaced other representations of the offender and 
inmate. This morally oriented narratives and their audiences toward the authoritarian methods 
favored by guards.758 The prisoners in these representations became increasingly monstrous 
and distant to images of law-abiding citizens, and the methods deployed against them 
emphasized greater bodily control and restrictions on their movements inside prisons.759 
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Communication theorist John Sloop has similarly described the effects of the interrelationship 
between representations of prisoners and penal practices during this period, noting that, “Just 
as the altruistic and redeemable inmate allows for the justification of rehabilitation and 
treatment programs, the representation of the prisoner as irrational and irredeemable is much 
more likely to justify a more control-centered incarceration, a philosophy of the old 
penology.”760 The problems of security and violence were certainly real, and the 
representations of Bowen, Burton, Ford, Hoss and his associates were not necessarily 
inaccurate - many of their peers in prison in fact feared and reviled them as well.761 My point is 
that these men and their actions dominated many accounts of the problems besetting state 
and county prisons penal policy for years, and they were not easily reconcilable with the image 
of a redeemable prisoner and the kinds of reintegration programs that the Bureau’s leadership 
promoted.  
Less than a week after Walter Peterson’s funeral, Gov. Shapp and other senior 
administration officials met with dozens of representatives from the state’s guard force who 
lobbied for the creation of a separate institution for prisoners they considered too violent to be 
housed in any of the exiting prisons.762 The guards’ position was hardly new, but the highly 
public deaths of correctional staff endowed it with additional political salience. Shapp, who 
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made reforming the state’s prisons a major priority early in his tenure, acquiesced to the 
guards’ demands and proposed converting one of the state’s existing institutions to hold 
“chronic troublemakers” and “incorrigibles.”763 He described the proposed facility as an 
“intensive care unit,” but refused to name a location for it.764 It soon became clear, however, 
that the intended cite was located in the rural, far northeastern corner of the state at Farview 
State Hospital, the state’s only maximum-security forensic facility.765 The “maxi-max” unit was 
to be located in a converted wing of the existing hospital controlled by the Bureau of Correction 
and renamed “Waymart.” 
Civil liberties groups and prisoner advocates implored Shapp not to overreact to the 
news of Peterson’s death. A delegation of representatives from the National Lawyers Guild, 
Justice Commission of the Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, National Emergency Civil Liberty 
Committee, ACLU, Social Relations Department of the Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh, 
University of Social Realities, Friends Peace Center, NAACP, Association of Pittsburgh Priests 
and the Thomas Merton Center met with the governor on December 21st to try to persuade him 
against supporting the creation of a new control facility. For the time being, however, the 
guards held sway with the governor and his staff.  Msgr. Charles Owen Rice, who attended the 
meeting, told reporters afterward that he worried about how the Bureau and its staff would 
use the new facility: “Who is to determine who is an incorrigible?”766 Civil rights activist William 
“Bouie” Haden added that he felt “political incorrigibles” would be sent to the special prison.767 
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Aside from the contention over the establishing such a facility, the choice of Farview 
itself was controversial. The hospital was notorious.768 Not only did Farview carry the stigma of 
criminally insanity, its location in a remote region of the state meant that being committed to 
the hospital was tantamount to social and geographic banishment. Patients committed to 
Farview often spent decades there. Staff tended to see nearly all patient behaviors as evidence 
of dangerousness when making decisions to release people.769 This changed during the early 
1970s after a series of lawsuits, legislative hearings and investigations by researchers agreed 
that many people were being unnecessarily held at the hospital.770 Afterward, Farview’s 
population dropped drastically like other state hospitals,771 but unlike these latter institutions, 
its physical plant and custodians were well-equipped to handle people in high security 
situations. Gov. Shapp’s plan called for reusing this excess capacity for the new control facility. 
As administration developed this plan, the Bureau tightened security at the state’s existing 
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prisons with SCI Pittsburgh remaining on total lockdown for over a week after Peterson’s 
death.772 Shapp pledged that the new security unit would be operational by mid-1974.  
However, resistance to plan from a collation of prison activists, penal reformers and civil 
libertarians stiffened throughout 1974. In addition to the loose coalition from Pittsburgh that 
had already met with the governor, larger coalitions of social justice and prisoner activist 
groups coalesced in Philadelphia to oppose Shapp’s Waymart plan. The first, called the 
Prisoners’ Defense Coalition, was composed of radical activist organizations and unaffiliated 
individuals many of whom were African American and had either spent time in prison 
themselves or had friends and family members who did. The Prisoners’ Defense Coalition 
focused heavily on Waymart and similar issues in the federal Bureau of Prisons, but they also 
saw themselves as concerned with a range of other topics. Part of the motivation for forming 
the group was to bring the many smaller, disparate activist groups working on criminal justice, 
social welfare and racial justice in the Philadelphia area together to share experiences and 
resources and to present a united front to the state. Most constituent member organizations 
advocated a fundamental restructuring of the prison system and society in general. They saw 
the Waymart plan as another effort to crush one front of the broad civil rights movement, one 
of many techniques deployed by the “U.S. government in its effort to repress our struggle.”773 
By August 1974, another coalition opposed to the Waymart plan formed in the 
Philadelphia area under the named the Coalition to Reduce the Causes of Prison Violence.774 In 
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many ways, it was an outgrowth of the organizing efforts of the Prisoners’ Defense Coalition. 
Many of the members of the latter group were also part of the new one.775 However, the new 
coalition included a number of more established organizations with professional, white, middle 
class membership and leadership. This group’s racial and social standing granted it a greater 
degree of access to the Shapp administration, to lobby against the use of Waymart.776 Margery 
Velimesis, from the Pennsylvania Program for Women and Girl Offenders, took the lead role 
organizing the coalition, which included the Prisoners’ Rights Council, Community Assistance for 
Prisoners, Pennsylvania Prison Society, Philadelphia Commission for Effective Justice, 
Chancellor’s Office of the Philadelphia Bar Association, ACLU, American Foundation Institute of 
Corrections and Philadelphia chapter of the National Alliance Against Racist and Political 
Repression.777 As their name suggested, the group acknowledged the existence of serious 
institutional violence, but desired alternative strategies to address it. Its message and 
organizational goals were narrower than some of the more radical and far-reaching views 
expressed in the Prisoners’ Defense Coalition in this respect. 
From the outset, both coalitions solicited the views of currently serving prisoners on the 
issue of the proposed control unit and prison violence in general. With the help of the 
prisoners’ law clinic at SCI Graterford and the consent of the Bureau of Correction and 
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Graterford’s superintendent, Ronald Marks, they arranged a meeting with a group of about 
fifteen prisoners, all of whom had earlier signed a petition protesting the proposed new facility 
along with nearly 200 other Graterford residents. The Bureau’s description of the people it 
intended to hold in the new unit – incorrigible prisoners, unreachable through any routine 
penological methods – left many of these men and the activists concerned about the unit’s 
potential uses and skeptical about the Bureau’s reassurances about the humane regime it 
intended to install at the Waymart maxi-max unit.  
The prisoners and their activist allies believed that a range of control techniques used in 
similar units in other states, especially those described as forms of behavior modification, like 
“Edison medicine” (electroshock therapy), psychosurgery, token economies, psychotropic and 
emetic drugs and aversion therapy, would eventually be employed at Waymart.778 Since the 
later 1960s, increasingly critical portrayals of these techniques appeared in mainstream 
media.779 Some widely-popular, scathing accounts of contemporary prisons, like Jessica 
Mitford’s Kind & Usual Punishment, devoted considerable attention to behavior modification.  
Within prisons, the fear of such “Clockwork Orange” techniques was profound.780 Knowledge 
and stories of behavior modification techniques circulated among prisoners across the county 
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and many of Graterford men would have had either direct experience with some of them or 
knew of prisoners who had. While these techniques, which were quite varied and not always 
compatible, had appeared in prison in numerous jurisdictions, the most well-known and 
notorious applications were in the federal Bureau of Prisons, especially the Special Treatment 
and Rehabilitative Training (START) program located at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners 
in Springfield, Missouri and the planned expansion of a similar program at FCI Butner in North 
Carolina.  
Federal prison authorities were often vague in their statements about the behavior 
modification programs on these facilities, but what they said resembled many of the 
statements of officials in the Shapp administration. Like the planned Waymart facility, federal 
officials claimed these programs targeted a relatively small population of persistent, violent 
troublemakers who refused to conform to institutional rules. The interventions were 
ambiguously described as state-of-the-art treatment designed to compel prisoners to adjust to 
institutional settings. However, they were not intended to reform people or prepare them for 
their ultimate release and reintegration into society. The goal of these various techniques was 
to break down or restructure a person’s personality so that they obeyed institutional rules. 
There were well-founded reasons for concern about such practices. Not only were they being 
used by the most influential prison system in the country (U.S. Bureau of Prisons), but there 
was already evidence that state and county prison authorities in Pennsylvania over-medicated 
prisoners for the purposes of control. Moreover, Holmesburg Prisons operated the now well-




inmate test subjects.781 Additionally, Farview’s remoteness from the state’s major urban 
centers made it even more difficult for prisoner advocates to monitor the unit for the use of 
such practices. 
The conversion of Farview for the Bureau of Correction moved slowly, however. The 
hospital’s isolation also posed problems for the Bureau. The distance of the hospital from other 
state prisons created numerous logistical problems for transporting prisoners and finding 
adequate personnel, problems which had in fact plagued the hospital for decades.782 
Additionally, the Bureau of Correction required modifications to the physical plant in the wing it 
was going to inherent from the Department of Public Welfare. These practical problems, in 
addition to mounting political opposition from civil libertarians, penal reformers and some 
legislators, slowed down the opening of the unit.  
This, in turn, renewed criticism from the AFSCME leadership and union locals at many of 
the state’s prisons.783 Despite repeated statements by several different administration and 
Bureau officials that the facility would be ready in mid-1974, the project was continually 
delayed. In early 1975, AFSCME began accusing Shapp of caving in to prison reform groups and 
reneging on his promises for a separate control unit. As one AFSCME local director Vincent 
O’Brien described the situation, “Physically the wing has been converted for Waymart; 
politically it hasn’t been converted.”784 
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The exorbitant costs involved in creating the unit also provided critics with a platform to 
attack the proposal. The development of the new facility requiring $1.2 million in supplemental 
funding in the Bureau’s budget and would continue to absorb nearly $800,000 a year 
thereafter.785 Such an expenditure needed approval from the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
were intense budgetary disputes had become a regular occurrence during the 1970s.786 
However, budgetary concerns were only part of the problem for the administration’s plan in 
the legislature because it attracted the critical attention of the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, which held hearings on the matter in May 1975. The 
Waymart plan was especially controversial among many African American representatives, such 
as subcommittee chairman Charles Hammock and David Richardson, both of Philadelphia, and 
Joseph Rhodes of Pittsburgh.787 Each representative worried that the selection criteria for being 
sent to the isolation unit would disproportionately target African Americans and politically 
outspoken inmates. Richardson in particular felt the plan was “an indication of racial tactics…to 
move toward a concentration camp to hold prisoners, to try to get away from the real causes of 
crime.”788 
Pennsylvania Attorney-General Robert Kane, who oversaw the Bureau of Correction,789 
defended the Waymart proposal before the admitted Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, 
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but admitted that its location was far from ideal.790 Kane told the subcommittee that the unit 
was temporary, but immediately needed because of the upsurge in prison violence. He said 
that two new, permanent units would be established at Pittsburgh and Philadelphia by the end 
of the decade, and he repeated his reassurance that prisoners held at Waymart would “not 
receive psychosurgery, medical experimentation or treatment services through the behavior 
conditioning-token economy, aversive conditioning approach.”791 Such reassurances failed to 
mollify critics who argued that the administration had not sufficiently explored alternatives, 
adequately explained the new institution’s program, or indicated how prison authorities would 
identify people for transfer to Waymart. These issues further stalled the project, and the 
General Assembly stripped the additional funding for Waymart out of Gov. Shapp’s proposed 
budget the following month.792 
As the effort to establish Waymart encountered stiffer resistance, guards became 
increasingly militant over the issue of administrative segregation and the use of the existing 
Behavioral Adjustment Units in the state’s prison system. Walter Peterson’s death dramatically 
highlighted the conflicts between prisoners, guards, superintendents and the Bureau’s central 
office over the nature of confinement in the Behavioral Adjustment Units and these units now 
became the front line in a conflict over whose views of order, security, and the rights of both 
prisoners and employees would prevail. Any proposed changes in these units and how they 
were to be used risked confrontations. For example, the planned closing of the Behavioral 
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Adjustment Unit at SCI Pittsburgh in May 1975 led to a several-day long walkout by the 
institution’s guard force at the end of the month.793 SCI Pittsburgh superintendent, James 
Howard informed reporters once the strike commenced that some of the concessions the 
Bureau agreed to after Walter Peterson’s murder were in violation of state-mandated 
standards for segregation units.794 The closing of the unit had been discussed with the guards 
and their union for some time and there were plans for shifting some inmates to the Behavioral 
Adjustment Unit at SCI Huntington. The rest of the residents were placed in SCI Pittsburgh A-
Block, which was not as secure at any of the state’s control units. 
Werner and Howard claimed they were puzzled by the guards’ actions since they had 
been notified about the closure well ahead of time, but it was apparent that the guards’ 
prisoner management prerogatives, their sense of security and their claims to control over the 
prison were jeopardized.795 The Bureau’s plans threatened to destroy the union’s workplace 
gains from 1973, and coupled with the long delay on the Waymart plan, placed the guards in a 
defensive position where they believed they had to resist the administration’s decision to close 
the Behavioral Adjustment Unit even if they had actually been consulted in advance. For many 
officers, the closing disrespected their colleague’s death, but also devalued their own lives as 
people who had to work in dangerous situations. President Judge James Bowman of the 
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Commonwealth Court issued an injunction against the officers and ordered them back to work, 
but he also forced the administration to reopen the Behavioral Adjustment Unit or enhance the 
security of the A-Block.796 The guards defied the court, but returned to work within a few days 
after the administration agreed to greater security measures. The guards’ ability to counter this 
plan and some of the other liberalizing changes ushered in by Sielaff and Werner was certainly 
enhanced by the passage of the Public Employee Relations Act in 1970, which permitted state 
employee to unionize.  
Despite their increased clout, however, the guards were not able to force the opening of 
the Waymart unit. The General Assembly refused to allocate operational funds for it, but two 
more pressing issues emerged that brought the plan to a halt. First, Commissioner Stewart 
Werner increasingly lost favor with senior administration officials, including the governor. Lt. 
Gov. Ernest Kline terminated him on July 23, 1975, citing mismanagement and conflicts over 
penal philosophy.797 Kline stated that Werner’s ambitious reintegration programs were costly, 
poorly evaluated and simply failed to produce the desired results.798 The various forms of 
community corrections and early release also created a considerable amount of friction with 
law enforcement and the judiciary and negative publicity, which expended much of the 
administration’s political capital when it came to pursuing greater criminal justice reform. For 
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Shapp, who lacked strong support from his own party, this was a steep price to pay. The 
proposed elevation of the Bureau of Correction to cabinet-level department was indefinitely 
stalled in the legislature.  
Gov. Shapp replaced Werner with William B. Robinson, the warden of the Allegheny 
County Jail in Pittsburgh.799 Unlike Werner and Sielaff before him, Robinson was considered 
conservative in penology circles and had direct custodial experience. Starting his career as a 
guard in 1954, he ascended the ranks in the Allegheny County prison system, serving as deputy 
superintendent of the Allegheny County Workhouse in Blawnox to eventually become warden 
of the county jail in 1967, a position he held for eight years. Many observers viewed Robinson’s 
appointment as an effort by Shapp to clamp down on expenditures and security as well as 
temper the pace and public image of some of the community corrections programs. Robinson 
favored these latter programs, which he had also developed in Allegheny County, but he was 
much more security-conscious and emphasized stringent program evaluation and screening 
practices.800 These latter concerns also made him leery of how Werner had been developing the 
selection criteria for transferring people to the Waymart unit. He vowed to halt the project until 
it was further evaluated, a position which both Lt. Gov. Kline and Gov. Shapp supported.   
The second roadblock for Waymart was ultimately more damaging to the state. In late 
1974, rumors about suspicious deaths at Fairview began reaching senior officials in the Shapp 
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administration.801 Wayne County Coroner Robert Jennings asked the Department of Public 
Welfare and the Department of Justice to investigate a series of patients deaths that he 
believed were caused by guard brutality and later covered up.802 Although the administration 
initially tried to dismiss the claims as unfounded, Coroner Jennings persisted and eventually the 
issue became a major scandal lasting for the rest of the decade.803 Over twenty deaths 
appeared to be caused by neglect or abuse. Although sufficient evidence for prosecution was 
lacking in most cases, the state eventually brought murder charges in several cases.804 As the 
scandal grew over the course of 1975, Gov. Shapp asked the Bureau of Correction to consider 
alternatives to the Waymart maxi-max unit.   
While the administration eventually abandoned the Waymart project, the controversy 
over control units continued, although in often less public ways. Guards remained sensitive to 
changes in segregation policies and desired greater flexibility in placing prisoners in isolation. 
They also wanted to eliminate restrictions on how long prisoners could be isolated. Many of the 
prisoners who ended up in these units during the 1970s were political activists, Muslims or 
associated with prison or street gangs. As such, many of them had experience with organized 
forms of prisoner resistance and petitioning courts for redress of their grievances, skills they 
proceeded to use against the state’s segregation practices.  
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Three federal district courts (Eastern, Middle and Western Pennsylvania), the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals and to a lesser extent, Pennsylvania’s state courts heard challenges to 
the Bureau of Correction’s segregation polices and the constitutionality of the conditions in the 
state’s many Behavioral Adjustment Units. Prisoners litigated over the justification, procedures 
and legal protections involved in isolating a prisoner.805 Since the Bureau held many prisoners 
indefinitely in such units, at times seemingly outside the regulations spelled out in the Bureau’s 
written policy on segregation, prisoners often tried to force the authorities to clarify their 
release criteria and how they evaluated an isolated prisoner’s status and continued placement 
in the hole.806 Frederick Burton, one of the assailants in the slaying of the Holmesburg warden 
and deputy warden, pursued a long-running case on the issue of release criteria against the 
Bureau and the administration of SCI Pittsburgh, where he was isolated in the Behavioral 
Adjustment Unit.807 The Western District court eventually ordered the Bureau to formulate 
more precise release procedures, but did not believe Burton’s contention that the years he 
spent in isolation constituted cruel and unusual punishment according to the Eight 
Amendment.808  
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Much of the litigation prisoners brought against the Bureau also involved the actual 
conditions inside the isolation units. In such cases, whether or not prison officials had acted 
legally in segregating someone, the nature of the units themselves and their amenities (or lack 
thereof) formed the point of contention. The three federal district courts received numerous 
petitions over prison conditions in general during the 1970s, many which contained extensive 
complaints about the conditions in segregation units and the treatment people received in 
them. Eventually U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania consolidated many 
of these cases with a sweeping complaint filed by the Imprisoned Citizens Union in November 
1970, which covered nearly every aspect of daily life in the state’s maximum-security prisons 
and devoted considerable attention to segregation practices.809  
Several jail-house lawyers and other prisoner activists, many of whom had spent time in 
segregation units, formed the Imprisoned Citizens Union as a way to collectively and 
comprehensively sue the Bureau of Correction in a class action over conditions across the entire 
prison system.810 The organization’s driving force was Richard O.J. Mayberry, a renowned jail-
house lawyer who had filed and won numerous complaints in federal courts since the early-
1960s and edited a newspaper called the Prisoners Free News.811 Subsequent complaints were 
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so similar that Judge Joseph Lord III combined them into the large class action suit, Imprisoned 
Citizens Union vs. Shapp. Parties to the case reached an agreement on many of the issues raised 
in the lawsuit, which provided the basis for a far-reaching consent decree that required the 
Bureau of Correction to develop and promulgate a comprehensive set of procedures governing 
inactions between prison officials and inmates.812 In many ways, the consent decree was an 
attempt by prisoners to force the Bureau to live up to its pledge for a prisoners’ Bill of Rights 
based on the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which it 
adopted in 1970.813 However, instead of broad principles, the consent decree explicitly required 
the Bureau to develop clear policies that were available to prisoners and provided avenues for 
the redress of grievances. The consent decree also established the U.S. District Court for 
Eastern Pennsylvania as the dedicated forum managing the agreement and the court soon 
heard accusations from prisoners that the Bureau had failed to fulfill its obligations.814   
Despite the consent decree, a few areas remained unsettled. The most prominent was 
the constitutionality of the Behavioral Adjustment Units at SCI Graterford, SCI Dallas, SCI 
Huntington and SCI Muncy, the state’s only prison for women.815 In 1974 and 1975, Judge 
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Joseph Lord III toured each of the prisons, inspecting the conditions in the control units, which 
he found acceptable, if “grim and cheerless,” in Graterford, Dallas and Muncy.816 However, he 
ordered the Bureau to immediately close a range of three isolation cells at Huntington known 
to inmates as the “Glass Cage.”817 These cells were separate from fourteen nearby disciplinary 
segregation cells by a heavy steel door and surrounding glass walls. The court found the degree 
of isolation, poor lighting and ventilation, repugnant odor and lack of bedding in the Glass Cage 
offensive and unacceptable. Within a few months, Judge Lord III reversed this order after the 





The commonly told narrative of the decline of the rehabilitation foregrounds the 
disillusionment of prison officials, researchers and the larger public with correctional experts 
and their ability to reform offenders. While this is certainly true, it tells only part of the story in 
places like Pennsylvania. From the violence at Holmesburg Prison to the protests over the 
creation of a control unit at Farview, the tensions running through Pennsylvania’s prisons 
revealed a shift in the racialization of punishment in the late 1960s onward. The postwar 
rehabilitation project, whatever its limitations and abuses, fundamentally envisioned white, 
heterosexual subjects as its preferred targets of reform. However, over the course of the 1960s, 
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and certainly by the 1970s, the subject of penal discourse and intervention gradually became 
blacker. As it did, the assumption that the subject of prison discipline and reform was still 
reclaimable eroded, which paralleled doubts in other parts of American society about the 
effectiveness and desirability of racial assimilation policies. For many white audiences 
(especially of penological professionals), rehabilitation appeared less plausible and less 
convincing as an account of what prisons could, and should do, with the people sent to them 
once the image of the offender became blacker and less willing to accept a subordinate status 
while confined. Even community corrections seemed less likely to succeed when the 
communities in questions were poor, largely black, inner-city neighborhoods in Philadelphia 
and Pittsburgh.   
 African Americans had always been imprisoned at disproportionate rates, but until the 
mid-to-late twentieth century they were still not the largest racial group within most prisons in 
the northern and western United States. Prison regimes, run by white administrators and 
guards, simply presumed that the typical offender in their custody would be white. As this 
changed, racial animosities and misunderstandings invested the already authoritarian 
relationship between keepers and the kept. During the racially contentious atmosphere of the 
1960s and 1970s, this made nearly every interaction between white officers and black 
prisoners, or between white and black prisoners, potentially volatile. For many members of the 
Pennsylvania’s predominantly white guard force, this undermined their ability to communicate 
with prisoners and maintain order. For many black prisoners, this led to a litany of racial slights, 
abuses, neglect and discrimination on a daily basis. However, it also provided the raw materials 




civil rights activism. For many black prisoners, imprisonment was not the result of 
individualized, psycho-social problems and criminal conduct as the discourse of rehabilitation 
conceptualized it. Rather, it constituted the latest evidence of continual racial discrimination 
that destroyed black communities and predominantly targeted young, black men. They need 
only look around them to see their disproportionate presence behinds bars. 
 This penological manifestation of the country’s larger racial formation shaped the 
activism of prisoners like Sylvester Lockhart and the efforts of their supporters like Msgr. 
Charles Owen Rice. However, it also informed the positions of guards who demanded greater 
security and the elimination of programs benefitting prisoners. The tensions between these 
views mounted in the late 1960s, reaching their denouement in the mid-1970s, when guards 
succeeded in convincing the administration to either support their demands or halt further 
concessions to prisoners.  
While the history of rehabilitation’s decline, prisoner activism and prison officer 
unionism in Pennsylvania paralleled similar developments in New South Wales, race played far 
less of an explicit role in the events of the latter state. The civil rights movement in New South 
Wales, and Australia in general, was not as large or visible as its American counterpart, and the 
number of Aboriginal prisoners was far smaller than the number of black prisoners in 
Pennsylvania. The prisoner activists in New South Wales were almost entirely of European 
descent. Class-based critiques of prisons were more prominent among these activists. This was 
significant for how race shaped the changing penal imaginary in each place. While the re-
emergence of custodial priorities and the winnowing of rehabilitation programing in 




few years later, these developments increasingly constituted anti-black prison regimes in 
Pennsylvania, whether or not this framing was explicitly named. Much like Khalil Gibran 
Muhammad’s description of notions of early-twentieth century criminality in the urban north as 
the “condemnation of blackness,” the prisoner management tactics deployed in Pennsylvania 
during the mid-1970s also disproportionately targeted black prisoners and formed a 
counterpoint to the ideal white subject of rehabilitation.819 This is not to say that all the 
prisoners subjected to such tactics were black. As the case of Lt. Walter Peterson and Stanley 
Hoss indicated, violent white prisoners also murdered black officers and ended up in 
permanent isolation.820 The point is that the shift to stricter prisoner management routines and 
resistance to prisoners’ rights was always racially significant in the image of its presumed 
subjects. This means that tactics like isolation, which were presumably the same in both New 
South Wales and Pennsylvania, carried substantively different racial valences in both places. It 
also means that the decline of rehabilitation needs to be understood not just as a racialized 
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Chapter 3: “Prisons Belong to the Community”: Prisoner Activism, Inquires and Security and in 
New South Wales 
 
 
Prisons belong to the community. Subject to the needs of proper administration and security, 
they should at all times be open to scrutiny by the public, interested bodies and the media. The 
more prisons are open, the less the risk of abuses in the system being hidden. A fuller knowledge 
of the world of prisons and the workings of the Department is necessary to dispel public apathy 
and make possible open and healthy comment and criticism.  
 
The Department has complained of hindrance to its programmes of reform by conservative 
public opinion; but it has never attempted to inform the people of New South Wales of its 
problems or the state of the prisons. Indeed, it has actively impeded the public from gaining the 
knowledge it is entitled to have and has effectively shut off the prisons from view. It is surprising 
to find how many reputable and distinguished citizens have been banned from entry to prisons. 
They include the present Premier, Mr Wran, other members of Parliament including some who 
are now Ministers of Cabinet, barristers and solicitors, members of the public interested in 
prison reform and representatives of the media. This restrictive policy is incomprehensible. 
 
The appointment of this Commission resulted as much from public disquiet with the prison 
system in general as with any single or series of events. Apart from a few dedicated groups, the 
public generally has little knowledge of prisons, even less of prison policies. The apathy of the 
community has been frequently mentioned in this Report. The Department has done little to 
remedy this. In fact, the secrecy with which it has surrounded its activities can fairly be 
described as obsessive. 
 
Justice John F. Nagle, Report of the Royal 





Introduction: Bathurst, October 1970 
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Similar to Pennsylvania, events in the year 1970 proved to be a crucial turning point for penal 
politics in New South Wales over the next couple of decades. During October 19th and 20th, a 
short-lived uprising by youthful prisoners at Bathurst Gaol and the subsequent reprisal by 
guards set the stage for an ongoing campaign by prison reformers and activists to establish a 
royal commission investigation into the state’s entire prison system. Most accounts of this 
uprising began with about sixty young prisoners absconding from a mandatory muster, running 
into C Wing and smashing cell fixtures. The complaints of the prisoners and tension in Bathurst 
was longstanding. The Department of Corrective Services later made public a log of 
disturbances at the prison, which stretched back several years.822 In fact, Bathurst had earned a 
reputation for violence and rebellion many decades before.823 Yet, unlike many prison riot 
investigations, this “pre-history” was not of much interest to subsequent investigators or many 
other people interested in the events of October 19th and 20th. Narrators and interpreters of 
the events were less focused on determining the causes of the 1970 disturbances, but often 
saw them as the cause of later events.824 Nevertheless, most subsequent inquiries and accounts 
acknowledged that prisoners staged a peaceful sit-down strike in one of the recreation yards 
the previous Friday, the 18th, over Bathurst’s squalid living conditions and arbitrary, harsh 
discipline, both of which had earned the institution a notorious reputation among prisoners and 
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warders alike.825 Questions about what followed the uprising in the hours and years after the 
uprising mattered more to the subsequent shape of penal politics in New South Wales and, to 
some degree, the rest of the country. 
 Immediately after breaking away from the muster, several prisoners and guards 
exchanged blows before a standoff developed, with inmates barricading themselves inside C 
Wing. The young prisoners withdrew several hours later after receiving assurances that they 
would not face any reprisals. Bathurst’s superintendent, John Winter Pallot, permitted them to 
share cells that night, which many prisoners hoped would deter potential assaults by the 
staff.826 But, the retaliation came anyway. Superintendent Pallot delivered the first blow the 
following morning, striking an inmate in the face in front of assembled guards after taunting 
him about the events of the previous day.827 Guards then extracted people from the cells and 
forced them to strip naked while repeatedly kicking, punching and beating them with batons.828 
Some of the inmate’s injuries were severe. The beatings rendered a number of people 
unconscious and bleeding on the cellblock floors before guards dragged them back into their 
cells. Many prisoners later recounted the terror of waiting in their cells, listening to the screams 
and cries in the cellblock grow louder as the guards moved closer to them, cell by cell.829 
Maxwell Hanrahan, one of Bathurst guards, disagreed with his colleagues’ actions. He later told 
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investigators that as he observed the reprisal from a landing that another guard, Mr. Chandler, 
commented to him, “They will never keep this behind four walls,” a sentiment that Hanrahan 
shared.830  
Over the next few months, accounts of these events escaped the confines of Bathurst’s 
cellblocks as numerous victims took their stories to the Sydney press, civil rights groups and 
circles of friends and family after their release. This kind of violence against prisoners, in itself, 
was hardly new. Accounts of penal authorities inflicting violence against inmates had circulated 
in New South Wales since the era of the penal colony, and they usually found less than 
receptive audiences beyond prison walls. However, in 1970, this had begun to change. For 
much of the previous decade, but especially following 1966, a series of social movements 
blossomed in Sydney,831 which challenged numerous institutions, from schools to the military, 
to the family. In fact, it sought to fundamentally transform political and social life. A 
manifestation of wider activism and counterculture of the “global 1960s,” its specific form in 
Australia, pulled together numerous strands of anti-authoritarian and radical thought and 
practice. Drawn especially from anti-war resistance to Australia’s involvement in the American-
led Vietnam War, the civil rights and Black Power movements fighting racial discrimination 
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against Aboriginal Australians, and women’s liberation and feminism.832 The anti-war 
movement, in particular, drew critical attention to the established institutions of government. 
As historian Donald Horne commented: 
 
Vietnam was seen as a transcendent issue, sweeping all issues up into the one 
concept of ‘the radical’, so that those who were enraged by the slaughter in 
Vietnam would become enraged by so many other issues that they might lift 




Many of the often young people involved in these movements were not only more receptive to 
the types of protests coming from prisoners, but some of them had also been imprisoned 
themselves for short periods of time for their political activism.834 This experience of 
imprisonment, however limited, helped forge a link between prisons and the larger radical 
social movements of the time.835  
While resembling prison activism in other parts of the world, the movement in New 
South Wales was deeply moored to the specific struggles in the state’s prisons and the local 
conditions shaping public discourse, policies and possibilities. The publicity of the American 
prisoners’ rights movement, especially some of its more charismatic organic intellectuals like 
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George Jackson, exerted a lot of influence on the discourse of prisoners’ rights in Australia and 
elsewhere, but it did not resonate as broadly throughout Australian society in the same way as 
it did in the U.S. As political scientist Marie Gottschalk has argued, the prisoners’ rights 
movement in the U.S. was in many ways an outgrowth of the civil rights movements, which had 
dominated national politics throughout the 1960s and much of the postwar period.836 The 
social and political ferment in Australia, while substantial, was more recent and not as directly 
connected to the plight of prisoners as it was in the U.S.  
In addition, there were certain political and institutional features, which both 
constrained and channeled the emerging penal politics in New South Wales that produced a 
markedly different prisoners’ rights movement. Perhaps key among these was the high degree 
of authoritarian, executive control over the prisons and the lack of counterbalancing 
institutional forces which prisoners and their allies outside could draw on. The presence of 
independent federal courts, habeas corpus and formal constitutional protections in the U.S. 
played a major role in prying open prisons and exposing abuses. As the dispute in Philadelphia 
over the riot investigation indicated, the dispersed or fragmented nature of penal governance 
often led to highly public, politicized conflicts over prison management and order. In contrast, 
the sitting government in New South Wales, and more specifically, penal bureaucracy, tightly 
controlled prisons and determined the level of access the public had to those inside. As the 
epigraph at the beginning of this chapter reveals, the Department of Corrective Services could 
even ban numerous members of government from the institutions. The Department firmly 
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controlled prisoners with little or no oversight. A visiting justice, who usually held court in the 
superintendent’s office, adjudicated all prisoner infractions as well as the latter’s complaints of 
abuse. Until the mid-1970s, prisoners had no right of appeal to an outside court.837 Arguably, 
this lack of any forum for the redress of prisoner grievances, meant that tensions with the 
prisons during a time of widespread social upheaval and anti-authoritarianism quickly escalated 
into conflict.   
Unlike the intense news coverage of the July 4th riot in Philadelphia and the competition 
over who would lead the inevitable inquiry, the violence at Bathurst did not lead to an 
immediate investigation. Nor did the mistreatment spark much publicity at the time. The major 
Sydney and national dailies initially devoted little attention to the event, uncritically accepting 
the explanations and reassurances of John Maddison, the current Minister for Justice in the 
Liberal/Country Coalition government. An article in the Sydney Morning Herald, for instance, 
began by simply paraphrasing Maddison’s dismissive response to critics: “The administration of 
NSW prisons was neither harsh nor oppressive by world standards.”838 Maddison often 
repeated this refrain to the press in the ensuing months, denying wrongdoing while boasting of 
how the state’s modern penal practices compared to global standards.839 While a few questions 
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emerged in Parliament within days of the event, they were largely uncritical and mainly 
concerned with the security of prison and the potential for escape.840 
Despite the stifling control of the Department of Correctives Services and Maddison, the 
questions about what occurred at Bathurst in October 1970 did not abate. The narratives of the 
event emanating from the prisons continued to grow and thickened over the next year as 
statements and allegations by prisoners, several guards and psychologists employed by 
Corrective Services appeared in public forums. These included chronicles from the press and 
Parliament, as well as before more delimited audiences in guard union meetings and the 
cellblocks and yards of the state’s prisons. Years later, between 1976 and 1978, a royal 
commission established that the leadership of the Department of Corrective Services, and 
Commissioner Walter McGeechan in particular, purposely misled the public about the events at 
Bathurst, essentially covering up assaults on prisoners by the guards and senior staff, including 
Superintendent Pallot.841 While some staff members at Bathurst and other prisons remained 
adamant that they did not use violence on prisoners, many others acknowledged that it 
occurred. Some publicly stated it was justified: the only way to control recalcitrant prisoners 
and to deter others through terror.  
While numerous authors, including the Royal Commissioner, Justice John F. Nagle, have 
dealt with the cover-up extensively and the subsequent violence at Bathurst in 1973 and 1974, 
it is nevertheless, instructive to revisit how these issues came to light and especially how the 
subsequent Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons (often called the Nagle 
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Commission) altered the prison system and the discussion of punishment more broadly. Since 
the Royal Commission, the state’s prison system has been the subject of repeated inquiries and 
conflicts between unionized prison guards and the administration to the point that these 
regimes of investigation and disputes over their findings and recommendations became a 
regular part of the organization of incarceration. Commissions of inquiry, whether major, like 
the Nagle Commission or smaller, have a long history in New South Wales and Australia, in 
general. Prior to representative government, royal commissions and boards of inquiries were a 
common feature of the administration of the penal colony. Australian governments still use 
royal commissions to a far greater degree than in many other Commonwealth countries, 
including the United Kingdom. George Gillian claims that between 1970 and 2002 there have 
been 74 royal commissions in Australia.842 This figure does not account for the volume of lesser 
inquires. Between the late nineteenth century and 1970s, inquiries directed at prison 
authorities were far less frequent in New South Wales than they have become since Justice 
Nagle finished his work.  
If solely judged on the caliber of reform it initiated and the implementation of its 
recommendations, the Nagle Commission has a mixed record.843 Rather than viewing in this 
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way, I examine how the Royal Commission marked the beginning of a period of inquiry, 
publicity and rapid change for the prison system that to some degree continues to this day. As 
much as the inquiry discredited the prison system’s leaders, many staff and a host of practices, 
it also cleared the ground for the reconstitution of authority even if this latter process remained 
unresolved and controversial for years. I also try to read against many of the powerful guiding 
questions that the Royal Commission pursued in its work, highlighting how the inquiry 
produced and circulated knowledge about the internal order of the state’s prisons, as well as 
those in other parts of the world and created a framework for posing questions and pressing 
claims. But, it is to the aftermath of October 19th and October 20th, 1970 that I now turn. 
Prison Unrest and the Questions of a Royal Commission    
 
By the end of November 1970, a number of prisoners who had been at Bathurst in 
October were released and produced statutory declarations about the violence, which George 
Peterson, Member of Parliament for Illawarra, forwarded to Maddison. Peterson, who was 
well-known for his interest in prison reform, challenged Maddison to publicly investigate the 
prisoners’ claims.844 At about the same time, four psychologists employed by Corrective 
Services wrote a letter to Commissioner McGeechan, claiming to have heard from numerous 
prisoners about “atrocities” that took place at Bathurst in October.845 One of the psychologists, 
Len Evers, also passed this information onto George Peterson who, along with a few 
sympathetic colleagues, again pressed Maddison throughout the summer of 1970 and 1971 for 
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more information about the events at Bathurst. Maddison sidestepped such questions, derided 
Peterson’s reputation, and refused to grant him and other Labor MPs permission to speak with 
prisoners at Bathurst and other prisons.846 
Nevertheless, the pressure mounted for a greater reckoning of what occurred at 
Bathurst.847 In June 1971, a group of unnamed lawyers circulated an anonymous polemical 
pamphlet titled, Bathurst Batterings – October 1970: The Case for a Royal Commission into the 
Department of Corrective Services of New South Wales, to numerous public officials, the media 
and organizations.848 The 32-page pamphlet collected much of the existing allegations, quoted 
prisoners at length and argued that only a royal commission could adequately assess the truth 
of this event and evaluate the current administration of the state’s prisons. Within a week of 
the release of Bathurst Batterings, a guard and secretary of the Prison Officers’ Association 
branch at the Long Bay prison complex named John Ristau also called for a royal commission 
during a nationally televised interview, arguing that the Department’s position on the events at 
Bathurst was misleading.849 Ristau’s colleagues officially censured him within a week of his 
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statement and he would face further intimidation by the Department of Corrective Services 
over the ensuing years.850  
While publicly refusing to hold an inquiry, Maddison quietly asked Commissioner 
McGeechan for a fuller account of what occurred at Bathurst. McGeechan assigned E.A. Quin, 
one the department’s legal officers, the task of interviewing prisoners who had either made 
accusations of abuse or were named by others as victims. Much of what is known about this 
internal investigation became public five years later during the work of the Royal Commission. 
The latter inquiry described the Department’s investigation as perfunctory at best and more 
likely an attempt to bury a potential scandal under the guise of a seemingly official inquiry.851 
Quin and McGeechan both sought to discredit and intimidate prisoners during the interviews 
and encouraged dishonest responses from prison staff, including Bathurst’s superintendent, 
John W. Pallot.852 Despite Quin’s bias, he concluded that “a prima facie case exists against 
Prison Officers generally at Bathurst gaol…but no case against any specific Officer.”853 
McGeechan refused to pursue Quin’s acknowledgement that abuse occurred at Bathurst. 
Questions arose during the Royal Commission about whether McGeechan failed to inform 
Maddison about Quin’s findings or if Maddison was also complicit in concealing them from 
Parliament.854 
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Regardless of whether Maddison knew or not, he publically announced in July 1971 that 
he was satisfied by the internal inquiry’s findings that the allegations of abuse were baseless 
and the officers had used force appropriately to protect themselves and restore order at 
Bathurst.855 There was no need, he said, for a costly inquiry that opponents would just use to 
smear the government and Corrective Services. Nevertheless, Maddison attempted to defuse 
some of the opposition by announcing the appointment of the Corrective Services Advisory 
Committee, a body of criminal justice experts to assist the minister and Commissioner 
McGeechan.856 The Advisory Committee had little real power and Maddison and McGeechan 
largely ignored its advice and complaints.857 Maddison’s decisions did not entirely quell the calls 
for an inquiry, and it arguably worsened the frustration of prisoners and tension between them 
and prison staff in many of the state’s institutions.858  
Unlike past accounts of abuse by prison staff, the government struggled to silence its 
critics and assert its position as hegemonic.859 A key difference by the early 1970s was that 
prison issues now dovetailed with a host of other anti-authoritarian, anti-war and civil rights 
movements that made challenges to established authorities much more common, persistent 
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and effective.860 Much like other parts of the world at approximately the same time, prisoner 
rights activism and radical abolitionist movements blossomed in New South Wales as part of 
these countercultural and political movements. Prison activists in New South Wales frequently 
drew on language, symbols and strategies from similar movements in other states and 
countries as well as a broad Anglophone activist and academic literature. 
Bernie Matthews, a long-term prisoner who spent years in segregation, later remarked 
that he saw the effects of this new political disposition among many of the prisoners he served 
time with: 
 
As more and more conscientious objectors and Vietnam War protestors became 
imprisoned, they introduced a new mentality of 'stand up and be counted' that 
ran contrary to the old crims' philosophy of copping it sweet and doing their time 
as easily and quietly as possible. A new political awareness and social 
consciousness had been injected into the prison system.861  
 
 
Surely, some of the novelty of this political awareness among these activists reflected their 
more privileged social backgrounds. They stood out among most prisoners for this as much as 
their politics and would likely never have been imprisoned if it had not been for their civil 
disobedience. Their willingness to complain to other government authorities when they 
experienced life in the state’s prisons, as well as the receptiveness of some officials, differ from 
the view of state authorities held by many lower class and Indigenous prisoners.862 The 
masculine disposition of quiet endurance in the face of routine abuses in prison, or “copping it 
                                                          
860  
861 Bernie Matthews, Intractable: Hell Has a Name, Katingal: Life Inside Australia's First Super-Max Prison (Sydney: 
Pan Macmillan Australia Pty, Limited, 2006), 119.  





sweet” as Matthews and many other inmates refer to it, was less common among these 
younger, privileged prisoners.  
 The events at Bathurst in October 1970 and lingering questions surrounding them 
played a key constitutive role in catalyzing a broader mobilization around reforming, and even 
abolishing, the entire state prison system.863 A number of existing organizations developed 
significant campaigns around these issues and new ones formed specifically in response to the 
violence and cover-up. The New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties established a prison 
subcommittee to devote more attention to these issues and several of its members 
anonymously authored the influential Bathurst Batterings pamphlet.864 This subcommittee 
included several former prisoners, including Tony Green who spoke publicly about his 
experiences at Bathurst. Also in 1971, Green, the former Long Bay Gaol psychologist, Len Evers, 
and several others established a related organization, the Penal Reform Council. This 
organization worked closely with the Council for Civil Liberties over the next decade, but 
focused, as the name suggests, exclusively on prison matters.865  
By 1973, however, Tony Green and several other members of the Penal Reform Council 
grew increasingly uneasy with the organization’s reformist line, opting instead for more radical 
abolitionist critiques of imprisonment. Consequently, Green, Liz Fell, Wendy Bacon, and Matt 
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Peacock organized another organization, the Prisoners Action Group. While they acknowledged 
the importance of pragmatic reforms to improve prisoners’ lives, this organization saw its final 
goal as the abolition of prison as an institution altogether.866 The Women Behind Bars, which 
focused on the unique and often overlooked difficulties faced by female prisoners, also 
emerged from this split with the Penal Reform Council and included many of the same people 
who formed the Prisoners Action Group.867 Despite the considerable differences among these 
organizations in terms of their composition, social background, politics and strategies, they all 
publicly denounced the government’s management of the prisons and kept the issue alive in 
public debate through publications, media appearances, conferences and demonstrations. As 
the scholars-activists George Zdenkowski and David Brown argued, “The net result was an 
unprecedented escalation of information about prison. Attacks on the credibility of the critics 
became more difficult to sustain as the embryonic group became a small phalanx.868 
Over the next two and a half years, resistance to the state’s penal authorities was even 
more pronounced inside several prisons. By the autumn of 1973, strife had returned to 
Bathurst.869 After the peaceful resolution of a sit-in by approximately 150 Bathurst prisoners in 
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late October, Superintendent Pallot tightened discipline, further curtailed privileges and simply 
ignored the grievances raised in the sit-in.870 Despite promises to the contrary, the staff 
transferred several people involved in the sit-in to other prisons and placed several others in 
segregation.871 Throughout the spring and early summer, tensions between staff and prisoners 
worsened, but little was done by Pallot and McGeechan to alleviate the situation despite 
prescient warnings of pending trouble by senior custodial officers who were dispatched from 
headquarters to evaluate the situation.872 After another sit-in in January and what appeared to 
have been several weeks of preparation, prisoners openly rebelled on February 3rd and 4th, 
1974, destroying significant portions of the prison and setting it ablaze.873 Guards eventually 
subdued the rebels with firearms and tear gas, seriously wounding several people and forcing 
the rest of the participants into the segregated Back Special Yards. Many of these inmates later 
claimed that when the guards moved them to buses for transportation to other prisons, they 
forced them to run through a large gauntlet of baton-wielding officers who repeatedly beat 
them as they passed by. 
After the extensive publicity of the October 1970 disturbance and the accusations of 
misconduct by the authorities, the far more destructive events of early 1974 at the same 
institution drew outrage from a number of people and organizations. Renewed calls for a royal 
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commission gained additional weight within days as another disturbance erupted at Goulburn 
Gaol on February 10th.874 After harsh questioning in Parliament over the next few weeks, 
Maddison conceded that the government would establish a royal commission to investigate the 
riot and its causes, but stated that it would have to follow the prosecution of inmates involved 
in the uprising.875 Since the initial proceedings against the Bathurst prisoners did not occur until 
about a year later, this effectively stalled the promised inquiry.  
It did not, however, mollify the government’s critics. In the early-to-mid 1970s, a 
number of existing and new prisoner-operated newspapers inside several facilities began 
publishing articles that were more openly critical of the current state of prisons and debated 
the possibilities for change. Although far less radical and confrontational than publications 
produced outside the prison system, this emerging debate, nevertheless, pointed to increasing 
restlessness among prisoners, the growing articulation of shared difficulties and grievances, and 
the loosening control of prison authorities who still tried to repress this activity.876 In 1974, a 
number of prisoners at Cessnock Corrective Centre in the Hunter region of northern New South 
Wales formed the Prison Legal Cooperative, a more politically confrontational organization, 
which sought to “preserve, protect, and to extend the rights of prisoners and ex-prisoners.”877 
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The organization focused on legally challenging restrictive rules, disciplinary and transfer 
procedures, and limited access to services and opportunities, like education. While it only 
existed inside the state’s prisons, the cooperative collaborated with several outside 
organizations that supported their work. Prison staff continually repressed their activities by 
transferring or segregating members as well as confiscating their legal materials, 
correspondence and books. Within a short period of time, however, the Prison Legal 
Cooperative established a more stable presence in the state’s prison system with members and 
sympathizers scattered across different institutions.  
In the wake of the February 1974 disturbance at Bathurst, many of these prison reform 
and abolitionist organizations in the community escalated their activities, holding regular 
meetings, conferences and demonstrations as well as publishing a number of critical periodicals 
and pamphlets.878 The Prisoner’s Action Group, for instance, held a major three-day 
conference, titled “Alternatives to Prison,” at the University of New South Wales in May 1975. 
The symposium ended with a heated dispute between attendees that revealed, not only the 
range of different positions and perspectives in the prison movement, but also the degree of 
radicalization among some groups.879 The argument involved a motion put forth by Barry York 
of the Prisoners Action Committee of Victoria, which called for supporting rebellions by 
prisoners like the recent examples of Bathurst and Goulburn, as well as the 1971 Attica uprising 
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in Upstate New York. Ken Buckley, President of the Council for Civil Liberties, opposed the 
motion as counterproductive because such a radical stance would alienate potential support for 
penal reform. However, the attendees passed the motion by a large margin.880 
In 1975, the Prisoners Action Group also began disseminating its radical critique of the 
prison in two publications. The first, the Alternative Criminology Journal, published scholarly 
articles as well as updates and analysis of the state’s prison system, the prison movement and 
the ongoing efforts to establish a royal commission. It frequently included articles by currently 
serving inmates. A little later, the group also began producing the Jail News, a much more 
accessible newspaper with shorter articles intended for a broader audience. Together, these 
periodicals resembled similar prison activist publications in other parts of the world, often 
including news from other jurisdictions in addition to reproductions of iconic images and 
satirical cartoons about prisons. The wide circulation of these latter images revealed the extent 
of shared concerns with imprisonment across national and sub-national borders. They were 
both highly flexible in that they could be easily situated into local politics, but they also 
condensed powerful critiques of carceral practices or exemplified inmate solidarity. These 
qualities enabled their circulation and translation into many different contexts. While some of 
these images were more general (Figures 3.1 and 3.2), others more clearly signaled their local 
context and the circumstances of their production, even if they also addressed larger concerns. 
Early issues of the Alternative Criminology Journal featured a regular column titled, 
“From the Inside,” which provided an example of the latter (Figure 3.3). The column contained 
commentary by prisoners and news about events activities in specific prisons across the state, 





like sit-down strikes and other forms of direct action. Emblazoned prominently above the title 
was a photograph taken by a journalist in D-Yard at the Attica Correctional Facility in Western 
New York during the September 1971 uprising (see Figure 3.3).881 This iconic picture of mostly 
(but not exclusively) African-American prisoners hands raised in the clenched-fist, Black Power 
salute symbolized the political empowerment and solidarity of inmates.  
 
 
Figure 7: Rehabilitated corpse, New South Wales 
Figure 7. Rehabilitated corpse, New South Wales - Jail News, 4 (February 1982). 
                                                          





Figure 8: Rehabilitated corpse, Pennsylvania
Figure 8. Rehabilitated corpse, Pennsylvania - Introduction flyer for Alliance for the Liberation 
of Mental Patients (reissue of Pennsylvania Department of Justice report), The Farview Papers: 
The Confidential Investigation by the Pennsylvania Department of Justice into Threats, Beatings, 
Illegal Contraband, and Deaths at Farview State Hospital, Waymart, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: 
Alliance for the Liberation of Mental Patients, 1977). MG-309 Governor Milton Shapp J. 
Records, Files of the Special Assistant for Human Services, Slot no. 14-0953, box 4 “F-H”, folder: 






Figure 9: From the Inside column, Alternative Criminology Journal 
 





It is notable, however, that in the Australian prison movement of the 1970s, 
articulations of race, punishment and criminality were far more subdued, if mentioned at all, 
even though there were clear signs of the overrepresentation of Indigenous Australians in 
custody.882 Unlike much of the prisoner rights activism in the United States, prisoners of white, 
European heritage played a much more prominent role in the prison movement in New South 
Wales and Australia, in general.883 The silence in many activist publications about race and 
Indigeneity was in itself a part of how the racial formation operated in Australian society.884 
However, it also pointed to the fact that most current and former Indigenous prisoners in New 
South Wales did not participate in penal reform campaigns, whether inside or outside of 
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prison.885 As Paul Coe of the Aboriginal Legal Services would later argue in a submission to the 
Royal Commission, many of the deprivations of prison life that animated the protests by white 
activists were not often viewed in the same light by many Indigenous people who routinely 
lived with hardships in the community.886  
Some sources of complaint for Indigenous prisoners reflected their particular 
circumstances and were not widely shared by many white inmates. The lack of adequately 
explained prison rules and opportunities especially disadvantaged many Indigenous inmates 
who either would not or could not communicate well with white authority figures. Such 
prisoners also frequently told representatives of the Aboriginal Legal Services that they were 
subjected to harsh racist insults by guards and given the dirtiest, most degrading jobs available 
in prison. Perhaps the greatest area of concern for Indigenous prisoners was the department’s 
new parole scheme, which Maddison often cited as evidence of the state’s modern penal 
practices compared to the rest of the world.887 The criteria for granting parole and its reporting 
requirements often implicitly relied on white assumptions about proper employment, 
residential patterns and family life that conflicted with prevailing employment and migratory 
norms in much of Australian Indigenous society.888 Nevertheless, the Aboriginal Legal Services 
supported many of the aims of the penal reform groups and pressured the government and 
Department of Corrective Services for changes in areas affecting Indigenous people.  
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As the prison movement grew, a few journalists also developed a greater interest in 
exposing what occurred at Bathurst in 1970 and 1974. A few publications, like the Australian 
Communist Party’s Tribune and several student-run university papers, routinely criticized the 
government’s handling of the Bathurst events, but their circulation was small in comparison to 
many of the major news dailies. The National Times stood out among the mainstream 
newspapers for several series of critical, investigative articles between 1974 and 1976, which 
delved deeper into the events at Bathurst and the Department of Corrective Services, in 
general, than any of the other major newspapers.889 At about the same time, Nick Franklin, a 
radio journalist at the 2JJ station, began broadcasting the Prisoner’s Program, featuring news 
from inside the state’s prisons and an ongoing discussion of state penal politics. As George 
Zdenkowski and David Brown noted in the early 1980s, “the regular weekly prisoners’ program 
played a significant role as a lifeline of communication between the prison cell and the outside 
movement.”890 Judging by the frequent references to the program in contemporary prisoners’ 
writings, listening to it became almost a ritual for many incarcerated individuals.891  
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Despite the mounting calls for an inquiry, the Liberal-Country government attempted to 
avoid what some in their ranks feared would be an embarrassing series of revelations if an 
inquiry was held. In August 1975, Maddison’s replacement, John Waddy, cast further doubt on 
the possibility of an inquiry, reportedly stating that there would be little benefit in investigating 
past events and that perhaps an evaluation by an expert from overseas would suffice.892 Jack 
Grahame, the lawyer for many of the Bathurst prisoners and a member of the Penal Reform 
Council, described Waddy’s statements as, “a kite-flying exercise by the Government to see if 
the community would accept the fact that there would be no Royal Commission.”893 The Sydney 
Morning Herald’s editorial page also criticized the government’s apparent intention to forego 
the inquiry and reminded them of the growing and widespread public concern with the state of 
prisons.894 
As the government wavered on whether they would hold an inquiry, prisoners 
increasingly demanded improvements in living conditions and many other reforms, especially 
to the disciplinary system. In October 1975, prisoners at Maitland Gaol staged two sit-ins 
protesting, among other things, the harsh discipline handed out to a fellow prisoner by the 
visiting justice and petty rule enforcement in general. Minister Waddy had scheduled a visit to 
Maitland on October 29th, and most inmates believed that a small deputation of prisoners 
would be able to directly discuss their grievances with him. When Waddy departed without 
talking to prisoners, many younger prisoners immediately held a sitdown demonstration in the 
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yard, which lasted until the evening at which time someone started a fire in one of the 
workshops.895 Maitland’s guards fired tear gas canisters at the demonstrators and forced them 
back to their cells after running through a gauntlet of baton-wielding guards. This drew 
immediate condemnation by prison reforms groups and the leader of the Labor opposition, 
Neville Wran, who pledged to fulfill Maddison’s original promise for a royal commission if they 
ousted the Liberal-Country government in the next election.896 The same day, an editorial in the 
Sydney Morning Herald opined that:  
 
…it cannot be maintained that the shortcomings of the NSW prison system are 
capable of correction simply by closed magisterial inquiry, established 
administrative procedures and subsequent bureaucratic action. A Royal 
Commission with the widest terms of reference is required and should be 
established by the NSW Government at the earliest opportunity.897 
 
On the following day, November 3th, another fire erupted at Parramatta Gaol near Sydney on, 
which, according to one press account, caused twice the damage of the Maitland fire.898 Within 
days, the government reaffirmed its intention to hold a royal Commission after the Bathurst 
inmates’ trials had ended, which were expected to end in early 1976.  
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Arrival of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons 
 
 The government finally ordered a royal commission in late February 1976.899 However, 
to the dismay of many penal reformers, prisoners and activists, however, the initial composition 
of the commission did not include anyone with sufficient knowledge about prisons and the 
government also wanted to retain the services of the prominent, conservative British 
criminologist, Leon Radzinowicz.900 The Council of Civil Liberties and the Penal Reform Council 
petitioned the government to include a former prisoner on the commission at least in a lesser 
capacity, but they rejected this proposal.901 However, within two months, before the Royal 
Commission began its work, the Liberal-Country government fell from power and the new 
Labor Premier, Neville Wran, altered some aspects of the inquiry. Wran reduced the number of 
commissioners from three to one, appointing New South Wales Supreme Court Justice John F. 
Nagle as the sole Royal Commissioner.902 The terms of references, which were very broad, 
remained the same.  
Despite these changes, many of the activists who fought so diligently to establish the 
inquiry, now seriously considered boycotting it or even holding their own alternative inquiry.903 
Many activists, especially those associated with the Prison Legal Cooperative, the Prisoners 
Action Group and the Women Behind Bars, feared that the Royal Commission could simply 
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become an instrument of legitimation, effectively whitewashing the department’s policies, 
exonerating McGeechan, Pallot and Bathurst’s staff and making any future change even less 
likely. They worried that unless they staked out clear abolitionist positions in their official 
statements to the Royal Commission, their participation would be read as a “tacit endorsement 
of its findings” regardless of their content.904 
Although the terms of reference were wide, requiring the inquiry to investigate the 
entire operations of the Department of Corrective Services, questions abounded about the 
ability of prison activists, reform organizations and, above all, prisoners to fully participate. 
Prisoners justifiably feared the possible reprisals by guards and the department if they testified 
or spoke with investigators. Many groups and individuals could also not afford legal 
representation, which was necessary since the Royal Commission proceeded in an adversarial 
fashion, with witnesses subject to multiple examinations and cross-examinations. The 
government eventually provided legal aid to some parties appearing before the inquiry, but 
only after Nagle attempted to consolidate many diverse parties into one “counter-group” as a 
cost-saving gesture for legal representation.905 Perhaps more troubling was the potential for 
guards and senior staff to block the ability of prisoners to communicate with the Royal 
Commission by confiscating correspondence or transferring inmates to country prisons away 
from metropolitan Sydney.906 Nagle ordered the posting of an official announcement of the 
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inquiry in all the state’s penal institutions, which included an invitation for submissions by 
prisoners. Hundreds of prisoners took their chances and scrambled to submit evidence. 
After nearly five years of continual pressure by prisoners, penal reform activists, a 
variety of small radical political organizations and the Australian Labor Party, the Royal 
Commission into New South Wales Prisons finally held its preliminary sitting on April 14, 1976 
and began hearing testimony on July 12, 1976, well after the election of the new government. 
Justice Nagle submitted interim recommendations on March 4, 1977, an interim report on 
December 20, 1977 and a final report on March 31, 1978, which included 252 
recommendations. The inquiry’s terms of reference required Justice Nagle to investigate the 
entire Department of Corrective Services, “in light of contemporary penal practice and 
knowledge of crime and it causes.”907 Nagle, therefore, encouraged wide ranging testimony 
from inmates, staff, senior officials and various interested parties, pursued an exhaustive 
examination of documents and ordered an overseas study tour to inspect penal operations in 
numbers jurisdictions.  
During the two years of its existence, the Royal Commission accumulated an enormous 
archive of material on penal practices in New South Wales and, to a lesser extent, other parts of 
the world, especially Anglophone countries. The Royal Commission’s official exhibit list included 
over one thousand items, and 249 witnesses testified at the hearings.908 Additionally, Nagle or 
representatives from the inquiry interviewed over seventy experts, visited many of the state’s 
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prisons and traveled abroad to observe penal practices.909 The inquiry amassed a large 
collection of secondary literature, inquiry reports and administrative material from numerous 
penal bureaucracies in addition to voluminous working files and correspondence. This carceral 
archive and the report, itself, became a reservoir of ideas, critiques, solutions and a source of 
legitimacy in several penal reform projects, industrial struggles and political campaigns for the 
next several decades.  
Many groups and individuals appearing before the Royal Commission produced 
submissions created specifically for the occasion such as position statements on penal reform. 
However, many other documents presented to the inquiry were originally generated as part of 
the routine operations of the penal bureaucracy and intended for different audiences. The 
following ten items, selected at random from the list of official exhibits, provide a sense of the 
variety of material the Royal Commission collected: 
 
75. Corporate Plan of Department of Corrective Services. 1972. 
76. Corporate Plan of Department of Corrective Services. 1976. 
77. Security documents concerning concepts for Detention Centre. Letters from: 
1. Wormald Safe & Vault Co. 
2. K. A. Jessup Pty Ltd. 
3. Australian Security Systems. 
78. Handwritten explanation by Mr. Saunders in regard to Prisoner Z. 
79. Correspondence between Solicitors for Prisoners' Action Group and Mr. 
McGeechan  
concerning visits to prisons in connection with the Royal Commission. 
80. File of documents relating to certain control units in Great Britain. 
81. Article entitled "solitary Confinement-Insolation as coercion to Conform", by 
Dr Lucas,  
contained in the Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 
September,1976. 
82. Plan of Katingal Cell. 
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83. Extracts from Movement File of Prisoner AE. 
84. Movement File of Prisoner AI. 
85. Movement File of Prisoner AJ.910 
 
 
Despite the breadth of the material covered, a number of critics pointed out that Justice Nagle 
narrowly interpreted the terms of reference on several crucial matters. George Zdenkowski and 
David Brown convincingly argue that Nagle foreclosed an examination of certain topics (like 
prison abolition) and some individuals (former Minister for Justice John Maddison) that many 
people in the prison movement believed were central to understanding the problems of 
imprisonment in general and New South Wales’ prisons in particular.911 Critics also criticized 
Nagle at the time for his undertheorized approach to much of the material before him.912 He 
eschewed many larger questions about the purposes and principles of punishment as well as 
the nature of crime and its causation even though questions were clearly in the terms of 
reference or arose early on in submissions by the department. Instead, Nagle tended to isolate 
the prison from these larger questions as well as its relation to political economy, state politics 
and the legacies of colonialism. 
The Royal Commission as an Ethnography of Prison Life 
 
Instead of reiterating these critiques at length, I want to instead emphasize the surplus 
of knowledge about the prisons and penal authority that emerged from the inquiry and the 
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effects that it had on penal discourse and practice afterward. Nagle’s empirical pursuit of 
answers to inquiry’s often unspoken guiding questions in the terms of reference opened 
windows to other material, which revealed numerous working routines, practical adaptions, 
guiding assumptions and the circumstances of life inside the prisons. Perhaps unintended, this 
recourse to the mundane minutia of prison life covered material that was simply unmentioned 
in public articulations of official policies and even in most representations of prison in the arts. 
The Royal Commission and the broader public glimpsed in such material features of specific, 
sub rosa prison orders and the penal knowledge necessary to navigate them. Such knowledge 
competed directly with the official representations of the Department of Corrective Services in 
their publications and public statements, and it afforded greater agency to inmates, prison 
guards and other administrative staff. This knowledge highlighted how these groups 
requisitioned the official materiality of the prison for their own purposes and willfully subverted 
prison rules. 
This evidence was more than merely a description of life in places like Bathurst, 
however, because it factored into how investigators evaluated causality and the expectations 
that could, or should, be placed on those working and living in penal establishments. The 
practical contours of everyday life in prison that emerged from these items and the inquisitive 
narratives bundled with them also publicized the state’s prisons and the questions of 
punishment to a degree, which had not been central to prison accounts in many decades. The 
length of the proceedings meant that the internal workings of the state’s prisons and misdeeds 
of many employees and prisoners became, at times, almost a daily topic in the state’s major 




material in an uncritical fashion. While this knowledge was not new for many people inside 
prisons or those knowledgeable about them, it provided much different sources of knowledge 
about prisons for larger audiences.  
In the next two subsections, I focus on two items from the exhibit list in more depth 
partly because they are in some ways unusual, even among the routine operational material 
examined, but also because they illustrate the breadth of the Royal Commission’s interest, how 
they drew connections between different aspects of the prison system and its operations and 
how certain material items anchored inquisitive narratives. These items were interesting, too, 
because they appeared as supplements or by-products of the effort to answer many of the 
powerful, but often implicit, guiding questions of the inquiry. While these items spoke to the 
questions queried, they did so indirectly and often appeared of relatively little importance or 
easily aggregated under more general headings, like poor prison conditions. It may have held 
multiple, rich meanings and ambiguities, but not all of these features captured the interest of 
the Royal Commissioner, nor were the problems these items exposed necessarily easy to assess 
or act upon. 
 
Exhibit 12: Heating and Cooking devices made by Prisoners at Malabar—“Boiling up 
Appliances" 
 
Exhibit 12 consisted of two items:  (1) an oily, flat canister, strong with the odor of burnt 




wood attached to a bed spring with two separate wires affixed to the top of the spring.913 These 
were two separate examples of a range of makeshift devices that inmates used for illicitly 
cooking in their cells. The first item, a modified shoe polish canister, was for “burning-up,” 
heating food either directly or in some sort of pan or pot. The polish, made of materials like 
turpentine, was highly flammable, and could be burned under moderate control through the 
central hole. Prisoners used the second item, “boiling-up wires,” to heat liquid. The piece of 
wood rested atop a container of water with one end of the spring immersed below. The 
insulated wires, wrapped around the top of the spring, were then attached to a source of direct 
electrical current, usually a manipulated light fixture.  
The use and possession of both items violated prison rules in New South Wales, but 
prison staff found it next to impossible to reduce the production and use of such items. The 
range of testimony concerning these practices before the Royal Commission suggested that 
boiling-up was a more vexing problem for prison authorities and perhaps more common than 
burning-up.914 Cooking in one’s cell was likely to be more time consuming and difficult to hide 
from staff. Whereas, boiling water for a hot drink was easier, quicker and more concealable. 
After lock-up, many incarcerated individuals stripped the covers off light fixtures and directly 
accessed the electrical wiring for boiling-up. Since this practice necessitated extinguishing the 
lights before baring the wires, inmates often affixed the wires of the boiling-up device by match 
light after sundown.  
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Occasionally, a number of people doing this at the same time would overtax a facility’s 
electric system, blowing out fuses. In some prisons, the resulting blackout could affect an entire 
cellblock, leaving numerous occupants in the dark. In others places, each cell had its own fuse, 
which if blown out, easily led staff to a person illicitly boiling-up. People affected by blown 
fuses, whether they were the ones boiling-up or not, often hailed guards for help, loudly 
banging on their cell doors and yelling (“knocking-up”). Prison staff resented the disruption and 
extra work created by blown fuses, and they frequently charged inmates with prison offenses 
for possessing improvised heating devices, but to no avail. The practice was common 
throughout the state’s prisons. 
These rather mundane items came to the attention of the Royal Commission as it 
investigated the Department of Corrective Services’ disciplinary system and the nature of rule 
violations by imprisoned people. Many of the submissions the Royal Commission received from 
inmates, civil libertarians and legal professionals contained sharp criticisms of how the prison 
staff enforced discipline and adjudicated charges. The Royal Commission reviewed a wide range 
of written materials, conducted interviews, heard testimony and corresponded with penology 
experts on the matter, trying to assess both how the department’s system worked in practice 
and the current state of the art on prison disciplinary systems in other jurisdictions. Two sets of 
official documents examined by the Royal Commission contained detailed instances of offenses 
and their resolutions. The first, inmates’ classification files, listed disciplinary charges (“write-
ups”) and the punishments handed out to inmates. The second, prison superintendents’ 
punishment books, logged all write-ups issued by guards, the penalties superintendents handed 




Burning-up and boiling-up were minor offenses usually dealt with by the superintendent 
or deputy superintendent, but they were one of the most frequent entries in the punishment 
books, as well as common entries in prisoners’ classification files.915 Because of this, they also 
formed a frequent friction point between prisoners, guards and the formal prison disciplinary 
system. Since makeshift heating devices were contraband, inmates caught with them could 
expect the suspension of amenities, like reading material, buy-ups916 and showers plus a few 
days of cellular confinement, possibly in special disciplinary cells. Convictions for these offenses 
did not add additional time to the current sentence being served by an inmate, but they could 
adversely affect other decisions, like transfer requests or inclusion in certain programs, 
especially if there were multiple write-ups in one’s record. While conducting routine cell 
searches, guards also inspected light fixtures for tampering, looking specifically for evidence of 
illicit heating.917 Staff often removed the electrical fuses for the lighting in cells with damaged 
light fixtures for a few days leaving the cell, and the person in it, in darkness as punishment. 
According to John Nash, the Chief Superintendent of the Malabar Complex, all of these 
measures did little to persuade imprisoned people to stop boiling-up at two of the Malabar 
complex’s major maximum-security prisons, the Central Industrial Prison and Metropolitan 
Reception Prison.    
The Royal Commission inspected three pieces of correspondence between Nash by two 
of his subordinates, Senior Overseer B. Vanny and Assistant Superintendent S.A. Cumberland, 
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concerning the subject, which Nagle deemed important enough to incorporate verbatim into 
the official transcript.918 The letters described the continual damage to light fixtures and the 
seemingly futile efforts to repair them. Vanny estimated that nearly fifty percent of the light 
fixtures in the Central Industrial Prison and Metropolitan Reception Prison were damaged from 
boiling-up.919 Citing the practice’s constant drain on maintenance work and potential for 
electrocution, Vanny implored Nash to renew its effort to eliminate the practice through more 
consistent punishment, like removing fuses from affected cells, a practice which had recently 
lapsed.920 He also suggested going forward that they either install a low voltage system or 
power points in each cell or encase the entire fixture in wire mesh and inspect this encasement 
for tampering as part of a routine cell search.921 Nash mentioned, almost in passing, that the 
main cause of the problem was the long hours prisoners spent locked in their cells in the 
complex’s maximum security prisons. He stated that he never saw tampering with light fixtures 
in the lower security prisons at Malabar where cooking facilities were more accessible.922 
These makeshift devices provided the inquiry with one of the many entry points they 
used to analyze the cascading interrelationships of control practices, prisoner amenities and 
disciplinary problems in the state’s prisons. In this respect, Nash’s comment highlighted how 
the policy of extended cellular confinement led to increasing disciplinary problems by how it 
converged with the limited cell amenities and the growing consumption expectations of people 
imprisoned in maximum security facilities. Evening lock-up in most maximum security prisons in 
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the state was 4 o’clock in the afternoon, which constrained the ability of imprisoned people to 
obtain hot water and food. Prisoners could post notes outside their cells, notifying the wing 
sweeper (an inmate worker) that they wanted hot water, which was then dispensed to them by 
the cup at the cell door.923 However, given the prevalence of illicit appliances, it appeared that 
the demand for hot items exceeded this method of providing them. The voluminous entries in 
the punishment books for burning and boiling up or being caught with these contraband 
devices exposed some of the effects of what the Royal Commission believed to be an 
unnecessarily repressive level of cellular lockup and control.924 
The uncontrollable production and use of boiling-up devices also pointed to the 
changing expectations of material and bodily comfort for people confined in the state’s prisons 
and how this conflicted with the prevailing penal order and built environment. The cellular 
lockup rules nourished a growing sense of relative deprivation among prisoners, creating the 
conditions for a rash of minor offenses against prison order. While being denied access to hot 
water for tea might not be on par with being denied adequate food or water, it increasingly 
conflicted with the daily nourishment expectations in much of Australia’s postwar, 
consumption-driven political economy. The prevalence of electric kettles at this time was part 
of a structured routine consumption, which also produced normative expectations of 
nourishment that could not be met in maximum-security cells, many of which dated from the 
early twentieth century and had undergone little change since.925  
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The electric lighting itself dated from another period of intense penal reform in the early 
twentieth-century.926 At the time, penal authorities installed lighting in the cells at Malabar as a 
way to ameliorate prison conditions and potentially enhance the effectiveness of reformative 
incarceration.927 They envisioned lighting as a supporting component of the ideal of the reading 
inmate educating himself in his cell. However, as collective understandings of comfort, 
standardized technologies and infrastructure shifted over the postwar decades, the electrical 
wiring became more vulnerable to counter-uses, like illicitly heating water. These alternative 
uses not only revealed the ingenuity of people locked in their cells for much of the day, it also 
indicated that some of the “pains of imprisonment” were painful precisely because of how they 
corresponded to the historically-specific, interlocking dynamics of consumption, political 
economy, and the daily routines and expectations of comfort and convenience.928 
As persistent and dangerous as the tampering was, Superintendent Nash and his 
subordinates rejected a much less costly solution – permitting prisoners to keep thermos flasks 
in their cells. Although Nash initially said he was concerned about replacing damaged 
thermoses, his main disagreement with the proposal was the prospect of “long lines of 
prisoners” waiting to fill their thermoses before lockup.929 The security concerns of supervising 
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these lines of prisoners and delaying lockup overrode what to the inquiry appeared to be a 
simple solution and one that other maximum security prisons in the state had in fact instituted. 
This latter fact also highlighted the localism of many prison rules, how they were enforced and 
the differences in amenities available at different prisons. While the Royal Commission 
recognized the need for variation among institutions, they also repeatedly criticized the 
department for not clearly communicating and enforcing more uniform prison rules. This in 
itself, Nagle argued, frustrated inmates who had spent time in several institutions of a similar 
security classification.930  
The burning and boiling up devices resembled similar inventions by imprisoned people 
that have appeared in numerous parts of the world at different times. There was nothing 
especially novel about their production, but such items rarely, if ever, formed the subject of 
such intense public scrutiny as they did during the Royal Commission proceedings. Moreover, in 
this context, the penal authorities lost much of their control over the devices, which they had, 
of course, already confiscated from prisoners. They became the anchor in a series of questions 
about the stifling level of cellular confinement and petty discipline at the Long Bay complex, 
which only enflamed tensions between the keepers and the kept. 
The cooking devices were also significant because they connoted more humane, 
domestic and sympathetic representations of prisoners than the inventions that administrators 
and cabinet ministers were more accustomed to displaying to the public. Against carefully 
staged exhibits of makeshift weapons and escape tools (like rope and grappling hooks) that the 
department periodically performed for the media, the public display of cooking devices 
                                                          




reminded onlookers of basic bodily needs and desires that most people could easily identify 
with.  
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Royal Commission’s focus on these items and 
practices dealt more directly with the problems facing staff than prisoners. Before the Royal 
Commission, burning up and boiling up were disciplinary problems before they were anything 
else. In addition, much of the discussion, and indeed the correspondence, dealt with these 
issues as managerial and building maintenance problems. Even when these items or the 
disciplinary penalties related to them surfaced in the testimony of prisoners, the counsel 
appearing before the Royal Commission avoided examining it in a similar detailed manner.931 
Richard Edney has argued that the gulf between official prison histories and prisoner accounts 
is often greatest on matters related to discipline and violence, both extraordinary and 
routine.932 Even though the correspondence and the Royal Commission’s work differed from 
the official history that Edney examined, one can still detect a similar pattern of avoiding direct 
consideration of the role of violence by guards in the production of disciplinary infractions. 
Numerous prisoners mentioned the pettiness of some guards in issuing disciplinary infractions, 
especially in maximum-security settings like the Central Industrial Prison and Metropolitan 
Reception Prison.933 Superintendent Nash, himself, commented on the difference in boiling up 
charges between these prisons and the lower-security institutions at the same prisons complex. 
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Could it be, as it was in so many prisons in New South Wales at the time, the high incidence of 
entries in the punishment books reflected the aggressiveness of the staff, who could always 
find these infractions if they looked for them? If they were as common as witnesses suggested, 
or simply widely considered to be so, would a person charged with boiling up stand much of a 
chance in a disciplinary hearing? Or, would they just concede? How many other actions and 
opinions could be punished in the act of removing a fuse from a cell and leaving a person in 
darkness in the name of curbing boiling up? While the Royal Commission felt that an alternative 
procedure for providing hot water would cut down on the incidence of boiling up, they left 
unexamined the possibility that in policing it, the practice also provided guards with a flexible 
disciplinary tool.  
Exhibit 136: Notes written on cigarette papers found in possession of T. Haley at Bathurst 
Gaol on 3rd December, 1973. 
 
 
Exhibit 136 included a handwritten note on six sheets of cigarette rolling paper that were 
pasted together and a typed version of the same text. The contents of the note were alarming, 
describing an escape plan, violence against specific prison officers, a planned assault on a 
nearby police station and a prisoner’s defiant interaction with Bathurst Gaol’s superintendent, 




If still here next week go ahead with the plan we need Chandler to order the screws 
on the tower to drop the guns. Dress the screws in greens. Where do they keep fork 
lift? We will use that to hoist us up and ladder on other side. If there is enough of us 




I’ll get a girl to fix up a boat when time is right. Make sure you get Chandler though. 
He’s yellow and will do whatever we say.  
 
Grab me that spunky young screw too. I’ll do the job on him before we go. I said to 
Pallett in cross examination. “I put it to you Mr. Pallett that you are senile and 
incapable of running a jail what do you say to that.” He stamped his foot and said “I 
am not senile.” 
 
Hope to see you soon china say hello to Wally for me. 
 
Signed the ambling ape 
 
Castros right hand man. 
 




Several guards found the note in the possession of Terry Haley, an inmate at Bathurst Gaol, 
on December 3, 1973, a couple months after a serious confrontation between inmates and staff 
and prior to the February 1974 uprising, which effectively destroyed the prison. Haley admitted 
to having the note during his testimony before the Royal Commission, but claimed to have 
received it under unusual circumstances. He disputed being either the author or addressee of 
the note. According to Haley’s statement to the Royal Commission and his subsequent 
testimony, a prisoner unknown to him passed him the note and indicated that it was from a 
friend of Haley’s, a prisoner named Wayne Newman. Earlier in November, officers had 
segregated Newman, Mick McHannigan and Gary Stevens in Bathurst’s Back Special Yards after 
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they protested the recent banning of weightlifting, which followed a sit-down strike in October 
1973 over numerous grievances and general living conditions at Bathurst.935  
Haley claimed he was suspicious of the note’s authenticity and the story of its origin, but 
could not contact Newman directly because of the latter’s placement in segregation. So, Haley 
tried to contact Newman through a cook who delivered food to the Back Special Yards. 
However, before he could verify the note’s authenticity, three officers (Mutton, Chandler and 
Stevens) confronted him in Bathurst’s library where Haley worked and strip searched him on 
the spot. Haley claimed that the only other prisoner in the library, Lenny Lawson, witnessed the 
entire event. The strip search occurred shortly after Haley received the note and he was clearly 
the only target of the search. From all of the accounts of the incident, it was clear that the 
officers came looking specifically for Haley, believing he was in possession of contraband. They 
soon discovered the note in his jacket pocket. 
Much of the Royal Commission’s interest in the note settled on what occurred next and 
how it was addressed later. Haley claimed that upon finding the note, Officers Mutton and 
Chandler escorted him to a segregation cell in B wing. Mutton ordered the two inmate wing 
sweepers present, Patrick James and Robert Merrit, to leave the building and stay in 3 yard 
immediately outside. Haley claimed that as he entered the cell Mutton attacked him, punching 
and kicking him repeatedly. Haley said Chandler also hit him, but eventually relented and 
restrained Mutton who continued to kick him in the ribs. Patrick James corroborated Haley’s 
account, testifying to the Royal Commission that he heard Haley’s screams and blows to his 
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body emanating through one of B wing’s windows onto 3 yard.936 The Royal Commission 
accepted Haley’s account of the assault and tried to assess what senior officials knew of the 
incident and what they did in response to it. 
Officer Mutton seriously injured Haley. When another officer, named Paget, checked on 
Haley later, he was still lying on the floor in obvious pain. He was moved to his own cell and 
treated by a nurse. The next day, Superintendent Pallot questioned Haley about the note and 
Haley used the opportunity to accuse Mutton of assaulting him. Pallot inspected Haley’s ribs in 
the presence of a nurse, but said he did not see any injury. Haley was segregated for several 
days until a Visiting Justice heard the charge against him for possessing the note. Haley pled 
guilty and received ten additional days of cellular confinement, but he repeated his claim about 
the assault. The Visiting Justice told him to make a statutory declaration in writing and submit it 
to Pallot to forward onto Commissioner McGeechan. Haley complied and was later seen by 
Bathurst’s physician, Dr. Doust, who ordered x-rays and diagnosed Haley with fractured ribs.937 
Despite this, Haley was soon before the Visiting Justice again, charged with falsely accusing 
Mutton of assault. The Visiting Justice denied Haley’s request to submit medical evidence and 
call witnesses and sentenced him to another three days confinement for putting his accusation 
in writing. Pallot also refused to consider Dr. Doust’s findings. According to Haley, the 
magistrate told him, “It’s no use. I would take the officer’s word anyway.”938 Pallot maintained 
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his position when later questioned about the incident at the Royal Commission and repeatedly 
disputed the seriousness of Haley’s injuries.939 
In the Royal Commission’s final report, Nagle subsumed this event under an analysis of 
prisoner discipline and the problems the Visiting Justice system.940 Since Nagle’s interest 
centered more on Haley’s physical and procedural mistreatment after being discovered with 
the note and possible improvements to the Vesting Justice system, the note itself was of less 
interest. The Royal Commission’s final report referred to the note itself only through its illicit 
status – a prisoner was caught with an item of “contraband.” It could have been almost any 
illicit item. Counsel appearing before the Royal Commission initially pursued a few questions 
about whether the note and the escape plot was “real” or “faked.” When asked, Haley denied 
being “Mano,” the note’s addressee, and claimed that Wayne Newman, the supposed author, 
was simply called Wayne and never known to him as the “Ambling Ape.” He said that he knew 
of no inmate with such a nickname, but stated that many inmates disparagingly referred to Mr. 
Dempsey, the Deputy Superintendent of Bathurst, by that name. While he did not believe that 
Dempsey wrote the note, Haley said he suspected that the guards (or one of them) actually 
authored the note and had the unknown prisoner pass it to him.  
Pallot appeared not to take the note and the escape plan too seriously. Over the years, 
he claimed that numerous stories like this had reached him only to prove chimerical.941 Of 
course, he may also have known that the note did not actually reveal what it literally purported. 
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Despite the escape plan, Pallot soon released Haley back to normal discipline after serving his 
cellular confinement. The guards union voted to accept the release of Newman, McHannigan 
and Stevens from the Back Special Yards within a month of the incident as well.942 
Numerous questions about the note, raised either directly or implicitly in the testimony, 
lingered unresolved: were the contents of the note fabricated or did they describe an actual 
conversation between prisoners? Was the note an artifact of an actual escape plan or a 
believable ruse by guards? Was there both an actual escape plot and a faked note referring to 
it? How did Haley come to have the note, who arranged for it to be passed to him? Did the 
guards observe Haley receiving the note? Did a prisoner(s) inform the officers he had it? 
Though they never stated so directly, Nagle accepted Pallot’s claim that such plot and 
contraband were in fact a normal part of life in a maximum security prison. Pallot considered 
the entire matter resolved after the Visiting Justice convicted Haley. Similarly, Haley’s account 
suggested that he had also given up on the matter, having exhausted his formal avenues for 
redress and paid a steep price for doing so.943  
Yet, how resolved was it? The incident occurred in December 1973, but the department 
held onto the note and produced it in court several years later. No one contested that  the note 
on the cigarette papers entered into evidence was the original note; questions of its 
authenticity centered more on who originally wrote it, who exchanged it and for what reasons. 
Since the results of those proceedings were not appealable to a higher court, the matter would 
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have been legally settled at that point. Yet, the authorities considered it worth saving, which 
was remarkable considering the extremely poor quality of the records of Visiting Justice 
proceedings.944 Whether the note was a true part of an escape plan or a ruse by guards, the 
prison administration may have perceived some risks in simply destroying it, whether from 
future investigations or losing some potentially valuable information about activities among 
prisoners or even guards. 
The note posed other risks, as well. Whether it was an actual or concocted artifact of an 
escape plot, the note endangered any inmate who possessed it. Furthermore, the risks it 
presented exceeded the immediate threat of violence and discipline. Although central to critical 
accounts of Bathurst, the note itself and its contents tended to recede in the accounts of other 
prisoners and activists in favor of descriptions of Haley’s mistreatment. If it was a true account 
of conspiracy among inmates, how would its truths have affected the charge of brutality by the 
guards or the larger goals of the prison movement in exposing guards’ violence throughout the 
system? 
 Many of the initial audiences were other prisoners, at first in Bathurst, then in other 
prisons. These prisoners focused more on Haley’s beating and the injustice of the Visiting 
Justice hearing. It became a central event in narratives about the enflamed tensions between 
staff and inmates at Bathurst leading up to the February 1974 disturbance. Many inmates who 
spent time at Bathurst imbued the incident with causal significance, citing it as one of the most 
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significant precursors of the disturbance.945 The Royal Commission viewed it in a similar 
manner, and it was a major reference point for activists trying to establish the inquiry.  
The use of the narrative of Haley’s mistreatment outlasted the Royal Commission, 
appearing two years after Nagle completed his work in a popular 1980 feature film about the 
Bathurst riot titled, Stir.946 Bob Jewson, a prison movement activist who was incarcerated at 
Bathurst during the riot, wrote the screenplay for the film and played a central role in the 
Prisoners Action Group’s participation in the Royal Commission.947 In this cinematic depiction of 
Haley’s experience, the guards surprise a prisoner named Albie (Number 24) in the chapel 
(rather than the library) and search his jacket. One of the guards covers his right hand and 
sleeve with the jacket while ostensibly searching it and quickly produces the note. The 
implication is that he pulls the note from his own sleeve. Closely following the accounts of the 
sweepers, the film then shows the guards taking the prisoner to the “pound cells” 
(segregation), where the viewer hears the sounds of a vicious, off-camera beating. The scene 
never broached the topic of the note’s contents, but the guards clearly used the pretense of 
discovering the note to violently punish Albie for his involvement in an organized protest the 
day before.948 The event is one of the causal precursors leading up the later riot. 
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Definitively resolving the question of who authored the note would likely have robbed it 
of much of the arbitrary, subversive, disciplinary, polemical and inquisitive power that 
condensed around it. That the account of the note and its divergent interpretations was not 
just possible, but believable or likely, conferred significance on it because it raised questions 
about the various possibilities of its existence, the range of different uses it could have been put 
to and the whole gamut of relationships and collusions it revealed among prisoners, guards, 
senior prison staff, the Visiting Justice and the department. Pallot was surely correct in 
asserting that escape plans and rumors were rife in maximum-security prisons, but they rarely 
made it over the walls in such a public manner. That such an account formed part of a public 
inquiry was not only novel, but also crucial in publicizing the state of the prisons in New South 
Wales and how they operated.   
Creating an Opening for the Voices of Prisoners 
 
Of all the things that the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons produced for large 
public audiences outside the prisons, perhaps the most significant was the testimony of those 
currently serving time in these institutions. While imprisoned people had been interviewed by 
past inquiries, their voices had not been accorded the same level of recognition and their claims 
the same degree of acceptance since the nineteenth-century.949 More often, investigators and 
senior government officials dismissed prisoners’ claims about life in prison, especially if it 
involved accusations of wrongdoing by staff, by calling into question the moral rectitude of 
prisoners and their ability to speak truthfully. This was not just the position investigators or the 
                                                          




media took sporadically. It was also woven into the very fabric of prison discipline system 
overseen by a Visiting Justice, usually stipendiary magistrates from a nearby Court of Petty 
Sessions, who adjudicated many violations of prison rules. Prisoners appearing before these 
justices could not call witnesses or have legal representation and the Visiting Justice himself 
was required to “‘see that discipline is enforced’ and to ‘support the officers in the exercise of 
their authority.’”950 This created a situation whereby the word of the charging officer was 
always believed. The authorities frequently charged prisoners with making a false statement for 
denying charges or accusing staff of wrongdoing.951 The message sent to prisoners this system 
was to simply be quiet and accept whatever sentence was pronounced. 
 At the outset of the Royal Commission’s work, Justice Nagle invited submissions by 
prisoners and spoke to many of them during tours of the state’s institutions. The Sydney press 
published summaries of claims made by prisoners during the hearings, often quoting them 
directly. As had previously been the case, numerous commentators in the media, legislators 
and especially the guards’ union decried prisoners’ testimony, citing the criminal histories of 
prisoners and their lack of truthfulness. This was, in fact, also the position Walter McGeechan, 
the Commissioner of Corrective Services, maintained throughout the proceedings.952 During the 
inquiry and in the Department’s internal investigation of the 1970 violence at Bathurst, 
McGeechan produced the criminal and institutional disciplinary histories of prisoners who were 
giving evidence. In the Royal Commission’s list of exhibits, prisoners’ submissions are listed 
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sequentially with these records, which were obviously appended in an attempt to discredit the 
witnesses.953        
 Despite such hurdles to being heard and taken seriously, prisoners sent numerous 
submissions to the Royal Commission. Just the opportunity to do so created a certain level of 
protection, which had not existed before. Recalling the work of the Royal Commission in a 2004 
symposium, former prisoner Brett Collins explained: 
I was in Grafton Jail when Justice Nagle visited with David Hunt back in 1976. I 
was serving 17 years, was in segregation and had served five of the almost ten I 
eventually did. The prison movement outside had made the Royal Commission 
aware of the plight I was in as one of the prisoner organisers. That attention 
meant I was safer from that time on.954  
 
 
Many of the activities, which the Department had suppressed for years, were either permitted 
to surface or at least not pursued as vigorously as they had been. For instance, the ability to 
communicate directly with the Royal Commission, ostensibly without interference, meant that 
many of the complaints that animated the work of the Prison Legal Cooperative for years could 
now be directly raised with outside authorities without the same level of subterfuge previously 
required to get the message to outside activists.955  
This opening permitted prisoners to articulate their experiences and denounce abusive 
conduct by their warders bringing the prison system, especially its most secluded parts, like the 
control facilities of Grafton and Katingal, into a greater public of debate and discussion. Since 
Justice Nagle was especially interested in the claims of malfeasance and abuse in maximum-
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security prisons and disciplinary units, the Royal Commission heard extensive evidence from 
many prisoners who spent years in these institutions. Such testimony provided fascinating 
narratives for the reading public. Some of the prisoners held in the high security disciplinary 
units were already well-known to the public through their criminal exploits. Darcy Dugan, for 
instance, had been the subject of both denunciatory and romantic headlines for his brazen 
robberies and escapes since the 1940s.956  
More often, however, the press portrayed prisoners held in these units as simply 
monsters. A diatribe against the Royal Commission and the Wran government in the April 6, 
1978 edition of the Daily Telegraph best illustrates this (Figure 3.4). Arranged under a large 
banner headline declaring, “THE BRUTES OF KATINGAL,” the newspaper published pictures of 
nine prisoners held at the Katingal maximum security block at the Long Bay prison complex, 
along with a short description of their crimes and dangerousness. Within a few days, the 
Prisoners Action Group and the Close Katingal Campaign responded with a publication mocking 
the Daily Telegraph titled, “The Real Brutes” (Figure 3.5).957 The piece replaced the  prisoners’ 
pictures with photographs of Walter McGeechan and John Maddison. These competing 
portrayals, coming as they did at an unusual moment when prisoners publicly denounced their 
mistreatment in state custody, displayed an intense struggle over the image of the confined 
person and their his forms of knowledge. Opponents tried to use many of the same 
incarcerated individuals who testified as symbols of radicalism, violence and mayhem to not 
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only discredit the Royal Commission, but to enhance their control over the prisons and remove 
McGeehan, who was despised by many corrections officers. To do so, these prisoners had to be 
stripped of their voices, denying them of what scholar David Brown has called in a different 
context, their “discursive citizenship.”958 This lesser, status of a non-citizen, or better yet one 
who forsakes their citizenship by offending against the community, has been a common way of 
conceiving of the subject of penal sanctions and their rights. It was, therefore, unsurprising that 
many of the public conflicts over the state’s prisons involved struggles over how prisoners were 
represented, made to speak and resisted these characterizations in their acts of baring public 
witness. 
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Figure 10: The Brutes of Katingal 








Figure 11: The Real Brutes 





Another example of this area of contention emerged from an investigation of a 
disturbance at Maitland Jail in 1975 by the New South Wales Ombudsman. Numerous prisoners 
complained to the Royal Commission about abuses during the disturbance similar to what had 
occurred at Bathurst, including guards forcing inmates to run a gauntlet. Justice Nagle referred 
these complaints to the state’s Ombudsman in an effort to save time and address other 
matters. Among the press coverage of the disturbance, The Sun published an image of two 
hooded prisoners holding weapons with a banner identifying them as “HOODED JAIL RIOTERS.” 
During the Ombudsman’s investigation, it came to light that these photographs were taken 
over five days after the riot on November 4, 1975.959 The inmates depicted in the image were 
working in Maitland’s kitchen when a guard summoned them to a secluded extension yard, had 
them change out of their kitchen work cloths and into standard prisoner green uniforms. The 
guard and some of his colleagues then had them don hoods and hold makeshift weapons while 
they took several pictures of them with a Polaroid camera.960 The guards essentially forced the 
prisoners to participate in creating threatening images of themselves, which they used to, not 
only satisfy media requests for information, but also justify their actions in forcefully putting 
down the recent demonstration by prisoners. 
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the investigation of certain complaints made by prisoners to the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons, 
144. 





Figure 12: Officers forced prisoners to pose as rioting prison radicals 
Figure 12. Officers forced prisoners to pose as rioting prison radicals. Source: 
New South Wales Office of the Ombudsman, Report under section 31 of the 
Ombudsman act 1974, concerning the investigation of certain complaints made 
by prisoners to the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons (Sydney: 





Yet, when inmates were able to control their own message in public forums a much 
different picture emerged. Many of them described systemic brutality at several prisons, most 
notably at Grafton Gaol, the disciplinary terminus for the entire prison system, located in the 
northern part of the state. These detailed, graphic testimonials of vicious beatings were 
consistent from prisoner to prisoner, painting a picture of the official, deliberate physical 
violence that constituted Grafton’s’ intractable regime. Such abuse had become so routine at 
the prison that certain aspects of it were ritualized, bounded as specific events and named, the 
most notorious example being the “reception biff” inmates received after being stripped naked 
upon arrival. The reception biff was a brutal, humiliating disciplinary shock administered to new 
prisoners, announcing the austere nature of the regime they had just entered.  
The description of a reception biff by William Henry Baldry, a prisoner who had been at 
Bathurst during the 1974 riot, illustrates the degree of detail in prisoner submissions: 
 
Smith rolled up his sleeves and had a short, black truncheon in his hand. My belt 
was removed by Wencell and three other screws came into the yard, also 
carrying black truncheons. Wencell “The Hun” said “take off your overalls”, 
Smith and the other three screws stood around me and beat me to the ground 
with their batons. They were hitting me on both arms, both thighs and the back 
continually and heavily. Smith said whilst flogging me “I will teach you to give 
evidence against us”. I collapsed. Wencell told me to get up and I did so. He said 
“Open your mouth” and I did. He looked into my mouth and said “Have you got 
false teeth?” I said “No”. He said to the other screws “He’s right. Give it to him 
again”. They repeated the flogging with much more enthusiasm. This time they 
directed their attention to my underarm area, across my lateral muscles. One of 
the screws said to me “How do these batons feel, like feather dusters?” They 
were sniggering. I went down to the ground and Wencell said “Get up”. I did. By 
this time I had shit and pissed myself. Wencell asked me to open my mouth 
again, which I did. He looked in my mouth and then said “Turn around and bend 




which was covered with shit as were my legs. He said “He’s right. Give him some 
more”. They repeated the flogging the same way and I collapsed.961 
 
 
Baldry was beaten more as he was led to his cell and similarly abused for the next few days. 
Baldy described to the Royal Commission yet another reception biff he was subjected to 
months later after he returned to Grafton from a court appearance in Sydney for charges 
stemming from the Bathurst riot. Baldry claimed that the institution’s Deputy Superintendent, 
Allan Penning, participated in this beating and was especially infuriated that Baldry had claimed 
in court that he was mistreated at Grafton.962 Baldy submitted that Penning backhanded him 
and said, “I don’t know why you blokes always go so crook on us. It’s the very men you 
complain to who condone Grafton. We are only here carrying out their orders. When are you 
going to wake up to that?”963 
 Grafton’s reputation and the reception biff had become so deeply entrenched in the 
state’s institutional penal culture that it also featured prominently in many prisoners’ 
conceptualization of the appropriate, masculine disposition toward official violence and 
authority. Bernie Matthews, who served several periods at Grafton for escape attempts, later 
recalled both the viciousness of abuse he suffered at Grafton and the struggle to properly 
endure it. As Matthews explained, one’s beating and how one handled it had an audience 
beyond the immediate inmate and baton-wielding guards encircling him:   
 
There was no protection. A nude man is totally vulnerable. Defenseless. Every 
psychological and physical advantage belongs to the guard. Superiority. They had 
it down to a fine art and used it to its fullest. 
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I gritted my teeth and remembered what other tracs [prisoners classified 
as “intractable”] had told me about the reception biff at Grafton. Never yell or 
make a noise during the flogging. It was a sign of weakness to other prisoners if 
you yelled or screamed out in pain. Tracs were judged by how well they could 
handle it. Pain and suffering was hard currency inside the walls of Grafton Jail. I 
continued to grit my teeth and tried to cover my naked body as their batons beat 
a tattoo over my back and shoulders. 
The crescendo of batons meeting bare flesh made a distinct sound. It was 
a sound I would never forget. A sound that would haunt me and remain buried in 
the recesses of my memory for the rest of my life.  
My pain-fogged brain could faintly decipher frenzied screams of 'cunt', 
'bastard', 'asshole', 'maggot' before one baton slammed across my face and 
blood flowed from my nose and mouth. Blood has a thick, gluey taste. Fear has a 




 Faced with numerous consistent descriptions of this kind of violence, the prison officers’ 
union chose to concede that physical repression was part of Grafton’s regime rather than trying 
to refute every accusation.965 However, they attempted to shift the blame, much as Penning did 
in Baldry’s account, to the leadership of the Department of Corrective Services, saying that they 
were following official policy. While Nagle determined the senior leadership of the Department 
at least knew of this violence and was responsible for it, he did not accept the guard’s version 
of the superior orders defense, saying that “such a defense is redolent of other debates 
concerning more sinister and more notorious happenings.”966 
Prisoners’ testimony, like that of Matthews’s and Baldry’s, played a crucial role in 
exposing Grafton’s regime. Established in 1943 by then Acting Comptroller-General of Prisons 
Leslie Nott, Grafton’s regime was modeled on a similar repressive, concentration program 
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adopted in Canada in the 1930s. For over thirty years, the state’s penal authorities used it to 
control difficult prisoners and crush resistance elsewhere in the prison system. Perhaps the 
most revealing thing about the scandalous attention given to Grafton’s regime in the mid-1970s 
was that the accusations of brutality were hardly new. They had, in fact, surrounded the 
institution since the 1940s. Yet, complaints by prisoners simply fell on deaf ears, whether the 
audience consisted of members of the judiciary, officials from other state agencies, legislators 
or the media. By the late 1960s, some criticisms of Grafton’s regime began to gain more 
traction in the press and arts, reflecting the growing influence of civil rights discourse and 
activism.967 Nevertheless, the Royal Commission provided the first official platform for these 
accounts to be acknowledged and explored in detail. 
 The inquiry also provided the public with its first extensive look at Grafton’s 
replacement, the small maximum-security control unit at the Long Bay complex called Katingal. 
Prisoners described it initially as being a large improvement over Grafton’s brutal regime. This 
40-cell unit was the state’s most secure facility. It had only been in operation a few years before 
the Royal Commission commenced. As Justice Nagle noted in his final report, the Department 
was very secretive about Katingal and did not fully inform the Corrective Services Advisory 
Committee about its existence until construction was well underway.968 Katingal appeared to 
have been the product of importing and adapting several overseas models that representatives 
of the Department observed on a study tour during the late 1960s. It bore a striking 
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resemblance to the control unit at the American federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois.969 
Katingal lacked the physical repression of Grafton and other maximum security prisons (at least 
at first). Instead, it deployed isolation to a much greater degree and featured numerous 
electronic security devices and physical barriers, which monitored inmates and prevented them 
from coming into contact with staff members.  
Overtime, prisoners subjected to Katingal’s limited space, lack of natural air and light, 
and monotony began to deteriorate mentally and physically. Many prisoners tried to mentally 
occupy themselves with reading, writing and art as a bulwark against Katingal’s attritional 
regime. Like many other control units, new transfers were given a basic set of privileges, but 
they could earn more through good behavior, moving up successive stages.970 The authorities 
would eventually grant amenities, like access to television, reading material and greater 
correspondence privileges, things which simply did not exist at Grafton.971 The combination of 
these privileges and the Royal Commission’s solicitation of prisoners’ knowledge enabled 
several people held at Katingal to produce extensive submissions for Justice Nagle. In addition 
to describing the abuse at the hands of warders, some people offered substantive 
recommendations for improving the state’s prison system and ensuring there were adequate 
legal protections and avenues for redress.  
Bernie Matthews, who suffered persistent back problems from the beatings he received 
at Grafton in the early 1970s, described his transition to Katingal in a subsequent memoir. His 
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narrative is instructive not only for understanding prisoners’ initial reactions to the new facility, 
but also how he used its affordances and the discursive opening created by the Royal 
Commission to conduct research and craft an alternative penal account. In 1975, the 
Department of Corrective Services began to replace Grafton as a disciplinary prison and 
transferred Matthews and all of Grafton’s other intractable prisoners to Katingal. By now, the 
leadership of the Department felt that Grafton had outlived its useful life and was likely to 
become a public embarrassment. Matthews described the Katingal as a windowless, mind-
numbing tomb, which nevertheless lacked the overt physical abuse of Grafton and permitted 
him certain amenities that were unavailable there as well. After a short while, it was apparent 
that the number of prisoners simply could not endure the psychological onslaught of isolation, 
confinement in a small, institutional space and the relentless boredom.972  
Once Matthews attained Programme 3, the highest privilege level, he gained access to 
avenues for communication with the outside world, and he began an extensive letter writing 
and research campaign on prisoners’ rights and defamation. Matthews harbored profound 
resentments about how he had been treated at Grafton and portrayed in the Sydney press after 
an escape in 1970.973 Much of his correspondence dealt with ascertaining the nature of the 
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rights a person retained while confined in New South Wales and many other countries, but he 
was also looking for outside leverage, a way to appeal to legal authorities beyond the 
Department of Corrective Services and New South Wales government. He initially contacted the 
state’s Law Reform Commission, as well as several federal agencies, including the Attorney-
General’s office.974 Eventually, Matthews remarked, “That pursuit took me to the USA, France, 
Britain and New Zealand without stepping outside my cell. In effect I had wrapped myself in a 
cocoon of mental activity which the physical surroundings of Katingal failed to penetrate.”975 In 
addition to preparing material for his own legal actions, Matthews produced several 
submissions to the Royal Commission based on this transnational correspondence and 
research.  
Matthews was especially concerned with prisoners’ access to the law. Since English 
precedents shaped Australia’s laws and penal codes, he obtained recent legal cases involving 
the rights of British prisoners, which in turn led him to the effects of the European Common 
Market on British law. As Matthews explained to Nagle in one of his submissions, since the U.K. 
had signed European Convention on Human Rights, British prisoners could now appeal to the 
European Court of Justice. One prisoner, named Sidney Golder, won a case against British 
prison authorities in the EU court, which held that the British penal code violated the 
convention by preventing Golder from contacting a lawyer after he was accused of participating 
in a prison riot. Matthews acknowledged in his submission that this court did not have 
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jurisdiction over Australia and he was also aware that even though Australia was a signatory to 
the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, its enforcement mechanisms were also lacking. But, he 
told Nagle that this was a glaring deficiency in the state’s legal protection for confined people.  
Matthews also provided the Royal Commission with examples of the recent history of 
the prisoners’ rights movement and judicial intervention in the United States. More specifically, 
he described an officially-recognized, representative, prisoner organization in the state of 
Washington somewhat similar to the grievances committees Commissioner McGeechan tried to 
establish, but which had far more independence and influence on institutional policies. Some of 
the material Matthews presented to Justice Nagle included information about unofficial 
prisoner organizations in places like California and New York that were organized around 
widely-shared grievances with state penal officials.  
Matthews also described the ongoing litigation of the Imprisoned Citizens Union in 
Pennsylvania, which he said challenged “virtually every facet of prison life in the state’s 
prisons.”976 At the time, Matthews wrote to Nagle, the Imprisoned Citizens Union had not yet 
reached a consent decree with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, but the legal material 
described the areas of prison life covered in the suit, including segregation practices similar to 
what Matthews endured at both Grafton and Katingal. The prisoners’ rights movement and 
receptiveness of authorities in both Australia and the United States, however limited, 
nevertheless created the context for Matthews to conduct this research and address it to a 
senior judicial official. Likewise, the newfound interest of the American federal courts in prisons 
and the activism of prisoners before him gave Richard O. J. Mayberry the opening to bring such 
                                                          




an encompassing lawsuit against the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction. The irony, of course, is 
that both men were held in high-security segregation at the time. 
Despite Matthews’s placement in what was in the mid-1970s one of the most secure 
facilities in the Asia-Pacific region, he was able to analyze his situation and make 
recommendations to the Royal Commission based on a set of global knowledge about 
prisoners’ rights and self-governing organizations. He was well aware that these things were 
lacking New South Wales and pointed this out to Justice Nagle. Matthews framed this paucity 
as an opportunity for the Royal Commission to bring the state’s penal practices in line with 
many other Anglophone countries, a comparative and mimetic practice which had plenty of 
antecedents in other areas of Australian public policy.977 In doing so, he articulated a global 
vision of local prison reform that resembled how Justice Nagle evaluated prisons in New South 
Wales, in part, through a global perspective. For Matthews, the conjuncture that permitted his 
endeavors, not only helped him endure the claustrophobic confines of Katingal, it also shaped 
his political subjectivity: 
 
I became more politicised with the growing accumulation of overseas 
information but the Katingal screws saw no danger in my intellectual pursuits. It 
was a serious error of judgement on their part because my typewriter became a 
lethal weapon that eventually created more havoc than I ever did with a 
balaclava and cut-down shotgun.978 
 
The Royal Commission and Resistance to Open institutions  
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 While the Royal Commission focused most of its attention on the difficulties of 
maximum-security prisons and control units, it also provided a forum for people concerned 
about the other end of the custodial spectrum – namely at the Department of Corrective 
Services’ open institutions, especially the agricultural or afforestation camps.  The Department 
operated twelve open institutions in the mid-1970s, including six camps.979 In addition, there 
were seven variable security institutions, which had sections with a comparable level of 
security.980 Established in the early twentieth-century, New South Wales operated afforestation 
camps as step-down institutions, sending prisoners to them after they had served the initial 
part of their sentences in maximum security. As suggested by the term “open institution” these 
facilities had a low level of security and in many cases operated on the honor system. At times, 
prisoners slipped away from the camp or work details, which is why some people brought these 
institutions to the attention of the Royal Commission.    
 In 1977, a number of residents living near the Mannus Afforestation Camp (sometimes 
referred to as the Brookfield camp) and its smaller satellite the Leslie Nott Afforestation Camp 
(or Laurel Hill) wrote to the Department of Corrective Services, Bill Haigh (the new Labor 
government Minister holding the prisons portfolio) and eventually the Royal Commission 
concerning the possible expansion of the camps and a number issues they had with camp 
management. In March 1977, rumors surfaced around the town of Tumbarumba, located about 
300 miles southwest of Sydney, that the Department was attempting to purchase several lots of 
land adjoining the nearby Mannus camp as well as re-open the recently closed Leslie Nott 
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camp.981 The Department apparently tried to keep these plans quiet. They placed a notice in 
the local newspaper, but did not consult the local council directly or hold any community 
meetings.982 Instead, they approached individual landowners with lands adjoining the camps.983 
The possibility of the camps expanding alarmed the Tumbarumba Shire Council and some 
residents after they learned of the Department’s plans. They were especially worried about 
losing tax revenue on the lands acquired by the state and the possible distorting market effects 
on local land prices because the Department was reportedly offering some residents above-
market value for their land.984 Some people feared that the loss of taxable land in the shire 
would necessitate raising taxes on the remaining private holdings or cutting services.985  
However, the most controversial and visceral concern about camp expansion was the 
potential it held for more escapes from custody, which in fact had already recently increased.986 
Since the camps were expanding, and in the Leslie Nott camp’s case actually re-opening, many 
people assumed that the population of the camps would grow, leading to greater security 
difficulties for the camps’ staff. Given the prominence of industrial actions by prison officers 
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elsewhere in the state during the 1970s, local residents feared the consequences of a possible 
labor strike by guards.987 The Department insisted the camps’ expansion was not intended to 
create more population capacity but to develop a more efficient agricultural business operation 
for the camps and create more meaningful work opportunities for inmates.988 Minister Haigh 
informed Sir Eric Willis, the Leader of the Opposition, that they needed to enhance the acreage 
of productive fields as well as expand their beef cattle operations to achieve a greater economy 
of scale.989 
Shortly after the Department’s plans had become widely known, some residents 
opposed to the expansion of the camps approached their local shire council, local Member of 
Parliament and local branch of the Country Party in an attempt to galvanize support for 
blocking the Department’s plans. They also contacted authorities in Sydney, including the 
Leader of the Opposition, Sir Eric Willis of the Liberal Party, the state’s Ombudsman and 
eventually the Royal Commission, which had been sitting for nearly a year. Mrs. Joyce 
McEachern, one of the most vocal critics, wrote a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald, accusing 
the Department of secretly buying land and informing the nearby residents only after the 
fact.990 She also accused the Department of maintaining inappropriate security at the Mannus 
camp, not informing residents of escapes and refusing to compensate them for property 
damage or theft by escapees. McEachern’s accusations, published in the state’s preeminent 
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news daily, brought a rural dispute over land and escapes that seemed to mainly involve only 
about seven families near the camp within the fold of the state’s contentious penal politics. The 
next day, Minster Haigh responded to McEachern’s letter in the same newspaper. He denied 
the claims of secrecy and disputed the number of escapes that McEachern claimed to have 
occurred to previous year.991 He also dismissed her concern with escapes, claiming that her 
complaint was manufactured by the local Country Party Member of Parliament, Gordon 
Mackie. Within a few days, the exchange provoked a response from Len Evers, a former 
psychologist in the Department and member of the Penal Reform Council.992 Evers reassured 
McEachern that escapees were largely harmless to locals, but he decried Minster Haigh’s 
response as dismissive and denigrating. The intensity of the exchange further drew the 
attention of the Royal Commission and Ombudsman.   
A spokesman for the group of residents informed the Tumbarumba Times that they had 
not only established contact with the Royal Commission, but were preparing a formal 
submission and hoped to testify as a group.993 Even before the exchange of letters in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, the Royal Commission’s secretary had contacted Commissioner 
McGeechan about the land purchases and dispute over the camps, requesting that he send all 
of the Department’s files regarding on this topic to the inquiry.994 This later became an 
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additional problem for the Department because they needed the files to fulfill a similar request 
by the state’s Ombudsman who had also received numerous letters from several residents near 
the camps.995 
The concern with escapes exploded at the end of March when two young prisoners 
escaped from Mannus and held three women at gunpoint in a remote home until the women 
surrendered a small sum of cash and keys to a car, which the prisoners subsequently stole.996 
The police caught the men soon afterward, but the publicity the incident generated brought the 
Department into greater conflict with the community. In addition to the fear of criminal activity 
by escapees, the episode also renewed another longstanding complaint in the area, namely 
that the state did not compensate victims whose property had been damaged or stolen by 
escaped prisoners.997  
Furthermore, some people suspected that the Department was deliberately 
underreporting the actual number of escapes from the camps.998 It was well-known in the area 
that escapes were not uncommon given the open security of the camps, but they had in fact 
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increased during Walter McGeechan’s tenure as Commissioner of Corrective Services.999 The 
causes of the increase in escapes became a major area of dispute between the Department and 
the local community, especially since the Department refused to enhance the security of the 
institutions, arguing that to do so would nullify their status as open institutions.1000 The 
Department argued that overcrowding at the Mannus camp caused by the 1975 closure of the 
Leslie Nott camp and transfers from the Emu Plains camp combined with the lack of 
“meaningful work” at Mannus, increased the incidence of escape at Mannus.1001  
Many local residents and the media did not accept McGeechan’s explanation and 
believed that the level of escapes was a manifestation of more than just a temporary 
overcrowding or capacity problem at the camps. Instead, they argued that the number of 
escapes reflected systemic changes in the economy of penalties and custody levels available to 
penal authorities in the state. In particular, new sentencing options, like periodic detention, the 
extension of parole and other forms of community corrections alternatives, like work release 
schemes, had altered the profile of the prisoners who were now being sent to the camps.1002 
The Department still used the camps as a stepdown institution to prepare long term prisoners 
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who had been in maximum-security for release, but now the alternative options diverted many 
other prisoners who required less security away from the camps altogether. The result was a 
greater percentage of the recent prisoners, according to a press account, “tended to be ‘hard 
core’” offenders who had spent considerable time in maximum-security before being sent to 
Mannus, Leslie Nott, and other camps.1003 The Tumbarumba residents essentially argued, 
contrary to the Department’s position and without much supporting evidence, that the increase 
in the number of escapes represented the decisions of the penal authorities to treat less serious 
offenders in a different manner and populate the camps with more dangerous, desperate men. 
Their call to close the camps entirely rested on the notion that the prisoners therein were, in 
general, dangerous to local residents.  
Immediately after the two escapees had been caught, Deputy Commissioner of 
Corrective Services Bill Weston flew to Tumbarumba and tried to reassure a group of local 
residents and elected officials of the overall safety of the camps.1004 While sympathetic to the 
concerns of some of the Department’s opponents, Weston told the assembled group that the 
Department would not change either the security of camps or the type of inmates it was 
currently sending to them. He said bluntly that people living in the area had to deal with the 
reality of escapes from time to time or they should seek the closure of the camps.1005 Soon 
afterwards about fifty residents held a contentious public meeting at the Rosewood Gold Club 
where they established the Close the Camp Committee and resolved to have both Mannus and 
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Leslie Nott shuttered.1006 Some attendees expressed extremely negative views of the prisoners 
held at the camps. For instance, one speaker told the assembly, “Prisoners are animals. They 
are dogs, they are born that way, and will stay that way.”1007  
The vehemence expressed at the meeting was not universally shared in the area, 
however, and it provoked criticism from many other nearby residents who saw the camp as a 
major contributor to the local economy. The local newspaper received letters supporting the 
Department’s stated aims of rehabilitating prisoners and saw the camps much as the 
Department did as a way for long-term prisoners to transition to an open environment prior to 
their release. One letter-writer, Margot Martin, chastised members of the Close the Camp 
Committee: “Prisoners—although they may have sinned against our society—are not sub-
human. They are paying the penalty for their crime. They need help and guidance and even, 
dare I say it, a little compassion.”1008 Other people accused the Close the Camp Committee of 
undermining property values themselves with the negative publicity they generated. A few 
people rhetorically asked members of the Close the Camp Committee, in letters to the 
Tumbarumba Times, how they planned to make up the loss of revenue that the camps provided 
to the entire community if they were closed.1009 
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In their submission to the Royal Commission, the Rosewood-Mannus Residents group 
opposed the continued operation of the camps, but largely muted their dire view of imprisoned 
people. Perhaps responding to some of the critical comments from their neighbors at 
community meetings or in the local press, or perhaps sensing the liberal position of Justice 
Nagle, the group of residents framed their submission partly in terms of their concern for the 
humane treatment of prisoners. They tried to persuade Justice Nagle that the prisoners would 
be much better off somewhere else since Mannus was so far from the urban coastal areas that 
most prisoners called home. 
The prisoners detest Mannus as a Siberia of the prison system. The miserable 
winter climate, its extreme remoteness and scarcity of family visits due to lack of 
public transport to the area and the distance from nearest large centres of 
population, all combine to alienate the prisoner from the community. The urge 
to escape under these circumstances apparently is overwhelming. 
 
A wife with young children, not owning a vehicle, finds a visit to Mannus almost 
impossible, yet contact with family and wife is an important part of 
rehabilitation.1010 
 
Arguing that the camps’ security was inadequate for the higher risk prisoners that the 
Department was currently sending to them, the Rosewood-Mannus Residents group demanded 
the government close the camps.1011 
 The Royal Commission visited and inspected the Brookfield and Leslie Nott camps in July 
1976, prior to the disputes.1012 They also spent a lot of time hearing evidence from Clyde Piggot, 
the Superintendent of the Brookfield Camp at Mannus, but they did not directly address the 
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expansion disputes.1013 Nevertheless, the Royal Commission’s presence shaped the dispute in 
several ways. As a number of people pointed out at the time, the Brookfield camp opened in 
the 1920s. So, it was hardly the case that the residents of the area were unfamiliar with the 
camp or that the controversy was necessarily similar to the types of disputes that emerge when 
the state builds a prison in an area that did not previously have one. While Superintendent 
Piggot admitted there was evidence of hostility from some residents over the issue of escapes 
in the past, he felt this was a minority of local residents and that it had waned by the time he 
took command.1014 Nevertheless, it appeared that the number of escapes had increased at 
precisely the same time that the Department, as a whole, was under intense public scrutiny by 
the Royal Commission and the subject of alarming media accounts of rioting prisoners and 
industrial actions by guards.  
The Department’s secretiveness, or simply lack of effective public relations, in the 
dispute over the camps was familiar to the Royal Commission, which had recurrently uncovered 
incidents of untruthfulness or disregard for the public. As Nagle described the Department’s 
record in this area, “the secrecy with which it has surrounded its activities can fairly be 
described as obsessive.”1015 This can be seen in the normal rules governing Mannus. Despite the 
fact that Superintendent Piggot was the most senior official permanently assigned to the area 
and had established local relationships, he was very limited in what he could communicate to 
the public, especially in regard to security and escapes.1016 With frequent reports about the 
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inquiry in both print and broadcast media, the behavior of the Department’s officials in the area 
around Tumbarumba not only seemed suspicious, but as evidence of serious mismanagement 
and an affront to local residents. Activities that appeared scandalous to locals quickly ascended 
the penal hierarchy not only because the activists appealed to senior politicians and the Sydney 
press, but because it was the Department’s policy not to delegate such matters to officials like 
Piggot. Minster Bill Haigh not only replied to Joyce McEachern’s letter to the editor in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, but also corresponded directly with her and other activists. He would 
later attend a community meeting in the area and face direct criticism over camp security and 
the land purchases. The Labor government, led by Neville Wran, placed a great deal of 
importance on effectively controlling the topic of prisons since it played such a prominent role 
in their rise to power, and the public identified them with the Nagle Commission. The political 
context of the prisons, still very fluid with the Royal Commission sitting and serious prison 
disturbances occurring, amplified a dispute near a small, rural prison camp into a highly visible, 
state political issue.   
 Another way the Royal Commission’s work affected this dispute was in the language 
that the residents adopted in many of their statements. In addition to challenging the 
government over how the Department’s policies affected local taxes, land valuation or farming 
competition with local farmers, they also took issue with camp management and penology. 
Their concern with escapes dealt with more than just how the community was alerted to a 
breach or the issue of reimbursement for damaged property. The resident activists made claims 
about the internal workings of the camp, the Department’s classification system, the economy 




not they counted as rehabilitation. The residents’ concern for these matters was surely not that 
deep or longstanding.  Yet, with all of these issues being routinely debated in the press 
accounts of the Royal Commission, it is hardly surprising that they focused on them and crafted 
their arguments with these concerns in mind. For example, several of the activists repeatedly 
disputed the wisdom of the Department’s plan to build a large Aberdeen Angus herd on the 
newly acquired land to train prisoners in the beef industry.1017 The market for beef, according 
to these farms, was depressed with many herders currently selling meat below their production 
costs. They believed that prisoner labor would never be able to compete in the shrinking 
market. Moreover, they claimed that most of these prisoners would never find employment in 
the industry with a surplus of trained workers without criminal records. Instead of wasting state 
funds on farming, they argued that the Department should focus more on the timber industry, 
among other things, which was more closely related to the camps’ longstanding afforestation 
projects.   
Haigh visited the area in May 1977 and met with local officials and a deputation of the 
activists, but he did not concede to any of their demands. He admitted that he and the 
Department had communicated poorly with local residents since the beginning of the 
expansion process, but stated that the camps were expanding and focusing more on beef cattle 
herding. Nevertheless, the minister agreed to recommend the creation of an additional police 
officer position in the area, and to increase the telephone lines between the camps and shire 
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officials to alert them of escapes. Haigh also said he would ask relevant officials about the 
possibility of providing compensation for property damage caused by escapees as well as 
finding ways to offset adverse effects on local tax revenues. However, Haigh balked at the idea 
of including community participation in screening procedures and population management, in 
general. They acknowledged that more thorough screening was a serious local concern, but 
provided little in the way of assurances or detailed information that this would be improved. 
Instead, the government proposed the creation of an Advisory Committee with representatives 
drawn from the Department, the shire council, the local Chamber of Commerce, sporting clubs, 
service clubs, churches, schools, hospital organizations and the Rosewood-Mannus Residents 
group.1018 It was to be the first of several such committees the Department of Corrective 
Services established to address the larger role that communities near prisons played in the new 
configuration and visibility of penal power.1019 
 
Conclusion 
The history and institutional governance structure of New South Wales, and to a lesser 
extent Australia in general, profoundly shaped how the state’s prison system transformed over 
the course of the 1970s. It also played a large role in the specific form the prison activist 
movement took in New South Wales and how the broader public came to know about life 
behind bars. Much of this can be seen in the overwhelming importance of the Royal 
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Commission into New South Wales Prisons. From the late 1960s until 1976, activists and critics 
of the Liberal-Country government campaigned for the establishment of a royal commission. 
Between 1976 and 1978, Justice John Nagle oversaw the Royal Commission, which revealed 
gross mismanagement, disclosed routine torture, empowered prisoners’ voices and 
recommended over two hundred specific changes. After Nagle tendered his report, the Royal 
Commission monitored some of the actions the Department of Corrective Services took on the 
recommendations through periodic update reports, but this did not last long. For the next 
decade, disputes over prison policy centered on how people interpreted Nagle’s report and 
whether or not certain reforms would be implemented.  
Perhaps the biggest dispute over the findings of the Royal Commission involved the 
possible persecution of officers for physical violence against prisoners. Nagle recommended 
that the state’s public prosecutor review the evidence, but stopped short of calling for 
prosecutions. The Labor government, under Neville Warn, also balked at the idea, but only after 
a long period of silence and inaction.1020 While some of their supporters demanded greater 
accountability for the officers, the most stalwart in this position were people in the prison 
movement who were politically far to the left of the Wran government and not a crucial part of 
their electoral coalition. However, Wran knew full well that pursing prosecutions risked a major 
walkout by prison officers and possibly lost votes from other public employee unions and more 
socially conservative members of the working class. Frustrated with the government’s 
intransigence, the Prisoners’ Action Group pursued a private prosecution of the officers named 
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in Nagle’s report only to fail in court.1021 Private prosecutions, while legal in New South Wales 
at the time, had become a rarity by the turn of the century as a public prosecutors representing 
the state subsumed this role. The Prisoners’ Action Group’s tactic spoke more to their anger, 
desperation and frustration after having their claims of official abuse widely acknowledged but 
ultimately dismissed. Abusing prisoners might be wrong, but not that wrong, and as many 
people argued, it was now in the past. 
Despite avoiding criminal sanction, some of the named officers were officially 
reprimanded, but none of them lost their jobs. Nevertheless, the state’s decision to sanction 
some officers drew condemnation and a labor strike from the officers’ union. It also cause 
protests by prisoners, which prison guards put down by force.1022 Industrial actions like this had 
become commonplace in horrible relationship between the Department of Corrective Services’ 
senior management and its lower level staff. The Prison Officers’ Vocational Branch (POVB) 
hated most of Nagle’s findings and recommendations and attempted to prevent many of the 
changes he endorsed in his report.1023 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the POVB used 
job walkouts at particular prisons to block changes in local practices as well as larger statewide 
actions to defeat broad policy changes they opposed.1024 Perhaps the most significant of these 
was Nagle’s recommendation to close Katingal, which he dubbed the “electronic zoo.” Instead 
of one central control unit, Nagle recommended adopting the British practice of using dispersal 
                                                          
1021 Ibid.; “Two Jail Officers to be Charged,” Sydney Morning Herald, (October 23, 1980); “Prison Officers Cleared of 
Charges,” Sydney Morning Herald, (January 21, 1981); George Zdenkowski, “Brett Collins – Prison Activist under 
Attack,” Legal Service Bulletin, 7 (June 1982), 137-138. 
1022 “Shots, Gas in Jail Riot: Four Prisoners Wounded, Taken to Hospital,” Sydney Morning Herald, (October 24, 
1980); “It’s Chaos Behind Those Walls,” The Sun-Herald, (October 26, 1980); “Chaos in State’s Jail System,” Sydney 
Morning Herald, (October 27, 1980). 
1023 Personal interview with Noel Day, former Deputy Chairman of the Corrective Services Commission, April 2009. 




units, essentially smaller control units located within the state’s maximum security prisons. 
Premier Neville Wran approved Katingal’s closure and the construction of dispersal units, but 
this policy failed to appease either the POVB, who frequently called for reopening Katingal, or 
prison activists, who viewed the dispersal units as simply smaller versions of Katingal with all 
the same dehumanizing problems. 
Even before Nagle submitted his final report, Wran relieved Walter McGeechan of his 
position as Commissioner of Corrective Services. This had been Nagle first recommendation, 
but he also suggested eliminating the position and replacing it with a five-member commission. 
The government created the new Corrective Services Commission and appointment Tony 
Vinson, a professor of social work and former parole officer, as its first chairman. Vinson 
strongly supported the changes advocated by Nagle and saw transforming the prison system as 
his major task. Vinson quickly discovered what McGeechan repeatedly complained about 
during his testimony before Nagle: the POVB simply blocked his plans through walkouts, 
disobedience, intimidation and leaking information to the press and political opposition. After 
only two and a half years, Vinson was relieved of his duties as his policies had generated 
numerous high-profile labor strikes and made for embarrassing exposés by the Sydney media. 
Vinson’s departure did not end the struggle between the POVB, the Corrective Services 
Commission, the government and the remaining prison activist groups. Even after the 
government defeated a 35-day statewide POVB walkout in 1984, the POVB was still a major 
player in the management of the state’s prisons.  
Unlike Pennsylvania, the judiciary in New South Wales played a minor role in the state’s 




Visiting Justices, the state’s courts deferred to prison authorities in the management of the 
penal institutions. Without the existence of constitutional provisions similar to those used by 
prisoners in American courts, there was very little legal basis for court intervention. This meant 
that federal courts in Australia simply did not have powers corresponding to American federal 
courts in relation to the states on matters of civil rights. This severely limited the ability for 
prisoners to seek the help of outside authorities and placed them under much stricter control 
of the Department of Corrective Services. The access that prisoners in Pennsylvania had to 
outside organizations, journalists and lawyers, while stark in its own way, exceeded the 
limitations placed on prisoners in New South Wales. This stifling level of control partly 
contributed the tension between staff and prisoners and the frequent outbursts of violence 
throughout the 1970s. The small size of Australian civil rights movement compared to the U.S. 
and its lack of focus on prison matters, meant that New South Wales did not have a large, 
longstanding campaign to reform prisons that existed for quite some time in the U.S. before the 
1970s.  
Such authoritarian control and lack of a large movement organized around race and civil 
rights made the Royal Commission all the more significant. Along with the February 1974 
uprising at Bathurst, the Royal Commission, opened the gates. Although, the institution of the 
royal commission itself demonstrated a degree of centralization that was absent in 
Pennsylvania. The sitting government appointed the Royal Commission. It was, in other words, 
not independent like the American judiciary. The legacy of this executive power is apparent on 
the official notice of the Royal Commission and its final report both of which were approved by 




Elizabeth II. Despite this degree of control, the Royal Commission’s work was much broader and 
thorough than that usually seen in American legal cases. Unlike any other twentieth century, 
Australian prison inquiry up to that point, it listened to prisoner accounts of life inside and 
treated them with respect. Most other inquiries, if they bothered to speak with prisoners at all, 
dismissed their views as unreliable or untruthful based on their status as criminal offenders. In 
these respects, the inquiry fundamentally changed the prison system in New South Wales and 




















Chapter 4: “Overcrowding is the Future of Corrections”: Prison Population and the Politics of 
Knowledge, Suffering and Prison Construction in Pennsylvania 
 
 
In light of the fact that all of the agencies and officials involved in recommending a new prison 
admit that the overcrowding problem is immediate, but only short term, and since a new prison 
is neither immediate nor short term, it does not seem to be the appropriate solution to the 
problem we are now facing. 
 
Sam McClea, Judiciary Committee Staff, 
House of Representatives, 19811025  
 
 
Pennsylvania’s increased reliance on incarceration to effect public safety has resulted in a prison 
and jail crowding crisis. Even though a decade of construction has increased our institutional 
capacity by 51%, construction has not kept pace with our incarceration policy. However, the 
simple truth is that it is highly unlikely that any governor or general assembly will advocate the 
kind of expenditures necessary to safety and humanely institutionalize all the offenders 
sentenced to prison and jail. It is just too costly. 
 
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and 
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Introduction: The Emergence of Persistent Overcrowding 
 
After the 1970 Independence Day violence at Philadelphia’s Holmesburg Prison, prison 
overcrowding emerged as one of the major new themes in penal discourse during the 1970s 
and 1980s. While no one exclusively blamed overcrowding for the violence at Holmesburg, 
prison officials, the district attorney and his staff and the courts, nevertheless, cited it as a 
major contributing factor, which also overtaxed staffing levels and the availability of programs 
and work for inmates. Despite this, they disagreed on who or what caused it and how to 
remedy it. Over the next two decades, a similar debate on prison overcrowding appeared 
across the state as most county penal systems stretched their capacities and the state’s prison 
system entered a period of protracted growth, which has not abated. The problem of prison 
overcrowding became more pronounced over the course of the 1970s and exploded as 
arguably the major problem in corrections during the 1980s and 1990s. It was a major theme of 
public discourse about prisons during the 1980s, but with some notable exceptions, the 
descriptions and metaphors used by state officials and journalists presented it as a technical 
problem. Prison administrators and political leaders tried to find the best way to reestablish 
balance to an admittedly very imbalanced system, but it was a managerial problem, amenable 
to managerial solutions. Prison population and capacity statistics provided perhaps the most 
powerful representation of this problem in this discourse. However, the phenomena these 
figures purported to quantify changed over time, revealing disagreements over the definitions 
of overcrowding, as well as the normative ratios of space and services to people from which 




This chapter is about this debate on prison overcrowding, how various actors 
conceptualized the problem of overcrowding and how it affected prison life and penal politics 
in Pennsylvania during the 1970s and especially the 1980s. In recent theory and historiography, 
scholars have treated prison overcrowding as a consequence of an overall shift in governing 
strategies in the wake of profound racial, economic and social change during the late twentieth 
century. Such work, focused on different analytical scales, explores the multiple origins of 
increased punitiveness and the growth of prison populations, but it rarely considers how prison 
overcrowding became a penological problem in itself during these decades and how various 
actors understood and endured it. I take a fourfold approach to exploring this topic by focusing 
first on the phenomenon of large increases in prison populations and some of the problems 
that arose by simply defining what actually constituted overcrowding. While I touch upon 
causal arguments for these increases, I am less interested in explaining the cause of increased 
prison populations. I find the multiple accounts in the existing sociological and historical 
literature convincing in this regard. I am much more interested in the types of arguments and 
understandings that actors deployed at the time regarding prison overcrowding because they 
were inseparable from the multiple strategies they developed to address the issue, whether 
this was finding a way to reduce the number of court commitments or finding a way to resolve 
disputes with one’s new cellmate. To be sure, many of these contemporary debates involved 
the types of causal arguments that became more common in subsequent scholarly work. Some 
are convincing, but I deal less with trying to evaluate their accuracy than situating them in a 




 First, a caveat about the term “overcrowding” and why I use it. Like a number of other 
common terms in penal discourse (like rehabilitation), overcrowding was often very ambiguous 
and condensed and drew upon numerous different meanings and facets of prison life. Yet, it 
was in most cases a term of governing, one that presumed a privileged vantage point, where a 
broad, if not entirely synoptic, vision surveyed the entire penal apparatus, marking deficits of 
space and services. Government officials, researchers and Pennsylvania’s major media forums 
conceptualized prison overcrowding almost exclusively in this way, as an administrative 
description usually expressed in systems metaphors. They occasionally also used the term 
“crowding,” but it was usually interchangeable with overcrowding. Each term referenced an 
abundance of prisoners exceeding the prison system’s operational capacity standards, which 
had been designed to optimally accommodate a certain number of imprisoned people. Once 
the number of prisoners crossed that threshold a litany of problems ensued, which disrupted 
many of the intended levels of services, security and safety. Sometimes, these elite actors 
discussed overcrowding as a problem caused by a deficit of prison capacity rather than too 
many prisoners. Such views formed a crucial part of proposals to build new prison cells. 
Regardless of how it was framed, these arguments implied the existence of predetermined 
optimum standards for the prolonged confinement of people as well as assumptions about 
what constituted imprisonable offenses. Thus, the debate about overcrowding often quietly 
pointed up these normative penological assumptions and the investments many people had in 




Foucault succinctly pointed out the assumptions and partiality of this term: “They tell us that 
the prisons are overcrowded. But what if the population is overimprisoned?”1027 
Much like many other common terms in political discourse, overcrowding carried other 
valences depending on its audiences and speakers. Prisoners often adopted the word 
overcrowding and other systems terminology in describing their plight, but usually added 
different meanings to it, reflecting their much different relationship to the problems of 
overcrowding. They often spoke of overcrowding in both a holistic way – it effected everything 
in their daily lives – and because of that, as an explanatory device, summarizing what had gone 
so terribly wrong inside the state’s institutions. More frequently, they expressed their 
frustrations with the current situation in words and ways that simply escaped the language of 
experts who did the most to define the public perception of overcrowding. At times they 
conceptualized the pains of imprisonment in large scale terms – a reaction against civil rights 
and latest iteration of America’s endemic racism, fostering punitive, exclusionary practices at 
multiple sites in the state apparatus, which channeled a greater number of poor, largely African 
American, young men into custody for ever longer periods of time. More often, prisoners 
described the immediacy of one of the many problems traceable to overcrowding, such as 
having to share a cell with other people, the increasing lapses in security or the prolonged 
waiting times for basic services.  
Despite their position, however, prisoners’ use of the term overcrowding still retained 
certain assumptions about the macro-order of a prison and prison system. Their views often 
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challenged the specific content of the assumptions of administrators, but the latter’s expertise 
and problem constructions, the built environment of the prison and its routines still established 
the terrain of this debate. In this sense, I see the presence of the term in prisoner or activist 
speech and publications as similar to their use of the word “riot.”1028 While lacking the 
pejorative qualities of that term, overcrowding, nevertheless, positioned incarcerated people as 
incarcerated people, objects of population to be managed, sorted and distributed in a secure, 
cost-effective and efficient way. With these points in mind, I use the term throughout this 
chapter. It was a common term in penal discourse at the time, which deserves analysis. I see no 
reason to discard it in favor of some more neutral term to describe this phenomenon, which I 
do not believe exists. Highlighting the conditions of its existence through its use offers a way to 
think about overcrowding as both a powerful concept in late modern penality and lived reality 
for imprisoned people and staff.1029  
                                                          
1028 A number of social historians and sociologists have usefully analyzed the pitfalls in accepting the term riot and 
its conventional understandings in the archive, which more often than not reflect the views of elites and the 
authorities tasked with restoring order. While accepting these arguments, many participants in “prison riots” 
displayed all the rationality of the subjects in crowds studied by Rudé, Thompson and Hobsbawn, but also adopted 
the term “riot” as their own, adding to it masculine qualities of valor, honor and strength in their opposition to 
prison authorities. Other prisoners, of course, were terrified of “riots” and viewed them in much the same way as 
elites, albeit with the much more immediate concern for their personal safety. George Rudé, The Crowd in History: 
A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964); E.P. 
Thompson, “Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present, 50 (February 1971), 
76-136. See also Alyssa Ribeiro, “‘A Period of Turmoil’: Pittsburgh’s April 1968 Riots and Their Aftermath,” Journal 
of Urban History, 39 (March 2013), 147-171. I take exception with Amanda I. Seligman’s recent call to use “neutral 
language” when describing conflicts, like riots or civil disorders. I do not believe that there is such a thing as neutral 
language in describing events like “civil disorders.” One can write a nuanced account of conflicts, using the terms 
of the time, while also pointing up the contemporary politics and silences of language. See her “‘But Burn—No’: 
The Rest of the Crowd in Three Civil Disorders in 1960s Chicago,” Journal of Urban History, 37 (March 2011), 230–
255. I thank David Pederson for pointing me to this issue and some of this literature. 
1029 I am indebted in this to William Roseberry’s understanding of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as a way to 
analyze historically specific forms of struggle rather than consent. “What hegemony constructs, then, is not a 
shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting 
upon social orders characterize by domination.” William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” 
in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation 




While overcrowding became a common term in penal discourse in Pennsylvania after 
the 1970 Holmesburg riot, it has been a perennial problem of prison management since the 
inception of the institution much like classification and the separation of prisoners. Even during 
times of excess capacity, it has always been one of the major preoccupations administrators, a 
possibility to anticipate and avoid. Pennsylvania’s state and county institutions have also had 
other periods of pronounced overcrowding. Although, these earlier episodes were usually 
short, lasting only a few years at most. County jails, especially in urban areas, were particularly 
prone to drastic population fluctuations because they mainly held detainers and people 
sentenced to short terms; a large influx of people could be met with an even greater exodus of 
people the following week. This volatility meant that it was not uncommon for some county 
jails to oscillate between periods of overcrowding and slack capacity in short periods of time. 
State prison populations by contrast remained much more stable. Since they largely consisted 
of people serving long sentences, population changes were more subdued.  
The increase in prison populations during the 1960s was not isolated to Philadelphia’s 
prisons, but it was also not yet a widespread problem in most other county penal systems or 
the state’s prisons. At the time, penologists like William Nagel of the Philadelphia-based 
American Foundation did not consider overcrowding to be an unusual or widespread problem 
in the state, but he believed it soon would be unless something was done to enhance the 
capacity of the state and county institutions.1030 Like many other prison administrators, he 
believed that the advance of the large postwar Baby Boom generation into their late teens and 
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twenties would likely increase the number of people committed to correctional authorities. In a 
study of the state’s county prisons for the American Foundation, Nagel determined that sixteen 
of Pennsylvania’s seventy county penal institutions were overcrowded on February 20, 
1964.1031 Many of these institutions were located in large metropolitan areas or smaller urban 
counties, like Dauphin County (Harrisburg), but even a few rural counties, like Clarion County, 
had stretched the capacity of their jails by the mid-1960s.1032 The state Bureau of Correction as 
a whole, operated well below the crowding threshold Nagel used (discussed below) even if 
some of the individual institutions in the state system, like SCI Camp Hill near Harrisburg, 
exceeded it at the time.1033  
In retrospect, these problems would be the beginning of a long period of prison 
population growth that eventually spread to most secure penal institutions in the state, in both 
county and state jurisdictions. As this occurred, disagreement and debate about how to define 
and measure overcrowding, let alone counter it, also began to appear with greater frequency in 
penal agency reports, legislative hearings, public commentary and activist campaigns. For much 
of the postwar period, the definitions of acceptable accommodation were fairly stable and 
uncontroversial among most prison professionals who, in addition, had a firmer grip on the few 
public discussions about this topic that took place. Some aspects, like the principle of one 
person, one cell, were in fact quite old. Established in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, this practice famously formed the basis of a specific theory and method of penal 
reformation – the Pennsylvania model of cellular isolation. According to its advocates, isolation 
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and enforced silence severed a criminal’s relationship with corruptive associates and habits, 
forced him to confront his guilt and begin the process of personal and spiritual redemption.1034 
The state’s penal code incorporated the principle of one person, one cell, and it continued to 
govern penal accommodation through the 1970s. This was by no means a universally accepted 
standard. Most prisons in the world during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
did not separate prisoners in this manner and many still do not. Even in places where this is the 
standard, short-term detention centers (jails and immigration centers) often hold prisoners in 
large groups as a matter of routine policy.  
The principle of one prisoner, one cell was not a sufficient metric of prison capacity for 
many administrators even in Pennsylvania, however. Managing a prison also required the 
flexibility to move prisoners within the institution, separate them as needed and accommodate 
an unknown number of new arrivals. In a 1965 American Foundation report, penologist William 
Nagel argued that prison administrators needed to have ten percent of an institution’s cells 
available as “breathing space” for these reasons. Thus, he defined a prison utilizing over ninety 
percent of its cell space as overcrowded.1035 This was a very pragmatic definition, based as 
much on Nagel’s own experience as a prison superintendent than any consensus in the field, 
but it would have found support among many senior prison staff who dealt with similar 
concerns on a daily basis.   
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University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 




If some facets of overcrowding appeared relatively straightforward, like having more 
than one person in a cell, other indications of overcrowding were more ambiguous and open to 
greater interpretation. As the Bureau of Correction developed a greater set of rehabilitation 
programs, training opportunities and activities for prisoners, these services also became 
incorporated into the standard expectations of accommodation, and thus, notions of 
overcrowding, as well. These services were never as comprehensive as policy statements would 
have had the public believe, but they informed the notions of care and living standards that 
effected people confined in the state’s prisons and jails. When they could not be met because 
they were thinly spread across too many people, they affected the perception of crowding by 
staff and prisoners alike. Extensive waiting lists for programs and long lines for meals and sick 
call were a recurrent feature of overcrowded prisons by the 1980s. Similarly, methods of 
prisoner management and security changed considerably over the course of the twentieth 
century. The standards of supervision and time out of cells not only went through considerable 
flux as prison regimes liberalized after World War II, but these routines, or rather their deficits, 
also informed notions of overcrowding. These normative qualities of imprisonment where not 
systematically quantified in the 1960s and 1970s, but many other aspects of prison operations 
were increasingly subjected to this type of knowledge production. 
The Bureau of Correction began publishing monthly and annual statistical reports 
covering a variety of population categories during the 1970s. Prior to this time, such statistics 
were not as comprehensive or widely available and the range of categories they tracked was 
limited. Once the Bureau devoted greater attention to this form of knowledge, the number of 




the ensuing years. Yet, seemingly basic knowledge proved to be difficult to establish. Nothing 
demonstrates this more than the effort the Bureau devoted to the question of how many 
prisoners it had in its institutions. The constant movement of prisoners proved to be a 
fundamental obstacle in this project. Prisoners frequently moved in and out of the Bureau’s 
immediate care, if not legal custody. Sometimes, they transferred prisoners to private hospitals 
or those operated by the Department of Welfare; sometimes, they moved prisoners back to 
county jails as part of legal proceedings; sometimes prisoners left penal institutions on 
furlough, work release or bereavement leave. Where was a person who was moving between 
different prisons considered to be for the purposes of counting his or her presence?  
In the hopes of gauging the overall population amid this flow, the Bureau developed 
numerous measurements, temporal snapshots and averages of the number of people in its 
custody. Individual prisons created daily population figures, based on counts by guards at 
regular inmate musters, which were designed to thwart escapes as much as anything else. 
Prisoners had to be accounted for as a routine part of institutional security, but these counts 
also inform weekly population figures, which the Bureau used to finesse transfers between the 
different institutions. The Bureau also produced monthly averages for each prison and end-of-
month totals. The Bureau monitored new court commitments and broke down most population 
figures into subsets categorized by race, age, sex, offense category and sentence length among 
other groupings. Penal officials and researchers represented overcrowding through a number 
of these categories, but most assessments of the state of overcrowding focused on the year-




At different points, the Bureau calculated these figures in different ways, which makes 
historical comparisons difficult. Sometimes, officials revised past summations when they 
adopted new calculating practices, but this was not a uniform practice or legal requirement. 
The historical depth of these statistics also varied between the reports with certain years 
eventually disappearing, making the problem of overcrowding, not only more presentist, but 
also appear normal when the earlier years of lower prison populations were simply excluded in 
the reports.1036 By the mid-to-late 1980s, the statistical reports showed a trend of consistently 
overcrowded prisons. The report for 1985 only went as far back as 1980.1037  One can only 
speculate what the figures would be for these now missing years because they would have to 
be recalculated according to the most current criteria, assuming of course, that such criteria 
were unproblematic. These counting variations also involved a trend toward greater 
disaggregation of the inmate population into ever more specific categories in the hopes of 
better understanding and managing the mass of confined people.  
Thus, drawing on annual statistical reports to show the increasing numbers over a 
period of years (see Figure 3.1) misses how much effort Bureau staff and penal researchers 
expended in trying to understand and represent prison populations. Some of this effort can be 
gleaned from, ironically, the amount of space in the statistical reports devoted to just 
representing the shortfall of space in the prisons. Over the course of the 1970s, the Bureau’s 
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personnel began featuring prison capacity utilization for each prison along with population 
totals until prison capacity became a standard, standalone category in the reports by the early 
1980s.1038 In addition, a new statistical category permanently appeared in these later reports – 
capacity deficits (see Figure 3.2). This gap between capacity and population became a new 
statistical entity in itself to track over time and informed proposals for new cell construction – 
efforts to close the gap (see Figure 3.3 and 3.4). What counted as “capacity” itself also 
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Table 3: Pennsylvania average daily prison population, 1960-2005 
 
Table 3. Pennsylvania Average Daily Prison Population, 1960-2005. Source: Pennsylvania 










































Table 4. Tracking capacity shortfalls. Source: Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 1990 

















Year Number of Inmates Capacity Capacity Utilization % 
1980 8,243    8969 91.9 
1981 9,420    8959 105.1 
1982 10,572    8975 117.8 
1983 11,798    9451 124.8 
1984 13,126    9907 132.5 
1985 14,260  10742 132.7 
1986 15,227  11048 137.8 
1987 16,302  12447 131.0 
1988 17,929   12972 138.2 
1989 20,490   13825 148.2 






Table 5: County jail average daily population and capacity, 1980-1989 
 
 
Table 6: Department of Corrections year-end population and capacity, 1980-1989 
 
Table 5 and 6. Minding the gap. The discrepancy between actual jail and prison populations 
compared to actual jail and prison capacity. Source: Reproduced from Pennsylvania Commission 
on Crime and Delinquency, Corrections Overcrowding Committee, Containing Pennsylvania 
Offenders: The Final Report of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency 





Senior staff in both the Bureau of Correction and the administrations of Gov. Milton 
Shapp (1971-1979) and Gov. Dick Thornburgh (1979-1987) devoted greater resources to this 
effort to better understand the state’s prison population throughout this period. By the late 
1970s, the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency also made understanding the 
causes of prison overcrowding one of its major priorities. While most researchers, government 
officials and legislators knew that dealing with overcrowding would involve multiple strategies, 
they saw prison construction as a major component of any strategy. The research accumulated 
over the 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated that the increase in prisoners would last for at 
least a decade before falling and new, harsh sentencing laws would add even more prisoners to 
the state’s already overcrowded system. The research not only buttressed proposals for 
building new cells, it also highlighted the geographic areas within the state that produced the 
most court commitments to prison and the areas that where the Bureau often had to move 
prisoners for activities like court appearances, medical evaluation, education and work release. 
Among many others. Gov. Thornburgh, his immediate policy advisors and the leadership of the 
Bureau of Correction believed that any new prison construction designed to deal with 
overcrowding had to accommodate areas of need in the system and hopefully better facilitate 
the use of cell space elsewhere in the system.  
Consequently, the Thornburgh administration attempted to locate a new prison in the 
Pittsburgh area, which would assume the tasks of classification for Pennsylvania’s western 
governmental catchment zone and provide sorely mental health treatment for disturbed 




population. In addition to the new cell space, the proposed prison would also remove many of 
the seriously mentally ill prisoners from other prisons, who had begun to cause increasing 
difficulties for prison staff who, because of recent mental health legislation, could no longer 
transfer most people to state hospitals. The classification functions of the new prison would 
also enhance the distribution of prisoners to the appropriate levels of security and reduce the 
overuse of maximum-security prisons. This strategy soon foundered, however, on resistance 
from local communities in Pittsburgh who protested the closure and planned conversion of an 
old state hospital into the new prison. The quest to locate a place for the “missing prison,” in 
the words of one administration official, spoke to one of the unforeseen problems of prison 
overcrowding and the strategies designed to address it.1040 
 
System Analysis, the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency and the Problem of 
Overcrowding 
 
From the late 1970s onward, the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency 
(PCCD), devoted a considerable amount of its resources and time to understanding the causes 
of prison overcrowding in Pennsylvania’s penal institutions and developing strategies to address 
them. This project, and the existence of the PCCD itself, originated in the unprecedented, 
federal interventions into criminal justice policymaking during the 1960s. While crime and law 
enforcement recurrently appear in state and local politics, they rarely played much of a role in 
                                                          
1040 "The Missing Prison," Harold Miller to Rick Stafford, January 19, 1982, Dick Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 





national policy debates and electoral campaigns until the 1960s. As a number of scholars have 
argued, the issues of crime and law enforcement dovetailed with contemporary debates on 
racial discrimination and civil rights, but as Naomi Murakawa points out, these “foundational 
years for federal crime politics” were not simply a “backlash” against Great Society liberalism. 
Rather, they emerged from longstanding strategies of resistance to African American civil rights 
and in many ways resembled earlier iterations of how crime and punishment articulated white 
supremacy.1041  
Viewed in this manner, it is easier to understand why President Johnson’s landslide 
victory in the 1964 presidential elections failed to diminish the appeal of the issue of crime and 
law and order rhetoric, which Barry Goldwater and George Wallace had each made a 
centerpiece of their campaigns.1042 Johnson and the Democratic-controlled Congress tried to 
claim this issue, however, by devising an extensive federal crime program to compliment other 
Great Society anti-poverty initiatives. The Law Enforcement and Assistance Act of 1965, one of 
the first major pieces of legislation on his matter, established the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance, which distributed federal funds to local law enforcement agencies for crime-fighting 
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programs. President Johnson still desired a larger federal role in crime control and established 
the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1965 to study the nature 
of contemporary crime and law enforcement and build greater support for more extensive 
legislation. 
By 1968, however, the issue of crime had only worsened for President Johnson and 
liberals, in general. Widely publicized results from national polls showed that many Americans 
believed crime had increased, and they often equated it with civil rights protests and urban 
rioting, which had dramatically increased since 1965.1043 President Johnson’s proposed crime 
legislation, which relied on much of the Commission’s work, met stiff resistance from 
Congressional Republicans and Southern Democrats. Among other things, President Johnson’s 
Congressional opponents objected to the proposed legislation’s direct provision of federal, 
crime-fighting funding to localities through the use of categorical grants.1044 The administration 
had used this same funding practice in other Great Society programs as a way to bypass 
administration opponents in state governments and build coalitions in large urban centers. In 
its revisions, Congress substituted block grants to state governments for the categorical grants, 
which removed the direct influence of administration liberals over the use of the funds. It also 
empowered governors to appoint members to newly created state planning agencies, which 
decided how to distribute federal crime-control monies.1045 Ironically, the President’s 
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Commission also endorsed this method of distributing federal funds, albeit quietly. In their 
view, the county’s law enforcement agencies were deeply fragmented and the lacked the 
necessary degree of coordination between the police, the courts and corrections agencies to 
support the development of rational crime control practices.1046 The Commission’s members 
worried that categorical grants directly to local governments would only exacerbate this 
problem. Johnson, now a lame-duck president mired in Vietnam and urban riots, grudgingly 
signed the legislation. The new law expanded the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, 
renaming it the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) and created a state-level 
institutional framework for managing and distributing LEAA funds.  
In Pennsylvania, Gov. Raymond Shafer created the Pennsylvania Crime Commission as 
the state’s planning agency for LEAA block grants on the day the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act passed.1047 In 1970, Gov. Shafer created another agency, the Pennsylvania 
Criminal Justice Planning Board, to exclusively fulfill this task because the Pennsylvania Crime 
Commission had some potentially conflicting duties.1048 Upon assuming office in 1971, Gov. 
Milton Shapp renamed the agency the Governor’s Justice Commission.1049 The central state 
agency utilized smaller regional planning councils to help evaluate local funding applications, 
distribute funds and monitor projects undertaken by local law enforcement agencies, 
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researchers and private criminal justice organizations across the state over the course of the 
1970s. Many of the funding recipients included county penal agencies. For instance, Warden 
William Robinson, the future Pennsylvania Commissioner of Correction, obtained LEAA funding 
from the Governor’s Justice Commission to create and implement a new classification system 
for the Allegheny County Jail in Pittsburgh.1050  
While LEAA funding helped launch numerous crime control and treatment programs 
across the state, it also became a major political resource and point of contention. The fights 
over appointments to the state agency and regional councils, as well as disputes over funding 
proposals, soon replicated at the state level many of the concerns over the political use of the 
crime program that members of Congress and the Johnson administration initially aired during 
the legislative wrangling over the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.1051 Gov. Shapp’s 
handling of the Governor’s Justice Commission drew criticism and charges of partisanship from 
people such as U.S. Attorney Dick Thornburgh and later Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo. Mayor 
Rizzo actually demanded the power to appoint all the members of the Philadelphia regional 
council.1052 The central agency and regional councils emerged as new sites for political 
patronage and internal disputes between factions of the state’s Democratic Party, both of 
which were rife in Pennsylvania during the 1970s.1053 Even Shapp’s Attorney-General, Robert 
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1051 Gest, Crime & Politics, 24.    
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Kane, publicly criticized the governor’s use of LEAA funds for a controversial corruption 
investigation of Philadelphia police, which Shapp abruptly terminated once it appeared a major 
discrediting exposé was at hand.1054  
These political disputes at the state and local level underscored two major problems 
signaled by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 
First, the Commission argued that the instructional structure of American criminal justice was 
deeply fragmented into numerous overlapping and competing agencies. This administrative 
structure exacerbated conflicts between officials and their respective political interests and 
local party organizations. This type of conflict was especially pronounced in Pennsylvania. After 
civil service reforms eliminated most of the state’s political patronage positions in the early 
1970s, party organizations struggled to find a new currency of political influence to cement 
coalitions and punish rivals.1055 Appointments to regional planning councils and funding 
approvals for crime-control programs provided just this source of legitimate reward. The 
second problem, related to the first, was that there were not enough experienced personnel in 
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the states who could serve in planning agencies, evaluate crime control programs, craft 
comprehensive plans and successfully manage large federal funds.1056 Federal officials worried 
that many members of state planning agencies and regional councils would only represent the 
views and financial desires of their respective law enforcement agencies (police departments 
were usually overrepresented) or political coalitions rather than approaching the problem of 
crime in a systemic or holistic manner.1057 In short, the Commission worried that the project of 
criminal justice planning suffered from a lack of competent professionals, the influence of 
parochial interests and a labyrinth of bureaucracies and programs.  
President Johnson and his Democratic allies in Congress may have failed to nationalize 
crime control in the way that they had envisioned, but the nature of administrative 
fragmentation and the desire for greater standardization became a central concern throughout 
the administration of criminal justice.1058 These problems – more problems of the proper 
government of crime than crime itself – revealed a preoccupation with the nature of order, 
interconnections and cohesive action common in contemporary systems analogies and 
thinking. Historian Howard Brick has noted that such systems-oriented understandings of 
nature and society “appeared promiscuously throughout elite culture” during the 1960s, after 
gaining influence in government and the academy during massive mobilizations of World War 
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II.1059 For criminal justice reformers and planners, this problem construction placed a premium 
on research, knowledge and pragmatic interventions that addressed how best to conceptualize 
and overcome the hurdles of administrative fragmentation.  
This type of criminal justice knowledge and problemization came from a new set of 
experts who were neither well-versed in the sociological or criminological traditions nor 
knowledgeable about the practice of penology. Yet, the federal government’s attempt to 
nationalize the issue of crime empowered these experts whose synoptic, pragmatic knowledge 
made them invaluable technical analysts and planners. Chief among these new intellectuals was 
Dr. Alfred Blumstein, a member of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, who became increasingly influential in Pennsylvania during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Blumstein did not originally work on criminal justice issues, but the reputation of his 
work in operations research and systems analysis for the military brought him to the attention 
of Department of Justice officials who perceived the usefulness of a similar systematic approach 
to crime control. This led to Blumstein’s appointment to the President's Commission where he 
became the Director of the Science and Technology Task Force.1060 In Chapter 11 of The 
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Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Blumstein and his staff advocated a greater use of the 
insights of systems analysis and operation research to understand the interrelationship 
between criminal justice entities and how deficits of coordination and integration between 
these sites contributed to haphazard and ineffective crime-control policies. Blumstein’s Task 
Force produced one of the most lasting artifacts of the Commission, a famous flowchart, 
representing the many different agencies and temporal stages of governing crime as an 
integrated criminal justice system (Figure 4.1). Authors and officials often abbreviated this 
institutional formation as the “CJS.”  
 
 
Figure 13: Sequences of events in the criminal justice system 
 
Figure 13. Systems analysis representation of the criminal justice system and it temporal 







This flowchart was a crucial intellectual tool in Blumstein’s approach to the problems of 
criminal justice, including prison overcrowding. In major works funded by the President’s 
Commission and later the LEAA, Blumstein and several of his colleagues introduced numerous 
similar models representing criminal justice agencies as an interrelated, if not well-integrated, 
system in which “units of flow” (i.e. arrestees, defendants, prisoners) passed through various 
processing stages (such as the courts, prison, and parole) incurring certain amounts of work and 
cost at each stage.1061 Using these models, Blumstein and his colleagues sought to demonstrate 
how some of the persistent problems in the criminal justice administration could be addressed 
by tracing the impact of multiple decisions at different stages along this process. This was a 
crucial intervention. It not only established a generic model of evaluation and analysis, but 
through repetition and enactment in various programs, it brought the “criminal justice system” 
into being as a coherent, institutional object to be studied and acted upon. This is not to say the 
various criminal justice institutions ever closely resembled the models in the work of Blumstein 
and his colleagues, either alone or as a group, but the ascendance of such models authorized 
certain understandings and interventions, precluded others, and eventually pulled the entire 
field of criminal justice toward greater integration. In terms of how state officials allocated 
resources and prioritized certain penological goals, it did not matter much that police, courts, 
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social welfare organizations, jails, prisons and hospitals were not the coherent formation 
desired by planners. In fact, this deficit actually propelled greater discursive elaboration and 
action along this line of thought.   
By the early 1970s, Blumstein had moved to Pittsburgh from Virginia and became the 
director of the Urban Systems Institute at Carnegie Mellon University. While he and several of 
his co-authors still produced reports for national criminal justice audiences based on national 
data sources, they also began highly detailed empirically studies of Pennsylvania's criminal 
justice agencies and even those located in Allegheny County.1062 One of Blumstein’s primary 
areas of interest was in developing practical tools for criminal justice planning agencies to 
evaluate newly proposed programs. He saw prediction and modeling tools as especially useful 
for understanding the relationships of prison populations to other institutional areas and the 
forces affecting their fluctuation over time. The first major product of the research undertaken 
by Blumstein and his colleagues was a computer program, the Justice Simulation (JUSSIM), that 
enabled state planners to establish a baseline of the current costs and workloads of a set of 
integrated criminal justice agencies, then project the consequences of policy changes.1063 
In several versions of the JUSSIM program and a host of other models, these researchers 
largely conceptualized the process of flow in a unidirectional fashion. This was a common motif 
in operations research in other areas of government and industry. Effects of actions on one 
stage became noticeable in subsequent stages, eventually accumulating into major problems 
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toward what would appear to be "the end" of the criminal justice apparatus. Blumstein and his 
colleagues knew the unidirectional flow of their models potentially limited their use, but they 
had difficulty in conceptualizing actions that escaped this predominate direction of flow. 
Conceiving such issues as "upstream" problems or the products of "feedback loops" drew 
attention to these difficulties, but still maintained most of the focus on the production of 
“downstream” effects.1064 Blumstein advocated an intervention strategy that stressed changing 
the behavior of actors located institutionally further upstream. As the flowchart in Figure 1 
indicates, the agencies at the end of the process were in the area of Corrections. Blumstein’s 
expertise and the knowledge he and his colleagues produced, therefore, held particular 
relevance for the study of systemic problems originating in other areas of the criminal justice 
system, which later affected prisons. Despite this targeting of decision points along a chain of 
interconnected “people-processing organizations,”1065 the work of Blumstein and his colleagues 
often treated this topic like a natural process. The hard work of changing the behavior of 
bureaucrats or the political and ethical struggles over policies and law enforcement tactics at 
times appeared in these studies more like the technical decisions of dam or canal construction 
– the task at hand was to locate the best points from which to hinder or redirect the river of 
people flowing through criminal justice agencies.1066       
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Several of Blumstein’s colleagues affiliated with the Urban Systems Institute used the 
JUSSIM computer program to help evaluate the effects of new policies on a series of agencies 
they identified as the Allegheny County Criminal Justice System. One of their first areas of 
analysis was to project changes to the detentioner population in the Allegheny County Jail if 
greater information was available to judges in making their decisions on granting bail.1067 In a 
1973 article on the project for the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, the lead 
author, Jacqueline Cohen, and the rest of the project team argued that the use of JUSSIM in 
situations like this could actually reduce the harm of incarceration to many people while also 
saving the county a large amount of money by highlighting intervention points in upstream 
areas to reduce the jail population.1068  
Perhaps just as importantly, they extolled the depoliticizing effects of adopting a system 
analysis approach and tools like JUSSIM for program evaluation and planning. Cohen and her 
co-authors argued that the planning agencies created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act were inherently political and often consisted of representatives of opposing law 
enforcement agencies.1069 Proposals for new programs invariability generated conflicts 
between advocates and opponents, but also often created a third group of neutral committee 
members who, according to the essay’s authors, were “much more sensitive to the empirical 
issues of any particular proposal.”1070 The JUSSIM program and systems analysis, in general, 
would empower this group, reduce political stalemates and facilitate the flow of funding to the 
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most meritorious programs. The fruits of the project soon became incorporated into the 
Allegheny Regional Planning Council, which hired a fulltime staff member who was proficient in 
the use of JUSSIM.1071 This project further embedded the systems analysis problem 
conceptualizations, modeling and planning tools into, not only this specific regional council, but 
also later the Governor’s Justice Commission. It also emphasized the benefits of approaching 
these problems from a deliberately apolitical, technocratic perspective. During a time when 
scandals, corruption and accusations of illicit patronage were rife in state and local 
government, such a position held a great deal of appeal for people who sought to 
fundamentally reshape criminal justice policy and “clean up” government, like U.S. Attorney 
Dick Thornburgh, a rising influence in Pennsylvania’s Republican Party.           
The influence of system analyses in criminal justice policymaking in Pennsylvania, 
especially in the area of corrections, also grew from the mid-1970s because of the declining 
faith in rehabilitation and the concurrent rise of concerns about security, resource allocation 
and labor relations. By 1974, Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Correction was mainly trying to defend 
and consolidate some of its community corrections programs while tightening security practices 
throughout its institutions. Major initiatives in the name of rehabilitation or reintegration had 
largely become a thing of the past. Gov. Shapp’s dismissal of Stuart Werner, the liberal 
Commissioner of Correction, in 1975 effectively brought to an end the introduction of new 
innovative reintegration programs that had commenced in the last few years of Arthur Prasse’s 
tenure and continued through much of Allyn Sielaff and Werner’s leadership. Many people in 
the legislature, media and criminal justice fields interpreted Shapp’s appointment of the more 
                                                          




conservative William Robinson a few months later as a penological retrenchment, if not 
outright disavowal, of the reforms introduced by Robinson’s predecessors.1072  
In addition, prison populations in the Bureau of Correction began to rise every year by 
the mid-1970s, matching a trend that was already occurring in many of the state’s county jails. 
The rapid growth of incarcerated populations strained the resources of the Bureau of 
Correction and county penal agencies, including personnel, as hiring did not keep pace with 
prison population growth. This diluted the level of supervision by guards and service provision 
by other staff, which increased security problems, like drug-trafficking, assaults and idleness. As 
institutional living and working conditions declined, the threat and reality of both judicial 
intervention and labor strife increased. This placed additional emphasis on population 
management, stretching correctional budgets and maintaining institutional order - all of which 
were more amenable to governance with the type of systematic, synoptic knowledge being 
produced by Alfred Blumstein and his colleagues.     
In 1978, the Republican, Dick Thornburgh, defeated former Pittsburgh Mayor Pete 
Flaherty in Pennsylvania’s gubernatorial election. Thornburgh, a former prosecutor, 
campaigned explicitly on a law and order and anti-corruption platform, attacking the record of 
both the Shapp administration and the Democratic-controlled General Assembly for their 
unwillingness to clamp-down on both malfeasance and street crime.1073 Upon assuming office, 
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Thornburgh pursued a number of major crime control policies and assembled a close circle of 
advisors in the Governor’s Office, including many researchers from Carnegie Mellon’s Urban 
System Institute. Alfred Blumstein joined the administration as Thornburgh’s choice for the first 
Chairman of the newly created Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD), 
which succeeded the Governor's Justice Commission.1074 Several of Blumstein’s students and 
co-authors followed him into state government or found receptive audiences for their work 
with administration officials. Jacqueline Cohen, Daniel Nagin, Richard Stafford and Harold Miller 
co-authored several reports, working papers, and peer-reviewed journal articles that became 
very influential in the Thornburgh administration's criminal justice planning.1075 Miller, Nagin 
and Stafford joined the Thornburgh administration as trusted advisors holding key positions as 
the Director of the Office of Planning and Policy (Miller), Deputy Secretary for Fiscal Policy and 
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Analysis in the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (Nagin), and the Secretary of Legislative 
Affairs (Stafford).1076  
Together, these experts brought with them a set of penological assumptions and 
knowledge practices that complimented Dick Thornburgh’s reputation as a stern prosecutor 
and advocate for more retributive sentencing and punishment practices. By the time Gov. 
Thornburgh assumed office, the commitment to rehabilitation among correctional 
professionals nationwide had significantly deteriorated. Thornburgh and his staff viewed this 
moment as a major departure and hoped to fundamentally reorient all major aspects of 
Pennsylvania’s penal policy, from sentencing, to corrections, to parole. The title of a collection 
of essays, co-edited by Harold Miller, the director of Thornburgh’s Office of Planning and Policy, 
aptly described this moment as Corrections at a Crossroads.1077 
This view was hardly isolated to Thornburgh and his immediate advisors. Legislators 
from both parties proposed a series of new sentencing laws from the mid-1970s onward 
designed to reduce sentencing variations, increase penalties and lengthen the actual time many 
offenders spent behind bars. In 1976, both houses of the General Assembly embarked on a 
major legislative effort to create mandatory-minimum sentences for a range of serious 
offenses. A bill in the House of Representatives to increase legal protection for people whose 
leased property was stolen morphed of several revisions into a vehicle for increasing penalties 
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for other offenses, including robbery, arson and rape.1078 The Senate and House eventually 
targeted the bill toward creating longer sentences for habitual felons, but it failed to reach a 
vote in the House, with too many members fearing what one source reported as an estimated 
$28 million price tag for the expected increase in prison populations.1079 The following year the 
General Assembly enacted, with Gov. Shapp’s signature, a new law increasing penalties for the 
production and distribution of illegal drugs. The law also instated a sentencing commission, 
which was tasked with developing sentencing guidelines to reduce the disparity of sentences 
and the discretion of judges.1080 Despite their disagreements about the best way to reform 
sentencing, most members of the Republican and Democratic caucuses in the General 
Assembly agreed that the state’s longstanding indeterminate sentencing structure and 
discretion afforded to judges and parole boards needed to be curtailed. While some more 
liberal representatives hoped this could potentially reduce prison populations, most legislators 
and officials in the incoming administration desired exactly the opposite.  
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In 1979, the newly elected Thornburgh ignored the sentencing commission, preferring 
instead to push his own mandatory minimum sentencing bill through the legislature.1081 The 
governor and his team rolled out a large public information campaign with a new sentencing 
proposal and Thornburgh, himself, gave numerous speeches and interviews about the 
mandatory-minimum proposal. In many of his remarks, Thornburgh drew upon the civil rights 
discourse, identified with victims, and tried to harness public fear and vindictiveness. In his 
words, the new sentencing reform was:   
 
Designed to put fear to work for the citizen and not for the criminal. Designed to 
insure that first civil right that all of us are entitled to, the right to be free from 
fear in our homes, on our streets and in our communities.1082 
 
 
The governor’s proposal required five year minimum imprisonment terms for crimes involving a 
firearm, repeat violent offenders, and crimes committed on or near public transportation.1083 
People convicted of a third violent offense would automatically receive a sentence of life 
imprisonment.1084 Thornburgh also attacked discretionary forms of release. He discontinued 
                                                          
1081 “Thornburgh Seeks Major Changes in Sentencing,” Pittsburgh Press, (April 28, 1981); Kramer and Ulmer, 
Sentencing Guidelines, 18-19, 33-34. 
1082 “in Pittsburgh State Committee GOP Dinner,” 8-9. Republican State Committee, Pittsburgh, PA, October 28, 
1981. Dick Thornburgh Papers. UPASC. Available at: http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?c=thornspeeches;cc=thornspeeches;g=thorntext;xc=1;xg=1;q1=crime%20package;op2=and;idno=AIS9830.11.0
1.0117;rgn=full%20text;didno=AIS9830.11.01.0117;view=pdf;seq=0001. Last checked July 16, 2015. These themes 
of putting fear to work for the citizen and the first civil right being freedom from the fear of crime ran throughout 
numerous speeches and public statements by Thornburgh. He repeats them again in his memoirs. See Thornburgh, 
Where the Evidence Leads, 157. 
1083 The statute defined violent offenses as third degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary deviate 
sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault and kidnapping or attempts to commit any of these. Senate Bill 
1081 P.N 1515, Session of 1981, An Act amending Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania 
Consolidated Statutes, further providing for the imposition of certain mandatory sentences. Available at: 
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=1981&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=1081. Last 





the practice of granting pardons to people serving life sentences and advocated abolishing the 
current parole system altogether.1085  
As part of their work on the mandatory minimum legislation, Thornburgh’s team of 
policy analysts focused on trying to understand fluctuations in prison populations and 
forecasting their future growth. This departed from the approach taken by the independent 
Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission. While the Commission’s end product was surely going to 
result in greater prison commitments and lengthier sentences, the agency’s enabling legislation 
actually avoided consideration of prison capacity in devising the new sentencing guidelines.1086 
Gov. Thornburgh’s policy team, however, tied the mandatory minimum legislation to a funding 
provision for additional prison construction based on their best estimates about the growth of 
the state’s prison population. Thornburgh and his staff claimed that doing so would minimize 
prison overcrowding caused by the sentencing changes and avoid federal litigation of prison 
conditions. To do otherwise, they argued, would have simply been “irresponsible.”1087  
In their campaign for the new crime legislation, however, Thornburgh and 
administration officials avoided discussing the Bureau of Correction’s current shortfall of prison 
space. Early internal drafts of press releases directly acknowledged that the state’s prisons were 
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overcrowded, but this format never reached the press. Gov. Thornburgh’s edited version of the 
draft eliminated any mention of overcrowding, his red pen marks completely crossing out a 
section titled, “How Serious Is Overcrowding in the State Prison System?”1088 In public 
statements about sentencing legislation, overcrowding was a potential future problem that the 
administration wisely sought to avoid with additional prison construction. Dwelling on the issue 
in the present or in relation to the mandatory minimum bill would only hand ammunition to 
administration critics.  
Yet, forecasting the size of prison populations and their future change was both a 
relatively new endeavor and speculative at best. Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins note in 
their study on the “scale of imprisonment” that correctional forecasting only became common 
in the 1970s as the object of study - prison populations - began to rise for several consecutive 
years.1089 Correctional authorities in many jurisdictions tried to project their future prison space 
needs with simple linear models, which assumed the continuation of readily observable trends 
in a small sample of immediately preceding years. These models had limited value since they 
were basically static and had no way of accounting for any change in the trends used in crafting 
them.1090 More sophisticated models soon appeared, but this emerging body of research was 
still limited as it usually only tried to analyze the effects of specific pieces of sentencing 
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legislation in isolation from other factors that affected the size of prison populations.1091 By the 
time the Thornburgh administration began serious work on this issue, correctional forecasting 
was a clearly a nascent science at best, with few models and a scant research literature. 
Nevertheless, a branch of the research program pursued by Alfred Blumstein and his 
colleagues at Carnegie Mellon’s Urban System Institute dealt with historical variations in the 
size of prison populations and incarceration rates. Drawing on national imprisonment statistics 
(and later more detailed data from Pennsylvania), Blumstein and his student researchers at 
Carnegie Mellon published a series of articles in the 1970s in which they argued that 
incarceration rates in the United States for most of the 20th century fluctuated within a narrow 
range, always returning to a mean rate of around 110 prisoners per 100,000 people. They 
theorized that various criminal justice agencies behaved in a self-regulating manner over time, 
which maintained the level of incarceration with an acceptable, societal norm.1092 According to 
this homeostatic theory of imprisonment, jurisdictions might differ from each other in terms of 
this mean level of incarceration, but these levels reflected the stable norm for that jurisdiction.  
It was clear by the late 1970s, however, that the country’s prison population as a whole, 
and those in many state systems, had grown well beyond the historical norm identified by 
Blumstein and his colleagues. At first glance, this unprecedented growth would seem to have 
contradicted this model, but the researchers suggested this growth actually marked a shift to a 
new stable level, which was still in progress. Since they only focused their analysis on periods of 
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relative stability, they portrayed spikes and dips in the use of incarceration as anomalous and 
unworthy of detailed analysis or explanation.1093 Perhaps the most glaring weaknesses of these 
articles was they provided almost no discussion of what was driving the increase in the number 
of prisoners.1094 Even the precise nature of the mechanisms of system stabilization, which 
corrected prison populations back to a mean, were more assumed to exist than actually 
explicated.1095  
By the late 1970s, the same researchers, now closely affiliated with the Pennsylvania 
state government, sought to address the reasons for the growth of the state’s prison 
population while estimating how anticipated changes in sentencing world effect this pre-
existing trend. Alfred Blumstein, Harold Miller, Jacqueline Cohen, Rick Stafford and Daniel 
Nagin, among others, published many of these studies in public policy and criminology journals. 
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Yet, much of this work originated within the Governor’s Office and the Pennsylvania 
Commission of Crime and Delinquency and was clearly intended to support the prison 
expansion proposal as part of the governor’s mandatory minimum legislation.1096 These 
researchers developed a prediction model based on how demographic trends in the state 
intersected with current arrest and conviction rates for certain categories of imprisonable 
crimes. Blumstein, Cohen and Miller argued that an unusually large cohort of young males who 
were entering the statistically peak age for imprisonment (early to mid-20s) drove the growth 
of Pennsylvania’s prison population over the 1970s. Their argument portrayed this growth in 
naturalistic and deterministic terms, treating the large postwar demographic boom as a 
statistical floor upon which the effects of other considerations like changes in sentencing 
severity could then be estimated. An inexorable sense of momentum permeated this work, 
attributing much of the upward pressure on prison capacity to ostensibly agentless, 
demographic waves. Even if current conditions remained the same and no new sentencing 
legislation was passed, the state's prison population would continue to grow for several more 
years, according to these researchers, peaking in the 1990s before falling.1097 They often 
referred to life course movement of this demographic bulge as the “pig in the python” effect 
that was working its way through the criminal justice system as it had affected public schools 
earlier.1098 
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There were, of course, good reasons for highlighting the significance of the postwar 
demographic change. The large, Baby Boom cohort of young adults composed a greater 
proportion of the overall population and most prisoners usually fell within this youthful age 
range. However, this type of analysis assumed that offending rates, policing, court dispositions, 
the availability and use of alternative sanctions would all remain consistent. Some of the 
disaggregated demographic categories employed by Blumstein, Cohen and Miller also quietly 
omitted highly charged political issues that were far from settled in many parts of the state. 
This was particularly the case with the two racial categories they used: “white” and “nonwhite.” 
The authors not only predicted the growth of proportion of nonwhites in Pennsylvania’s overall 
population, but based on existing racial disparities in arrest and imprisonment statistics, they 
also assumed that this group would commit more crime and be arrested and imprisoned at 
proportionately greater frequencies than their young white, male counterparts in the future.  
Such an analysis assumed that criminogenic propensities adhered in racial categories 
without exploring reasons why “nonwhites” had disproportionately high rates of arrest and 
imprisonment and “whites” had fewer. How racial power quietly constituted the statistics and 
categories of their research simply did not enter into their analysis. They did not question how 
race intersected with urban decline, under- and unemployment, poor health and drug abuse, 
criminal behavior and the criminalization of behavior as well as a whole range of routine 
discriminatory practices among the police, judiciary, correctional staff, parole boards and 
probation and parole officers. While such questions were unlikely to be posed in such a 
pragmatic endeavor as predicting prison capacity needs, failing to do so only further obscured 




Murakawa and Katherine Beckett have referred to this type of knowledge production as the 
“penology or racial innocence,” which “begins with presumptions of race-neutrality and adopts 
narrow definitions of racism, as well as data and methods often ill-suited to its analysis, even as 
the policies and practices of criminal justice expand in ever-more race-laden ways.”1099 
Moreover, the austere, technical language and methods in such analyses, combined with their 
demographic determinism and color-blind racism, minimized responsibility for policy decisions, 
including the severe sentencing changes under consideration at the time.  
Unlike many other members of Thornburgh’s administration, however, Alfred Blumstein 
was not wholly committed to prison expansion and often pointed out some of the major 
weaknesses of solely relying on new construction. At the opening meeting of the PCCD, 
Blumstein told his staff that regardless of how they intervened, they should expect that 
demographic trends would drive an increase in crime rates, arrests and convictions in the near 
future. He emphasized that current research on rehabilitation suggested they would not be 
able to develop crime-control programs that would appreciably affect crime rates and 
reoffending and sentencing was simply outside the PCCD’s purview. However, he felt they could 
find reasonable alternatives to imprisonment that could be implemented for the “least 
dangerous.” He warned that creating these alternatives “must be done so that we target our 
inevitably limited prison capacity on those individuals where prison can be most effective. We 
must find them, identify them, and put them behind bars where they can be incapacitated from 
committing further crimes. The criminal justice system can also be effective in attacking the 
                                                          
1099 Naomi Murakawa and Katherine Beckett, “The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the 




rational criminals through deterrence, and this includes organized crime, white collar crime, 
and official corruption.”1100 Prison capacity was not only a scare resource for Blumstein, he also 
recognized its limited effectiveness in controlling crime.  
Shortly after assuming the chairmanship of the PCCD, Blumstein requested two separate 
forecasting studies to comparatively gauge the future growth of the prison population and 
assess the possible magnitude of prison overcrowding.1101 The studies, completed by Phillip 
Renninger of the PCCD’s Criminal Justice Statistics Division and Carnegie Mellon University’s 
Harold Miller, differed in their final estimates but were based on numerous shared assumptions 
and data sources.1102 Each predicted the prison population would crest around 1990 
somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 prisoners, then decline. Blumstein advised Gov. 
Thornburgh that since new prison cells would take several years to be constructed and would 
not be needed by the end of the 1990s, devoting enormous resources to prison expansion was 
not the best option to address current overcrowding and expected increases from sentencing 
changes.1103 Although, he agreed some prison construction was necessary and believed it would 
enable the closure of older prisons, Blumstein felt it was more prudent to develop new 
alternatives to prison or invest more in existing community corrections programs and minimum 
security facilities.1104 
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In his capacity as chairman of the PCCD, Blumstein also advised criminal justice officials 
and local politicians across the state about the difficulties they could expect in county jails from 
the demographic onslaught he and his colleagues had identified. In November 1981, he warned 
attendees at the fall convention of the state’s Prison Wardens Association that “they’re going 
to be your problem for the next decade” and they should expect a range of problems due to 
serious overcrowding.1105 Blumstein recognized that the prison administrators in the audience 
had little control over policies that affected their institutions like sentencing, but told the 
audience they should be prepared for “The consequences of overcrowding…cruelty to inmates, 
the deterioration of prison programs, increased inmate control of institutions, staff morale 
problems, staff turnover, and a greater risk of riot and hostage-taking.”1106 He said there were 
only three possible ways to alleviate overcrowding pressures: sentence fewer people to 
imprisonment, release them earlier or build new prisons. Blumstein did not advocate any one 
of these solutions, pointing out that they all had serious drawbacks, but he said decisions such 
as these had to be made by well-informed local officials after a robust debate on the limited 
policy options.1107 
Gov. Thornburgh and his immediate staff aggressively pursued prison construction with 
little consideration of the other options Blumstein raised. Thornburgh’s support for harsher 
sentencing was well-known even before he ran for governor. He was also not a supporter of 
community corrections or forms of discretionary release. Shortly after becoming governor, 
Thornburgh also curtailed some of the discretionary release pathways. Unlike previous 
                                                          






governors, for instance, he only sparingly exercised executive clemency to commute life 
sentences. In Pennsylvania, a life sentenced prisoner could only become eligible for parole (and 
participation in rehabilitation programs) if his life sentence was commuted. Once the governor 
commuted a life sentence, the prisoner began serving an indeterminate sentence with a 
minimum term; only then was release on parole a possibility.1108 Thornburgh refused to grant 
commutations or pardons unless he felt there was a clear case of injustice. Some penological 
experts, such as Rendell Davis of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, harshly criticized 
Thornburgh’s policy as a “cork stopping up the bottle,” which created enormous tension and 
desperation among lifers.1109 The governor maintained this policy throughout his two terms in 
office and attempted a far more significant change to the state’s parole system, calling for its 
outright abolishment. 
Gov. Thornburgh and members of his administration largely rejected the traditional, 
recuperative focus of criminology and penology of trying to reform offenders. This was certainly 
not a unique view at the time. The decline, and in some cases outright abandonment, of 
rehabilitation and its associated interventions had become the dominant position of most 
people involved in the criminal justice by the end of the 1970s. Thornburgh’s position as 
governor and his long track record of law enforcement, gave him both the platform and 
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legitimacy to, not only advocate retribution and incapacitation as general penological 
principles, but to push for specific reforms and polices embodying them. With mounting 
bipartisan support for harsher penal policies, Thornburgh commanded the debate on prison 
capacity and overcrowding, which became more of a tertiary or technical sub-issue of 
sentencing reform, concerning how many new prison cells were needed and where to locate 
them.  
Thus, most of the administration’s internal knowledge production concentrated on 
predicting future growth of imprisonment, the effects of the mandatory minimum legislation 
and new sentencing guidelines and the base goal of determine how many new prison cells to 
construct. Building more cells was not only necessary, but the only responsible way to address 
crime, which would prevent the state’s prisons from being overwhelmed with “units of work” – 
the bodies of confined people. The estimates produced by the Bureau of Correction, Blumstein 
and the PCCD and Harold Miller and his staff in the Governor’s Office informed the decision to 
request funding for an additional 2,500 prison cells.1110 Troubling questions about the social 
costs, the negative effects on communities, its intersection with questions of social insecurity 
and unemployment, and the worsening conditions in the state’s prisons were either 
unmentioned, dismissed or given superficial consideration in this project. Dick Thornburgh’s 
intellectual advisors laid the groundwork for a greater pragmatic departure from rehabilitation 
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through their, at times cautious, advocacy for a new penal policy focused more on the 
emerging penal philosophy of “selective incapacitation.”1111 
While the notion that persistent offenders should be the primary target of 
imprisonment is quite old, the current iteration the concept, under the name selective 
incapacitation blossomed during the 1970s. Much like Blumstein’s work on criminal justice 
systems, research in this area drew on quantitative methods. By the late 1970s, many criminal 
justice research projects shifted from evaluating rehabilitation programs to attempting to 
determine both the deterrent and incapacitation effects of penal sanctions intended to better 
hone polices based on these penal theories. Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin played a key role in 
evaluating many of these studies for the National Academy of Sciences.1112 Based partly on 
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their work in Pennsylvania and access to the knowledge base collected by the PCCD, they later 
tried to identify the life-course offending patterns of persistent offenders, the “criminal 
careers” of “career criminals.”1113 In addition to relying more on quantitative methods, the 
scale and subject of such research also changed and its institutional location and funding 
sources also transformed.   
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter eliminated LEAA, citing both its lack of clear, beneficial 
results and notorious wastefulness. Most state planning agencies collapsed when the federal 
funds disappeared, but a few persisted with new mandates. The PCCD under Blumstein’s 
direction was one of the more successful state planning agencies in this regard, and producing 
knowledge and policies on managing prison overcrowding was one of the chief reasons for its 
continued existence.1114 The commissioners and researchers at the PCCD felt these types of 
problems were more amenable to targeted reforms than the vaguely defined problem of 
crime.1115 Blumstein later described this movement, "the central problem has shifted from the 
unmanageable to the manageable..."1116 The PCCD directed its efforts at identifying and 
rectifying wayward institutional practices within crime control bureaucracies rather than the 
more traditional problem of crime these institutions were originally designed to combat. Yet, 
Blumstein and his colleagues believed this reflexive administrative approach would make such 
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institutions more efficient at crime control even if they ultimately held modest expectations 
about their overall effectiveness.1117 
Similarly, as the social scientists and administrators who championed rehabilitation and 
reintegration lost influence or shifted their views,1118 the target and strategies of their 
intervention shifted. In some cases, a different set of professionals and forms of expertise 
emerged in correctional bureaucracies and related agencies. Blumstein and his colleagues, for 
instance, focused more on administrative concerns of resource management, overcrowding 
and security. James Jacobs described a similar transformation in the state of Illinois during the 
1970s. As the prisoners’ rights movement, street and prison gangs and federal courts pressed 
claims against Illinois’ prisons, administrators responded by rationalizing numerous aspects of 
the penal agency’s operation, fulfilling judicial mandates, creating new prisoner management 
standards and documenting activities that might become subject to future litigation. This new 
direction intensified over the course of the 1970s in many American states. The influence of 
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judicial interventions, increasing prison populations and fiscal austerity increased 
administrators focus on resource management and reducing potential legal liabilities. 
This intellectual and practical shift came at the expense of developing any new means of 
addressing prisoners as people in the way rehabilitation, for all its faults, had for decades. The 
knowledge produced by Blumstein and his colleagues had a profound effect on Pennsylvania’s 
prison system and the swelling number of people confined in it. Yet, it could not provide the 
ground for a new prison regime; it “effaced the prisoners altogether, either as an object of 
correction or a subject of informal collusion,” but established many of the structures and terms 
of legibility through which overcrowding and prison expansion would be understood in public 
discourse.1119 Likewise, the sociological tradition of studying the institutional social life of 
prisoners, inmate subcultures and their effects on rehabilitation programs all but disappeared 
as the security, creation, allocation and design of penal space became paramount.1120  
This was somewhat ironic because the nature of inmate society and life behind bars also 
underwent massive changes as Pennsylvania’s prison and jail population soared after 1980 (see 
Figure 3:1). The Bureau of Correction’s institutions as a whole exceeded their capacity in 1980 
and never returned within capacity limits. 
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No Bodies to Spare 
 
During the late 1960s, several prisoners at SCI Graterford began laying the intellectual 
ground for an organization composed of people who had spent time in prison and understood 
its travails that would fight for the rights of prisoners.  On March 16, 1971, a group, called the 
Prisoners’ Rights Council, achieved incorporated status as a non-profit organization. Victor 
Taylor became the group’s first director, and he was soon joined by Allan Lawson after his 
release from Graterford. As part of their many campaigns they published a newsletter, the 
Public Report Card, which they distributed inside the state's prisons and to a variety of public 
officials and organizations. It featured updates on prison litigation and reports from the PRC's 
ongoing projects. This publication also included editorials on a variety of prison issues, penned 
by the staff at the PRC and inmate correspondents.  
One such editorial written by Donald C. Coleman titled "Prisons--Tenants--
Overcrowding," in 1978 began with a view on overcrowding far removed from the policy 
debates in Harrisburg and knowledge production at Carnegie Mellon:   
 
Just about all the jails are overcrowded and it has been this way for quite some 
time. But this has got to stop somewhere because the jails are overcrowded with 
our bodies, and we don't have any bodies to spare.1121 
 
 
Coleman, himself a former inmate, implored prisoners to take advantage of every opportunity 
afforded to them to gain skills, which could be “used in/by/for the community when they 
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return.”  Specifically, he argued that inmates needed find a way to educate themselves while 
imprisoned, especially by earning a GED, a high school diploma equivalent. Throughout his 
column, Coleman emphasized the responsibility to do this rested with the inmates themselves 
and if enough of them took up this task, not only would the community readily accept them 
upon their return, but “this would, I believe, remedy our problem of overcrowding.”1122  
Coleman's idea was one of the many proposals offered as a solution to the growing 
problem of overcrowding in Pennsylvania’s secure penal institutions. While one may question 
how effective his strategy might have been and the assumptions that supported it, his 
statement pointed to a big difference in how overcrowding was discussed and experienced by 
inmates, penal experts and administrators. Most of the archival record contains the reports, 
documents, and memoranda of penal administrators and politicians. Like Coleman’s article, this 
official material deals with the purported causes of overcrowding and its possible remedies. 
However, the quantity of deficit that haunts the problem of overcrowding in the official 
material was one measured largely by spatial units and to a lesser degree services and 
employee manpower. There were no cells or beds, wings or units, to spare. A variety of more 
spaces for inmates were needed; the obstacles to overcome in obtaining them were finding 
suitable locations for new construction, political support and funding. Bureaucrats worried 
about the influx of greater numbers of inmates, but not having bodies to spare—“our bodies”—
was not a framing to be found in official material on the problem of overcrowding. As 
Coleman’s statement implies, people trapped in overcrowded institutions still envisioned other 
places and purpose for themselves beyond the immediate institutional confines and categories, 





but doing so became difficult with the immediacy of problems created or exacerbated by 
overcrowding. 
This distinction presents a difficulty for recounting how the issue of overcrowding came 
to dominate most discussions of penal policy and prison life from roughly the late 1970s 
onward because, unlike Coleman's opening statement, most inmates did not usually directly 
address "overcrowding" as an issue in the way that bureaucrats did. Problems of institutional 
life often associated with or compounded by overcrowding, such as the inability to access 
programs, extended time in cells and sharing a cell with others, were often discussed by 
inmates in letters to activist organizations, such as the Prisoners’ Rights Council. Inmate 
correspondence to senior prison officials asking for redress of certain difficulties, like delays in 
transfers and long queues at medical clinics, also attested to the effects of overcrowding. 
Occasionally, inmates pressed claims in court that specifically sought reliefs from overcrowding. 
More often than not, however, litigation by prisoners and their supporters outside cited other 
problems, which were often affected by overcrowding. Yet, many of the issues cited by inmates 
were long-standing complaints not necessarily related to contemporary overcrowding, like 
arbitrary discipline and segregation. The fact that the initial upswing in prisoner activism in 
Pennsylvania occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s meant that many of the contentious issues 
and conflicts besetting the prisons at that time were not directly affected by overcrowding, 
which became much more pronounced years later. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from prisoners’ correspondence, legal petitions, activist 
publications and memoirs that overcrowding did concern those living in such conditions and 




and insecurity, austerity and lack of services in the prisons, the lack of a meaningful narrative of 
prison life, and the path for a way out. For many prisoners, overcrowding simply became 
synonymous with nothing working right.  
Victor Hassine, a well-educated, activist prisoner, who began serving a life sentence at 
Graterford in 1981, described how overcrowding pressures overtaxed the number of personnel 
at the prison, which gradually reduced services and security. Once this trend began, Hassine 
claims it became difficult to focus on anything except one’s immediate surroundings: “Our lives 
became a daily challenge to avoid injury and stay of trouble, which left us little time to reflect 
on the errors of our ways. In essence, the penitentiary evolved into a ghetto.”1123 The “terrified 
population of inmates,” Hassine writes, “lost all sense of security and live[d] like ‘moment 
dwellers’ with no thought of the future.”1124 To make matter worse, Hassine notes that the 
level of personnel at the prison did not increase to accommodate this new population. The 
staff, stretched too thin to provide adequate security for most of the prisoners as well as 
themselves, simply retreated. In this environment, numerous Philadelphia-based street gangs 
flourished and competed for turf, contraband markets and new recruits. 
Depending on how one determines prison capacity, Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Correction 
surpassed its system-wide capacity at some point between 1980 and 1981. One of the first 
effects of this population surge was idleness among prisoners. Or perhaps better stated, the 
expansion of idleness, which had already effected significant parts of the prison system. Some 
employment opportunities actually shrank during this period and wages fell, as well, leaving an 
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ever greater proportion of the inmate population without a legal means to earn income or 
occupy much of their time. The Bureau reduced the hours of many fulltime workers as well in 
an effort to spread the limited resource across more people.1125  
Incarcerated people, especially those who had been behinds bars before, frequently 
described how theft and violence between prisoners increased in tandem with idleness and the 
decline in staff supervision.1126 Victor Hassine claimed that at SCI Graterford the increase in 
thefts often led to situations where one had to fight a thief caught in the commission of 
stealing.1127 To not attack a thief in such a situation, announced one’s weakness and invited 
repeated and eventually more serious victimization. Hassine recalled that during the first few 
months of his confinement, he accumulated and then later gave away numerous items he 
purchased in the commissary after a friend warned him about how vulnerable the possessions 
made him.1128 
The interrelated problems of theft and violence became so acute that prisoners across 
the state demanded the Bureau provide padlocks for cells so that prisoners could protect their 
belongings while they were away from their cells during the day. Eventually, prison 
administrations altered cell fixtures to provide holes for padlocks, which prisoners could now 
buy in the institutions’ commissary.1129 Victor Hassine argued that this demand fell on deaf ears 
for quite some time before the administration complied. It was not until staff members started 
getting injured breaking up fights resulting from cell thefts that they agreed with the 
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proposal.1130 It was basically “a tacit admission that they did not have control over their own 
prison.”1131 Unfortunately, On the other hand, the padlocks did not deter many thieves who 
began forming groups for the sole purpose of invading cells when the occupant was present 
and the cell doors were unlocked during the day.1132 Prisoners soon adapted to this continual 
threat by always staying awake while the cells were opened during the day and not using the 
toilet until lock-in.   
As more and more prisoners entered the state’s institutions during the 1980s, prison 
administrations began experiencing ever greater shortages of guards. Few people applied for 
the position, and it had a very high turnover rate.1133 Many of the state’s prisons actually 
operated well below their authorized compliment of guards. Prisons made up these shortfalls 
with the extensive use of overtime. A March 1980 study by the Citizens Crime Commission of 
Philadelphia noted that many institutions did not fully man their watchtowers and often 
allotted only a minimal guard compliment during the night. SCI Dallas in Luzerne County, for 
instance, had “an inmate population of 950,” but had “only 23 guards on duty at night.”1134 This 
situation only worsened over the course of the decade as the approval for new hiring could not 
keep pace with influx of people committed to the prisons. A lawsuit brought by Major Tillery, 
Victor Hassine, Kenneth Davenport, William Grandison, Nelson Mikesell and Ellis Matthews 
against the state about the overcrowded conditions at SCI Pittsburgh in 1989 determined that 
the only seven guards supervised 741 inmates in the institution’s South Block during the 
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day.1135 Chief Judge Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. who conducted an unannounced inspection of the 
prison, determined that: 
 
“Blind spots” abound throughout the block where incidents, including rape, 
assault, cell theft, cell arson and drug use may occur unknown to the corrections 
officers. The shower area is one of the most dangerous areas; no corrections 
officers control this area on a fulltime basis.1136 
 
 
In many areas of the state’s prison the level of supervision was so inadequate that 
guards warily held back as far as possible for their own safety. Assaults, stabbings, rapes and 
gang fights were commonplace in SCI Pittsburgh’s auditorium and gym, especially since there 
was often only one guard to watch hundreds of prisoners. Judge Cohill noted that “corrections 
officers do not make rounds; they wisely choose to stand by the door next to the riot 
button.”1137 Some prisoners readily admitted that they could see the toll this situation was 
taking on many officers. Charles Goldblum and Charles Busbee, both prisoners at SCI 
Huntington, wrote in the aftermath of a riot and lockup at their institution: 
 
The stress on the guards who work here is nothing short of severe. Many of the 
more experienced officers are beginning to experience burn out and many 
inexperienced officers are being given responsibilities that they are not ready 
for. They are also being left alone in situations that create danger to both 
themselves and inmates. It is no wonder that they are having a hard time 
attracting good people.1138 
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The pair noted that personnel shortfalls also affected other types of staff. Correctional 
counselors had caseloads of over 200 people and they were rising. At the time of the writing, 
the prison employed very few more specialized treatment staff: only four full time 
psychologists and one part time psychiatrist.1139  
The practice of double-celling, and later multiple-occupancy-celling, created perhaps the 
greatest immediate impact on the people living through the rapid population increase from the 
late 1970s onward. These practices became increasingly common throughout the country 
during this time, and were eventually the subject of federal court decisions.1140 In 1981, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in Rhodes v. Chapman that the practice of double-celling at an Ohio 
maximum security prison did not, in itself, constitute either an Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment violation. This decision paved the legal grounds for double-celling throughout the 
county, but Pennsylvania statutes concerning cell occupancy were actually much stricter than 
many other states. It was still unclear how Pennsylvania laws dating from 1790, which 
mandated solitary confinement, would be effected by the Supreme Court ruling, if at all. The 
federal ruling, nevertheless, gave some legislators the leverage to challenge these statutes over 
a dispute about overcrowding involving Philadelphia’s county prisons. As part of the ongoing 
Jackson v Hendrick lawsuit stemming from the July 4, 1971 riot, a three judge panel from the 
Philadelphia Common Pleas Court ordered the city in March 1981 to provide one person per 
cell within four months by releasing numerous pre-trial detainees.1141 This order would have 
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necessitated releasing over 800 detainees – a plan that several Philadelphia officials hoped to 
avoid. Consequently, Sen. Michael O’Pake (D-Berks) sponsored a bill in the state Senate, with 
the vocal support of Philadelphia District Attorney Ed Rendell, to amend state laws to permit 
double-celling.1142 Passed in July, the amended law permitted Philadelphia County to ignore the 
Common Pleas Court order and allowed the state Bureau of Correction to begin the practice of 
double-celling.1143  
The incidence of theft, assault and rape increased with double-celling, especially since 
prison officials often lacked effective ways to screen prisoners who were being bunked 
together. Passive or weak prisoners sometimes ended up sharing a cell with predatory inmates 
who repeatedly abused them within the confines of their own cells.1144 Even in less severe 
situations, double-celling increased tension among prisoners throughout state and county 
prisons and jails. Hassine describes how routine arguments abounded after his “cell door 
opened and another man was shoved inside”: 
 
My first argument with my new co-tenant was, of course, over who got the top 
or bottom bunk. Then we fought over lights on or off, hygiene habits, toilet-use 
etiquette, cell cleaning, property storage, and who friends could visit. There was 
missing property, accusation of thievery, snoring, farting, and smoking. As these 
arguments raged on every day, new ones would arise to make things worse.1145 
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In some cases, prisoners were lucky enough to find friends willing to share a cell, which 
reduced some of this friction.  
In many of the state’s older prison and jails, the small size of the cells made double-
celling all the more burdensome. For example, SCI Pittsburgh’s North Block had large cells, 
measuring eight by seven feet, and small cells, measuring six by six feet.1146 These cells 
contained a bunk bed, desk and toilet and sink fixture as well as two footlockers and any 
personal belongings permitted by administration. The prison began double celling in both large 
and small cells in 1982.1147 Judge Cohill later claimed that “During our inspection tour I entered 
one of the small double cells. I was unable to turn around once inside it and had to back 
out.”1148 Even though many of the prisoners in these smaller cells worked during the day, they 
nevertheless, often spent fourteen hours a day in their cells.1149 Ironically, SCI Pittsburgh 
actually had numerous unoccupied cells on the top three tiers of the North Block, which 
Superintendent George Petsock left unused because he could not provide adequate security for 
these tiers. The administration only used 273 cells of a total of 636 cells in the North Block, but 
forced more than one person in each of the cells they used.1150 
In other prisons, especially newer ones where the design permitted better line of site 
supervision, the administration used every cell, and they also reconverted some cells that had 
been turned into offices or storage space.1151 Soon, prison administrators supplemented 
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double-celling with dormitory-style bunk bed accommodations in auditorium, gym, dining halls 
and other large spaces of some prisons.1152 Policing such sleeping arrangements was even more 
difficult and dangerous for staff who often simply remained near door and escape paths. 
Recreational areas, of course, faced similar problems. In addition to the aforementioned 
violence and lack of supervision in SCI Pittsburgh’s gym and auditorium, the institution’s 
available outdoor recreational areas were extremely limited and poorly monitored. The age of 
the institution, which was opened in 1882, posed serious space limits because it was not 
designed with prisoner recreation or sports in mind. Compounded by the loss of space due to 
construction, the prison had an area the size of about half of a football field for 1,800 
people.1153 The lack of space and adequate staffing to support recreational activities and many 
forms of education and therapeutic programing often translated to prisoners spending 
extended periods of time locked in the cells where the routine arguments and resentments 
Victor Hassine described mounted. 
The lack of space also effected the operation of the Bureau of Correction’s classification 
system as well as the screening practices used in the institutions for cell and work assignments. 
Whereas in the past, official considerations, such as residence, health and work opportunities, 
influenced classification decisions along with unspoken, but crucial criteria, like race, the 
deciding factor often became just the availability of cell space. In practice, this frustrated the 
attempts of many prisoners to remain near their homes, loved ones and legal representation, 
and prevented them from gaining transfers to prisons with desired programs, regimes and 
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friends. Gary G. Williams described this ordeal in a letter to the Prisoners’ Rights Council, 
seeking their help.1154 A Philadelphia resident, Williams began serving his sentence at SCI 
Graterford in the early 1970s. After an assault on a guard, the administration transferred him to 
SCI Huntington and placed him in the Behavioral Adjustment Unit for thirty days. He 
complained to the Prisoners’ Rights Council that his family, who visited him at Graterford, could 
not afford the trip to Huntington. He also could not get a special diet at Huntington for stomach 
ulcers, which Graterford provided for him. Additionally, Williams said he was frightened by 
"some of the people here that are not on good terms [with] inmates and guards alike.”1155 He 
disputed the veracity of the original reason for his transfer, claiming that he was not the person 
who assaulted the guard. The officer later admitted so, according to Williams, dropped the 
charges and apologized to him. Nevertheless, Williams could not get transferred back to 
Graterford. He repeatedly implored the most senior official involved in managing population 
movement, Deputy Commissioner Erskind DeRamus, to authorize a move. DeRamus eventually 
consented to the move, but it still could not be completed because Graterford simply did not 
have any extra room. 
In addition to compromising the classification system and distribution of services 
throughout the Bureau, the extra demand for services and space effectively rendered even the 
pretense of providing some types of services meaningless. In February 1982, the new 
Commissioner of Corrections, Ronald Marks, told a panel investigating a hostage taking incident 
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at Graterford the prison system as a whole could not adequately care for an increasing number 
of mentally ill prisoners who did not meet strict criteria for transfer to the state’s mental health 
system.1156 Following a major disturbance several years later at SCI Camp Hill, near Harrisburg, 
a prisoner who chose to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisal, described some of the 
routine frustrations caused by overcrowding in a letter to K. Leroy Irvis, one of the people 
charged with investigating the riot.1157 The numerous problems he listed affected most of Camp 
Hill’s residents: 
Vocational and Academic programs had long waiting lists due to overcrowding. 
These were also stipulated as a must before you could be released. 
 
Counseling programs were limited and had long waiting lists due to 
overcrowding. These were also stipulated as a must before you could be 
released. 
 
Recreational facilities were severely overtaxed. Too many inmates had nothing 
to do with their time because of overcrowding. 
 
Privileges were being taken away under the pretense of security, when in reality 
everyone knew that the real reasons were too many people were trying to use 
these privileges (such as “Family Days”) and causing excessive workloads on the 
staff. 
 
Meals which had to be prepared hours ahead of time because of the amounts 
necessary to cook due to overcrowding were rancid, cold, skimpy and loaded 
with insects. 
 
Yard times were cut short because guards didn’t feel like running yard. 
 
Water in showers were cold and shower rooms built for 12 people often had 40 
to 50 people in them at a time. 
 
Total lack of professionalism on the part of the medical staff. When you signed 
up for medical attention, it would often take at least 4 or 5 times before they 
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would give you serious consideration and you were lucky if you got it then. The 
medical staff would humiliate you and treat you as though you were feigning 




These types of complaints were certainly not unique to overcrowded prisons. However, 
overcrowding contributed to the decline of prison conditions, which predated it by at least a 
decade, and provided an explanatory resource for prisoners who lived through this process. 
As a normative discursive concept, overcrowding pointed to a sense among prisoners of 
the appropriate, tolerable and expected number of people who could be safely confined and 
care for in the state’s prisons. This was, in this sense, both an approximation of the minimum 
spatial standards and the necessary level of guard supervision, services and opportunities that 
the state should provide. The comments of prisoners revealed the most frustration over these 
matters when prison officials, or certain practices like the process of parole consideration, 
acknowledged these expectations as normative but, nevertheless, tolerated situations in the 
prisons, which routinely negated these standards. 
Of course, Pennsylvania’s prisons were not necessarily better in many regards prior to 
overcrowding. The volume of litigation from the mid-1960s to 1980 attests to many routine 
arbitrary and brutal practices that existed before the rapid influx of new prisoners 
overwhelmed capacity constraints. Many of the criticisms inmates voiced about a lack of 
privacy, theft and violence were also endemic to these institutions, even if they were arguably 
less common and severe. Victor Hassine acknowledged as much in an essay on overcrowding, in 
which he located its “true evil” elsewhere: 






As the term implies, prisons must have been crowded before they became 
overcrowded. Crowding in prisons was planned; overcrowding was not. Since the 
early 1800s when penitentiaries were first built, the one aspect of prison design 
that has survived is the practice of housing as many inmates as possible in the 
smallest cells possible, while meeting their minimal needs using a minimum of 
staff… the true evil of overcrowding has very little to do with crowded living 
space. Human beings, if they must, can and have lived in caves and tunnels. The 
destructive nature of prison overcrowding stems from the fact that it came 
unplanned, and was imposed on a system specifically created to discourage that 
confinement of too many inmates in one place… Suddenly we inmates found 
ourselves at odds with our own rigidly designed environment.1159 
 
 
In addition to actually overtaxing practices and built environments designed for far less people, 
overcrowding became a new central explanatory device for nearly every difficulty in the state’s 
prisons. As the views of prisoners indicated, overcrowding seeped into nearly every aspect of 
life behind bars.  
The Missing Prison: Localism, Penal Expansion and Institutional Geography 
 
"The Missing Prison" was the title of a memo dated January 19, 1982 sent to Rick Stafford from 
Harold Miller, both of whom were senior advisers and policy planners for Gov. Dick 
Thornburgh.1160 Miller began the document by reminding Stafford that "we are still short 325 
cells" after the recent failed attempt to convert a state hospital into a prison in an urban 
community. Miller reviewed a range of possible options to pursue, weighing the advantages 
and disadvantages, which involved either abandoning the project and accept the shortfall or 
pursue a few other potential sites for constructing an entirely new prison in a far less populated 
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area on the other side of the state. Describing the prison as "missing" pointed to the 
assumption that prison expansion was the only available policy option. 
The key planning staff in Thornburgh's administration considered and deployed a variety 
of different options to deal with the prison space shortfall, yet these choices were all geared 
toward expansion rather than decreasing the inmate population or developing some sort of 
diversion or alternative. Overcrowding and obtaining new bed space dominated the internal 
policy discussions of the administration. There was comparatively far less attention to prison 
education, work, and counseling, which had been the mainstays of the rehabilitative project 
inside the state's prisons a decade before. These concerns were not entirely absent; the 
administration wanted to enhance prison industries, for instance. However, these types of 
policies were clearly not the main concern for the Bureau of Correction or those senior advisors 
in the Thornburgh administration tasked with developing policy and legislation. 
 Thornburgh’s sentencing legislation came bundled with a proposal for 2,500 new prison 
cells. Beyond the resistance to the passage of these reforms in the legislature, the question of 
where these new cells would be constructed shifted the political dispute over penal policy to a 
number of localities across the state. This process and determining actually what kinds of new 
cells would be constructed highlights, as Thomas Sugrue has argued, how localism remains a 
persistent factor in American political history, helps explain the way governments implement 
policy and how local actors either facilitate or frustrate this process.1161 An important, but often 
overlooked aspect of prison overcrowding in the early 1980s was how it nourished local 
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political contention outside prison walls. As the number of prisoners increased inside the 
prisons, the state refashioned some of its institutional priorities, choosing to convert numerous 
state hospitals into prisons and discontinue a variety of institutional mental health and 
disability services. This decision encountered stiff resistance near a number of these 
institutions, which created the opportunity for businesses, political leaders and many 
community organizations in several rural, economically-depressed communities to approach 
the Thornburgh administration with proposals for hosting new prisons. As this prison siting 
process unfolded, it revealed and frustrated the preferences of some community members who 
objected to new prisons and punitive policies. In addition, the building of new racialized 
political coalitions around prison construction in rural areas complicated the plans of senior 
prison officials in the Bureau of Correction who had devised plans for managing the large influx 
of new prisoners with new cells at urban locations that were ultimately rejected. 
From the perspective of Gov. Thornburgh and his circle of immediate advisors, there 
were several advantages to utilizing existing structures for the new cells, whether this meant 
additional construction at an already operational prison or converting state hospitals into 
prisons. Simply in terms of cost, it was far cheaper to pursue this strategy than to build an 
entirely new prison, especially if the latter option also entailed acquiring new land. In addition, 
this strategy potentially involved less political risk. Many of the administration’s planners 
believed communities that already had state institutions would welcome continued public 
investment. They hoped that the political backlash they expected following the closure of some 
state hospitals might be mitigated if converting them into prisons ensured continued local 




could not be rehired for correctional work, some of the former custodial staff and maintenance 
workers would be better able to make this transition. Beyond the immediate circle of 
employees and their families, the administration’s planners believed that the larger community 
around these hospitals would approve of continual public spending in the area, especially if this 
money represented a substantial portion of the local economy. They expected more opposition 
to their plans in areas that did not already have either a prison or a state hospital.  
 Scholars have described this latter kind of land-use opposition, often referred to as the 
Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) syndrome, as largely a negative reaction to the specific choice of 
site rather than a more general opposition to the policy in question. Many people supported 
increased penalties and new prison building, but did not want to live near the new facilities. 
Since the 1990s, a number of scholars have shown that NIMBY opposition to prison siting also 
created opportunities for some civic leaders and local development boosters in economically-
depressed, rural areas who welcomed new prison construction as an economic investment in 
their communities. This phenomenon certainly occurred in Pennsylvania, but it does not 
entirely capture how this process unfolded and how the Thornburgh administration stumbled 
into the more explicit policies of selling prison construction as a public investment in depressed, 
rural communities. In some cases, the opposition to new prison siting revealed a much deeper 
disagreement about the aims of penal and social policy and the likely targets of such 
interventions. The administration and especially senior prison officials in the Bureau of 
Correction did not initially favor the option of building prisons in rural areas. 
While mindful of the financial and political costs associated with new prison 




cells that reflected their particular management problems and how they envisioned the 
operation of a sound penal system. The Bureau practiced a type of regionalism that emphasized 
keeping inmates close to their counties of origin, which meant both where they entered the 
criminal justice system through arrest and adjudication and where they had ties to family and 
friends.1162 In normal prison operations, inmates routinely moved between facilities for any 
number of reasons ranging from the need for specialized medical care or rehabilitation 
programs, such as drug treatment to disciplinary transfers, and the need for court appearances. 
The cost of transporting inmates over long distances was so prohibitive that it restricted the 
range of possible locations for new prisons. Despite the waning support for the types of 
reintegration programs introduced a decade earlier, the Bureau still operated a large network 
of community corrections centers and graduated release programs that worked best when the 
participants were near their home communities, potential employers, social services and the 
support of family and friends. Since the vast majority of state prisoners came from Philadelphia 
and Pittsburgh, these factors mitigated against prison expansion in rural areas. 
There were several other major incentives for building new prisons near Philadelphia 
and Pittsburgh. Perhaps the most pressing was making sure any new prison had adequate 
nearby services in the event of emergencies. The availability of fire, police, and medical services 
were a constant concern to administrators hoping to avoid what they called "another 
Attica."1163 Proximity to cities also increased the chances of attracting better qualified 
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employees. This was especially the case for educated treatment staff like correctional 
counselors, psychologists and psychiatrists. For at least a decade, correctional administrators 
had also realized that the racial imbalance of the guard force, which was largely white, created 
persistent tensions with the large percentage of non-white, especially African American, 
prisoners that had only grown since the 1960s. While there was little evidence of a major push 
to address this problem, it was nonetheless another argument advocates mustered in favor of 
keeping any future prisons near urban centers.1164 
The Bureau wanted much of the new cell space to be near Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. 
With most of the state's inmates originating from these two cities, any increase in the number 
of commitments from the courts would require more cell space nearby. More specifically, the 
Bureau want to increase size and capabilities of each region's Diagnostic and Classification 
Centers (DCC), which were located at SCI Graterford (Eastern or EDDC), north of Philadelphia, 
and SCI Pittsburgh (Western or WDDC), only a few minutes away from the city's downtown. 
Each of these units was located within the walls of a larger general population prison, but they 
were operated separately and people confined in them did not mix with the prisoners in the 
large adjacent prison. These centers received and classified newly committed inmates from 
their respective catchment zones. Although, they were not the only diagnostic and classification 
centers in the state – the other one was in the central part of the state at SCI Camp Hill (Central 
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or CDCC) – they were the busiest centers and were often more overcrowded than the general 
population units at the same location given their smaller size.1165 
It became much harder to move prisoners out of a DCC when the range of available 
prisons and cells began to shrink because of system-wide overcrowding. This was particularly an 
issue when the classification committee at one of the DCCs decided the space available in the 
system at the time was simply inappropriate for a specific prisoner or group of prisoners at a 
certain custody or need level.1166 Scenarios like this eventually resulted in cumulative problems 
in the early 1980s because as certain prisoners could not be safely moved out of the DCC, the 
space and attention required for new admissions to these centers also receded.  
As prison officials well knew, this was a potentially dangerous situation. Being still 
unclassified, the inmates in these units were not separated and sorted as they would be later 
once the authorities assigned them to other institutions. Part of the rationale for this initial 
classification process – arguably its most important aspect – was to prevent victimization of 
certain people by others as well as to break up any grouping of potentially disruptive inmates 
who might threaten the institutional security.1167 Custody staff working in the DCCs made cell 
assignments within the centers based largely on their initial, informal judgment.1168 An 
independent review of the Pennsylvania's classification procedures by a private consulting firm 
emphasized that this practice compounded the dangerousness of an already bleak situation. 
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They recommended creating a formal reception screening tool to reduce what it felt was a 
haphazard cell assignment process within the DCCs responsible for "serious incidents involving 
inmates that were not afforded adequate supervision."1169 Senior Bureau staff felt that the 
larger intervention required to alleviate this problem was enhancing the space devoted to these 
centers. Not only would this clear up the congestion in these centers, it would potentially 
improve the quality of the initial classification evaluations, which would benefit the overall 
management of the wider system and reduce the risk of violence. 
The process of expanding the DDCs was much easier in the eastern part of the state 
than it was in the west. Since 1970, the Eastern center was located at SCI Graterford. It had 
previous been part of SCI Philadelphia, the old Eastern State Penitentiary, but the Bureau 
transferred it to SCI Graterford after they decommissioned the old penitentiary. The 
Thornburgh administration briefly considered the idea of reopening SCI Philadelphia in 1980. In 
addition to the concern over the DCC, the closure of this prison a decade earlier removed over 
five hundred cells from the Bureau’s apparatus, which the administration hoped they could 
bring back into service. However, after a team from the Bureau and several other departments 
inspected the old prison, they determined it was unusable in the current situation. While it was 
not yet in a state of terrible disrepair, it still would have cost $3 million to demolish and 
renovate structures inside the prison walls for current use.1170 The prison’s lack of space for 
recreation and programming was a long standing complaint about the prison and one of the 
original reasons why Commissioner Arthur Prasse closed it. Superior Court Judge, Robert E. 
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Woodside, once derided the continued use of the prison saying it was "the only place in the 
world where a football field turns a corner and a baseball diamond is a triangle."1171 Coupled 
with poor lines of sight for guards, the lack of space for congregate industry, education, or any 
other form of major programming for the inmates, the old prison presented major difficulties in 
terms of control. Additionally, its location in a Philadelphia neighbor meant that the possibility 
of escapes posed a serious public relations problem.1172 All of these issues and the fact it was 
now owned by the city of Philadelphia made it too costly to reopen. In a letter to State 
Representative Lois Hagarty, who had also inquired about reusing the old prison, Harold Miller, 
the head of Thornburgh’s Office of Policy Development, explained that SCI Philadelphia's 
"construction reflected an emphasis on 'penitence' in that era, namely small cells with little 
recreational space. It would simply be impossible to use the existing buildings inside the wall for 
a modern prison."1173 The entire process of evaluating the old prison was done quietly; the 
press and larger Philadelphia public never knew it was ever considered even a remote 
possibility.1174 
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When the Bureau closed SCI Philadelphia, they had planned to build several other 
prisons nearby, including a separate Diagnostic and Classification Center. Even though the 
General Assembly approved construction funds, several successive administrations never 
moved forward with these prisons because of opposition to its proposed locations.1175 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s local resistance also prevented the construction of 
several regional jails.1176 These prison siting problems were recent enough to be well known to 
people in the Thornburgh administration, and it is clear from their correspondence about 
prison expansion that they considered local political fallout to be the major obstacle to 
obtaining the desired additional capacity.1177 In the end, the Bureau decided they would 
construct the additional cells for the EDCC inside the existing walls of SCI Graterford, in essence 
expanding the existing center.1178 
The biggest political opposition to the prison expansion project originated in the 
western part of the state. Gov. Thornburgh, who was from Pittsburgh, was especially cautious 
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about prison siting in western Pennsylvania. Prefiguring the support to area gave to Ronald 
Reagan a few years later, Thornburgh performed much better than expected in the west during 
the 1978 gubernatorial election.1179 His success was surprising given that most voters in this 
area were registered Democrats and his opponent was Pete Flaherty, the former Democratic 
mayor of Pittsburgh. Thornburgh worried about losing these votes in the upcoming 1982 
election and was careful not to create unnecessary political problems for western Pennsylvania. 
An instance of this caution can be seen in how the administration dealt with lingering problems 
posed by the regional jail system, which was still only partially completed nearly fifteen years 
after the General Assembly approved its creation. The only two jails built were in western 
Pennsylvania - the State Regional Correctional Facility (SRCF) at Greensburg and SRCF Mercer. 
Prison officials considered the regional jail project as a costly "burden" that made the 
management of the state prison system unnecessarily difficult.1180 These facilities aided 
counties by confining inmates serving a sentence with a maximum period between six months 
and two years instead of having these inmates remain in county jails. By 1980, however, with 
only two such institutions, the regional project never realized its intended purpose and by 
statute they could not be used to house regular state prisoners. The administration wanted to 
"back out" of the "regional concept,” but feared the leaders in the counties would object to this 
proposal, especially since many county jails in the regional catchment zones were struggling 
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with overcrowding and were asking the state for additional help.1181 The Thornburgh 
administration sought and received legislative authorization to build new cell space at the SRCF 
Greensburg and SRCF Mercer and loosen the criteria for using these facilities, but it stopped 
short of legally re-designating them as "state correctional institutions" because of the possible 
backlash from counties in the west.1182 The sensitivity of this issue and the distance precluded 
using one of these regional jails as the site for the new Western Diagnostic and Classification 
Center.1183 
 Unlike the situation in the east at Graterford, Commissioner Marks and other Bureau 
officials were not enamored with the idea of expanding the existing center at SCI Pittsburgh and 
wished to avoid doing this as much as possible. At the time, the WDCC was inundated with 
more commitments than it could process in a timely manner, and the relatively small portion of 
the prison set aside for the center further complicated matters. The architecture of SCI 
Pittsburgh presented numerous blind zones, poor sight lines and other control difficulties 
compared many of the state’s other prisons. The murder of a senior officer by several inmates 
in 1973 occurred in an area that was vulnerable to lapses of control.1184 Because of these 
problems and continual costly maintenance, the Bureau did not want to further its dependence 
on the institution. 
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The plans crafted by Thornburgh’s immediate advisors and the senior staff in the Bureau 
of Correction required moving the diagnostic and classification function to a new facility as well 
as creating a mental health unit in this new prison that could house mentally ill inmates 
currently in the general population at SCI Pittsburgh.1185 They eventually targeted this plan on 
the C. Howard Marcy State Hospital within the city of Pittsburgh, which they hoped to convert 
into a small medium security prison in addition to housing the WDCC. The planners believed 
this change would redress space shortfalls at SCI Pittsburgh and reduce tensions in the old 
prison. Divesting the old prison of these specialized functions and removing categories of 
inmates needing specialized care would also enable the prison to become more of a “pure” 
maximum-security, general population facility, which would be easier to manage.1186 Its 
location in the city and proximity to SCI Pittsburgh made the C. Howard Marcy State Hospital 
ideal for this type of conversion.  
By June 1980, the Department of Public Welfare, which operated the hospital, was 
already considering closing C. Howard Marcy Hospital. Earlier in the year, Helen B. O’Bannon, 
the state's Secretary of Public Welfare, established a task force to assess the operations of all 
Pennsylvania’s state hospitals in Allegheny County (Woodville, Mayview, Dixmont, the Western 
Restoration Center, and Marcy) and suggested ways to consolidate their operations and close 
unnecessary facilities.1187 This assessment was part of a larger statewide plan to reduce the size 
                                                          
1185 “Concept Paper for New Correctional Facilities” June 8, 1981 Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, Dick 
Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 19: "Concept Paper for New Correctional Facilities," and "Bureau of Correction: 
Concept for a Total System" concept papers for new prison locations and construction, prepared by the 
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction June, 1981-April, 1982.” UPASC. 
1186 Ibid. 
1187 "C. Howard Marcy State Center: A Report to the Secretary of Public Welfare," Prepared by Kathryn S. McKenna, 
Western Region, Department of Public Welfare, March 17, 1981, 2. Dick Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 15: 




of the state hospital system and eliminate certain areas of care and responsibility. While the 
Department of Public Welfare and the administration still envisioned a major commitment to 
the care and custody of the severely mentally ill, they felt their role in providing institutional 
treatment for the “mentally retarded”1188 needed to be reduced and ultimately 
discontinued.1189 Accordingly, welfare department officials targeted many of the hospitals that 
primarily cared for the mentally retarded for consolidation and closure.  
The task force determined that Marcy was the most likely candidate for closure. In 1974, 
the state re-designated the hospital, which had once treated tuberculosis patients, as a 
“transitional facility” for mentally retarded patients who were being transferred from other 
state centers prior to their release from state care. Ironically, the main impetus for converting 
March to this use was overcrowding in several other state hospitals for the mentally 
retarded.1190 By the 1980s, the hospital was very costly to operate; it was the second most 
expensive hospital in the public system.1191 Complicating this further, by the 1980-1981 fiscal 
year, over a third of its budget came from the federal government in the form of matching 
funds from Medicaid under the Intermediate Care Facilities for People with Mentally 
Retardation benefit. These funds came with the expectation that certain standards of care 
would be maintained as well as ensuring that the facility met the Life Safety Code for fire 
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protection.1192 It was clear Marcy would need additional renovations to maintain federal 
funding. Even then, a reviewer of the facility’s operations noted that, “Marcy would still remain 
a large, old institution with an environment that will never be compatible with transitional 
living.”1193 The Department of Public Welfare’s task force felt the required renovations needed 
to bring the facility up to federal code were simply too burdensome given the state's fiscal 
problems at the time. Yet, with the impending loss of federal support, the state would have had 
to pay for the hospital's entire operational costs. The task force argued that state monies would 
be better allocated by consolidating mental health institutions in Allegheny County, closing 
Marcy, as well as the Western Restoration Center, and either transferring patients to different 
institutions or settling them “in the community.”1194 
In general, the plan to close the hospital would not have been a major surprise to many 
people in the state. As with many other states in the country, Pennsylvania's use of state 
hospitals had declined drastically during the 1960s and 1970s.1195 Gov. Thornburgh, a fiscal 
                                                          
1192 “C. Howard Marcy State Center: A Report to the Secretary of Public Welfare,” Prepared by Kathryn S. McKenna, 
Western Region, Department of Public Welfare, March 17, 1981, 2, 6-8. Dick Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 
15: “Conversion of the Marcy State Hospital into a correctional prison facility April-November, 1981.” UPASC. 
For more on Medicaid and Medicare funding for mental retardation and mental health in general see, Gerald N. 
Grob, From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), 64-70; Margaret W. Linn and Shayna Stein, “Nursing Homes as Community Mental Health Facilities,” in 
David A. Rochefort (ed.), Handbook on Mental Health Policy in the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1989), 267-292; Joseph P. Morrissey, “The Changing Role of the Public Mental Hospital,” in David A. Rochefort ed., 
Handbook on Mental Health Policy in the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 311-338; U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, “Background and Milestones: Intermediate Care Facilities for People 
with Mentally Retardation,” available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CertificationandComplianc/09_ICFMRs.asp. Last 
checked on March 31, 2010. 
1193 C. Howard Marcy State Center: A Report to the Secretary of Public Welfare, Prepared by Kathryn S. McKenna, 
Western Region, Department of Public Welfare, March 17, 1981, 2. Dick Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 15 
“Conversion of the Marcy State Hospital into a correctional prison facility April-November, 1981.” UPASC. 
1194 “Release of Hundreds of Mentally Ill Aired,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 16, 1981; “C. Howard Marcy State 
Center: A Report to the Secretary of Public Welfare,” Dick Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 15: “Conversion of 
the Marcy State Hospital into a correctional prison facility April-November, 1981.” UPASC. 




conservative who had pledged to reduce government waste and improve the bureaucracy’s 
efficiency, pushed the idea of closing more hospitals, arguing that the administration could 
realize substantial budget reductions this way.1196 In addition, the state was entangled in costly, 
ongoing litigation over abuses at the Pennhurst State School and Hospital in eastern 
Pennsylvania and it appeared this case would require the state to make drastic changes at all of 
its state hospitals for the mentally retarded.1197 Reducing the state’s overall care of this 
population would, in effect, lessen the court order reforms and potentially ward off future 
litigation. 
Despite the decline in the state hospital system, this policy was not without risks for the 
administration. The hospitals had a varied and vocal constituency of supporters composed 
largely of state employees and their union as well as families with relatives being treated at the 
hospitals. Earlier attempts to close state hospitals met with enough resistance that the 
administration retreated from ordering further closings.1198 Moreover, closing state hospitals 
primarily as a way to save state resources could be seen as cruel or indifferent to the suffering 
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of patients and employees, maybe even reckless if adequate alternatives were not in place for 
discharged patients. The administration was already the target of criticism by many people in 
the African-American community and social services professions for its plan to reduce the 
number of welfare recipients by over 60,000, a proposal often derided as “Thornfare.”1199  
The proposal to close Marcy, announced in January 1981, encountered opposition from 
Allegheny County officials as well as the union representing hospital workers. Both groups 
claimed they supported the “deinstitutionalization” of those patients most able to function 
without institutional care. However, the Pennsylvania Social Services Union (PSSU) argued that 
many of the residents at Marcy had multiple disabilities that could simply not be met by 
existing community based services.1200 They also noted that the lack suitable community based 
services would be even more acute for patients whose homes were outside of Allegheny 
County, which normally provided a higher level of mental health programs for its residents than 
surrounding counties. These points were also raised by the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees Council 13.1201 Allegheny County officials also objected to the 
closing. They argued that Marcy patients would be transferred to various community programs 
all of which were funded by a higher proportion of county resources. They criticized the state 
for drafting the plan without consulting or forewarning them and expecting them to simply 
accept patients and a greater fiscal burden.1202 The Allegheny County chapter of the Association 
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for Retarded Persons was not as critical of the plan to close Marcy as they recognized the 
coming shortfall of federal funding. As they stated: 
 
We also understand that change is particularly imperative from an economic 
viewpoint given the threatened loss of federal funds and the economic drain on 




Nevertheless, they argued the state was jeopardizing the care and safety of patients by not 
settling the funding issues with the county prior to announcing its decision to close the 
facility.1204 
At this point in the winter and spring of 1981, the Thornburgh administration had not 
yet publicly announced the idea of converting the C. Howard Marcy State Hospital into a prison 
after it was closed. It is not entirely clear when the latter position became more attractive to 
the administration officials tasked with planning new prison construction. The discussions 
within the administration about closing Marcy in 1980 and early 1981 were largely focused on 
rationalizing the operations of the Department of Public Welfare and its state-run 
institutions.1205 It also appears that many more of the state’s hospitals were vetted for their 
possible conversion to prisons.1206 In some of these early proposals, several other hospitals—
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not already slated to close—in the Pittsburgh area were considered for conversion along with 
or instead of Marcy. In one such proposal, the Bureau of Correction planned to convert both 
Marcy and the Dixmont State Hospital, which was further downstream from SCI Pittsburgh on 
the Ohio River.1207 Marcy would operate the diagnostic and classification center, short-term 
mental health unit and a medical center. While Dixmont would be converted to a prison that 
offered “a number of specialized purposes,” including programming for short-term offenders, 
those soon to be released, and those participating in work release or vocational education. This 
would also enable SCI Pittsburgh to function solely as a maximum security prison with programs 
befitting this security rating. Subsequent proposals for the new prison in the Pittsburgh area 
dropped the idea of also using Dixmont State Hospital.1208 
The conflict over the pending closure carried on throughout the spring and summer with 
local county and city officials, the unions, and families of the residents presented strong 
opposition to the administration’s plans.1209 The hospital was located near the East Liberty 
section of Pittsburgh, which at the time was a largely African-American residential area that had 
suffered badly from the political-economic changes of the last thirty years. For many residents, 
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the closure of Marcy would remove one of the areas main employers. Moreover, this particular 
closure dispute paralleled similar conflicts in other parts of the state where the administration 
was in the process of shuttering other public hospitals.1210 Public employee unions, joined by 
some state officials, had taken the administration to court to try to block the closures, but they 
were gradually losing their fight. After the State Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of a 
Commonwealth Court ruling that permitted the closures, it seemed likely that the opposition 
would lose the fight to keep Marcy open.1211 Nevertheless, those opposed to the closure 
continued to describe the administration’s fiscal arguments about closure as irresponsible and 
reckless with the lives of patients who could not care for themselves.1212 
The nature of the conflict changed abruptly in September 1981 when the Thornburgh 
administration announced the plan to convert the Marcy State Hospital into a 325-bed medium 
security prison as part of a broad package of legislation calling for mandatory-minimum 
sentencing and expanded prison capacity. The proposed conversion of Marcy matched the 
plans from the internal discussions with the exception that the addition of other specialized 
penal operations at Dixmont were dropped, and never publically mentioned. The reaction of 
the surrounding community and the city when the plan became public on September 16, 1981 
was explosive, especially in the neighborhoods of East Liberty, Larimer, and Lincoln-Lemington, 
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which were near where Marcy was located.1213 East Liberty, described by the Pittsburgh Press 
as “the city’s best politically organized, mostly black community,”1214 was a bastion of 
Democratic Party. Although, Dick Thornburgh had polled better than expected in Pittsburgh in 
1978 the city’s black community intensely disliked the governor and many of his policies, 
especially Thornfare, which disproportionately affected African Americans.1215 
On September 24th, about 200 people turned out at the Lincoln-Larimer Athletic 
Association for a meeting organized by the staff of the Democratic Party’s 12th Ward to protest 
the administration’s plan.1216 The meeting featured addresses by prominent local leaders, such 
as the 12th Ward Democratic Party Dock Fielder Jr., local NAACP Chairman, Harvey Adams and 
Frank Williams, the county director of property and supplies.  State representative William 
Pendleton, who spoke to the media at the event, felt that a prison sent a bad symbolic message 
to a neighborhood that already had a juvenile detention facility: “The young people at Schuman 
Center can look right across the hill and see where they’re going.”1217 He called for public 
hearings over the plan, something the Thornburgh administration surely wished to avoid.1218 
After several more community meetings, many East Liberty residents formed a pressure group 
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called the “12th Ward and Concerned Pittsburghers" to oppose the new prison. The group’s 
executive committee wrote to the governor and the legislature recommending that Marcy be 
used for a more "positive purpose." They proposed approaching the Job Corps about 
establishing an office and training center at Marcy.1219    
Letters from city and county officials decrying the plan soon flooded into the governor’s 
Pittsburgh and Harrisburg offices.1220 Pittsburgh’s mayor, Richard Caliguiri, objected to the 
governor’s plan publicly as well as through direct correspondence with the governor.1221 
Pittsburgh’s City Council and the County Commissioners also criticized the proposed facility.1222 
State Senator Leonard Bodack rejected the plan and passed along petitions with 1,189 
signatures from 12th Ward residents and 592 letters from city residents also opposed to the 
Marcy conversion.1223 Many of the letters received by the administration and the House 
Judiciary Committee, not only voiced their opposition to the plan, but also called for public 
hearings in Pittsburgh.1224 All of these local politicians and many residents frequently cited the 
administration’s heavy-handed approach to the whole issue, especially the lack of forewarning 
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and consultation over the prison proposal. The hospital closure itself was already a contentious 
issue in the city. The prison proposal only compounded this problem.  
Rep. William Pendleton, a first-term state legislator, emerged as the most vocal and 
visible of the administration’s opponents over the Marcy State Hospital, which was located in 
his representative district. While he called for public hearings in statements to the press and 
correspondence with the governor, he informally lobbied the administration and House 
Judiciary Committee to hold public hearings in Pittsburgh over the proposal. In an October 14, 
1981 private meeting with Harold Miller and Commissioner Ronald Marks, Pendleton indicated 
that even though the Judiciary Committee had dismissed the idea, he might nevertheless 
pursue public hearings on his own.1225 This was something the administration wished to avoid. 
In the same meeting, Miller and Marks tried to persuade Pendleton to support the 
administration's plans.1226 Pendleton said he was supportive of the administration's new 
sentencing proposal, but objected to the specific conversion of Marcy to accommodate the 
desire for new prison space. Pendleton argued that the area surrounding Marcy was a "very 
fragile neighborhood," as Harold Miller later recalled, and the presence of a prison would not 
help matters.1227 While Pendleton was a freshman legislator, he was accompanied at the 
meeting by Stanley Mitchell, the personal assistant to Rep. K. LeRoy Irvis, whose district was 
also near the hospital. Rep. Irvis was the House’s minority leader and previously the Speaker of 
the House. He was well-respected nationally and one of the state Democratic Party's most 
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powerful legislators. The presence of his assistant lent more weight to Pendleton’s position vis-
a-vis the administration.   
Miller reported to Rick Stafford and Gov. Thornburgh that despite their best efforts their 
arguments, specific plans and supporting maps failed to convince the representative that the 
new prison would not negatively affect the community, its image, and property values. 
Pendleton recommended that if Marcy could not remain a hospital, the old facility should be 
used for some other purpose benefiting the surrounding area. This was a point Pendleton had 
raised in an earlier letter to the governor.1228 He said the facility could be a "workfare training 
center," referring to the governor’s plan to push thousands of people off the state's welfare 
rolls. Miller stated that establishing such centers was never considered by the administration. 
Pendleton hinted that it was his intention and that of other members of the legislature to 
introduce the idea of using "vacant space in state institutions for training ‘Hard Core’ welfare 
recipients.”1229 When Miller rejected this idea, Pendleton suggested the administration look 
into the possibility of using Herr's Island in the Allegheny River as the location for the new 
prison.1230 
 The area around Marcy was a largely African-American populated section of the city that 
was also substantially poorer than many other neighborhoods. In the debate over Marcy, those 
opposing the administration's plans often made reference to the racial and class characteristics 
of the area through oblique, but recognizable ways such as "very fragile neighborhood," which 
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was "struggling to rebuild their community image."1231 This difference was also apparent in an 
article on the issue in the Pittsburgh Press suggestively titled, "East Liberty Losing Ground in 
Marcy Prison Fight."1232 The article included the comments of Rep. Terry McVerry, a white 
Republican representing the much wealthier suburb of Mt. Lebanon, who said he sympathized 
with his colleague Rep. Pendleton, but opined that prisons were going to generate opposition 
regardless of where they were located. He and Rep. Michael Fisher, Republican representing 
Upper St. Clair another wealthy, largely white, suburb of Pittsburgh, stated there were many 
advantages to the Marcy site. Both men had voted as members of the House Judiciary 
Committee to send the bill including the Marcy conversion out of the committee to the floor for 
a vote.1233 Rep. Pendleton responded to their comments by simply pointing out, "That's easy for 
them to say. It isn't in their communities."1234 The article also quoted the bill's prime sponsor, 
Republican Jeffery Piccola, who argued that "we're going to have to be willing to pay the price 
for the prisons" called for in the new sentencing legislation. Again, Pendleton referred to the 
number of halfway houses, a juvenile detention center, state and veteran's hospitals, and state 
police barracks in the area, and expressed that his constituents had “’paid our price in that end 
of town.’”1235   
 At first, the administration and its Republican allies in the General Assembly held fast to 
their original plan. Supporters deflected arguments against the conversion of Marcy, citing the 
general support across the state for the administration’s effort to increase sentencing severity 
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and construct a new prison. Even some of the people opposing the planned conversion of the 
hospital, like Rep. Pendleton, supported the increased penalties that were part of the same 
legislation authorizing the new prison construction.1236 This did not quell the backlash against 
the plan, as Harold Miller acknowledged in an update on the issue to Rick Stafford and the 
governor on October 21st:  
 
Of all the new prisons we have proposed, only Marcy has generated significant 
opposition (Even the opposition to the new prison at Graterford is limited and 
concerned more with whether we build it inside the existing wall or not).1237 
 
Following the October 14th meeting with Rep. Pendleton, a series of other potential sites were 
suggested and vetted by representatives from the city, county, legislature, and the 
administration, including in the latter case Commissioner Marks and the superintendent of SCI 
Pittsburgh, George Petsock who assessed the site for penological suitability.  
 The administration followed up on Rep. Pendleton's suggestion to investigate Herr's 
Island. Staff from the Department of Environmental Resources, as well as the Bureau of 
Corrections and the Department of General Services, inspected the site, but their report was 
not favorable. The potential for flooding was high, which could hamper evacuation and access 
by fire, police and medical services if there were an emergency at a prison located on the 
island.1238 These marks against the location precluded the need for assessing the possible 
political reaction from nearby communities. On November 5th, Rep. Pendleton arranged 
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another private meeting to discuss the assessment of Herr's Island and other potential sites in 
the City County Building in Pittsburgh. The meeting was attended by representatives from the 
mayor's office, the city council, and a host of county, state, and city level development and 
land-use bureaucrats, Pendleton and three staff members of SCI Pittsburgh, including Supt. 
Petsock.1239 Rep. Pendleton reiterated his objection to the conversion of Marcy and Edward 
Deluca, the head of the city's economic development agency, stated there were no sites in the 
city of Pittsburgh available for a prison. Nevertheless, the county's director of development 
Myles Span, suggested there might be six or more sites in the surrounding area that would be 
appropriate for consideration. These sites were located in Monroeville, Braddock, Boyce Park, 
Tarentum and Collier Township near the Greater Pittsburgh Airport.1240  
It appears the administration did not pursue these other options. With the exception of 
Collier Township, the distances between these sites and SCI Pittsburgh were greater than 
Marcy’s location. More importantly, these areas, while not the most wealthy in the county, 
were home to largely white residents, many of whom were also working class. Braddock, 
especially, would have been considered and industrial center and working or middle class 
communities by most Allegheny County residents. The administration expected an even greater 
public rebuke if they tried to locate a prison in these largely white communities. The 
administration's planning staff reconsidered the possible conversion of the Dixmont State 
Hospital after the administration encountered resistance at Marcy, and also thought about 
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converting Woodville and Mayview State Hospitals, which were also in southwestern 
Pennsylvania.1241 None of these hospitals had been slated to close at that time, and the 
administration balked at these ideas because, as Harold Miller stated in assessment of the 
situation: 
 
All of these are in relatively well-to-do areas of the county. It seems likely that if 
we are getting widespread opposition to Marcy, we will get even more at these 
sites, particularly if we have to close an institution instead of conversion or 
construction.1242 
  
Despite opposition from the House of Representatives, Miller suggested they could still push 
forward with the Marcy plan because the broader sentencing legislation it was a part of had 
cleared the Judiciary committees in both chambers of the General Assembly. Miller believed 
the bill had a good chance of being approved in a floor vote in both chambers, but feared that 
much of Pittsburgh would be hostile to the administration if they proceeded in this direction, 
something that would be remembered in the next gubernatorial election only a year away.1243  
 As Miller was writing this letter, a standoff with several armed inmates who had taken 
hostages at SCI Graterford was in its second day of negotiations.1244 The tense situation 
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captured headlines across the state and was picked up by the national media. The standoff 
lasted a few more days and was eventually resolved peacefully, but the media coverage of the 
event brought into focus serious system-wide management problems in the state's prison 
system, which could not have been lost on the participants in the Marcy conflict.1245 In the days 
following the resolution at Graterford, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported on a November 5th, 
behind-closed-doors meeting between the city, county and administration staff, which it 
referred to as the "latest chapter" of "the Battle Over Marcy." 1246  Without revealing any 
names, the paper stated local officials convinced the administration's delegation to consider 
seven other possible places to locate the new prison.  
 It appears that even while the administration sent some staff from SCI Pittsburgh to 
hear about Herr's Island and other possible sites, some of the more senior planners were 
already planning to drop the Marcy plan.1247 It had become too politically costly and the 
hostage situation at Graterford did not help. Harold Miller recommended dropping the Marcy 
proposal and building a prison in another part of the state.1248 Rick Stafford, concurred, advising 
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the governor that Marcy had generated a lot of opposition and that they could not afford to 
lose political support in Allegheny County. So, they began looking for sites elsewhere. On 
November 12, 1981, Thornburgh announced he was abandoning the conversion plan for Marcy, 
but that the hospital would still close. Speaking at a meeting of the International Society of 
Crime Prevention Practitioners, Thornburgh told reporters: 
 
The case was made to our folks by elected officials and citizens groups that 
Marcy’s proximity to neighborhoods that were fragile would have a very harmful 
effect on efforts made to increase the viability of the area.1249 
 
 
He also tried to mitigate some of the political damage from the Marcy episode by supporting a 
plan suggested by Rep. Pendleton to approach the federal government about the possibility of 
relocating a Job Corps training center at the site of the closed hospital.1250  
With an election coming up a year later, the Marcy campaign had angered too many 
voters in the western region, but dropping the plan left the administration with a shortfall of 
325 beds and continued overcrowding difficulties at SCI Pittsburgh. This miscalculation on the 
part of the administration stemmed in part from the planners mistaken assumption that local 
residents would view a mental hospital and a prison as similar enough to not object to the 
conversion. They may have also felt that a community that already had other institutions, like 
halfway houses and a juvenile detention center would not object to what they believed to be a 
similar institution. It was clear from many of the letters the administration received from local 
residents that in addition to the common NIMBY objections to unwanted development, many 
                                                          





residents simply did not support the administration’s punitive social policy. Suggestions for 
work centers, job training and other reformative programs at the site revealed a major 
disagreement on this point. It was not simply that residents did not want a prison nearby, they 
wanted a solution to Marcy’s possible closure that emphasized a more welfarist orientation to 
government intervention and public spending. Of course, many people still supported the 
continued use of the facility as a hospital.  
 As the Marcy plan deteriorated, several community groups and leaders from Frackville, 
a rural, largely white, mining town, approached the administration with proposals of support 
for locating the missing prison in their area. First, the Shenandoah Chamber of Commerce 
offered the Bureau of Correction over 200 acres of cleared, improved ground with utilities that 
had been planned as an industrial park.1251 When this land proved to be insufficient for the new 
prison, the Greater Pottsville Industrial Development Corporation proposed two other sites in 
the area for the Bureau to consider.1252 Frackville was nowhere near Pittsburgh or even the 
western half of the state. Located roughly sixty miles northeast of Harrisburg in Schuylkill 
County, Frackville was far from the urban centers that the Bureau identified as having the 
greatest need for new institutions. A new prison in the area would not be able to house either 
the classification center envisioned by Bureau planners or the mental health facilities. It was 
too far from the concentration of hospitals and medical professionals in the Pittsburgh and 
Philadelphia areas. Nevertheless, administration officials saw Frackville as the only politically-
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viable option for building the new prison and a way to add even more cells than would have 
been possible at Marcy.1253 They decided that if they were going to build a prison from the 
scratch rather than converting an existing institution, like a hospital, then it would be more 
cost-effective to add additional cells to the prison design. The Frackville prison plan, therefore, 
called for 500 cells rather than the 325 cells originally envisioned at Marcy.1254 
 Compared to the controversial Marcy plan, the proposed Schuylkill County prison 
garnered a great deal of local support, but most of it came from businesses and the building 
trade unions not in the immediate area of the proposed sites.1255 Policy analyst, Harold Miller 
told Rick Stafford, one of Gov. Thornburgh’s closest advisors, that they had received letters of 
support from the United Labor Counicl of Schuylkill County, Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen 
Union #47, Noble C. Quandel, Jr. and the Quandel Company, American Bank and Trust Co. of 
Pa., Cressona Aluminum Company, Richard B. Ryon Insurance, Union Bank and Trust Company 
of Pottsville and the Building and the Construction Trades Council of Schuylkill County in 
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addition to the Greater Pottsville Industrial Development Corporation.1256 However, Miller later 
noted they had not heard from “residents, public officials, businessmen, or organizations 
located in Frackville, which is close to one of the sites.”1257 This was worrisome because the first 
site in the area that the Bureau considered encountered resistance by local residents who lived 
close to the possible prison site and this played a major role in the decision to abandon this 
initial location.1258 The broader county level support was crucial in securing the new sites, which 
were not as close to residential areas as the first one.  
Perhaps the most important source of support came from the local development 
corporation, which had purchased and improved much of the land that the state was now 
considering. The Greater Pottsville Industrial Development Corporation borrowed for these 
development projects without future tenants already in place. The original industrial park had 
been vacant for nearly five years and never had an actual business established on site. Because 
the public authority was legally separate from the elected local government their speculative 
investment in these development projects sidestepped the borrowing limits and voter 
authorization needed for debt-financed public capital projects.1259 The land they offered to the 
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Bureau was already graded, had proper drainage and was close to sewage and other utilities. 
Unlike the backlash against Marcy, the public authority and Shenandoah Chamber of 
Commerce also absorbed much of the local resistance to the new prison instead of the Bureau 
and Thornburgh administration, which had greater support in the area in general than it did in 
Pittsburgh.1260 Local protesters, upset over the initial site, directed anger more at these local 
bodies, who partly acquiesced by suggesting alternative sites. Even after the eventual site 
selection, the public authority acted as an intermediary between the local populace and the 
Bureau of Correction, answering queries about security and escapes as well as collecting 
employment applications and enquires.1261  
 On August 1982, the Bureau of Correction selected a site near Frackville for the planned 
$27 million 500-bed prison.1262 Gov. Thornburgh formally announced the new prison – later to 
be named SCI Frackville – in Pottsville on August 13th to an audience of local office holders, 
businessmen and labor leaders. The governor claimed that the new prison, part of over 3,000 
cells to be added to the prison system, was needed to alleviate overcrowding, which was 
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already plaguing the state’s institutions and showed no signs of abating. He also acknowledged 
his administration’s mandatory-minimum sentencing proposal would make overcrowding 
worse unless something else changed. He stated that their “campaign against crime has obliged 
us to put our money where our mouth is,” and by building prisons, “We’re not only talking 
tough. We’re acting tough.”1263 Press coverage of the announcement emphasized the economic 
development the prison would directly bring to the area in the form of construction and routine 
time operations employment, but also the tertiary business that would develop to support the 
new institution.1264 However, the news coverage and official statements by both the 
administration and the Greater Pottsville Industrial Development Corporation also clearly 
stated that overcrowding in the existing system and future growth of the state’s prison 
population necessitated the additional cell space that would, as a byproduct, economically 
benefit places like Schuylkill County, which suffered from high unemployment as the mining 
industry declined. Local papers informed readers that, once operational, the new prison would 
consume “5,000 tons of anthracite coal annually, which will of course help the local coal 
industry.”1265 Beyond these direct economic benefits, locals could partake in Thornburgh’s 
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toughness and hardline against “the criminals” the governor referred to in his 
announcement.1266 
The Frackville announcement ended the administration’s immediate campaign to secure 
additional cell space. In addition to the Schuylkill prison, the Bureau of Correction also added 
additional cells at several existing prisons (Graterford, 500 cells; Greensburg, 150 cells; Mercer, 
180 cells; Dallas, 200 cells), planned to construct a new prison adjacent to the exiting one at 
Huntington (500 cells) and converted two state hospitals at Cresson (500 cells) and Retreat (500 
cells).1267 Internally, however, Thornburgh and his advisors were careful how they crafted their 
public message about these political victories. Briefing notes for the Frackville announcement, 
for instance, made clear that they needed to frame the project “as a response to general prison 
population increases and overcrowding, not as a replacement for Marcy.”1268 The 
administration hoped to avoid public acknowledgement of their defeat at Marcy and the real 
consequences it would have for the Bureau’s classification system and mental health 
treatment, especially in the western region. Thornburgh and his advisors deemed it politically 
more prudent to portray themselves as taking responsibly for addressing crime with harsh 
sentencing and dealing with the inexorable climb of prison populations and the safety risks this 
posed to staff and inmates.  
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Yet, Thornburgh and most members of his inner circle of policy advisors and cabinet 
members knew the new cells would do little to alleviate overcrowding for years. The Frackville 
prison would take four years to build. Even the converted hospitals would not be ready for 
several years. The administration downplayed this, however, because it raised immediate 
questions about the how the alarming annual increases in prison populations would be 
addressed in the short-term. The same briefing notes warned against associating Marcy with 
the Schuylkill prison also acknowledged that Pennsylvania’s prison population increased by 14.3 
percent the previous year and was growing at a rate of over 100 a month in the current year 
(1982).1269 At this pace, the new prisons would be filled and overcrowded once operational. In 
fact, a 1985 report produced by the Prison and Jail Overcrowding Task Force of the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) acknowledged that the growth of 
the state’s prison population had already outstripped the number of cells still being 
constructed.1270  
Prison officials pursued more immediate methods of trying to deal with the increasing 
number of people committed to their custody. In addition to double-celling, the administration 
also began deploying temporary modular housing within the secure perimeters of several 
prisons.1271 Correctional officials viewed such measures as desperate responses that clearly 
compromised security and safety. Yet, they had few other managerial options to address 
overcrowding as the punitive sentiment engulfing penal policy simply closed off the greater use 
                                                          
1269 Ibid.  
1270 Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, Prison and Jail Overcrowding Task Force, A Strategy to 
Alleviate Overcrowding in Pennsylvania’s Prisons and Jails (Harrisburg: PCCD, February 12, 1985), 2. 
1271 “Briefing Information on New Prison in Schuylkill County,” Harold Miller to Governor Thornburgh, August 5, 
1982. Dick Thornburgh Papers, box 265, folder 24: Proposal to construct a prison facility at the Shenandoah 




of “backend solutions,” like the greater use of parole, community corrections and sentence 
remission. These were precisely the type of short-term “relief valve” mechanisms the Chairman 
of the PCCD, Alfred Blumstein, pointed to as necessary components for addressing 
overcrowding.1272 Sam McClea, a Democratic staff member of the House of Representatives 
Judiciary Committee, criticized the administration’s plan to build more prison cells, noting that 
short-term solutions, targeted at moving low-risk offenders into more community treatment 
centers, would be a more cost-effective and flexible strategy for dealing with prison 
overcrowding.1273 While administration officials and legislators put forth such suggestions in a 
number of meetings on overcrowding sponsored by the PCCD, they did not carry enough broad-
based, bipartisan support to become law. Many of Gov. Thornburgh’s immediate advisors and 
Thorough himself opposed many of these options.1274  
Blumstein, among others, knew that there was no prospect of building their way out of 
the prison overcrowding problem.1275 Moreover, the research on prison populations 
undertaken by Blumstein and his PCCD colleagues as well as some of his associates in the 
Governor’s Office, like Harold Miller, indicated that the overcrowding problem would peak 
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around 1990, then subside. Blumstein warned that focusing on a large building program would 
not address the immediate overcrowding problem and leave the state with excess prison 
capacity a decade or so later. In a letter to Gov. Thornburgh, dated January 10, 1980, he 
cautioned that “since it’s likely that much of the additional capacity will not be needed after 
2000, provision of that capacity runs the risk that it will be used for individuals who do not 
warrant imprisonment.”1276 Yet, this is precisely the primary strategy the administration 
adopted, surely knowing the gap between prison capacity and population would remain and 
widen. 
Even if building new cell space appealed to many people in the Thornburgh 
administration as the best major policy option for dealing with overcrowding problems, the 
resistance they encountered at some of the sites, like Marcy, and the remoteness of eventual 
sites from urban areas compromised the Bureau’s spatial management strategies to leverage 
services provided by other agencies, industries and institutions, and attract professionals to the 
prison service. It also reduced the viability of work release programs and availability of 
programs run by volunteers and charitable organizations, which were more common near 
cities. Yet, the Marcy and Schuylkill County prison siting campaigns fundamentally altered the 
future penal geography of the state. After it opened in 1987, SCI Frackville soon surpassed its 
rated capacity. The administration of Gov. Robert Casey built additional prisons, one of which – 
SCI Mahanoy – was located within a few miles of SCI Frackville, which was upgraded to 
accommodate maximum-security prisoners. In addition, the federal government commissioned 
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FCI Schuylkill in 1991 about fifteen miles from the two state prisons. Sentencing reform and the 
governance of an overcrowded prison system facilitated the construction of a local political 
coalition in Schuylkill County between business, labor, local government, public authority-
development corporations and the state to obtain a new source of capital investment, 
employment and tax revenue. In the process, this economically declining county in the once-
mining intensive Pennsylvania Coal Region transformed into a politically-safe area to locate new 
prisons. The almost entirely white population of the county contrasted sharply with the racial 
composition of the home counties of many of the prisoners who would eventually be held in 




While prions overcrowding is a longstanding problem in the history of imprisonment, it 
has usually been short lived. Penal authorities have historically deployed a number of 
mechanisms to release some prisoners early, like parole, or divert new commitments to other 
forms of sanction, like probation. However, in the late twentieth century, overcrowding 
became a permanent aspect of prisons in most of the United States. In this regard, the 
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experience of people living and working in Pennsylvania prisons resembled accounts from many 
other American states.  
Throughout the 1980s, overcrowding was arguably the central problem of Pennsylvania 
corrections. The early years of this problem, discussed here, created a sense of crisis among 
penal authorities and prisoners alike. Many other concerns, like safety, staffing levels and the 
lack of medical and mental health care for prisoners, all eventually led back to the pressure 
created by trying to house far too many people in institutions, and with standards, designed for 
much fewer people. While the efforts of prisoners, courts and some senior officials improved 
life behind bars for many people during the height of the prisoners’ rights era, overcrowding 
quietly undercut these gains. After rehabilitation evaporated as a major organizing discourse, 
many of its associated programs and practices receded or were simply eliminated. The few 
programs that remained soon had long waiting lists. Some prisoners waited years for inclusion 
into an education or counseling program. Life for many prisoners in maximum-security 
institutions during the 1980s became a daily routine of trying to avoid trouble and seeking 
safety. For many others, this safety was found in one of the many prison gangs that began to 
flourish in the absence of other ways of organizing inmate sociality.  
Victor Hassine’s prison memoir, Life Without Parole: Living in Prison Today is very much 
an account of what daily life was like in overcrowded prisons. Most of his narrative is about 
learning to navigate the confusing mass of people he encountered at Graterford and later 
Pittsburgh. It is notable that he never discusses treatment, counseling, education courses or 
many of the other routines of the treatment era. He also often mentions the distance prison 




the height of rehabilitation, like Malcolm Braly’s False Starts: A Memoir of San Quentin and 
Other Prisons, is remarkably different in this regard.1278 
As the discordant race relations that developed in the 1960s worsened throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, prison administrators quietly began implementing control policies that 
concentrated black, and later Latino, prisoners in prisons near Philadelphia, like Graterford, and 
white prisoners in rural prisons, like Huntington. SCI Pittsburgh had a greater parity of black and 
white prisoners, but many black prisoners from Philadelphia viewed it more as a white 
prison.1279 The authorities did not acknowledge this practice as it would have immediately 
attracted judicial attention, but it was one of the many ways that the authorities tried to 
manage racial hostility among prisoners in overcrowded prisons.     
For officials like Alfred Blumstein, overcrowding became a major area of research and 
knowledge production, but ultimately a problem they could not solve. As the head of the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, Blumstein organized a task force devoted 
to overcrowding and several major conferences on the issue with numerous high-ranking 
attendees from state government and law enforcement. The Prison Overcrowding Task Force 
released several extensive reports detailing the scale of the problem, some of its causes and a 
mix of possible remedies. As Blumstein had always maintained, prison overcrowding 
represented the confluence of several different causes and could really only be addressed with 
multiple interventions and policy changes. Yet, many of his recommendations fell on deaf ears 
in the administration of Gov. Thornburgh and his Democratic successor, Gov. Robert Casey. 
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Suggestions to increase the use of parole and other forms of discretionary release or 
community corrections did not find favor with Gov. Thornburgh, who advocated eliminating 
parole all together. At a time when sentencing was becoming harsher and provided a way to 
garner political credibility, emphasizing decarceration strategies, even longstanding ones, was a 
political liability. Building new prisons, however, was not.  
Overcrowding problems in Pennsylvania during the early 1980s stood in stark contrast 
with how penal authorities in New South Wales managed their state’s prison population. While 
Commissioner Walter McGeechan developed several community corrections programs in the 
early 1970s, they began to receive greater use after 1973 when the prison population began to 
fall. This trend continued for several years after the Royal Commission, no doubt bolstered by 
Justice Nagle’s recommendation that prison only be used as a “last resort.” After Rex Jackson 
became the Labor government’s Minister for Corrective Services1280 in 1981, he began a new 
discretionary release program called “release on license” by using authority granted to him as a 
Minster under the Crimes Act of 1900 to release certain prisoners who were not yet eligible for 
parole.1281 This program paralleled the parole system and the sentence remissions prisoners 
could earn during their imprisonment. In many cases, it by-passed these other mechanisms all 
together. The Department of Corrective Services further reduced the size of the state prison 
population with this program, but the release on license scheme also contained the seeds of its 
own demise. The discretionary release authority in the hands of the minister eventually 
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attracted criticism by the judiciary and political Opposition who felt that the scheme was 
undermining sentencing.1282 The government abandoned the scheme in September 1983, but 
more serious problems with it soon arose. Rex Jackson had a serious gambling problem and had 
been recorded by police accepting bribes for the early release of prisoners to pay off debts. This 
eventually developed into a major scandal for the Labor government. Jackson was dismissed, 
tried and convicted and spent over seven years confined in the prison system he once oversaw. 
The scandal made other attempts to reduce the prison population with decarceration programs 
politically suspect for years. 
In the mid-to-late 1980s, much like in Pennsylvania, politicians in New South Wales 
discovered the political mileage to be gained from punitive, law and order campaigning. The 
state’s prison population began a steady climb around 1986 and exceeded capacity the same 
year, with a 102.1 percent occupancy rate.1283 A much harsher “Truth in Sentencing” law passed 
by the new Liberal government in 1989 lengthened sentences and caused an additional 
increase in the number people behind bars.1284 The prison population continued to grow 
throughout the 1990s, but it never reached the levels of incarceration or prison overcrowding 
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Chapter 5: The Transfer of Prisoners in New South Wales 
 
 
Scattered from the Bering Strait almost to the Bosporus are thousands of islands 
of the spellbound Archipelago. They are invisible, but they exist. And the invisible 
slaves of the Archipelago, who have substance, weight, and volume, have to be 
transported from island to island just as invisibly and uninterruptedly. And by 
what means are they to be transported? On what? 
 
                                                                                                       Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn1285 
Introduction: On the Move 
 
Early in the public Royal Commission hearings, Walter McGeechan, the Commissioner of 
Corrective Services, mentioned his Department moved roughly 85,000-86,000 prisoners 
between prisons and other facilities every year. Because he cited the figure so casually and did 
not specify any particular year for it, his statement made it appear this was a relatively normal 
level of prisoner movement for the Department of Corrective Services in any given year.1286 In 
subsequent hearings, legal counsel for several penal reform groups1287 and the Royal 
Commission asked McGeechan and his staff to clarify this figure and provide a rationale for this 
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level of prisoner movement.1288 The figure seemed high to them, but they had little basis to 
judge what constituted a normal rate of inter-institutional prisoner movement.1289  They asked 
McGeechan several times about the accuracy of the figure he mentioned and what this would 
have meant for the average number of movements for an inmate per year. McGeechan 
explained that calculating how many times an inmate moved on average by simply dividing the 
number of yearly transfers per inmate—a proposition put to him during questioning—obscured 
how and why specific inmates were moved or that some moved more often than others.1290 
Yet, he did not elaborate beyond this. The ambiguity in the figure, and the numerous reasons 
for transfers, invited further questioning over several different sessions of the Royal 
Commission. 
On the thirteenth day of public testimony, P.L. Stein, counsel appearing for the Council 
of Civil Liberties and the Penal Reform Council, asked McGeechan bluntly, “is there a conscious 
policy of the Department to keep prisoners on the move from one establishment to another?” 
McGeechan denied there was such a policy, stating that in fact “the ideal would be to have no 
movements.”1291 This failed to satisfy Stein. Almost nine months later, the Council for Civil 
Liberties again brought the issue to the attention of the Royal Commission, including it on a list 
of topics they proposed for further investigation. Specifically, they wished to know the: 
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Necessity, function and real volume of prison movement, consequences to 
prisoners, families and management of using geographical movement as a policy 
instrument, effects of ‘shanghais’1292, expense and alternative instruments.1293 
 
  
The continued interest in this issue stemmed partly from the inability or unwillingness of 
officials from the Department of Corrective Services to elaborate on whether or not they 
considered it to be “high.” McGeechan’s figure also seemed odd to investigators because he 
repeatedly described an approximate number that varied between 80,000 and 86,000. This 
suggested the Department did not keep accurate records of these movements, which made this 
category appear less significant to the Department compared to the multitude of other figures 
that appeared in their annual reports to Parliament, their own internal data, and submissions to 
the Royal Commission.1294 Some of these other statistics, the prison population figures in 
particular, made the volume of transfers appear excessive. The yearly average of daily prison 
population during McGeechan’s tenure (1968-1978) never exceeded 4200 inmates.1295 The 
total number of people the Department of Corrective Services received from the courts never 
exceeded 25, 000 a year over the same period and usually remained below 20,000 yearly 
committals.1296 Many of the people represented in the yearly committal figures served short 
sentences, were released on bail, or simply had their charges dropped. Nevertheless, these 
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figures when set beside the numbers of transfers that McGeechan cited perplexed counsel 
appearing before the Royal Commission. The discrepancy suggested to them that Corrective 
Services moved inmates much more frequently than what they assumed to be a reasonable 
rate. The appearance of vagueness on this issue concerned the Royal Commission because of its 
implications for penological practice and the civil rights of prisoners, in addition to the high 
administrative and financial costs incurred by moving prisoners.  
The commission sensed that something was amiss in the Department’s practice of 
moving prisoners, but they were unable to articulate their concern beyond a few minor 
suggested changes (like giving more advanced warning of pending transfers, especially to family 
members). While it was not surprising to the Royal Commission that Corrective Services moved 
inmates, the practice nevertheless diverged from the presumed immobility of inmates implied 
by imprisonment. The tension over this issue also flowed from disparities between the various 
framings used by different actors. A synoptic, administrative perspective informed the 
descriptions of the routine practices, policies and statistical knowledge about transfers, which 
differed sharply from testimony by inmates and staff about particular examples of transfers. 
The synoptic framing was not novel to the commission investigators and the counsel 
participating in the proceedings. After all, the Wran government explicitly asked them to adopt 
this view in the commission’s terms of reference. When analyzing transfers as a category in 
itself, however, this perspective emphasized the movement of inmates instead of their 
confinement behind walls. Nevertheless, the questions put to witnesses often suggested that 
investigators and counsel still considered movement to be an exceptional or episodic 




Certainly, most inmates remained at specific prisons for long periods of time once the 
penal authorities assigned them there. Even for the relatively few inmates that the Department 
moved frequently, the preference of penal authorities was too keep in them in place as long as 
they could. This was also usually what inmates preferred with some significant exceptions. 
However, in the yearly movement figures the Royal Commission glimpsed that system of 
confinement was, in fact, very mobile. Nevertheless, this mobility was still difficult to see in 
much of the evidence, the way it was presented, and the way it was discursively constituted.1297  
The transfer figures, along with the other statistical data presented at the Royal 
Commission, depended on the fixity of their subjects in the very enumerative operations that 
constructed them. These quantitative methods assigned clear, distinct places to inmates (and 
to a lesser extent, staff as well) within the overall structure of penal space. These distinct 
spaces –the grids, categories and cells on forms – enabled the enumeration and description of 
inmates. They corresponded, at least conceptually, to inmates with such attributes in specific 
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37 (July 2012), 446-460. While dealing explicitly with prisoner transfer, the authors limited their focus to the initial 
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places —usually prison cells. Correctional officials and the Department’s research staff would 
have been the first to point out that such statistical material was often based on abstractions 
distinct from actual inmates. For instance, the prison population statistics most often publically 
cited by officials were based on yearly or monthly calculated daily averages. These averages 
were, in turn, composites of actual inmate counts done at each prison, which were reported 
weekly, themselves being the summation of daily counts that occurred during three daily 
musters. These latter counts, the weekly and daily totals, were often the figures that matter 
most internally as staff used them in making placement and transfer decisions. In both 
instances, however, these calculations described a fixed number at any given point. 
Enumerating inmates like this necessarily involved establishing and following standards 
delineating how to count inmates, which ones to include and exclude depending on, among 
other things, where they were. 1298 In other words, penal statistics followed rules dictating that 
an inmate must be counted here rather than there.1299 Leaving aside questions of statistical 
validity, whether or how much these figures matched their objects in the “real world,” the 
methods worked against thinking of inmates as moving through penal space. In a discursive 
environment emphasizing the fixity of categories, inmates, and prisons, the topic of transfers 
seemed literally out of place.  
In the section of the Gulag Archipelago from which I drew the epigram starting this 
chapter, Solzhenitsyn described the invisibility that obscured prisons, their inmates, and how 
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they were transported to and from places of confinement and forced labor.1300 This invisibility 
was all the more remarkable because of the sheer scale of the Gulag system and the work that 
went into creating and sustaining it. Solzhenitsyn’s characterization is useful for thinking about 
the similar, but clearly different, practices and policies of prisoner transfer in New South Wales 
during this period because of the way he foregrounds the movement of the confined. This 
routine movement is often left unstated or unexplored in the literature on prisons. It is 
arguably more prominent in the literature on convict “transportation,” for which the penal 
colony of New South Wales. Yet, even here, the literature focuses less on the movement of the 
convicted once they disembarked in the new penal colony than on their initial voyage across 
the oceans.1301 The title Solzhenitsyn chose for the section in question, “Perpetual Motion,” 
summarized the routine aspect of this process, which the author, of course, saw from a very 
different viewpoint than that available to the Royal Commission.  
In addition to Solzhenitsyn’s questions in the epigram, one might also ask why prisoners 
were transported. How did this process relate to other changes sweeping over the penal 
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apparatus at this time? How was penal space and the routines investing it transformed during 
this period, and what did this entail for the manner in which prisons were governed? Answering 
these questions involves looking closer at the routines of prisoner movement and how it fit 
within the framework of penal operations, its changes, and points of friction, which became 
increasingly tenser at the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The Economy of Prisoner Movement in the Postwar Penal Apparatus 
 
There was one exception to the ambiguity in the prisoner transfer statistics. Corrective 
Services kept specific records for the number of transfers, or “escorts” as they were often 
called, that the Special Operations Division (S.O.D.) supervised. They provided this information 
to the Royal Commission in their first large submission.1302 The S.O.D., created by McGeechan in 
November 1970, undertook difficult assignments like emergency response, riot control, and the 
transportation of prisoners deemed to pose a high risk of escape or assault.1303 According to the 
Department’s submission to the Royal Commission, the S.O.D. conducted 4,573 escorts in 1975, 
of which 131 were considered to be in the high risk category.1304 It is difficult to know why the 
S.O.D. was used only in a relatively small number of transfers or the specific protocols that 
determined when it was to be deployed ordinary custodial staff, or if needed, the police 
conducted most transfers, which did not require the specialized skills or equipment of the 
S.O.D. Since the unit was based in Sydney, it was also more difficult for it to be deployed to 
country prisons. Animosity toward the S.O.D. ran deeper however, among the prison officers’ 
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union1305 and most rank-and-file officers because they believed that it devalued their status in 
the penal hierarchy and suggested that could not handle certain situations. Derided as a 
“palace guard,” the S.O.D. appeared to be McGeechan’s ill-conceived, pet project, an 
unnecessary innovation that worsened the administration’s relationship with the guards’ 
union.1306 This unit played an increasingly important role in the transfer particularly involving 
prison activists, violent inmates, and others formally classified as “intractable.” The topic of 
transfers and its related abuses was deeply interwoven with this unit’s creation and its 
reputation for brutality among inmates. Much of the Royal Commission’s discussion about 
explicit examples of disciplinary and punitive transfers implicated the S.O.D.. They also 
highlighted the problems that McGeechan and more senior staff members had with rank and 
file officers and their union, both of whom deeply opposed the S.O.D.’s elitism, which they 
believed devalued the role of most staff members.1307  McGeechan’s attention to this unit and 
its elite (and “elitist”) reputation may partly explain the exactness of escort records concerning 
it compared to the much looser figures for overall prisoner movements. 
The normal operations of the classification process, which distributed inmates to 
specific prisons, custody levels, and programs across the state, created the greatest volume of 
inmate movements. The Royal Commission staff and counsel appearing for other groups knew 
about this process, at least in its broad contours. It was not a major revelation, for instance, 
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that the Department of Corrective Services oversaw a hierarchy of different establishments and 
security levels designed to function together as a “system”—of some kind. Nor was it a surprise 
the penal authorities differentiated inmates from each other as they assigned them to these 
various prisons. This process, of course, entailed a substantial amount of prisoner movement 
between these facilities.  
However, many participants in the Royal Commission hearings did not know much 
about the classification process as it was currently practiced or how all the state's penal 
institutions worked together. Thus, much of the testimony dealt with exploring the norms and 
routines of various regimes and programs throughout the prison system, the various moments 
of the classification process and its associated programs and industries, and how all these 
practices related to each other. While “transfers,” as a discreet and duly named activity, 
comprised only a small (if recurrent) part in this review, the inquiry nevertheless focused on a 
series of different practices that bore relation to the issue of transfers and suggested that they 
were becoming more frequent as problems arose in other areas of prisoner management. 
Despite the fact that the New South Wales had a disproportionately large number of 
maximum security prisons in relation to its entire prison system, variations in the security 
regimes, programs, and industries between the different institutions ideally enabled the 
movement of prisoners to gradually looser regimes provided that they maintained good 
conduct.1308 This network of prisons formed in Benedict Taylor’s words, "a spectrum of 
differentiated penal institutions, giving administrators a finely graded set of carrots and sticks 
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with which to manage and manipulate inmate behavior."1309 The high volume of inmate 
transfers reflected, in part, how prison authorities managed inmates by moving them through 
various stages along this spectrum, which itself was expanding, branching into ever finer 
gradations as new programs and forms of supervision were established. As Taylor has argued, 
the post-World War II penal bureaucracy gradually integrated the pre-war prison farms 
(innovations originally intended to replace prisons) into providing a supporting role for the 
more secure institutions. Inmates "stepped down" to these camps from maximum and medium 
institutions in the latter part of their sentences or after earning good marks elsewhere in the 
system.1310 Inmates, of course, also flowed in the other direction along this spectrum of custody 
levels and privileges. The continued use of secure prisons and establishment of control or 
discipline units in some prisons, such as Grafton Gaol, permitted the penal authorities to 
transfer certain inmates to more regimented and harsher regimes for poor behavior, challenges 
to authority, or other concerns. Much of the control exercised at the lower end of the penal 
spectrum drew on the threat of moving inmates to the higher end if they did not conform to 
expectations. In either case, this system of incentives and punishments entailed moving 
inmates between institutions.1311  
The centralized classification system linked all these institutions through its protocols for 
sorting newly received inmates and periodically reviewing their status. Drawing on the then 
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current enthusiasm for social science expertise, the penal bureaucracy established the 
classification system in 1950 as a supplement to the previous practice of sorting inmates into 
various degrees of disposition toward authority and control, habitual criminality, and those 
thought to be redeemable. The new system’s main governing body, the Classification 
Committee, included for the first time an educationalist, trade supervisor and psychologist, in 
addition to officers with custodial expertise.1312 The Classification Committee evaluated newly 
committed inmates at the Long Bay prison complex near Sydney through formal psychological 
tests, a review of an inmate’s work and education history, and interviews. Several prisons at the 
Long Bay complex (the Metropolitan Reception Prison, Metropolitan Remand Centre, and the 
Central Industrial Prison) largely held newly received or recently convicted inmates who had 
not yet been moved to their assigned placement.1313  
Once moved to their placement prisons, inmates were evaluated again, although less 
rigorously, by a Program Review Committee at each establishment, which consisted of senior 
staff members along with a psychologist, parole officer, industrial officer, and supervising 
officer. This committee monitored inmates and assessed the continued suitability of their 
classification status.1314 The committee renewed or altered a prisoner’s custody level, taking 
into consideration their progress at a specific prison or section thereof, their disciplinary, work, 
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and education records, and any requests from the prisoner. This review initiated the 
reassignment of the inmate to another prison if this was deemed necessary.1315 The actual 
movement had to be approved by a centralized Classification Committee, which evaluated the 
work of the Program Review Committee, and the Prisoner Movement Section, which actually 
issued a transfer order.1316  
Prisoners often initiated this review by approaching superintendents and the Program 
Review Committees and requesting transfers to favorable locations for job and education 
opportunities or to be closer to family and friends. It is hard to know exactly how often inmates 
initiated such moves, but it was a frequent occurrence.1317 In many instances, it was likely that 
such moves were both requested and suggested, produced as much from negotiation, albeit 
very unequal, between the inmate and the Programme Review Committee concerning a variety 
of possible placements. Many inmates had their hopes for a favorable transfer frustrated by the 
classification process. At times, the various officials needed to approve a transfer conflicted 
with each other or failed to communicate to such a degree that inmates desiring a move to a 
different location became trapped in a byzantine administrative conflict. In its final report, the 
Royal Commission highlighted a number of instances where administrative units obstructed 
already approved transfers, either purposely or through inaction and incompetence, causing 
inmates a great of annoyance and resentment.  An inmate, referred to by the Royal 
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Commission only as “prisoner A,” wallowed in the Central Industrial Prison after being cleared 
to move next door to the Malabar Training Centre to work in the printing shop.1318 The Program 
Review Committee approved his transfer, as did the Life Sentence Review Committee1319 and 
the superintendent of the Central Industrial Prison, where prisoner A was located. Several 
months passed and Prisoner A remained in the Central Industrial Prison. It was not until the 
Royal Commission inquired about the inmate’s predicament while investigating the 
classification system that the inmate was finally moved.1320 The Program Review Committee 
noted in one of its reports that “prisoner A would in all probability be languishing in the C.I.P.” if 
the Royal Commission had not drawn attention to his plight.1321 
At other times, penal authorities quickly approved transfers and moved inmates. As will 
be discussed later in greater detail, the Wran government reconvened the Royal Commission in 
late 1977 after it had completed much of its work to consider certain accusations of corruption 
in the prisoner movement process. A low grade clerk in the Prisoner Movement Section stood 
accused of accepting bribes for favorable transfers. The investigation revealed at least one 
instance where a prisoner, Kevin Holland, was moved from a maximum security prison 
(Parramatta) to a minimum security prison (Berrima) without ever appearing before a Program 
Review Committee or even the central Classification Committee.1322 The investigation left much 
of this unexplained with definitive evidence of bribery hard to obtain. Nevertheless, 
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questionable transfers and pervasive rumors occurred enough to lead several members of the 
Program Review Committee at Parramatta to complain to McGeechan in writing about the 
abuse of the inmate movement system and what appeared to be, at the very least, informal 
arrangements circumventing official rules.1323 
Prison authorities often moved inmates to medical and mental health facilities as well as 
to courts in various parts of the state. These types of movements could be frequent, especially 
if the needed expertise was located in a central facility or area. McGeechan mentioned during 
cross examination that the lack of qualified mental health professionals near some country 
prisons meant the Department incurred unnecessary costs for transporting inmates back and 
forth to urban areas for treatment.1324 Inmates facing multiple charges were brought back and 
forth to court. For courts in the Sydney area, this involved moving between their placement 
prison to one of the prisons at Long Bay or Parramatta Gaol as well as to secure police or court 
lockups.1325 Inmates often travelled directly to court lockups for court attendance away from 
the Sydney area,  
 This geographic disparity in placement of support services and the country prisons 
apparently created a lot of difficulties for inmates, as well. Even in situations where an inmate 
needed to be transferred for medical or mental health reasons, the disruption to their lives 
could be unsettling. When discussing this matter during his testimony before the Royal 
Commission, Superintendent John F. Barry of the maximum security Goulburn Training Centre 
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said, in general, long-term inmates did not like the disruption caused by such moves, especially 
since it could mean the loss of their property or their specific placement and cell in the prison 
upon return.1326 Barry said he did not know the extent of the frustrations these types of moves 
caused inmates, but many had told him they did not want to leave. Occasionally, Barry said he 
arranged to have certain difficulties from the move minimized for those prisoners who 
requested it.1327 Nevertheless, the implication was that these kinds of arrangements were the 
exception to the normal pattern of disruption caused by such moves.  
These moves were, at times, particularly difficult for prisoners because throughout most 
of the 1970s the amount of personal property an inmate could collect was strictly limited. Even 
after the Department of Corrective Services relaxed such restrictions in some areas in the mid-
to-late 1970s, the limited nature of the personal amenities a prisoner could have meant that 
transfers threatened this relatively small area of personal autonomy, control, stability, and 
relief. A desirable cell placement, enrollment in a trade or education course, accumulated 
personal effects, extra food, and books were high valuable in the limits set by prison rules. 
Transfers could easily jeopardize some or all of these amenities. 
The range of gradations in the penal system, linked through the classification process, 
expanded in the years following McGeechan’s appointment to the post of Comptroller-General 
of Prisons in 1968. McGeechan replaced John Morony who had led the Department since 
1960.1328 Within two years, the Department of Prisons changed its name to the Department of 
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Corrective Services after absorbing the previously independent parole and probation service. 
The reorientation in penal philosophy toward rehabilitating inmates in its charge, evident in the 
name change, came under intense criticism during the Royal Commission. Derided for its 
superficial depth and ineffectiveness as well as its hubris and frightening unaccountability, the 
new focus and some of its practical consequences nevertheless accelerated the process of 
differentiation in the hierarchy of penal options. McGeechan oversaw the creation of two 
separate work release schemes, the establishment of the Silverwater Work Release Centre, the 
Parramatta Linen Service, the Mulawa Training and Detention Centre for Women, the Cessnock 
Corrective Centre and an unusual wilderness exercise and team-building program called Project 
Survival.1329 Periodic detention centres (basically, weekend incarceration) were opened at 
several different sites across the state.1330 Although, these latter facilities provided more of a 
sentencing option for judges than they did for the placement of prisoners assigned to other 
facilities, they still formed part of and relied on the hierarchy of imprisonment options.  A 
regular prison sentence was the step up from periodic detention. The fact that many of the 
periodic detention centres were located next to secure prisons highlighted this relationship for 
those serving time on the weekends.            
This gradual differentiation in the gamut of custody stages and programs over the 
postwar period increased the traffic of inmates between these levels. This process accelerated 
during the late 1960s and 1970s with the introduction of more minimum and medium security 
facilities and options, and at the same time, the creation and greater use of control units and 
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disciplinary mechanisms at the high security end of the system. While this diversification helps 
to explain the volume of inmate movements cited by McGeechan during the Royal Commission 
hearings, the number of movements also suggested a less visible transformation behind prison 
walls and even in open institutions, like the minimum security penal farms. It may not have 
been apparent at various points in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the prevailing system of 
inmate discipline, the manner in which staff, especially guards, ran prisons, was rapidly 
deteriorating.  
Most of the accounts of this transformation were retrospective, usually coming on the 
heels of serious prison disturbances or scandals and part of broad reform proposals from the 
mid-1970s onward. There were multiple signs of this transformation, and it maybe that the 
introduction of some programs after 1968 both caused and responded to the breakdown of 
prison routines and control. Many of the postwar changes that reduced the social distance 
between guards and prisoners had also increased the level of friction between these groups. 
However, after McGeechan’s appointment in 1968, the prisons became even more volatile. 
Officers resented changes that restricted their strict, physical prisoner management 
prerogatives. Prisoners resented the slow pace of actual change in prison conditions and 
seemingly farcical attempts to introduce new programs. 
In the context of the late 1960s and 1970s, numerous prisoners began to organize these 
grievances through rights-based discourse and claims-making, resembling similar 
manifestations of prisoners’ rights activism in other parts of the world. There were multiple 
sources of this political awakening behind bars. Much of it centered on younger politicized 




Many of these younger people had been part of anti-authoritarian social movements outside 
and they brought with them rights-based discourse and a much different style of resistance. As 
Bernie Matthews, himself a young inmate at the time, put it:  
 
As more and more conscientious objectors and Vietnam War protestors became 
imprisoned, they introduced a new mentality of 'stand up and be counted' that 
ran contrary to the old crims' philosophy of copping it sweet and doing their time 
as easily and quietly as possible. A new political awareness and social 
consciousness had been injected into the prison system.1331 
 
Accounts from older inmates who began serving time before the 1960s showed a marked 
difference in the way they expressed anti-authoritarian views (which were always pervasive 
among inmates).1332 Rights-based claims-making held little appeal for an earlier generation of 
prisoners in an era when inmates were managed with severe discipline and the social 
movements most commonly identified with 1960s in Australia were less visible or nascent.  
As these new political framings grew within Australia and on a global scale during the 
1960s, so did the manifestations of rehabilitative practices in the New South Wales penal 
system. The relatively small changes made by penal authorities, like increased leisure activities, 
education, and less censorship, dovetailed with younger inmates’ growing expectations for 
better treatment. These minor changes often became the basis for further demands. 
Sometimes, these changes provided platforms for greater criticism of the authorities. For 
instance, the Parramatta Resurgents, founded in 1964 with Comptroller-General Morony’s 
support as a therapeutic discussion group led by a parole officer, later developed an inmate 
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debating society, which, in turn, became more willing to criticize penal policies and practices in 
its activities and through its magazine, Contact. The Resurgents later submitted a collectively 
produced statement to the Royal Commission that was highly critical of Corrective Services and 
the practice of incarceration in general.1333 When prison authorities removed some of these 
privileges as punishment or clearly used them as control devices, they produced even greater 
friction and resentment among inmates. 
The movement of radical ideas described by Matthews was not unidirectional. Prisoner 
activism also inspired activists outside the prison system. Some inmates, such as Tony Green 
and Bob Jewson, turned the frustrations and resentments of the life they experienced in prison 
into the basis of far-reaching political advocacy for penal reform once they were released in the 
mid-1970s.1334 Radical organizations formed inside various prisons, strategizing how best to 
create permanent and substantial change in the penal system. At various times during the 
1970s, this involved trying to forge broad-based prisoner unions to compel concessions from 
penal administrators through well-coordinated tactics like work slow-downs, walk-offs, and sit-
down strikes in recreation yards.1335 These tactics were not necessarily new either, but their use 
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had always been more episodic and lacked a permanent organization among inmates 
resembling a union. Other groups, such as the Prisoners Legal Cooperative, pressed legal 
challenges to prison policies and rules where they could and marshaled inmate testimony once 
the government opened the Royal Commission inquiry.1336  
Additionally, many “cleanskin”1337 activists outside drew inspiration, rightly or wrongly, 
from the travails of certain inmates, who in turn often sought their support in the form of 
personal advocacy, help with legal matters, access to political material, or the maintenance of 
family and other social relationships outside. These immanent forms of prison activism, 
developing as much inside the walls, do not necessarily invalidate Matthews’s account of where 
this “new mentality” originated, but supplemented it. As George Zdenkowski and David Brown, 
two scholars allied with prisoner activists, acknowledged in the early 1980s, “the ‘prison 
movement’ is by no means monolithic.”1338 The prison activism that blossomed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s alarmed prison authorities who tried numerous methods of containing 
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prison radicals, their influence on other inmates, and interaction with outside allies. One of the 
primary means of doing this was to move them—a tactic, which itself became the subject of 
protest by inmates. 
 
Transfers as a Control Mechanism and Resource  
 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, a broad struggle emerged over the terrain of the state's 
prisons, how they would be run and who would hold the most influence as the prison order 
that had prevailed since the 1940s and 1950s unraveled. Administrative policy changes and 
interventions from the senior levels of the Department of Corrective Services encroached on 
the longstanding prison routines of superintendents and guards; increasingly politicized, young 
inmates challenged the authority of the guards, superintendents and the central penal 
authorities through strikes, sit-ins, legal actions and disturbances; prison guards, through their 
union, tried to wrest back control through industrial action over such issues as the closure of 
certain control units, inmate management and disciplinary protocols, and their customary 
discretionary powers in running the prisons. In this context, the use of transfers to prevent 
problems, punish inmates, destabilize organized inmate actions, and prevent media scrutiny 
and investigations became one of the preferred options of the penal authorities from the 
central office level down to the guard force. However, transfers also provided a way for the 
guard force to pressure superintendents, senior penal bureaucrats, and the state government 




transfers for the purposes of establishing its control over the prison system. However, for them 
it was not just inmates they wanted to move about, but increasingly also their guards. 
Prior to the late 1960s, prison staff derived a sense of pride and professional 
competence from being able to control prisoners in their charge. As a superintendent who rose 
from the ranks of prison officer later told David Grant, before late 1960s: 
 
As far as prisoners were concerned, we managed our own—it was considered a 
slur to have to transfer a troublemaker to another gaol. Sometimes we used 
Grafton if we had to, but that was rare.1339 
 
Routine prison rules and the practices permitted and encouraged prison staff to “manage their 
own” rather than relying on the lateral movement of inmates to a similar prison. The 
Department of Prisons afforded prison officers much greater latitude in how they applied force 
in the state prisons and the prison rules themselves severely restricted inmate behavior. Lateral 
transfers between prisons of a similar custody rating occurred, but not as much as they would 
later. Disciplinary transfers involved moving up the penal spectrum. For those inmates already 
in maximum security facilities (the majority of inmates), this usually meant being sent to 
Grafton Gaol, the state’s disciplinary prison.1340 
Once New South Wales abandoned the death penalty, Grafton's “intractable section” 
became the terminus of the prison system. Comptroller-General of Prisons Leslie Nott 
established this regime in 1943 as a response to a period of rampant prison disorder in the 
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1930s and early 1940s.1341 Upon arrival, a squad of prison officers met transferred inmates, 
stripped them and severely beat them with batons, often until they were unconsciousness.1342 
Known as the "reception biff," this officially condoned practice greeted all inmates sent to 
Grafton classified as “intractable” (usually simply called “tracs”) from 1943 to 1976.  Thereafter, 
prison staff subjected inmates to periodic beatings for minor infractions or simply on a whim. 
Inmates had to follow highly regimented routines and lived in Spartan conditions.1343 
Periodically, rumors or explicit claims of the routine abuse at Grafton appeared in public 
forums, but the Department of Prisons effectively contained any potential scandals arising from 
such these accounts.1344 The general sensibility toward punishment at the time and the legal 
leeway given to penal administrators meant the abusive practices at Grafton and in other state 
prisons largely remained behind the walls and did not disturb the existing penal arrangements if 
they did periodically become publically known.1345 By the mid-1960s, however, this general 
acceptance of harsh punishment and the bureaucratic latitude enjoyed by the Department 
                                                          
1341 “Gaol Experiment Succeeds,” Sydney Morning Herald Monday, November 8, 1943; Comptroller-General Leslie 
Nott borrowed the idea for using Grafton in this way from reforms instituted in Canada during the 1930s. Nott 
visited Canada in 1942 on an inspection tour. Mark Finnane, Punishment in Australian Society (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); John Morony, The More Things Change: A History of Corrections in New South Wales 
(Sydney: J. Morony, 1988); 526- 527; O’Toole, The History of Australian Corrections, 158; 141-144; Nagle, Report of 
the Royal Commission, 134, 145; Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System of Canada 
(Ottawa: J. O. Patenaude, Printer to the King, 1938); On the decline of capital punishment in Australia see, Ivan 
Potas and John Walker, Capital Punishment: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 3 (Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 1987) and Robyn Lincoln and Shirleene Robinson, “When the Penalty Was 
Death,” in Robyn Lincoln and Shirleene Robinson, eds., Crime Over Time: Temporal Perspectives on Crime and 
Punishment in Australia (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010): 187-210. 
1342 For inmate descriptions of the regime at Grafton, see Arthur Stanley Smith and Tom Noble, Neddy: The Life and 
Crimes of Arthur Stanley Smith (Balmain: Kerr Publishing Pty Ldt, 1993); 31-33; Simmonds and Gollan, For Simmo, 
96-97, 124-161; Hay, Catch Me If You Can, 184-197; Newcombe, Inside Out, 143-154; and Matthews, Intractable, 
26-31, 57-116, 155-166. See also Nagle, Report of the Royal Commission, 134-148. 
1343 Nagle, Report of the Royal Commission, 134-148 
1344 Ibid. 
1345 In general see, John Pratt, Punishment and Civilization: Penal Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Society 




began to erode. The various sources of this change are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, some of the specific accusations made by inmates and their families concerning 
Grafton in, particular, gained more attention and political traction.  
One of these incidents involved the suspicious death of Kevin Simmonds in 1966. 
Simmonds was already well-known to the general public for his participation in a prison escape 
and prolonged manhunt with his friend Les Newcombe in 1959, during which they killed a 
prison guard at the Emu Plains penal farm.1346 Both men were held at Grafton for many years, 
with Simmonds finally dying there, found hanged in his cell. Rumors circulated within the 
prisons and outside about the true circumstances of Simmonds’ death.1347 At the very least, his 
official cause of death—suicide—was seen by many as resulting from his brutal treatment at 
Grafton. By all accounts, he was beaten into submission, a shadow of his former self. “Grafton 
Gaol reduced him to a shuffling, vacant-eyed mumbler who burned his arms with 
cigarettes.”1348  The staff at Grafton strove to enforce this level of docility in the inmates sent to 
the prison, to break them and also deter other prisoners throughout the system. After 
Simmonds’ death, pressure mounted on the Department of Prisons to change its policy 
regarding how long inmates were held at Grafton. Simmonds and Newcombe, both of whom 
had committed the two cardinal sins of the penal system—escape and killing a warder—each 
                                                          
1346 For accounts of this escape and manhunt see, Newcombe, Inside Out; Simmonds and Gollan, For Simmo; 
Sydney Morning Herald, October 10, 1959—November 17, 1959; March 16, 19, 1960; May 18, 1960; November 5, 
1966. 
1347 Simmonds and Gollan, For Simmo, 103-113, 124-161, 167-168. 
1348 Gollan, Anne, “Simmonds, Kevin John (1935–1966),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of 
Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/simmonds-kevin-john-




spent seven years at Grafton. Thereafter, inmates were transferred to other prisons after 
serving five years in Grafton’s intractable section.1349 
Some prisoners sent to Grafton, like Darcy Dugan, were never broken the way 
Simmonds was. However, Dugan suffered greatly at Grafton for over a decade, finally being 
transferred to Long Bay in 1960.1350 Dugan, an armed robber, was also a well-known figure, 
perhaps the most famous inmate of his time. He had escaped custody multiple times in years of 
imprisonment and garnered a degree of roguish sympathy and celebrity for his skill and 
audacity while on the run.1351 Just his release from prison in 1967, after almost 17 years inside, 
made the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald.1352 Within a few weeks, an article appeared 
under Dugan’s name in which he directly accused the prison system of “sadism” at Grafton.1353 
The publicity generated by Dugan reached its climax when he joined the cast of the American 
written play, “Fortune and Men’s Eyes,” playing (ironically) the role of a sadistic prison 
guard.1354 The play itself was controversial because it discussed homosexuality and abuse in 
prisons, neither of which were public topics in Australia in 1968. The play and Dugan’s notoriety 
drew sellout audiences at every performance, culminating in a live television broadcast of a 
forum debating prison issues after one of the performances.1355 The Liberal Minister of Justice, 
John Maddison, who oversaw the prisons portfolio participated in the forum and immediately 
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found himself confronted by Dugan and another anonymous ex-prisoner (later identified as 
Tony Hackett) over the violence at Grafton and the unwillingness of the authorities to do 
anything about the prevalence of inmate rape.1356 The publicity generated by this incident 
reflected poorly on the Department of Prisons.1357 
Walter McGeechan, who had only recently ascended to the leadership of the 
Department of Prisons, disliked Grafton’s regime and the negative publicity associated with it. 
He began building a new control unit near Sydney at the Long Bay prison complex to replace it. 
Once this new unit opened in 1975, Grafton soon ceased functioning as a disciplinary prison. 
The new unit, called “Katingal,” differed substantially from Grafton: physical abuse was 
curtailed, but inmates were locked in windowless, individual cells for most of the day with few 
activities to occupy their time. 1358 Much of the new institution operated electronically, 
eliminating direct contact between guards and inmates. Even though Katingal was intended to 
replace the role that Grafton occupied for decades, some officers disliked it, arguing that the 
lack of physical repression reduced its value as a system-wide deterrent.1359 
Moreover, a number of officers’ claimed that discipline in general had been relaxed 
during McGeechan’s tenure. Some argued that Grafton was used less often than it had been in 
the past and that the treatment inmates received there was not as severe as it had once 
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been.1360 Officers often claimed that the relaxation of discipline accelerated once the Royal 
Commission began its work in 1976. Officer Neville Griffiths noted of Maitland that “conditions 
are more lenient now than they were approximately 12 or 15 months ago. Discipline is easier 
and restrictions have been reduced since the Commission started.”1361 This view was disputed 
by many inmates who felt that the regimes were as arbitrary and tight as they were in years 
past. Other inmates, especially those serving long sentences or with prior prison experience, 
agreed that the basic structure of authority between keeper and kept remained the same as did 
the lack of meaningful avenues for the redress of grievances or communication with prison 
authorities. Yet, as Darcy Dugan told the Royal Commission, “in general, officers’ attitudes have 
‘toned down’; they don’t push the rules as much as they used to.”1362 This extended to the 
regime at Grafton. He said, “Conditions up there, from probably the middle 60’s—the bashings 
were not stopped but they were reduced.”1363  
Most parties acknowledged there were numerous small loosenings or openings forming 
in what had up to that time been extremely rigid prison regimes. Disagreement over whether 
this was a “cosmetic,” merely rhetorical change or a “lapse in security,” depended on the 
perspective of the speaker and his experience of prison regimes in the past or elsewhere. It 
was, however, a topic of disagreement and a noticeable issue in a way that it had not been 
previously. Often, the openings were piecemeal and inconsistent across the prison system, 
sometimes more dependent on the attitudes of individual officers or the reputation of a certain 
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prison. Most inmates—but not all—welcomed the alterations on internal movement 
restrictions inside the prisons, even if they felt the changes were ultimately insufficient or 
begrudgingly accepted by staff. Some inmates, those more vulnerable to abuse by other 
prisoners, feared the decreased supervision by guards. This period marked the beginning of an 
upswing in the number of inmates "on protection," separated from other prisoners for their 
own safety.1364     
Once the Royal Commission began the hear evidence, discipline slackened considerably 
in the eyes of many prison officers. Inmates also noted that the Royal Commission's work 
forced prison staff and administrators to lighten the oppressiveness of their regimes, if only for 
the fear they might be prosecuted or otherwise held accountable to the Royal Commission or 
state government if it decided to substantially alter their longstanding position on prison 
policy.1365 The fact that the Royal Commission was even operating constituted a departure from 
the "hands-off" policy of granting prison administrators and staff wide latitude in running the 
prisons.1366 The small inroads on internal movement restrictions also accelerated during the 
commission’s sitting and especially after the Wran government began implementing some of its 
recommendations in 1978.  
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As the routines that governed inmate movements within the prisons deteriorated and 
discipline slackened, prison staff began relying more on lateral transfers to similar institutions 
and custody levels to deal with inmates they could not manage, did not like, or simply wanted 
to punish for whatever reason. There had always been some inmates who rebelled against 
prison staff, but as Bernie Matthews noted, there were increasingly fewer prisoners who were 
simply willing to abide by the old code of “copping it sweet”1367 as there had been in the past. 
Grafton rarely held more than twenty or twenty-five intractables at a time and the new Katingal 
unit at Long Bay held roughly forty inmates. This meant some of the state’s maximum-security 
prisons frequently transferred and received inmates on disciplinary charges, but these men 
were not destined for the system’s terminus control unit. However, within such prisons, like 
Goulburn, Maitland, Parramatta, the Central Industrial Prison, and Bathurst, isolation units 
supplemented the normal maximum security custody arrangements of the mainstream prisons. 
Like Grafton, these units were also referred to as the “tracs,” as well as the “front yards,” 
“special yards,” “pig pens,” or at Parramatta, “the Circle.”1368 They constituted a step below the 
terminus and at times some of these tracs were further differentiated with some considered 
worse than others.1369 Depending on the reasons for movement, inmates transferred to other 
maximum security prisons could end up in the tracs, which meant that they spent most of their 
time alone in small, open-air pens, or they joined the mainstream maximum security 
routine.1370 
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While inmates complained of the difficulties of movements in general, they considered 
these kinds of disciplinary transfers as a violation of their rights, simply intended to punish or 
segregate them from the general prison population. Known as a “shanghai” in the local prison 
argot, this kind of movement exceeded all other types of transfers in the amount and intensity 
of criticism it generated among inmates. Tim Anderson, a prisoner who spent time at several of 
the state’s maximum security prisons between the late 1970s to the early 1990s, described 
shanghais as the “sudden, unexpected and often violent abduction of a prisoner from one jail to 
another.”1371 Anderson recalled a senior prison officer taking this definition a step further by 
distinguishing shanghais from “liftings”: shanghais were truly late-night operations, whereas as 
similar movements occurring in the mid-evening were “liftings."1372 Inmates often used the 
terms interchangeably, along with “tippings” or being “tipped.”1373 Given the large number of 
yearly movements cited by McGeechan, shanghais probably represented only a small portion of 
the overall number of transfers. Nevertheless, the way in which the prison system used them—
or the threat of them—as a management and disciplinary tool fostered controversy and 
resentment among many inmates. Despite their immediate unannounced character, inmates 
came to expect this kind of transfer as one of the many discretionary punishments prison staff 
could mete out for certain types of behavior. The inmate accounts of shanghais often came 
from inmates who were considered to be “heavies,” powerful, respected, feared and often 
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violent inmates at the apex of the prisoner hierarchy.1374 This was not always the case,1375 but 
more often than not, the inmates testifying to the abuses of shanghais and control units were 
heavies, prison activists, or both. Their views, while clearly relevant, did not always reflect the 
opinions and experiences of many other inmates, especially those who were at the lower end 
of the prisoner hierarchy and custody ratings.1376  
Throughout the Royal Commission hearings, the description of shanghais as being 
unannounced transfers occurring late at night, continually resurfaced during questioning.1377 
Peter McInerney, who represented several prisoners at the Royal Commission, asked 
Commissioner McGeechan if he knew of the term “shanghai” and its meaning among prisoners. 
McGeechan responded stating he did, but downplayed the characterizations of the process, 
arguing the secrecy surrounding unannounced transfers was a necessary precaution because 
escorts could be waylaid by “people in the underworld.”1378 McGeechan could not produce any 
evidence to support this rationale and admitted that in many cases it was not possible to keep 
the movement of high security prisoners secret. He tried to avoid the implication that the 
movement of prisoners at night without their foreknowledge was a common practice. It was, in 
his words, a “very extreme case” in which a prisoner might be moved at midnight.1379 
Moreover, he claimed the timing of movements reflected other contingencies, like difficult 
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traffic patterns and poor weather, rather than a deliberate policy of transferring inmates at 
midnight.1380Nevertheless, he maintained his view that secrecy was an essential aspect of how 
the penal authorities moved certain inmates. Similarly, John A. Cook, a senior prison officer 
who worked at many different posts in the Long Bay prison complex, argued that it was 
necessary to move inmates occasionally without their foreknowledge despite the fact that most 
inmates knew a day before hand if they were to be moved.1381  Informing them of their pending 
transfer could jeopardize security or lead certain inmates to harm themselves to stop the 
transfer or earn one to a different facility, like a hospital.  
The testimony of these penal authorities during the Royal Commission, as well as the 
questioning by counsel, concerning “shanghais” differed markedly from many other instances 
when "transfers" or "escorts" were discussed.1382 The administrative assumptions of the latter, 
with their emphasis on managing the routine flow of inmates, gave way to starker descriptions 
of movements as conscious, sometimes, blunt methods of control. Nevertheless, witnesses 
from the Department and the guard force de-emphasized this aspect of transfer policy and 
practice. For instance, after some lengthy questioning about security precautions and the 
secretive nature of shanghais, Peter McInerney asked McGeechan about the rationale for 
moving inmates. Their exchange underscored the unwillingness of McGeechan to be forthright 
about how transfers were used in this fashion.  
 
5963. It is also done for discipline, is it not?—No, sir. 
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5964. If a man has not settled down, or misbehaves himself, in one prison, he is 
moved for disciplinary purposes to another prison?—A prisoner could be 
removed for disciplinary purposes, sir. He could also be moved for lots of other 
purposes. 
 
5965. And a lot were removed to Grafton?—There have been some removed, 
sir.1383 
 
Much of McGeechan's hesitancy and the evasiveness of his answers, as well as that of many of 
senior officials in the Department and the guard force could, of course, be attributed to the 
circumstances of their statements. Departing from longstanding practice, Nagle sought broad 
ranging testimony from inmates, indicating a willingness to consider critical views of the 
Department and not to simply give law enforcement the benefit of the doubt. Compared to the 
way Corrective Services and the guard force routinely operated, the inquiry blurred the lines of 
authority and openly questioned who was entitled to speak truthfully. Both the guards and the 
senior administrators in the Department were concerned about the potential for their words to 
be used against them in administrative disciplinary action, as cause for dismissal, and even in 
civil or criminal cases. Such possibilities tempered what they were willing to say during the 
hearings, and made the testimony by the prison staff on the topic of transfers all the more 
ambiguous and secretive, inviting more questions.  
 However, the hesitancy to talk about shanghais also reflected how they figured in the 
administrative, discretionary power of the penal authorities. Within the broad, and even vague, 
guidelines set by the Prison Act of 1952, prison superintendents and other senior staff could 
move prisoners for a variety of infractions, suspicions, routine management priorities, inmates’ 
                                                          




welfare, medical concerns or simply on a whim.1384 There was little recourse for inmates to 
dispute unwanted transfers. Unlike formal charges that could be laid against inmates for 
disciplinary infractions, movement orders were not subject to any form of hearing where an 
inmate could contest the charges. In this way, they resembled other routine administrative 
practices that either had punitive valences or were performed in such a way that made them 
appear punitive, like cell searches. Prisoners could not dispute these practices in any court.1385 
This lack of recourse to law or any form of review extended outside of the prison in the sense 
that family, friends, prisoners' rights activists, and other organizations could also not challenge 
the movement of prisoners. If used punitively, as many inmates asserted they were, transfers 
formed a punishment outside the law, even in the limited sense at the time of what the law 
meant in prison.1386 Despite gaining the opportunity to appeal the decisions of the Visiting 
Justice who presided over many prison disciplinary hearings in 1977,1387 the practice of 
transferring inmates still echoed Mark Finnane and Tony Woodyatt’s description of the 
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nineteenth century prison as “a world almost unknown to the law.”1388 At the same time, the 
power to transfer inmates resided within the administration prerogative established by statute.  
When addressing employees of the Department of Corrective Services, the senior 
leadership of the Department was forthright about using transfers as management tools for 
maintaining control and enforcing discipline. In the Manual of General Information, issued to 
staff in all prisons 1970,1389 the Department advised the “prompt removal of key inmates to 
other institutions or to segregation” as a means of preventing “institutional disturbances” and 
managing the “influence of inmate agitators.”1390 Notwithstanding the manual’s caveat that 
such agitators were not always so easily identified, prison staff in the state's maximum security 
prisons regularly employed this tactic to break strikes by inmates, prevent or frustrate contact 
between inmates and outside supporters or the media and discourage or disrupt legal actions 
by inmates seeking redress of grievances with outside courts.1391 The Prisoners Action Group 
described this same policy more bluntly in its submission to the Royal Commission, noting that, 
“the penalty of dissent, argument, resistance is movement through this graduated system to 
progressively heavier environments, and the ever present threat of such movement.”1392 As 
such it formed, "one of the most potent control mechanisms available to the Department. And 
the enormous numbers of movements of N.S.W. prisoners each year testified to the very active 
use of this weapon.”1393 
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Yet, even when armed with such a weapon, it was, at times, hard to deploy due to 
divisions within the penal apparatus. These divisions usually formed between guards and senior 
officers, such as the superintendent and his immediate subordinates, and the central office. 
Industrial disputes over transfers often developed over the movement and placement of 
specific inmates. Some inmates, like Ray Denning, could not be moved easily because most 
local sub-branches of the prison officers’ union at various prisons refused to accept him in their 
institution. Denning was convicted of killing an officer during an escape attempt in 1974, which 
made him the target of scorn and retribution for many guards.1394 Through their local union 
sub-branches, officers effectively nullified the possibility of transferring Denning from several 
different control units that he occupied during the 1970s.1395 It is probably safe to say the only 
reason he was moved between these units was because they were slated to be 
decommissioned shortly after his transfer.1396  
This type of activism by guards disrupted prison operations and the plans and policies of 
senior administrators and other sub-sections of the penal bureaucracy. Prison officers banned 
Bernie Matthews, an activist inmate who was also known for escape attempts and 
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confrontations with guards, from the Silverwater Work Release Centre despite the parole 
board’s recommendation to place him there in preparation for his upcoming release and his 
attainment of low security status by the Classification Committee. “When he was taken to 
Silverwater … the warders refused to accept him. He was taken back to Parramatta and later 
transferred to Long Bay Jail.”1397 If pressed to accept an inmate whom they had banned from a 
particular prison, guards threatened to strike and sometimes followed through on this threat by 
walking off the job, leaving a prison staffed by senior officers and police.1398  The worst case of 
the latter was the prolonged conflict over the placement of Peter Schneidas who killed an 
officer with a hammer at Long Bay in August 1979.1399 Despite the desire of the Department’s 
senior administrators to move Schneidas and eventually reintegrate him into the mainstream 
prison population, the officers’ union would not permit him to be moved for years. Schneidas 
became a custodial anomaly or exception in the immediate post-Royal Commission era because 
                                                          
1397 “Prisoner Officers Refuse to Take Inmate,” Sydney Morning Herald, (September 20, 1979); Zdenkowski and 
Brown, Prison Struggle, 117-118. 
1398 In addition to Denning, prison officers blocked the transfer of inmates Peter Schneidas and Steve Dowd. See 
Bersten, “Notes on Industrial Disputes in NSW Prisons Since 1970,” 39-42, 49. For a similar incident involving an 
anonymous prisoner see, “Long Bay Strike Could Be Called Off Today,” Sydney Morning Herald, (March 18, 1981); 
“Judge Criticises Jail Strike for Delaying Trial,” Sydney Morning Herald, (March 19, 1981); “End of Jail Strike 
Expected Today,” Sydney Morning Herald, (March 20, 1981). 
1399 “Court Hears of Long Bay Killing,” Sydney Morning Herald, (April 10, 1980); “Prisoner’s Court Challenge Fails,” 
Sydney Morning Herald, (December 7, 1982); “Jail Fast Man is Tortured: Psychologist,” The Age, (April 5, 1983); 
“Prison Hunger-Striker May Be Force-Fed,” Sydney Morning Herald, (April 6, 1983); “Hunger-Striker Near Death, 
Sister Claims,” Sydney Morning Herald, (April 7, 1983); “Schneidas: Court Battle No Answer,” Sydney Morning 
Herald, (April 8, 1983); “Warders Prepared to Talk Over Schneidas Transfer,” Sydney Morning Herald, (April 11, 
1983); “Why Money, Not Schneidas, Will Lead to Penal Reform,” Sydney Morning Herald, (April 12, 1983); 
“Warders May Stop Over Schneidas,” Sydney Morning Herald, (June 14, 1983); “Striking Warders to Meet; Jackson 
Firm on Schneidas,” Sydney Morning Herald, (June 16, 1983); “Prison Officers to Vote on Plan for Schneidas,” 
Sydney Morning Herald, (June 21, 1983); “Warders to Consider Compromise,” Sydney Morning Herald, (June 24, 
1983); “Warders Back,” The Age, (June 24, 1983); “Schneidas to be Shifted,” Sydney Morning Herald, (July 8, 1983); 




he remained in solitary confinement for years, long after others had been moved in and out of 
segregation.1400 
Incidents such as these appear to have escalated during the 1970s.1401 Surely, a big 
reason for industrial action by officers over the movements of certain prisoners stemmed from 
the closure of Grafton and within a few years of the closure of its replacement, Katingal, 
following the Royal Commission’s report. Denning and Matthews both spent long periods in 
these kinds of control units, as did a number of other specific inmates who became the subject 
of prison officer enforced bans from specific prisons. In other cases, however, officers targeted 
groups of inmates with their job walkoffs in an effort to change the general mix of inmates in a 
prison. For example, officers at the Mannus prison farm walked off the job on Friday, December 
29, 1977, demanding the replacement of the facility’s superintendent, the posting of more 
officers, enhanced security, and the transfer of 13 inmates they deemed unsuitable for 
placement at the minimum security institution.1402 After the strike ended, the prison farm’s 
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administration moved 20 inmates to Cooma Prison and the superintendent was replaced 
shortly thereafter.1403 In some cases, officer strikes over transfers or the threat to do so were a 
way for the union to force concessions on other matters, sometimes directly related to security, 
sometimes not.1404 In this sense, the guards’ union, especially at the local level of specific 
prisons, used prisoner transfers (whether demanded or opposed) as a negotiation tactic in their 
power struggle with the central administration of the Department of Corrective Services. 
Conflict along these lines became especially acute toward the end of the Royal Commission and 
after the appointment of Dr. Tony Vinson as McGeechan’s replacement with a mandate for 
implementing the reforms suggested by Justice Nagle.1405 
Transfers also provided penal authorities with a tool to dissuade inmates from pursuing 
legal action against the prison system or specific staff members as well as blunting their 
participation in other activities challenging penal authorities, including serving on grievances 
committees. The ability of prison staff to “dissuade” such actions with transfers clearly reflected 
the amount of power articulated through penal authorities. However, once the courts, state 
government, and media demonstrated a willingness to hear prisoner complaints, inmates were 
able to litigate and publicize claims of abuse and injustice in an unprecedented manner. At the 
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very least, this embarrassed the Department of Corrective Services by focusing political scrutiny 
and media coverage on them, making reforms and even normal operations difficult and 
potentially scandalous. On rare occasions, inmate claims resulted in criminal or administrative 
investigations against prison staff. Penal authorities, whether at the level of a specific prison or 
higher up in the penal bureaucracy, tried to obstruct legal actions and nullify the disruptive 
possibilities of prisoner grievance committees by transferring inmates away from prisons 
located where they had bases of support or in urban areas that facilitated communication with 
activist supporters, legal counsel, and the media. Frequently, moving such inmates frustrated 
their attempts to prepare cases, speak with witnesses and collaborators or press claims and 
organize inmates through other means. 
The subterfuge surrounding the removal of inmate Brett Collins from the Parramatta 
Prisoners Committee exemplified how Corrective Services used the transfers to ward off 
challenges from politicized inmates. Parramatta’s inmates had elected Collins to the Prisoner 
Committee, where he was an outspoken leader. Collins was a well-known prison activist, having 
a reputation for “shitstirring and organizing unions.”1406 After an altercation between a prisoner 
and a guard on September 29, 1977, the Prisoners Committee met with the prison’s 
administration and Commissioner McGeechan to protest extended lockups that affected the 
entire prison and diffuse a tense situation.1407 The Prisoners Committee wanted to have 
members of the Royal Commission and media present at this meeting and any subsequent 
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meetings; failing that, they wanted to be able to speak directly to the media to counter what 
they believed to be misleading reporting based on information provided by the prison 
administration and guards. McGeechan denied both requests.1408 According to a letter written 
by Collins on December 1, 1977, McGeechan “tagged me as the leading proponent of difficult 
points although we made plain that we acted collectively on group decisions and he made 
personal attacks on me.”1409 
During another highly charged meeting on October 5, 1977, prison officials informed the 
inmates they would transfer any inmate in the prison who was accused of assaulting an officer 
or was assaulted by a fellow prisoner.1410 This meeting was recorded and officials permitted the 
Prisoners Committee to pass a copy of the recording to outside activist groups and the Royal 
Commission.1411 Within 24 hours of this meeting, two inmates half-heartedly attacked Collins 
then ran away, injuring him enough to leave a mark on his face, but not hurting him as much as 
they could have.1412 Collins stated he had not had any previous difficulties with the inmates 
who attacked him, and he later discovered through others that they wished to talk it over the 
next day over coffee.1413 The fact that the two inmates ceased their attack when they did and 
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that they had not seriously injured Collins made the entire episode appear like an orchestrated 
attempt by the prison administration and/or the guard force (through the two inmates) to build 
a “legitimate” pretext for removing Collins from the prison. 
Within 15 minutes of being assaulted, the deputy superintendent appeared at Collins’s 
cell, inquiring about the incident.1414 Collins, suspicious of the senior officer’s timing and 
concern, told him it was from a boxing match. After a nurse visited him and he refused to be 
treated, an officer instructed him to report to the infirmary where he was met by the Harry 
Duff, Parramatta’s superintendent. According to Collins, Duff told him Commissioner 
McGeechan wanted a full report on the assault. Collins refused treatment and reiterated his 
contention that the mark on his face was from a boxing match. As Collins later told the counsel 
for the Royal Commission, “This was within ½ hour of an incident that would always be ignored. 
And nobody complained.”1415 Duff ordered him to make a written statement concerning the 
boxing match and his refusal to be treated.  
Later that night, the S.O.D. appeared at Collins’s cell, physically restrained him, and 
despite his resistance, dragged him handcuffed and gagged to an awaiting van.1416 Duff 
summoned three respected inmates to observe the process to reassure them that Collins was 
not being beaten, as well as to quell a potential uprising, as inmates in the wing, then the entire 
half of the prison, banged on their cell doors, demanding that Collins be released and permitted 
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to stay.1417 Collins was sent to the Central Industrial Prison (C.I.P.) where he met the 
Classification Committee the following day who offered to place him nearby in the Malabar 
Training Centre, but directly asked him if he would be participating in prisoner committees. 
Despite his assurances and the Classification Committee’s recommendation, Collins was slated 
to go to Bathurst, far away from Sydney and the university education courses he hoped to take 
while at the urban prisons.1418 The day after the removal of Collins from Parramatta Gaol, the 
institution’s inmates held a mass meeting to discuss the shanghai and protested the action by 
refusing to go to work, but to no avail. The penal authorities did not return Collins to 
Parramatta.1419 With the unprecedented scrutiny of the Royal Commission, the penal 
authorities exercised their power to move Collins through the construction of legitimate 
rationales and the mobilization of some inmates under their control. While the deceit was 
obvious to Parramatta’s inmates, it was also unprovable and officially unreadable. Thus, the 
penal authorities maneuvered within the prison regulations, manipulating them to transfer 
Collins, while deflecting critical scrutiny from outside investigators.1420  
Prison staff also used transfers to disrupt potential lawsuits or investigations by 
oversight bodies like the state’s Ombudsman.1421 Even though the state’s courts, other agencies 
and Parliament became more receptive to inmates complaints during the 1970, the actions of 
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prison administrators often hindered the ability of inmates to access these channels. In early 
1981, Steve Lewis, an escapee on the run, described to a journalist from the Sydney Morning 
Herald an instance of how transfers were used by prison staff to quench his plans to bring a 
legal suit against warders at the C.I.P. in the Long Bay prison complex.1422 Lewis’s statement 
contained a number of ambiguous framings, inconsistencies, and intimations of multiple, 
maybe conflicting motives for his escape, commission of crimes, and even just seeking out the 
journalist who interviewed him. 1423 It is hard to read it without hearing or otherwise being 
aware of some of these ambiguities or silent aporia.1424  Nevertheless, the manner in which he 
described the use of transfers—mainly as shanghais—echoed many similar accounts from other 
inmates at this time.1425 In this sense, Lewis’s account provides a description of shanghais and 
the role they played in the prison system at the time.1426 
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Lewis claimed to have witnessed prison officers abusing inmates during a major 
disturbance at the C.I.P. in 1978.1427 After the unrest, he tried to organize legal action against 
the officers and persuaded 12 other inmates to testify about the assaults. However, when the 
prison authorities learned of his efforts, they shanghaied him to the Goulburn Training Centre, 
nearly 200km away. Lewis said at the time he had served four years in maximum security 
prisons and was hoping to be considered for a re-classification and a transfer to a minimum 
security prison. Instead, he ended up at Goulburn in the special front yards, open-air 
segregation pens used to punish and isolate prisoners. He claimed that prison authorities did 
this to compel him to drop his planned legal action against the officers at the C.I.P. After what 
the journalist described as “a period of bewildering transfers and harassment,” Lewis stated he 
“did a deal with top prison officers.” He was sent to the medium security Cessnock Corrective 
Centre, in exchange for ceasing his legal action and persuading the other witnesses to follow 
suit.1428 
 The 1978 disturbance at the Central Industrial Prison that Lewis mentioned, occurred 
despite an attempt by warders to avoid such a problem through the extensive use of pre-
emptive transfers. The media explained that the mounting unrest at the C.I.P. stemmed from 
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multiple frustrations.1429 Much of the worsening tensions in the C.I.P and the state's other 
prisons reflected political uncertainly of how prisons were to be managed following the tabling 
of Justice Nagle's report in the spring of 1978. The guards sought to block the reforms 
recommended by Nagle and reassert their authority to control prisoners and prisons as they 
had prior to the Royal Commission and even McGeechan’s tenure as head of the penal 
bureaucracy. The guards’ actions frustrated many inmates who expected Nagle's reforms to be 
implemented immediately. Tensions between the guard force and inmates blossomed over the 
summer, especially in maximum security prisons like the C.I.P. Justice Nagle recommended 
abandoning the long standing practice of referring to inmates only by their assigned numbers as 
soon as possible.1430 One of the recurrent complaints of prisoners at the C.I.P. leading up to the 
upheaval was that they were still required to wear such numbers on their uniforms. This issue 
symbolically articulated many other frustrations and complaints. Many inmates simply refused 
to wear the numbers until a host of other grievances, such as the lack of industry, 
overcrowding, a delay in mail, and poor conditions for visitations, were addressed. They were 
also upset about the recent re-imposition of tighter discipline and an increase in the use of 
formal misconduct charges at the C.I.P. Sensing an impending showdown, the prison’s staff 
transferred numerous inmates on Monday, August 21, 1978. Conflicting accounts placed this 
figure between 50 and 53 inmates.1431 Prison authorities moved the prisoners to other 
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maximum security facilities at Maitland and Goulburn, as well as the minimum security farm 
Glen Innes.1432  
In hindsight, the transfers obviously failed to prevent the disturbance, which occurred 
the following morning, Tuesday, August 22nd. Speculating on what would have happened had 
the inmates not been moved does not seem productive. However, it is worth pointing out that 
the transfers contributed to the unrest at the prison immediately before the disturbance. The 
inmates remaining at the C.I.P. did not approve of the transfers, which appeared to them as an 
obvious attempt by prison staff to counter a protest meeting the inmates held on Sunday night. 
That meeting concerned the increased discipline at the prison, among other grievances, 
including the fact that one of their leaders had already been shanghaied to Maitland.1433 
According to news reports, the inmates collectively organized their refusal to wear numbers at 
this meeting and also planned to stage a work-stoppage the following week if their demands 
were still not addressed. The prison administration replied with the transfers the following day.  
The Sydney Morning Herald reported on Tuesday that three guards were injured during 
the transfer; apart from the implied resistance by inmates that was conveyed, there was no 
mention of any injuries they sustained. However, the newspaper noted when the escort vans 
stopped at a North Sydney police station “prisoners were heard pounding against the walls and 
shouting obscenities.”1434 Those prisoners remaining at the C.I.P. protested this action in a 
similar way. In the newspapers terms: “Last night after the transfers, prisoners at Long Bay 
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shouted abuse at prison officers from their cells.”1435 A spokesman for the Department of 
Corrective Services commented that, in general, prisoners at the C.I.P. were usually there 
awaiting transfer to some other prison within the larger system. These particular movements 
had merely been “accelerated by acts of defiance by prisoners.” He denied the prisoners had 
mentioned any “specifically stated” grievance.1436 At least two of the inmates who were 
transferred to the Maitland Gaol, north of Sydney, protested their removal from the C.I.P. by 
staging a sit-in protest on the roof of the prison’s chapel. After they agreed to come down, the 
prison authorities transferred them again, this time to the Parramatta Gaol, which is ironically 
much closer to the C.I.P.1437  
These latter movements highlighted the fact that the penal authorities shifted some 
prisoners from prison to prison at a much higher rate than others.  Terry Haley, an inmate with 
a poor institutional disciplinary record, exemplified this issue. Departmental investigators and 
the police identified Haley was one of the ringleaders of the Bathurst uprising in February 1974, 
and he was subsequently moved to Grafton and later Katingal. However, Haley was already a 
veteran of numerous movements and would be moved again after the Wran government 
closed Katingal in 1978. His girlfriend, the author Gabrielle Carey, characterized this pattern of 
movement:   
 
In what could only have been an effort to destabilize Terry, they had transferred 
him from one gaol to another so he rarely had more than a few months in one 
place. He never had the time to build up friendships. He always had to be alert in 
case the screws came in the middle of the night to take him to some other 
maximum security section of some gaol. It was as if the prison authorities 
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thought that by keeping him constantly on edge and harassing him, he must 
eventually break. Instead, Terry developed a steel resilience.1438 
 
Haley himself described this process and its effects: 
 
After ten years in NSW I’d been in every maximum security prison in the state. 
Not that I care much which gaol I’m in, I just wish they’d leave me in the same 
one for a while. You just start settling in and then they go and shanghai you. You 
never get time to think because you’re always worrying about when they’ll come 
and get you and where they’ll take you. The other part that gives me the shits is 
that they never tell you why you’re going. Like when they sent me to the tracs 
and the Blockhouse,1439 do you think I ever found out why I was sent there? No 
way, I’m the last one they’d tell. I mean, you’d think if they really believed in all 
this crime and punishment shit that they would tell you—so you’d know when 
you’d been bad (by their books) and you wouldn’t do it again-so the whole 
system would be put to work the way they reckon it works. But that’s far too 
rational for them. Far too fucking rational.1440 
 
 In addition to the difficulties described by Haley, inmates complained about awful 
conditions they endured during the actual movement from prison to prison, a practice referred 
to by the prison authorities as “escorting.”1441 Such comments appeared numerous times in 
inmate submissions to the Royal Commission and were also a frequent topic in inmate journals 
and diaries. Inmates resented the conditions in the transportation vans used to move prisoners 
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to and from various locations. The vans had room to hold 12 prisoners according to the Royal 
Commission testimony of John F. Barry, the superintendent of Goulburn.1442 Yet, some 
prisoners described occasions when more prisoners were loaded onto these vans.1443 Each van 
was partitioned down the middle so that inmates could be separated into two groups. As a 
matter of standard practice, the officers who conducted escorts to prisons with a closed 
security rating1444 kept inmates handcuffed during the entire process. 1445 Many inmates 
complained about being handcuffed and the way this made the trip much more difficult. In his 
diary, Ray Denning, considered a high risk inmate and a veteran of many transfers, decried 
Corrective Services’ intransigence in making some seemingly minor improvements that would 
have drastically ameliorated some of the difficulties encountered on these trips: 
 
There is no excuse why the Prisons’ Department can’t improve our transport 
facilities by taking our handcuffs off, as we have 3 locks on the back of the door 
and a car following behind the van. There is no reason why we can’t be given 
rubber cushions to sit on, and there is no reason why water containers can’t be 
put into the vans, after all that’s not asking for much. Or then again the Prisons’ 
Department must think it is asking for too much because prisoners have been 
complaining about the prison vans and S.O.D. squad1446 for years.1447 
 
As Denning’s account of several trips indicates, the provision of food and water varied and 
seemed to depend as much on the attitudes of the particular officers conducting the escort as 
anything else. On one trip from Grafton down to Sydney, Denning remarked that: 
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No water allowed, hard seats that jar your whole body, not getting out of the 
van at Taree where we stopped for dinner, which was 2 [meat] pies and ½ pint of 
milk. The van was full of dust and we had to wait 4 hours after leaving Grafton 
until we got to Taree, by then out throats were that dry that we drank the milk 
straight down and as a result had nothing to drink for the next 7 hours.1448 
 
Yet, on the way back a few days later, Denning wrote:  
 
I came up in the same van I went down in, only this time I was by myself. The 
boys at Long Bay made up plenty of food and 3 cartons of milk for me to have on 
the trip up. That made it a lot easier on me, as we only stopped for petrol and I 
left the Bay at 6:00 am and got into Grafton at 5:00 pm.1449 
 
Another prisoner, Warwick Robert James, described his first grueling trip to Grafton in 
the early 1970s in his submission and testimony before the Royal Commission.1450 The transfer 
began at 6:00am, when S.O.D. officers removed James from the Observation Unit, a high 
security section at the Long Bay prison complex south of Sydney. The officers striped him, 
performed a full body-cavity search, dressed him in a pair of overalls and slippers, and then 
handcuffed him to a security belt worn around his waist. Afterward, James claimed the officer 
in charge, named Osmond, hit him in the face twice and threatened him. Another officer hit 
him, as well, before forcibly shoving him into the transport van. Four other prisoners, each 
similarly handcuffed to a security belt, accompanied James on this particular trip. The officers 
did not feed them during the trip, and James even claimed he had not eaten for well over a full 
day. However, he said the officers ate in front of them. The inmates were not permitted to use 
the toilet at any time during the trip, which eventually ended with his arrival at Grafton at 
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4:30pm. At the time of his statement to the Royal Commission, James said he made this 
particular round trip from Sydney to Grafton and back again five times. In all, James stated he 
had been transferred 25 times during his six years of continuous imprisonment.1451 He claimed 
to have travelled 10 thousand miles with the S.O.D. in the 4 years prior to his testimony before 
the Royal Commission.1452 
Like James’s account, many other inmates complained they were routinely denied the 
opportunity to urinate and defecate during the transfer process. The escort vans were not 
equipped with toilets, but each had a bucket for excretions to share among the inmates being 
moved. While inmates often complained about having to use a bucket in their cells at some 
older prisons (the “slopping out” system as it was called), their provision in the vans was further 
complicated because it was nearly impossible to relieve oneself while handcuffed, whether this 
binding was just at the wrists, to a security belt, or other prisoners. Trying to do this while the 
van was in motion added to the ordeal. Inmates routinely stated they could not use the buckets 
provided in the vans. In some cases, when an inmate was able to use the bucket, it was liable to 
spill because it was not secured during what were often described as excessively jolting rides at 
high speeds.1453 
However, by some accounts, inmates apparently vomited in the buckets during these 
trips.  Inmates described the vans as poorly ventilated and stifling, especially during the 
summer heat on trips in the northern part of the state.1454  Inmate Raymond John Moore 
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claimed exhaust fumes frequently entered the inmate compartment of the vans, causing 
nausea and vomiting: 
 
I have never been on escort in the back of a van when prisoners have not 
vomited because of the fumes. In the back of each van there are buckets and I 
recall at one time a bucket being passed up and down the line of prisoners and 
each vomited into it. I never protested to the Mod Squad1455 about the fumes 
because I was frightened of being charged with insolence.1456 
 
Even when prison officers removed inmates from the vans during periodic stops, they 
usually left inmates handcuffed to each other, making use of the toilets difficult and 
embarrassing. Kevin Raymond Boardman, an inmate in transit from the Goulburn Training 
Centre to Maitland Gaol stated in his submission to the Royal Commission that he and a group 
of 21 other inmates had not been able to use the toilet for “about 6 hours” when they stopped 
temporarily at Parramatta Gaol.1457 The “Mod Squad” officers placed Boardman and his fellow 
inmates in a secure yard, provided sandwiches, but, nevertheless, left them handcuffed: “We 
were all sick in the stomach and some prisoners said they wanted to use their bowel but said 
they could not with handcuffs.”1458  
 Given the conditions of these movements, it is not surprising that many inmates hoped 
to avoid transfers as much as possible. The Council of Civil Liberties noted this fact in its final 
submission to the Royal Commission.1459 The Council assisted many inmates in their court 
proceedings after they were charged for the destruction of Bathurst Gaol in the February 1974 
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disturbance. Almost all of the prisoners held at Bathurst were immediately transferred to 
various maximum security prisons in the state following the riot. One prison that received many 
of these inmates was Maitland Gaol, nearly 170km north of Sydney. These inmates were 
reportedly abused at Maitland, but they nevertheless told the Council they wished to meet with 
their legal representatives and appear before the court as infrequently as possible because it 
entailed a long trip to Sydney in “Black Maria” escort vans.1460 Although, relatively temporary 
when compared to the long sentences many of these inmates spent in prisons, transfers 
created periodic episodes of greater control, deprivation, and, ironically, immobility 
(handcuffed in an small compartment) as prisoners moved from place to place. This experience 
often pitted the inmates’ bodily cycles, needs, and vulnerabilities against them in humiliating 
and painful ways that were usually avoidable in mainstream prison routines. Used punitively, 
transfers (shanghais) reinscribed the penal hierarchy at the level of the body.      
Despite the difficulties many inmates experienced during these movements, the 
possibility of being transferred also afforded inmates with an avenue for escaping certain 
prisons or undesirable situations. Of course, prisoners were able to request transfers from 
senior staff and the Programme Review Committees at their institution. This process often did 
not favor inmates with poor institutional records and also depended on the availability of space 
elsewhere in the system with suitable custody and program arrangements. Some inmates 
manipulated1461 this process and other aspects of prisoner placement protocols to move about 
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the varied spaces within the penal apparatus. Bernie Matthews later recounted how he tried to 
obtain a favorable transfer to a mental hospital with weaker security arrangements in late 1969 
by faking a suicide attempt for the sole purpose of escaping from custody.1462  
The tactic Matthews employed was a well-known prison subterfuge, one he learned 
from another inmate at Parramatta Gaol, where he was housed at the time. Matthews’s 
account underscored the continual, if unequal, diagnostic process at work in how both the 
inmates and various penal authorities interacted as they each assessed the situation, its 
possibilities and constraints, and the motivations and assumptions of other actors.1463 Stories 
and informal guidelines about favorable transfers, the various means to acquire them, and the 
best places to go also circulated within penal space, sometimes with inmates themselves, 
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sometimes through other media. Billy Sutton, the inmate who told Matthews about the 
psychiatric hospital and how to fake suicidal behavior, had himself just been transferred back to 
Parramatta from a nearby hospital. It appears Sutton had been there for actual treatment, but 
he told Matthews that the security he noticed was so loose that one could just walk away. 
Matthews desired a transfer there, and under the advice of Sutton, swallowed "30 pieces of 
razor blade" after wrapping them in clear cellophane tape.1464  
The ruse involved a knowledge of the protocols governing the prevention and treatment 
of self-harm and ways in which staff assessed and verified such acts.1465 An x-ray would reveal 
the razor blades, but not the clear tape, which blunted the sharp edges and prevented or 
reduced any actual internal damage. Matthews also sliced his tongue to further trick the guards 
who would see blood flowing from his mouth. After alerting the guards, a nurse evaluated 
Matthews, and recommended—as expected—that he be transferred for a psychiatric exam. 
Unfortunately for Matthews, there were limits to his knowledge. The guards moved him to the 
high security Observation Section at Long Bay instead of the lower security facilities at the 
Parramatta Psyche Centre or Callan Park, where he wanted to be placed. Although the 
Observation Section was used for psychiatric assessment, it also served as a punishment unit. 
Although Matthews did not explicitly acknowledge it, the guards at Parramatta and Long Bay 
presumably knew his suicide attempt was disingenuous. Aside from sending him to Long Bay, 
they also beat him on arrival and locked him in a cell for three days until he passed the taped-
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up razor blades.1466 The faked suicide attempt was a viable tactic because of the way it both 
drew upon numerous discursive and practical resources within the penal apparatus, and yet still 
remained hard to definitively decipher as either a stratagem or cry for help.  An inmate could, 
after all, purposely hurt himself to get away from some place or situation and still be 
profoundly troubled psychologically and in need of treatment. If Matthews’s actions appeared 
hard to place between rational choice and insanity, the varied purposes the Observation 
Section accommodated the dilemma. Nevertheless, Matthews’s case highlights the subversion 
of the transfer process and its use for ends beyond the officially stated purposes.  
A scandal that erupted after the public proceedings of the Royal Commission had ended 
highlighting the multiple lines of power that flowed from the transfer process. In October 1977, 
Bruce McDonald, a Liberal member of the Legislative Assembly, asked Bill Haigh, the Minister of 
Services who oversaw the prison’s portfolio in the Labor government, about “a ‘practice’ 
whereby a prisoner in a high-security gaol might, for a price, procure a transfer to a low-
security gaol.”1467 At the time of McDonald’s question, the Royal Commission’s staff were 
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drafting the final report. Premier Neville Wran reconvened the Royal Commission to hear 
evidence on the matter in the hopes of containing a potentially damaging corruption scandal. 
The Royal Commission heard evidence until late November 1977 and interviewed a number of 
witnesses, including several currently serving prisoners, senior prison staff, and administrators. 
The Interim Report of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons detailed numerous 
accusations of illicitly obtained transfers and a host of jailhouses rumors about this practice. 
Although it was never definitively established when the practice began, it appeared it extended 
back several years, possibly to the early 1970s.1468 The rumors and direct favors connected 
numerous inmates and their family members outside, many of whom did not know each other. 
These networks all led back to one particular staff member in the central office of the 
Department of Corrective Services and one ex-inmate who had a reputation as a key player in 
Sydney’s organized crime structure. 
The staff member was Paul Genner, a long-serving, but oddly low-ranking administrative 
clerk who worked in the Prisoner Movement Section of the central office and also served on the 
central Classification Committee. Genner stood accused of selling favorable transfers for 
hundreds to thousands of dollars. Arthur Stanley “Neddy” Smith, the ex-inmate, had an 
extensive institutional record and was widely known to prison staff as a “heavy,” a violent 
inmate leader and “standover” man feared by many other inmates. According to the rumors, 
Smith acted as an intermediary between Genner and inmates who sought to purchase their 
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placement in a minimum security setting. After a stay at Grafton and several trac sections in 
other prisons in the early 1970s, Smith improved his institutional record by avoiding further 
disciplinary infractions and obtaining a job in the infirmary at Parramatta Gaol.1469 In this 
capacity, Smith gained the trust of a number of prison staff, especially Genner, after he helped 
an officer, Willy Faber, who was mortally wounded in an escape attempt by inmate Ray 
Denning and several others.1470 At the time, Smith was approaching his earliest parole eligibility 
date and his assistance with Officer Faber gained him the active support of Genner who 
hastened Smith’s consideration by the parole authorities.1471 Genner also presented favorable 
testimony to the Parole Board concerning Smith. While at this junction, there appeared to be 
nothing untoward about the relationship between Genner and Smith, this changed after Smith 
was released from prison in March 1975. 
During the reconvened inquiry, both men admitted they had met each other several 
times for lunch in the years following Smith’s parole.1472 While in itself a meeting between an 
ex-inmate and a staff member of the penal bureaucracy was not illegal or a violation of 
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Department rules, it was highly unusual and suspicious.1473 The explanations both men gave to 
the inquiry about the meetings failed to diminish their concerns about its inappropriateness, 
especially in light of rampant jailhouse rumors that transfers could be purchased from Genner 
through Smith. Both men shifted their evidence to match each other’s testimony during 
examination, suggesting to the Royal Commission that they had strategized on how best to 
frame their association once the inquiry began.1474 In the end, the Royal Commission could not 
prove that Genner sold transfers. Inmates who apparently benefited from Genner’s service 
recanted any incriminating testimony, if they had even provided any in the first place.  
However, there was enough evidence of his dishonestly about his dealings with Smith for the 
inquiry to recommend public service charges against Genner.1475 
The inquiry into the scandal revealed serious weaknesses in the procedures for 
transferring inmates and also the haphazard administration of the process that left it vulnerable 
to abuse. The investigators discovered, for instance, that inmate Kevin Holland moved between 
the maximum security Parramatta Gaol and the minimum security Berrima Training Centre 
despite never being seen by the Classification Committee.1476 In fact, Holland never appeared 
before any classification board whether at the central Long Bay facility or at any subsequent 
Programme Review Committees at various prisons. This would have been extremely odd for 
any prisoner, but more so in Holland’s case since he had a prior history of imprisonment in New 
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South Wales, including time in Grafton’s intractable section.1477 By all accounts, Genner handled 
Holland’s case during the time in question. Holland’s most redeeming value to the staff was his 
prowess at football. The superintendent at Berrima Prison sought Genner’s help in getting 
Holland for the institution’s football team.1478 One can only speculate about how often 
considerations such as these played in the movement of prisoners, especially since they could 
have been easily disguised or wrapped within more official rationales for movement. 
Nevertheless, it indicated that classification criteria beyond penological concerns figured in the 
transfer of some prisoners.  
In the opinion of the Royal Commission investigators, Genner arranged Holland’s 
movement, simply circumventing the routine classification process.1479  These actions far 
exceeded Genner’s official authority, but obviously not his actual power within the penal 
apparatus. Even Genner’s immediate superior, Executive Officer Blomfield, did not know that 
Holland had been moved to Berrima for several months and only learned the Classification 
Committee had not reviewed his case when it was revealed at the inquiry.1480 While there were 
no direct indications or even accusations of bribery in this particular case, it nevertheless, 
revealed that a sub rosa economy of favors and considerations actively competed with official 
procedures and rationales in the movement of prisoners. It also demonstrated the official 
procedures themselves permitted such variance.  
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This vulnerability in the procedures stemmed from the increased use of transfers, in 
general, and the inadequacy of the prevailing, and somewhat outdated, methods for approving 
them. According to the Prisons Act of 1952, the Commissioner of Corrective Services (or prior to 
1970, the Comptroller-General of Prisons) had to approve every transfer by signing the official 
movement order.1481 Prior to McGeechan’s tenure as Commissioner, John Morony used to sign 
every order.1482 This was also likely the same practice followed by Morony’s predecessors who 
served under the dictates of the Prison Act of 1952. McGeechan could not devote sufficient 
time to review and sign each movement order; given the increased volume of transfers, he 
would have had to approve over two hundred orders a day on average. Parliament amended 
the Prisons Act in September 1977 to permit the Commissioner to delegate his authority over 
this matter.1483 However, this amendment basically ratified what had already been practiced in 
the Department of Corrective Services for some time.1484 
To relieve the administrative burden, McGeechan had a committee of six senior officers 
in the Department, including the Deputy Commissioner, review and approve transfers.1485  This 
committee evolved to meet the increasingly burdensome task and did not seem to be part of 
any major reform or planned changed. Prior to consideration by these six officers, clerical staff 
in the Prisoner Movement Section prepared the actual movement order paperwork, which was 
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then sent to the committee. After granting their approval, the orders returned to the Prisoner 
Movement Section where the Senior Clerk, Paul Genner, affixed a stamp of McGeechan’s 
signature. The stamp Genner had in his possession was one of two that McGeechan had 
created by the Government Printer shortly after assumed office.1486 Originally, both stamps 
were held by the secretary of the Department, but one of them was issued to Genner during 
administrative reorganization following the burning of Bathurst Gaol in 1974.1487 Genner now 
stamped movement orders, as the secretary of the Department had done earlier. The other 
stamp passed into the possession of McGeechan’s private secretary and presumably out of 
active use.1488 Once Genner stamped an approved transfer order, it was issued to the relevant 
prisons and unit charged with actually moving the prisoner in question. In other words, the 
order was never re-checked by anyone outranking Genner after he stamped the paperwork. 
Since Genner knew how to draft movement orders and personally controlled the stamp, he 
could, and apparently did, use it to issue orders outside of the accepted parameters. The 
changing nature of prisoner movement, the its ad-hoc central administration, the little tool of 
authority in the form of the stamp, and the nearly unquestionable nature of movement orders 
once they were presented to prison staff meant Genner sat at a powerful confluence of 
knowledge and authority within, yet simultaneously outside of, the penal bureaucracy’s 
regulatory power.  
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This position enabled Genner to commodify transfer orders, exchanging them for 
money, but just as significantly, to also enhance his status relative to other penal bureaucrats 
and prison staff. The Programme Review Committee at Parramatta wrote to Commissioner 
McGeechan about Genner’s influence in July 1977, claiming they could not adequately perform 
their duties because inmates believed the real power in matters of classification and movement 
rested with Genner even though he was the most junior member of the central Classification 
Committee.1489 An inmate could appeal any adverse decision from the Programme Review 
Committee at Parramatta to Genner through informal channels. Genner’s power over these 
issues made the Programme Review Committee appear “to many inmates to be a mere 
mockery.”1490 Genner’s influence disrupted the normal hierarchy of the Department’s 
paramilitary grade system. That the superintendant of Berrima would seek the favor of a Grade 
1 Senior Clerk demonstrated how Genner’s control over transfers, shifted the officially 
recognized lines of institutional authority. The inquiry established that many officials within 
central office and in the various prisoners were either aware of the power Genner held over 
transfers, had suspicions about him in this regard, or had heard the many rumors testifying to 
Genner’s position.1491  Prior to the Royal Commission’s inquiry, the Department had opened an 
internal investigation into transfers involving bribery and Genner’s name was also mentioned in 
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these proceedings.1492 These investigators never substantiated the rumors, but it appears that 
to some degree they believed them. The Royal Commission felt these investigators could have 
been more diligent in the matter and more willing to acknowledge the veracity and implications 
of claims originating from inmates, even if prisons were a “’hot-bed for gossip.’”1493  
The disruption some staff perceived in Genner’s influence extended to inmates as the 
above example indicates. However, it empowered many of them. The ability to pursue a 
different avenue for (semi-)official transfers meant inmates did not need to approach the 
Programme Review Committees with the respect and deference that the committee members 
would have normally expected from inmates in such a position. At a time of widespread 
institutional unrest and major inquiries, this practice only compounded the crisis of legitimacy 
that was spreading across the penal apparatus in the 1970s. A number of staff members 
interviewed by the Royal Commission, noted that some inmates mentioned the illicit transfers 
openly in situations where they could obviously be overheard by guards. One could speculate 
that this lack of concern in mentioning the practice and even naming some of the people 
involved worried staff about the erosion of their own authority over inmates. According to the 
Interim Report, on at least one occasion an inmate told an officer in charge of sporting activities 
at the Milson Island prison camp that he could arrange to get athletic inmates transferred to 
the island: “I know Ned Smith who drinks with Paul Genner, he can arrange to get these fellows 
to the island.”1494 This officer reported the same inmate also told him, “Don’t worry about 
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Genner, we have him in our pockets.” The comment suggested that as powerful as Genner was, 
he may have put himself in a precarious position between the Department and organized crime 
in New South Wales.1495 
Officer Alex Patty also reported rumors of transfer-selling and specifically mentioned an 
inmate, John F. McIntosh, who was widely believed to have purchased his placement at the 
minimum security Silverwater facility.1496 McIntosh apparently did little to dispel the rumors 
and even joked about them with Patty.1497 This prompted Patty to alert his superiors who 
interviewed McIntosh in an effort to find out who he bribed in the central office. While never 
established definitively, additional inferences in the report suggest that Patty tried to obtain 
McIntosh’s cooperation by telling him it could be worth a work release.1498 The Sydney Morning 
Herald reported that a senior investigator had also offered prisoners compassionate early 
releases in exchange for information about who in the Department was selling transfers.1499  
The latter two implications, while never taken that serious by the Royal Commission, 
nevertheless added to the rumors circulating in the prisons about the transfer scandal and the 
possible benefits to be obtained through accusation and negotiation over the matter. The Royal 
Commission argued that many of the rumored illicit transfers probably lacked any substantial 
basis. Yet, they recognized the unusual influence wielded by Genner and his association with 
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Neddy Smith left the penal apparatus vulnerable to disruption and defamation caused by 
rumors that were believable or creditable enough given the circumstances.1500  
In many instances, the Royal Commission investigators felt some of the inmates they 
interviewed were trying to achieve their own personal goals or settle scores with other inmates 
and prison staff by testifying about transfers.1501 These inmates were, in essence, using the 
prevailing rumors, the uncertainty over the authority to issue transfers, and the inquiry for 
seemingly unrelated concerns. The same assemblage of different circumstances and abilities 
that enabled Genner, could not ultimately be controlled by him or Smith, as the conflicting sets 
of rules and rumors entwined in the transfer process proliferated across the various prisons, 
moving ironically with transferred inmates regardless of whether they purchased their passage 
or not.1502 Some inmates told the inquiry the names of other prisoners who might have 
knowledge of the bribery schemes simply because they were known to have been moved 
often.1503 The range of benefits some prisoners saw in this subversion of the transfer process 
will likely never been known. However, it clearly escaped the prisons cellblocks as MP Bruce 
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The transfer of people between different prisons has been a longstanding practice in the 
history of incarceration, but it became much more frequent as the number of prisons expanded 
and regimes and custody levels diversified. The normal operation of the postwar prison in New 
South Wales involved the greater movement of prisoners between institutions as they 
progressed through the custody levels, either on their way down to lower levels prior to 
release, or further up the scale as punishment. This was a routine part of the way penal 
authorities envisioned classification and differential treatment. However, the routine qualities 
of the transfer process enabled prison staff and prisoners to find ways to enact many other 
purposes and agendas through movement.  
Prisoners often tried to move to other institutions for either legitimate or illicit reasons, 
often both at the same time. They could formally request transfers for things like attending a 
training course that was only available at one particular prison. Or, they found ways to subvert 
the transfer process by forcing guards and superintendents into to moving them, like faked 
suicide attempts. Similarly, guards used the transfer process to discipline certain inmates and 
disrupt the activities of groups of prisoners. They also used it for purely punitive reasons. 
Officers had a wide latitude when it came to moving prisoners. Unlike the formal disciplinary 
process, they did not have to bring charges against an inmate to move them. After prisoners 
gained the right to appeal disciplinary decisions, simply transferring them, instead of charging 
them, avoided the possibility of an appeal by the inmate all together. As a number of inmates 
described during the Royal Commission, the actual process of being moved was often grueling 
and cruel. A great deal of unrecorded, rough justice could be administered on the highway, 




The Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons portrayed the collusion between 
Paul Genner and Neddy Smith to sell transfers as corruption and the result of poor 
management. However, it can also be seen as just another extension of some of the ways in 
which people subverted the formal protocols of prisoner movement. Perhaps the novel thing 
about Genner’s activities was how they eventually became the topic of news stories, 
accusations in Parliament and a royal commission investigation. Neddy Smith’s name would 
surface again a few years later in connection with another corruption scandal involving the 
prisons. This time for the illicit purchase of early release approval in a new decarceration 
program.  
Since a well-developed transfer process was an integral part of the postwar reforms, it 
also appeared in other jurisdictions like Pennsylvania. After the centralization of management 
functions in the Bureau of Correction in the early 1950s, inter-prison transfers became much 
more common. Along with the classification system, they helped integrate the state’s 
previously independent penal institutions into a more unified system. Much like in New South 
Wales, prison officers used the transfer process for disciplinary reasons and to crush the 
formation of collective organizations among prisoners. Black Muslims were often ensnared in 
large scale movements for these reasons. SCI Graterford and SCI Pittsburgh periodically 
exchanged difficult prisoners, as the case of prison activist Sylvester Lockhart demonstrated. 
However, the politics surrounding transfers was not as visible in Pennsylvania as it was in New 
South Wales. In the latter state, it became a frequent topic of prison activism and it attracted 
the attention of Justice Nagle during the Royal Commission. By the late 1970s, it appears that 




anything else, the system-wide lack of cell space created by overcrowding reduced the ability of 





























Chapter 6: Classification: Penological Knowledge and Practice in Transition 
 
Classification systems are no longer attempts to diagnose an illness but, rather, serve 
various purposes. One reason for this variety may be that we are in a time of change 
when there is no generally accepted paradigm. Retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, 
and incapacitation are now all considered legitimate goals of corrections.  
 
Doris Layton MacKenzie, C. Dale Posey and Karen R. 
Rapaport1504 
      
Introduction: Classification, Penal Politics, Circulation 
 
This chapter is about penal classification as both a practice of sorting inmates and institutional 
spaces and an exercise in knowledge production, emphasizing comparison, commensuration, 
differentiation and movement. In both of these aspects, penal classification involved an ever-
widening arena of struggle, dispute and collaboration during the 1970s and 1980s. Many 
contemporary accounts of classification resonated with MacKenzie, Posey and Rapaport’s 
characterization cited above, but they also frequently emphasized the inadequacy or failures of 
classification practices and rationales. Many contemporary critics portrayed the poverty of 
existing classification procedures as so severe and poorly integrated into prisoner management 
practices that they formed more of an institutional vacuum than a necessary part of the 
correctional system. This disillusionment, part of the more general turn away from 
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rehabilitation, was pervasive, but few prison staff believed they could simply dispense with 
classification in some form. As MacKenzie, Posey and Rapaport noted, it was too deeply 
embedded in multiple purposes and projects to be easily abandoned. By the same token, it was 
also hard to reform. 
Classification within prisons is premised on the notion that prisons confine a 
heterogeneous group of people. Conviction and imprisonment may cluster them into a 
collective body and set them apart,1505 but the differences among them are substantial and 
affect their lives behind bars. Since at least the early nineteenth century, classifying and 
separating inmates has been a major preoccupation of prison reformers, prison staff, and even 
inmates themselves. Michel Foucault saw classification as fundamental aspect of techniques 
like surveillance, enclosure and the partitioning of internal institutional spaces, and through 
dividing and ranking imprisoned groups of people, it also brought them into relation with each 
other through their differences.1506 These activities authorized numerous supplemental 
interventions into the lives of confined people and different management techniques 
correspond to specific categories of people and their characteristics.1507 Classification was not 
only critical for the daily functioning of prisons, according to Foucault, it actually also 
constituted them as a novel form of punishment, distinct from both the spectacular physical 
punishments of the ancien régime and the limited way it used imprisonment as well. The 
practice facilitated greater differentiation and expansion of the penal apparatus as a whole, 
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producing new knowledge about offenders, prison staff, and management, which formed 
dense, interdependent relationships among multiple prisons and similar institutions like 
asylums. The notion of a complex, integrated “prison system,” which became popular during 
the mid-twentieth century, owes its existence in part to the classificatory processes unleased in 
the modern prison described by Foucault. 
While forms of classification are central to all human practice,1508 it is a much more 
explicit, specialized practice in recent prison management, accompanied by formal procedures, 
expertise, tools and specially-trained personnel. These practices grew slowly over the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but blossomed after World War II as an integral part 
of various prison reform projects, emphasizing differential education, retraining and 
rehabilitation. In these refashioned prison regimes, the formal classification system became a 
major nodal point in the daily operation of penal power, coordinating almost all major aspects 
of prison life. Many sociological assessments, both contemporary and current, viewed the 
formal classification apparatus as “the core of the prison system.”1509 The major functions of 
the classification system were to evaluate all of the people committed to the prisons by the 
courts, determine their security needs, craft a reformative plan for new inmates and assign 
them to a specific prison. Once at the prison of placement, a secondary classification team, 
often called a program review committee, determined a more detailed plan and cell 
accommodation.  
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 Beyond these primary functions, classification committees produced a large body of 
knowledge to serve various management and research projects. The individual prisoner files 
created during the initial stage of classification followed an incarcerated person throughout 
their confinement, often literally, as files usually moved with people during transfers. Such files 
contained a personal history and record of assessments, whether these were formal 
psychological tests or the opinions of supervising officers. Often times, such files were 
incomplete or missing required information. In other cases, they could be quite extensive. 
Results from the initial battery of tests that some jurisdictions administered could occupy large 
parts of these files. For instance, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the initial assessment 
conducted by the Diagnostic and Classification Centers operated by the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Correction included the following tests: Revised Beta II (intelligence); the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) or WAIS-R (used for people who score below 80 on the Revised Beta); 
Jastak Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT); Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
MMPI (short and long version); at least one of the following projection tests - Bender Gestalt, 
House-Tree-Person, Projective Drawings, Cornell Index, Sentence Completion, Hand Test, 
Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test (TAT); and a psychological interview.1510 The results 
from these tests were usually in the files, but may have mattered little to the next set of staff 
members who managed the prisoner and file. These files expanded over time as they 
accumulated lists of disciplinary infractions and officers’ evaluations of a person’s disposition, 
maturity, ability to work and honesty. The power of such files in the lives of confined people 
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made them highly sought after items. Prison staff developed security procedures specifically to 
guard against the theft of these files. Classification files also provided researchers with 
enormous quantities of generalizable data, which became a central feature of the increasing 
use of standardized criteria and categories in classification. Researchers often designed projects 
on prisoner management, resource allocation or the effectiveness of therapeutic programs with 
the evidence in such files in mind. 
Yet, as Foucault noted, classificatory activities are deeply embedded in prisons. Most of 
this work exists beyond the formal, so-named classification system, but it also frequently 
informs, supplements and challenges it. For instance, a number of times during the 1970s and 
1980s, guards segregated certain prisoners and threatened to strike if their superiors freed 
them. In their view, such prisoners resided at the far end of security-rating system and could 
not be supervised in normal discipline. In many cases, the formal classification decision to 
segregate a prisoner in this situation often caught up to the actions of the guard force. Many 
differently-positioned actors, while not directly employed in the formal classification apparatus, 
engaged in this kind of work, often adopting and transforming the language and mechanisms of 
the formal practice. Even though classification committees were often suspicious and 
unsympathetic toward imprisoned people, they nevertheless provided a forum for the redress 
of certain grievances, however limited. Prisoners frequently petitioned such committees for a 
change in work, custody status or accommodation. As Bernie Matthews and Terry Haley 
demonstrated in the last chapter, many prisoners also identified and exploited vulnerable 




classification system’s categories, evaluative methods and shifting forms of expertise, 
therefore, furnished a wide range of options for actors to press claims or suppress challenges.  
In this respect, I view the centrality of classification in the operation of penal power not 
as a monolithic force always acting according to its stated instrumental aims, but as a supple 
institutional practice, which was always subject to challenge, manipulation, and enlistment in 
multiple, and at times conflicting, projects and goals.1511 This meant that actors often identified 
additional productive possibilities in classification. Just its data collection and creation 
capacities alone provided an indispensable fulcrum for numerous prison reform projects and a 
means to experiment with new techniques and evaluate programs. In the U.S. researchers 
supported by the National Institute of Corrections and the American Correctional Association, 
relied on the classification infrastructure in state penal agencies as a research engine and 
laboratory for piloting new objective classification methods and creating a set of national (and 
international) standards and best practices.1512 
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The formal classification apparatus—or its absence—also became an attractive vehicle 
for judicial mandates and interventions by independent inquiries, which had become 
increasingly common. By the 1970s and 1980s, prison systems in numerous jurisdictions 
experienced a level of scrutiny, investigation and scandal that had not occurred since the mid-
nineteenth century.1513 One of the consequences of this heightened visibility was that for the 
first time in decades, political leaders and the general public learned much more about 
variations in prison regimes, different categories of prisoners and the sorting mechanisms that 
penal authorities used to assign people to such categories. Often, this knowledge became 
embroiled in highly scandalous events: prison authorities failed to properly screen inmates for 
lower-security programs leading to escapes or they could not properly handle seriously 
mentally ill inmates. As in other areas of punishment at this time, a wider group of people, from 
legislators to the voting public, from prisoners to civil society activist organizations, demanded 
greater participation in decisions about how to sort, place and deploy inmates and penal 
spaces. Thus, various constituencies, from within and beyond prison walls, increasingly targeted 
their interventions on classification procedures, recognizing in them a potent way to 
reconfigure penal relationships and policies.  
For correctional agencies, classification afforded a mechanism for addressing problems 
like overcrowding, violence, poor living conditions and wayward overtime expenditures – 
provided that the procedures themselves were practically sound, politically acceptable and 
properly administered. If functioning in a convincingly effective way, it could also forestall 
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judicial intervention over a number of matters courts found objectionable. Officials in 
Pennsylvania, for instance, pursued a massive assessment and reform of the Bureau of 
Correction’s classification system precisely to prevent the intrusions of the federal courts. They 
hoped that despite the problems besetting the state’s prisons, evidence of a state-of-the-art 
classification system would not only create a way to address these problems, but also blunt the 
urgency of a more drastic mandate from the federal courts. Similarly, the Royal Commission 
into New South Wales Prisons, believed that a more rationale classification procedure with new 
custody categories could reduce the state’s overreliance on expensive and socially-destructive 
maximum security accommodations. In both cases, reforming classification entailed marshaling 
coalitions for change and suppressing dissidence within the penal bureaucracy. Significantly, it 
also involved drawing on knowledge and expertise from afar, whether in the form of 
consultants, study tours or published research. 
While Foucault, and more recently Stanley Cohen, have clearly demonstrated the 
fundamental continuity of classification in prison reform projects, the specific forms of social 
science and medical expertise invested in postwar classification practices rapidly lost credibility 
during the 1970s.1514 This shift involved a rejection of clinical reasoning and prediction methods 
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for determining future offending, treatment interventions and appropriate custody levels. In its 
place, penal researchers substituted a variety of formal, actuarial methods and techniques, 
primarily designed to curtail discretion or at least channel it into standardized, predictable 
formats.1515 Researchers and practitioners created succinct, uniform tools as part of this 
project, which structured decision-making and enhancing “interrater reliability” – the likelihood 
that different specialized staff would classify the same prisoner, the same way. This was never a 
straightforward process, however, as crafting new procedures was often a time-consuming, 
difficult political task. Numerous prison staff had to be persuaded about the need for change 
and the value of the new procedures. In Pennsylvania, the Bureau of Correction contracted the 
services of a private, correctional consultant to evaluate their current system, design a 
replacement and convince lower level staff of its advantages. Sometimes, scandals involving the 
prisons cleared away a lot of resistance to new reforms. The New South Wales Department of 
Corrective Services, for instance, adopted a new classification system after series of escapes, 
violent crimes and assaults in prisons and corruption scandals implicated the entire 
classification system. 
Concomitant to this shift, the circulation of classification knowledge increased over 
many parts of the world through a flurry of conferences, publications, study tours, institutional 
exchanges and evaluations. As the events in New South Wales and Pennsylvania will 
demonstrate, penal officials, independent investigators and activists canvassed classification 
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systems and associated prisoner management techniques in other jurisdictions in an effort to 
address local problems of prison order and to resolve or prevent scandals. This comparative 
work by actors themselves entailed situating local penal practices in a wider field of 
international practice and knowledge, which highlighted how modern a jurisdiction’s practices 
were in relation to other states. Just as important as how this knowledge circulated was how 
actors, whether they were penal officials or prisoners, perceived the field of political conflict in 
other jurisdictions. Scandals, for instance, were significant not only in how they discredited 
local practices and set the stage for learning from abroad. They also created points of 
comparison among jurisdictions. Thus, prison scandals, riots, inquiries and litigation produced 
knowledge as much as they tarnished it and created opportunities for its circulation.    
Nevertheless, the production and flow of classification knowledge was deeply 
asymmetrical. Unsurprisingly well-funded, research-intensive penal bureaucracies 
disproportionately influenced trends in many different parts of the world, and knowledge 




generations of penological discourse and practice.1516 The United States Bureau of Prisons and 
the National Institute of Corrections (both administratively within the U.S. Department of 
Justice) and Her Majesty’s Prison Service and other sub-agencies within the British Home Office 
conducted, sponsored, and disseminated the results of a wide array of research projects, pilot 
programs, and investigations of practices in their own immediate settings and elsewhere.1517 
Experts from these agencies also consulted with practitioners and penal bureaucracies from 
different jurisdictions and provided outside expert testimony at numerous inquiries. In 
addition, a growing body of private consultants, often researchers and former employees of 
correctional agencies, also rose to prominence at this time, selling their services and products 
to multiple penal agencies. One such private consultant, the Correctional Services Group, 
figured prominently in the reformation of classification procedures in Pennsylvania, several 
other American states and in other countries.  
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Beyond the larger political conflicts in state governing that structured these interactions, 
the new classification knowledge itself had certain qualities that facilitated its movement. 
Classification was, of course, an inherently comparative practice; people engaged in it 
articulated similarities and differences among people and penal spaces. Researchers and 
practitioners were well aware of the difficulties in comparison and sorting, nevertheless, they 
invested heavily in the intellectual assumptions of this work and were quite accustomed to the 
practice of finding similarities, weighing differences, translating seemingly incommensurate 
qualities and deciding when differences undermined homogenous groupings.1518 Much of the 
literature on inmate classification and criminal types assumed an audience attuned to this kind 
of reasoning. If classification deployed such reasoning in institutional forms and tools, these 
practices themselves could be compared, translated and grouped. The classificatory vision was 
broad in this sense; its advocates sought large fields of objects if only to better organize them 
into relationships among smaller units.  
Yet, penal classification was also narrow in another sense. It recognized, measured, and 
sorted a narrow range of relevant attributes. In practice, there were always far more 
characteristics of individual offenders that classification personnel simply ignored or did not 
formally factor into their decisions—at least most of time. Likewise, since almost all the 
relevant classification attributes were individual personal characteristics (or framed as such), 
prison staff left questions about contexts, situations and cultural variations largely 
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unexplored.1519 This manifestation of methodological individualism meant that classification 
knowledge could plausibly be applied to many different offenders in different contexts without 
raising many vexing questions, at least at first.1520 These practices could also hide such 
questions if they presented potential legal liabilities as they would have for clear instances of 
racial discrimination in the United States.1521 As scholars Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star have 
argued, political or legal vulnerabilities often fundamentally affect the manner in which people 
select and retain information in classification systems, but this history is also often obscured in 
the way classification works.1522 If only a narrow range of information is relevant for a 
classification system to be useful, then these systems and their practitioners must also erase 
much of their own history of production. Since the developers of such practices intended them 
as a general method, not necessarily tied to any specific location, they created less (obvious) 
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friction when they moved from jurisdiction to jurisdiction within the “transnational epistemic 
community” of penologists.1523  
Nevertheless, these techniques did not always fit in acceptable ways. They were often 
flexible enough to accommodate local needs. Actors adapted general templates derived from 
elsewhere to fit their needs, which themselves expanded over time. Once in place, new 
classification systems addressed a range of more particular problems unique to certain 
locations and junctures.1524 In other cases, the fit or lack of it was more controversial. The 
friction that appeared when the field of actors interested in classification expanded to include 
non-specialists in many ways pointed to the significance of the (productive) silences in the 
production of classification that underwrote the normal operation of these practices. This was 
not just because the rationale for certain classification schemes or categories were confusing or 
unknown to a wider field of actors. Considering only the formal classification systems distracts 
from the authority and social role of penal experts in the reconfiguration of penal relations. In 
Bruce Lincoln’s words, it: 
obscures the fact that all knowers are themselves objects of knowledge as well 
as subjects insofar as they cannot and do not stand apart from the world that 
they seek to know. One consequence of this (and far from the least important) is 
that categorizers come to be categorized according to their own categories. 
Taxonomy is thus not only a means for organizing information, but also—as it 
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comes to organize the organizers—an instrument for the classification and 
manipulation of society, something that is particularly facilitated by the fashion 
in which taxonomic trees and binary oppositions can conveniently recode social 
hierarchies.1525 
 
These social hierarchies included those organized around penal authority, expertise and 
citizenship. The specialization of inmate classification, which accelerated in the mid-twentieth 
century, created ever more cohesive networks of specialists—penologists, researchers and 
administrators—who produced and exchanged knowledge. These networks facilitated 
comparisons of practices across jurisdictions, but also created difficulties for those who thought 
they could easily adapted certain practices from elsewhere to their own situation. By the mid-
1970s, the increasingly public and contentious nature of prison issues propelled the reform and 
circulation of penal classification knowledge, but simultaneously brought the penal expertise it 
relied on into question as more people began to engage with these practices and challenge 
many of its assumptions. 
The Development of Twentieth-Century Inmate Classification and the Therapeutic Model of 
Rehabilitation 
 
The classification practices that fell into crisis in the 1970s formed a central part of the 
therapeutic model of imprisonment that held sway within penology during much of the 
postwar period, but they direct antecedents stretching back decades. Many of the programs 
and innovations created during these earlier decades left institutional arrangements and 
techniques that remained central to subsequent periods even if their initial justifications and 
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rationales had faded. This sediment of carceral practices and tools both enabled the 
development of therapeutic rehabilitation and at times inhibited its growth in different 
directions. In this section, I trace the development of these practices in New South Wales and 
Pennsylvania over a long period of time, highlighting the concretion of classification practices in 
successive instances of implementation and transformation.  
However, I first need to qualify the term “classification” for these purposes. As I am 
using it here, classification refers broadly to the practice of productively arranging, dividing and 
sorting penal space and groups of prisoners and staff as a means of control, management and 
knowledge production. It is necessary to establish how I am using classification since the term is 
currently invested with psychological reasoning that was not as salient in earlier iterations of 
these practices. Prison reformers in the early nineteenth century rarely used this term to 
describe their methods of sorting and control, preferring instead the term “separation.” Since 
my goal is to establish the historical and epistemological depth of penal classification, I have 
chosen to paint with a rather broad brush in exploring these various iterations. Many of the 
examples I describe occasioned disputes and resistance within the penal bureaucracies. Many – 
perhaps most – prison staff (like guards) rejected the claims of some of the experts who 
engaged in this kind of work, preferring instead their own assessments of who a particular 
prisoner was and how they should be managed.  
As a number of historians have argued, a form of classification figured prominently in 
the first few generations of penal reform in Europe and the early America republic. This was 
especially apparent in Pennsylvania, where a group of reformers, led by Quakers, developed a 




impressionable offenders and women, needed to be sequestered from hardened, adult, male 
criminals.1526 The Quakers’ position eventually evolved into a preference for complete 
separation of all prisoners into individual cells. Historian Michael Meranze argues that the 
solitary confinement regime at the Eastern State Penitentiary demonstrated the most extreme 
statement of this penal philosophy of containing the power of “mimetic corruption.”1527 Some 
politicians and influential people in Pennsylvania opposed this regime, but its main challenge 
came from reformers in New York who established a system of cellular separation of prisoners 
at night with congregate labor and meals during the day at Auburn Penitentiary.1528 While this 
disagreement was heated at the time, both practices rested on a notion of the most 
appropriate way to separate offenders for the purposes of control and redemption.   
By the mid-nineteenth century, most prisons in the United States adopted the Auburn 
model, but the Pennsylvania became much more influential abroad, along with Britain’s 
Millbank Penitentiary and later Pentonville Penitentiary.1529 While retaining these forms of 
separation, prison reformers began using the term “classification” to describe an incentive 
method of managing prisoners based on progressively granting them more privileges. From the 
mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, prison staff used systems like this to 
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encourage good behavior, punish deviance and, for some, facilitate reform. Zebulon Brockway, 
an innovative prison governor who served in Michigan and New York, was the foremost 
advocate of the this system in the United States, but he derived his reformatory model from 
similar practices in Ireland and Alexander Machonochie’s use of the “marks system” at Norfolk 
Island, a small penal colony administered by New South Wales.1530  
By the 1890s, prison administrators began placing greater emphasis on differentiating 
inmates into various custody or treatment groups upon arrival based more on the innate or 
unique characteristics of the inmate. Many prisons still used some system of progressive stages 
for managing inmates, which prison reformers referred to as “vertical classification,” but they 
invested more effort in refining new “horizontal classification” techniques for the initial process 
of separating new prisoners.1531 In the subsequent three decades, both New South Wales and 
Pennsylvania constructed several new prisons and a series of penal farms and afforestation 
camps at this time, which penal bureaucracies in each state intended to serve specific 
categories of inmates, such as youthful adult offenders, women, reformable non-recidivists, or 
inmates close to the expiration of their sentence. The establishment of these new prisons 
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permitted penal authorities in each state to further concentrate male adult inmates, especially 
recidivists or those convicted of serious violent crime, into the older, secure prisons.  
After taking a long study tour of penal systems in other parts of the world, Frederick 
Neitenstein, the reformist Comptroller-General of Prisons in New South Wales, oversaw a 
project that further refined a loose classification all of the state’s prisons according to the type 
of inmate to be held.1532 Neitenstein and his associates derived the categories in this project 
from a number of sources, including earlier principles of separation and the penal code. 
Goulburn Gaol, for instance, exclusively housed first offenders after this reorganization.1533 
They cohered as a group based largely on police detection, judicial conviction and their first 
sentence of imprisonment. However, Neitenstein’s reforms also included classification criteria 
based more on the individual, deviant qualities of the offender. In this, one can begin to see the 
influence of the burgeoning social and psychological sciences as penal authorities attempted to 
describe and theorize the innate characteristics of some inmates.1534 Parramatta Gaol held 
confirmed habitual criminals and there were also attempts to identify “alcoholics” and “feeble 
minded” inmates, which also included “sexual perverts.”1535 Neitenstein hoped to remove some 
of these categories of offenders to other institutions, like hospitals and asylums, but he was 
also interested in further differentiating the populations within individual prisons. The 
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categories for this latter practice, such as disposition, were more ambiguous and subject to 
variations in practice among the institutions.1536  
Regardless of the different bases of these categories, the primary rationales unifying 
them was security and good management; reform came a distant third. Custodial concerns, like 
the availability of cell space, transportation costs, staffing levels, preventing possible disorder, 
or simply dislike of a particular inmate, often determined inmate placement. Even when prison 
authorities differentiated inmates according to psychological criteria, they did so less for the 
purposes of treatment and more often as a way to contain inmates with difficult behavior or to 
uncover deception by others trying to avoid prison discipline and labor.1537 At this point, the 
state did not have a standard centralized body for making such decisions. The deputy-governor 
of a prison was often charged with making inmate placement and work assignments for 
incoming prisoners. However, since most inmates came from the Sydney area, the prisons at 
the Long Bay complex served as a de facto reception and classification center. 
As in New South Wales, inmate classification in Pennsylvania mainly involved the 
practice of grading the various prisons to accommodate broad groupings of inmates based on 
criteria such as age, sex, institutional behavior, and the place of conviction. The new prison built 
at Huntington in 1889, for example, held youthful adult offenders and was modeled on Zebulon 
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Brockway’s Elmira Reformatory regime in New York.1538 The State Industrial Home for Women 
at Muncy opened in 1920 and remained the state’s only prison for female offenders for 
decades.1539 In general, adult male inmates were either held in the Western Penitentiary in 
Pittsburgh or the Eastern Penitentiary in Philadelphia based on where they were tried and 
convicted. After 1915, the Western Penitentiary also operated a satellite institution, Rockview 
Penitentiary, for medium security inmates, and Graterford Penitentiary performed a similar 
function for the Eastern Penitentiary after 1929.1540 
Gradually, new methods of differentiating inmates began to appear within the prisons in 
the early twentieth century that relied more on psychology and psychiatry. Some prison 
reformers sought to use these new forms of expertise to identify insanity among prisoners and 
eventually remove them from the prisons. The insane offender was not new to penal 
authorities, but most officials believed that insane offenders simply could not be reformed and 
that their presence within prisons hindered the development of new regimes and practices 
designed to transform the behavior of otherwise normal offenders. Historian Stephen Garton 
noted that Comptroller-General Neitenstein’s plans for penal reform and prison grading hinged 
on the removal of numerous different classes of mentally ill inmates from prisons.1541 By the 
1930, state hospitals in New South Wales held many offenders who would have been in the 
state’s prisons a few decades earlier.1542 The 1912 opening of the Farview State Hospital for the 
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Criminally Insane in Pennsylvania also provided authorities in that state with a new option for 
dealing with mentally ill inmates.1543 While agencies other than the penal bureaucracy 
administered hospitals for insane convicts, small observation units at some prisons monitored 
inmates behaving erratically, often holding them until they could be transferred to state 
hospitals.1544 
Prison authorities in both states created psychiatric or psychological clinics in some of 
the larger state prisons in the 1920s and 1930s. These units often dealt with inmates who either 
could not adapt to prison routines or those who ran afoul of prison staff who suspected them of 
having psychological problems that could not be resolved through normal disciplinary practices. 
In some cases, these units aided nascent parole authorities in screening prisoners for release. 
Courts also often consulted with professional staff at these clinics to aid in sentencing specific 
offenders. Prison authorities usually hired professional staff for these units under part-time 
contracts. This relationship stabilized over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, but penal 
authorities rarely employed full-time professionals of this kind.1545 The Western State 
Penitentiary in Pittsburgh was likely an exception to this general practice. The Osborne Society, 
which surveyed all the prisons in the United States for several editions of its Handbook of 
American Prisons and Reformatories, stated that the psychiatric clinic at the Western State 
Penitentiary was “one of the few large prisons in the country in which the facilities for case 
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work have been developed.”1546 In addition to aiding in practical management decisions 
concerning disturbed or difficult inmates, this clinic also conducted research on offender 
typologies for the state’s parole board.1547 
These small social science inroads into the prisons laid the basis for more ambitious 
efforts to establish this form of expertise in prison regimes in subsequent decades. The 
advocates of these reforms, well-educated, middle class, professional social scientists and 
prison administrators, believed that the success of their prison reform project also depended 
on wide-spread intellectual exchange and experimentation. Much like other areas of social 
policy at this time, the prison reform movement developed transnationally around the shared 
problems of industrialization and rapid social change.1548 Historians Martina Henze and Nir 
Shafir have both argued that this movement, which dated to the late-eighteenth century, 
stabilized and professionalized during the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries with 
national and global connections through numerous organizations, conferences, publications 
and correspondence relationships overlapping and thickening.1549 National organizations, like 
the National Prison Association (forerunner to the American Correctional Association), and 
international organizations, like the International Penitentiary Commission, facilitated the 
diffusion of ideas, problem constructions and practices and established professional 
connections among prison staff from different jurisdictions.1550 
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While many participants in these networks lamented the inadequacy of current 
methods for reforming inmates, the lack of resources, or implementation failures, they rarely 
questioned the value of developing classification procedures, which they saw as a crucial pivot 
for numerous other reforms and plans. The knowledge about offenders, how to classify them 
and control them, produced in the nascent clinics of some prisons, found audiences in many 
parts of the world thorough these professional networks and their publications. Participants in 
these networks hoped that the initial social science excursions into prisons would become an 
entry point for expanding classification to all inmates. In addition to aiding prison management, 
the diagnostic procedures used to identify serious mental illness could, if expanded and applied 
to all incoming inmates, become the vehicle for building a much greater knowledge base about 
criminal offenders and how best to deal with them in custody.  
Actually instituting such plans proved far more difficult. Most wardens, their deputies 
and lower level prison staff, especially guards, often resented the presence of educated, 
middle-class reformers who usually had less direct experience interacting and managing 
prisoners. Many of these prison workers also simply opposed the views of these reformers and 
felt they were better able to discern relevant differences among inmates. During the early-
twentieth century, however, this conflict remained relatively muted; classification and the few 
social science experts who worked in prisons usually prioritized security concerns, which other 
staff shared, and their actual presence and influence in prison operations was meager at best. 
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Even in institutions like Western Penitentiary with its well-developed clinic, the deputy-warden 
made assignment decisions based almost exclusively on security needs and the ability to work. 
The United States Bureau of Prisons, which was far smaller than many state systems in the 
1930s, became a leader in developing classification procedures as well as finding ways to 
incorporate prison staff in the process in an effort to mitigate the power struggles these 
reforms often entailed.1551  
Advocates of classification also envisioned their reforms as being comprehensive, 
affecting and integrating all prisons within a specific jurisdiction. While such reforms could have 
provided a centripetal force within penal agencies, the reformers’ plans also presumed a 
significant degree of prior, institutional centralization that did not exist in most jurisdictions. 
This was especially the case in Pennsylvania. Unlike its neighbors, New Jersey and New York, 
Pennsylvania’s penal apparatus had a reputation in penology circles for being deeply 
fragmented.1552 In most respects, the prisons were largely independent and isolated from each 
other and its ineffectual central office. This arrangement even made it difficult to transfer 
inmates between institutions, with widely divergent practices and policies. Although, this 
practice did occur with particularly difficult prisoners.1553  
After Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary experienced several disturbances in 
1933 and 1934, an investigating commission recommended conducting a classification study of 
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all inmates in the state, starting with Eastern State and its newly-opened, satellite institution to 
the north, Graterford Penitentiary.1554 The commission members believed that this would 
enhance the ability of prison authorities to isolate troublesome prisoners in the eastern part of 
Pennsylvania at Eastern State and use Graterford as a medium security prison for less difficult 
inmates. In general, this arrangement already existed, but the commission felt that it could be 
improved significantly by a thorough classification program. However, they claimed that such a 
project could only be undertaken by a new, cabinet-level Department of Corrections, which 
would ensure a greater uniformity throughout the state’s prisons.1555 In addition to new 
authorizing legislation, the commission members believed uniform classification practices 
would provide an excellent vehicle for achieving bureaucratic integration. The General 
Assembly did not pass such legislation, but system-wide classification gradually developed over 
the next ten years. 
The prisons in New South Wales were already more functionally integrated than their 
counterparts in Pennsylvania in the 1930s. This was in part due to New South Wales’s particular 
history as a penal colony. The colony’s authorities originally developed a far more centralized 
state bureaucracy to control and manage convicts, which effected the entire state in general, 
but it was especially apparent in the clear hierarchy of the police and penal apparatus.1556 
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Nevertheless, the governors of each prison had wide latitude in enforcing discipline and 
developing local policies. Despite this, the state’s prison classification program remained largely 
based on the reforms of Comptroller-General Neitenstein and his immediate successors. 
Certain institutions further developed classification procedures. Long Bay Gaol, for example, 
began operating a psychological laboratory similar to the one in Pennsylvania’s Western 
Penitentiary in 1929 and had already instituted some psychological testing after its use on 
military recruits during World War I.1557   
As a number of scholars have noted, the Great Depression and World War II 
fundamentally disrupted established prison practices in numerous parts of world, but these 
events also created further openings for the social sciences and their experts.1558 It was 
apparent to many correctional officials by the mid-1930s, that ambitious plans for a self-
sufficient prison industry were doomed. Prison industries had always generated enormous 
resistance from free workers and organized labor, but this became critical during the massive 
unemployment of the 1930s.1559 Many jurisdictions passed legislation severely restricting the 
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use of prison labor and prison-made products.1560 In addition, most prison industries involved 
low-value added, basic manufacturing or agriculture that increasingly could not compete with 
most free world equivalents. The skill sets taught to inmates in prison industries and those 
required in the private market diverged significantly as prison labor became increasing less 
relevant to the nature of work outside.1561 Few governments could afford to subsidize 
industries or provide additional work for prisoners during the Depression.  
Consequently, prison regimes organized around the availability of labor fell into crisis 
with most prisoners idled as work disappeared. A national survey of prisons conducted by the 
U.S. Attorney-General in 1939 and 1940 concluded that:  
 
From a place of domination in prison programs, prison industries have gone to 
the other extreme where idleness due to their absence is the outstanding 
feature of prison life in sixty-six prisons and a major problem in all but six. The 
industrial prison as such exists in only a few places. In its stead is developing a 
prison in which industry will play only one part, although an important one, in 
the daily program.1562 
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In the absence of work, prison staff often accommodated the growth of illicit economies run by 
groups of powerful prisoners, who in turn colluded with the authorities in maintaining 
institutional order.1563 Many administrators considered these types of arrangements, which 
appear to have been widespread, as temporary adjustments, needed to maintain order, but 
they actively worked against the interference of the rival source of authority represented by 
social science experts and their methods. Many of these latter reformers, who were active in 
organizations like the American Prison Association and the International Penal and Penitentiary 
Commission, promoted even greater departures from previous prison regimes. They advocated 
the greater use of education and individualized case work, believing that industry would never 
return to its pre-depression levels. Work would become more of a supplement to these other 
programs focused much less on producing a profit or self-sufficiency and more on trade training 
or simply teaching industrious habits.1564  
Classification was a central aspect in many of these new plans. The reconstitution of 
prison order after World War II and the renewal of rehabilitation rested not only on the new 
array of services and programs, like education, but crucially on properly identifying and sorting 
inmates to match them with the programs and variable custody levels. Classification and the 
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case histories it produced also provided a way to further integrate parole and other forms of 
discretionary release and earned time reductions into prison regimes. Many reformers also saw 
in enhanced classification a means to contain the influence of truly dangerous prisoners and 
reduce the influence of pervasive, anti-institutional, prison subcultures. 
In the 1940s and early 1950s, prison authorities in several American and Australian 
jurisdictions began hiring or contracting more professional social scientists and academics to 
evaluate prisoners concerning their behavior, prospects for reform or parole consideration, 
possible work assignments, education, and transfer to different institutions.1565 This 
phenomenon paralleled the broader growth and increased legitimacy of social science expertise 
after World War II, apparent in both the United States and Australia.1566 Yet, these reforms did 
not appear in many jurisdictions until after a series of investigations, unrest, and riots as well as 
more protracted attempts by prison staff to reassert custodial authority over powerful groups 
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of prisoners. In the 1950s, penal authorities in many jurisdiction began investing heavily in the 
promise of a reconstituted reform project based on work, classification and individual 
treatment plans. Even the many jurisdictions that never bought into the claims of therapeutic 
rehabilitation, nevertheless, adopted classification procedures.1567 
Classification in these projects was always multivalent, serving several different 
purposes at the same time. Early forms of classification had largely prioritized custodial and 
management concerns. This continued to be the primary concern in classificatory practices 
after World War II. However, the emerging therapeutic model of rehabilitation, which of 
course, had numerous different permutations across jurisdictions and time, also began to make 
deep inroads on the classification practices. This articulation of classification with treatment 
was ascendant in prison reform circles and provided a coherent penal philosophy for 
bureaucratic reorganization and consolidation, which affected both the Bureau of Correction in 
Pennsylvania and the Department of Prisons in New South Wales.1568 Yet, as with many other 
aspects of imprisonment during this period, the competition between treatment and custody 
personnel ran throughout classification practices.  
In the early 1950s, prison bureaucracies in both New South Wales and Pennsylvania 
created formal classification committees which became an institutional meeting point for 
treatment and custodial staff. The similarity of these reforms and their timing was, of course, 
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not isolated to these two jurisdictions. Numerous jurisdictions (national and subnational) 
adopted analogous practices as well with many experts and practitioners engaging in study 
tours of other jurisdictions, obtaining research material from elsewhere, and attending 
international and regional penology and related social science conferences. Leslie Nott, the 
New South Wales Comptroller-General of Prisons, travelled to the United States and the United 
Kingdom in 1947 for the expressed purpose of inspecting foreign penal systems to aid in the 
overhaul of prison operations in New South Wales.1569 After Nott’s overseas study tours, the 
Department of Prisons established the first classification committee in 1950, which included 
social scientists among others. It was to evaluate all newly admitted prisoners at a reception 
prison in the Long Bay complex, near Sydney.1570 A major riot at the Western Penitentiary in 
Pittsburgh in 1952 led to an investigation, which included two penologists from different states 
(Illinois and Wisconsin), that recommended the reorganization of the prison system and the 
establishment of formal classification committees at two reception centers in Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh.1571 
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Many of the specific aspects and rituals of the postwar classification process appeared 
in many different jurisdictions.1572 The administration of standardized tests (intelligence, 
psychological, educational, and vocational) and the collection of criminal, institutional and work 
histories, for instance, was standard protocol in Pennsylvania, New South Wales and a host of 
other places. A classification committee composed of representatives of different areas of 
correctional employment (psychologists, industries officer, custodial officer, chaplain, senior 
officer/deputy superintendent) evaluated the resultant data and presented their views of an 
inmate’s case. They then solicited further information from an inmate during a formal interview 
before the committee.1573 This process, thus, drew on both standardized testing and the 
accumulated experience of a variety of different correctional workers. This was time consuming 
process and there were no clear guidelines to follow. Nor was there a way to ensure that the 
relevant classification criteria would be weighed the same for each inmate. In practice, the 
primary determinate of placement and treatment plans was still security; inmates who the 
committee determined to be the riskiest, usually based on their criminal history, often could 
not access the new programs and training opportunities because of their placement in high 
security institutions. 
During the 1960s, the American federal judiciary began to intervene in prison matters, 
reversing decades of deference to prison authorities on issues that the courts previously 
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considered to be internal administrative prerogatives.1574 Many of the early cases came at the 
behest of imprisoned members of the Nation of Islam, who argued that prison authorities 
violated their religious freedom and free speech.1575 By the late 1960s, however, cases involving 
the violations of due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
touched upon whether inmates had certain due process rights attendant to formal decision-
making by prison staff, which directly affected a prisoner’s life and well-being. Imprisoned 
people challenged their captors on decisions to segregate them, exclude them from certain 
programs, transfer them and how they adjudicated internal disciplinary hearings.1576 Decisions 
such as these always involved classification or program review committees and prisoners soon 
challenged the basic evaluations these committee produced, which dramatically affected how a 
person would be treated in prison and where they would be placed. The courts largely granted 
prison authorities wide latitude in classification decisions and denied that inmates had due 
process rights in this process. 
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However, the willingness of courts to also hear cases alleging “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” according to the Eighth Amendment, meant that a multitude of routine prison 
practices and conditions came under direct scrutiny. These cases, often referred to as “totality 
of conditions” cases, indicted the practices and living conditions of entire prison systems as 
tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment.1577 These cases came in two waves. The first 
occurred at the very end of the 1960s and lasted through the first few years of the 1970s.1578 
These cases challenged the constitutionality of entire state prison systems based on 
widespread overcrowding, lack of meaningful opportunities for rehabilitation, education, and 
recreational, violence between inmates and between inmates and guards, arbitrary discipline, 
and arbitrary work and housing assignments. The resolutions of these cases often led to the 
judicial appointment of special masters, persons or committees charged with making sure that 
prison officials carried out court ordered reform. In this sense, the judiciary, though nominally 
outside of normal prison operations, began to exert a great deal of influence in the direct, daily 
routines of prison life. 
While classification per se was rarely the subject of “totality of conditions” litigation, the 
courts argued that comprehensive classification systems were the best vehicle for reforming 
poor prison conditions because they provided a systematic way to separate violent predatory 
inmates from the vulnerable, provide programs, education, and medical and mental health 
services to those in need, and reduce overcrowding and the excessive use of maximum security 
                                                          
1577 The first case fitting this description was Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.  825 (1969). Although it did not specifically 
mention or consider classification, the court determined that imprisonment in Arkansas state prisons constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
1578 Phillip J. Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District Court Judges and State and Local Officials (New York: 




placements.1579 In some instances, the courts felt that the lack of such a comprehensive 
classification system contributed to the problems that were the basis of the suits. As a result, 
those tasked with carrying out the courts’ orders, whether state prison authorities or special 
masters, spent a considerable amount of resources creating or drastically refashioning 
classification systems, a process which also became fraught with political disagreements.1580  
The second wave picked up in the late 1970s and largely involved new prisons 
experiencing overcrowding.1581 Many of the earlier totality of conditions cases concerned much 
older prisons, including some nineteenth-century facilities. These latter cases became more 
frequent as overcrowding reached unprecedented levels in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
While courts, legislators and prison officials considered numerous methods to address 
overcrowding by diverting convicted offenders away from prisons, once they decided to confine 
a person, formal classification systems were the only available mechanism for allocating scarce 
prison space, and they played a central role in evaluating candidates for early release schemes. 
This meant that courts scrutinized classification procedures and often found them wanting. 
Even latter cases that did not involve direct orders to implement new classification systems, 
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nevertheless involved remedies that presupposed the managerial capacity provided by 
comprehensive classification systems.1582  
At the beginning of the 1980s, a little over a decade’s worth of court rulings highlighted 
classification as a major area of judicial concern. Its systematic nature, which touched upon 
nearly all facets of prison organization and routines, meant that court intervention over other 
matters would often end up considering classification decision-making and related practices, 
like segregation. Several rulings that declared some states’ entire prison systems 
unconstitutional focused on how a revised or newly created classification system could provide 
the primary way to eventually bring the prison system back into constitutional compliance.1583  
The passage of the federal Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) in 1980 
added additional weight to these ruling. Prior to this law, the Department of Justice could only 
join cases that had been filed by others. In most cases, the original petitioner in such cases 
were impoverished prisoners who occasionally gained assistance from activist lawyers and 
organizations like the NAACP and ACLU. Even in the best of circumstances, these litigation 
projects lacked adequate resources. After the passage of CRIPA, the federal Department of 
Justice could initiate actions against prison systems for unconstitutional conditions on its 
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own.1584 This meant that meritorious cases that might have never been brought to court due to 
lack of funds or other resources by prisoners and their allies could now be initiated and funded 
by the Department of Justice.1585 This provided the federal government with a powerful legal 
tool for using the courts to develop and enforce compliance with a new set of national 
standards for prison conditions. With the prospect of greater outside scrutiny by the federal 
judiciary and attorneys-general, prison systems had an enormous incentive to revisit how they 
classified inmates and how they could alleviate unconstitutional practices through the 
classification system.  
Ironically, the expert knowledge and deliberative decision-making that animated the 
postwar reform of classification became several decades later its main source of vulnerability to 
judicial intervention. Courts acknowledged that prison authorities had the right to classify 
prisoners, and they did not extend due process rights to inmates for classification decisions. 
However, classification practices often appeared arbitrary; classification committees gave little 
or no justification for their decisions and often failed to apply criteria equally across all cases. 
The subjective aspects of expert decision-making—once touted at this practice’s best feature—
now appeared too loose, biased and arbitrary. Classification practices also lacked any 
accountability mechanisms. The unchecked discretion enjoyed by both custodial staff and 
positivistic social scientists on classification committees worried the judiciary.    
 Penological experts were also concerned about classification, but for them it was only a 
minor part of much more pervasive doubts about the purposes and effectiveness of the entire 
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postwar project of therapeutic rehabilitation. While much of the growing rejection of 
rehabilitation centered on specific programs and interventions, like group counseling programs, 
some practitioners also targeted classification practices because they were the basis of 
treatment plans and the mechanism for allocating people and resources toward or away from 
specific programs. Even with the other purposes served by classification, the current practices 
could not escape association with the therapeutic discourse and assumptions nurtured over 
several decades.  
Despite the decline of rehabilitation during the 1970s, classification practices underwent 
a renewal with many of its other functions becoming more salient. The main title of a 1982 
volume published by the American Correctional Association summarized this shift: Classification 
as a Management Tool.1586 The lead essay in the volume, by Larry Solomon and S. Christopher 
Baird, emphasized that previous classification practices were often too esoteric or useless for 
most correctional staff.1587 The classification process generated increasingly complex research 
data about offenders, but such findings were either not utilized or became more like social 
science window-dressing for what were security-based decisions, usually made by senior 
custodial officers serving on classification committees.1588 This reality meant, according to the 
authors, that many prison systems underutilized classification systems and thereby ignored 
how beneficial they could be, especially if they were revised. Solomon and Baird were 
unequivocal in their view: “Corrections must recognize that classification is first and foremost a 
management tool.”1589  
Whether the area of concern was security, budgeting, resource allocation, judicial and 
constitutional compliance or treatment, the major function of classification was to properly sort 
inmates in the most efficient, optimal way in relation to institutional capacities. This had 
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arguably always been a major aspect of classification, but researchers and practitioners 
explicitly stated it now and relegated treatment effectiveness to a secondary concern.1590 As 
Solomon and Baird indicated, this meant that classification needed to be simplified to better 
serve the complex array of different needs and areas of concern in prisons. The cover of the 
Classification as a Management Tool volume reflected this new orientation as a return to a 
basicn sorting exercise (See Figure 14 below). 
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Figure 14: Classification as basic sorting 
Figure 14. Image of basic sorting on the cover of American Correctional Association Classification as a 






This new managerial orientation in penal classification held out the hope that some of 
the longstanding tools of reformative imprisonment could be transformed to address 
contemporary problems of overcrowding, resource scarcity, judicial scrutiny and violence 
among prisoners. As such, it became a recurrent item on lists of reform recommendations 
produced by courts, independent inquires, internal assessments and expert consultants.  
The Construction of Objective Classification in Pennsylvania 
  
The creation of a new classification system in Pennsylvania between 1981 and 1983 
must be understood in relation to these broader political trends, but also in how they related to 
specific changes and scandals affecting criminal justice in Pennsylvania. While the U.S. federal 
courts had not explicitly objected to clinical methods of prediction and classification, with their 
emphasis on professional judgment and deliberation, they reigned in similar reasoning in other 
institutional settings, especially in relation to institutionalization for mental illness. This critique 
of professional discretion was much broader, however, and was not the exclusive purview of 
the federal courts. It encompassed other areas of criminal justice, especially in the areas of 
sentencing and judicial discretion.1591 In the late 1970s, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly 
passed legislation creating a sentencing commission to craft sentencing guidelines designed to 
reign in the wide range of judicial sentencing patterns.1592 The state’s major dailies often 
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published articles highlighting sentencing discrepancies between different judges and courts 
involving ostensibly the same types of crimes.1593 It appeared from these critiques that 
sentencing differences could be explained by where a person was convicted and sentenced; the 
notion of a geography of sentence severity and leniency sat uneasily with an expectation of 
uniform law enforcement. Between 1978 and 1982, the Pennsylvania Commission on 
Sentencing drafted two different sets of guidelines in an attempt to create more sentencing 
uniformity before gaining legislative approval.1594 Gov. Dick Thornburgh’s mandatory minimum 
sentencing bill addressed this issue as well, but in a more focused and punitive manner. 1595 
Discretionary authority in the state’s parole system also came under fire from legislators 
and Thornburgh. The governor repeatedly attempted to abolish the entire parole board, citing 
its inconsistent decision-making, reclusiveness, and unaccountability before the public. He 
wanted to retain post-release supervision and establish a “good time” incentive system for 
prisoners to earn much smaller sentence reductions.1596 Although, the parole board survived 
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Thornburgh’s campaign, the issue of discretion and accountability framed the debate and 
parole eligibility was tightened.1597 Gov. Thornburgh also publicly highlighted his decision to 
restrict his use of the governor’s pardoning and commutation power, which was a substantial 
departure from past governors.1598 Thornburgh’s immediate predecessor, Milton Shapp, 
granted 525 pardon requests for sentences of life or lesser terms. Thornburgh in contrast only 
granted fifteen by the end of his time in office.1599 Again, the governor’s public reasoning was 
that the exercise of this authority directly conflicted with the court’s decisions. 
While many life-sentenced prisoners and some progressive penal reformers objected to 
Thornburgh’s position on pardons and commutations, they and many other prisoners 
welcomed the curtailment of parole. For decades prisoners had complained about the 
seemingly arbitrary, capricious decisions of parole authorities who never explained the 
reasoning behind their decisions. Prisoners, with enormous amount of time on their hands, 
routinely swapped and compared stories success and failure before the parole board. The 
frustration this exercise of discretionary power engendered among prisoners was palpable to 
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anyone who investigated the nature of prisoner grievances.1600 Reform or the complete 
elimination of parole was, therefore, a shared position in the governor’s office and the prison 
cell. It animated conservative and radical critiques of the prisons, if for widely different reasons: 
conservatives believed parole was too lenient and radicals felt it was authoritarian.   
Even if it was not as visible as other major political issues of the day, the problems with 
structured decision-making, discretionary authority and the efforts to eliminate them or 
became a broad political theme and reform program that permeated various others areas of 
public administration as well.1601 In some ways, this widespread effort to tame discretion 
constituted an attack on the form of regulatory power invested in numerous public agencies 
since the 1930s, prior to the more explicit efforts to deregulate the economy and rollback 
public services in the 1980s. In many instances, these efforts overlapped and involved many of 
the same public figures, notably in this case, Dick Thornburgh. However, in the 1970s, assaults 
on discretionary authority also became a way to attack other practices, some of which long 
predated the administrative governance strategies of mid-century liberalism. In Pennsylvania, 
this took the form of multiple efforts to eliminate patronage appointments from state and local 
government. 
Pennsylvania was unusual in the 1970s compared to many other states in the country on 
the issue of political patronage. Much of the postwar period witnessed the steady decline of 
such appointment power, but the state’s governor controlled over 22,000 positions as late as 
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the mid-1960s.1602 The passage of collective bargaining rights to public employees severely 
curtailed the number of patronage jobs, but Gov. Milton Shapp still controlled about 4,000 
appointments in 1972. Despite this decline, the leaders of the state’s Democratic and 
Republican Parties were slow to adapt and replace patronage with regard to how they 
managed their parties, built coalitions and governed the state. Many party loyalists still 
believed that governors had access to more positions than was the case after the mid-1970s, 
and they wrote to incoming executives, asking for employment. Newspapers accounts of 
patronage politics during the Shapp (1971-1979) and Thornburgh administrations (1979-1987) 
are interesting partly for their silence about the shifting nature of politics and governing in the 
state.1603 Invective denunciations of machine-style politics, which were commonplace in state 
political coverage, often failed to fully appreciate the significance of how the rapid decline in 
patronage was actually undermining this very governing strategy, making it a far less effective 
political tool by the mid-1970s.  
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As patronage declined, however, accounts and incidents of “corruption” became much 
more visible and widely covered in the press.1604 This is a crucial background for understanding 
the appeal of state and local efforts to eliminate discretionary authority in numerous public 
agencies from the mid-1970s onward. This, of course, resonated with some notable national 
precedents as well. Revelations of abuse and war crimes by American forces in Vietnam, for 
instance, and the Watergate scandal already pushed notions of corruption, malfeasance and 
the abuse of power into wide circulation. These themes were particularly pronounced in 
Pennsylvania in the 1970s, however. While covering scandals, the media frequently reminded 
its audience that Pennsylvania had one of the country’s most corrupt state governments. David 
Runkel, a reporter for the Philadelphia Bulletin, claimed that “238 Pennsylvania public officials 
from 1970 to May 1978 were convicted of, admitted to, or plead no contest to charges of 
corruption.”1605 
After the publicity of scandals and corruption, both political parties, but especially the 
Republicans, championed a series of legislative initiatives in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
designed to restore integrity to government.1606 Since Democrats controlled the General 
Assembly and governor’s office for much of the 1970s, most of the taint of corruption fell on 
them. Although Gov. Milton Shapp was never implicated in any wrong doing, administration 
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critics, from both parties, blamed him for tolerating corruption in the executive branch and not 
setting a higher ethical standard for public employee and officeholder conduct. Dick 
Thornburgh, who had been appointed the U.S. Attorney for Western Pittsburgh by Richard 
Nixon and later became assistant attorney general and head of the Criminal Division in the U.S. 
Department of Justice, built his crime fighting reputation by prosecuting organized crime and 
official corruption in Pennsylvania.1607  He carried this reputation over to his gubernatorial 
campaign, claiming repeatedly that the state suffered from an “integrity crisis” and “an 
epidemic of corruption.”1608 Directly significant for Pennsylvania’s prison system, the General 
Assembly passed legislation in 1980 that made the Attorney-General, who oversaw the Bureau 
of Correction, an elective position rather than a gubernatorial appointment after accusations of 
corruption surrounded the position for years.1609 The legislature temporarily moved the Bureau 
of Correction to the Department of General Services to keep it within the governor’s control, 
but most observers expected that the Bureau would soon become a full-fledged department in 
its own right. 
All of these trends commingled in the formation of a complex, layered discourse of 
public authority that stressed classical liberal and libertarian themes on the restraint of certain 
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types of discretion, the provision of accountability mechanisms and a reconfigured relationship 
between the state and citizens. As many people have pointed out, this political rationale often 
merely transferred such power to other sites, which were more politically amenable to 
advocates of these reforms.1610 Much like the disparate sources of this discourse, its political 
valences varied considerably depending on who adopted it and the specific contexts in which 
they deployed it. A facet of this discourse focused on restraining aspects of penal authority, 
which became a central concern of many people across the political spectrum in the 1970s.  
In many instances, these assaults upon penal authority touched upon the work of 
classification committees, whether the main bodies at diagnostic and reception centers or the 
smaller program review committees at each institution. Mistakes or abuse in classification 
could lead to scandalous negative publicity, whether this involved decisions to segregate a 
person, admit them to a mental hospital or transfer them to a minimum security facility or 
community corrections program from where they could escape,. This was especially the case 
with programs located at the porous border of the penal apparatus, where prisoners 
supposedly learned to transition to freedom, however limited. Such sites became highly visible 
in media discourse about punishment and had in fact increased in the last decade as the Bureau 
made more of a commitment to alternatives to imprisonment. Community correction programs 
developed into ambiguous, but sensitive penal spaces – ethically, professionally and politically. 
Assignment mistakes at these points could easily lead to escapes or violence and were hard for 
anyone to overlook in the penal apparatus, state government or the media. They were 
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flashpoints for scandals and one such eruption, albeit in a different jurisdiction, became the 
vector through which a specific form of classification knowledge and expertise entered the 
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction. 
In early 1981, Bureau staff in the central office obtained a report produced by the 
Correctional Service Group (CSG), a private correctional consulting group that evaluated the 
classification system used by Maryland’s Division of Correction.1611 The report followed a major 
investigation of Maryland’s classification procedures by the Governor's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice with the support of both the governor and the 
Maryland General Assembly.1612 At the time, Maryland’s prison bureaucracy and Governor 
Harry Hughes were embroiled in a major scandal over several high profile prisoner escapes, 
especially from community corrections centers.1613 Investigations by the Governor's 
Commission and a grand jury attributed the escapes to major weaknesses in the current 
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classification system, specifically how it failed to screen out numerous prisoners with records of 
serious violent crime for minimum security facilities, community corrections centers and the 
state’s work-release program. Media accounts of the escapes blamed well-intentioned, but 
naïve, prison authorities for undermining public safety with incompetent or reckless 
classification decisions that placed dangerous offenders in low security settings.1614 Many 
newspaper articles even profiled some of the prisoners involved in the scandal, highlighting 
their poor records and dangerousness. While such accounts clearly discredited Maryland’s 
Division of Correction, they nevertheless, framed the problem in such a way that tightened 
security and changes in classification could be offered up as immediate solutions. 
The Governor's Commission contracted the Correctional Service Group to further study 
the issues and recommend improvements. The CSG not only provided knowledgeable advice, 
but their expertise and outsider status helped depoliticize a contentious topic, framing it 
instead as a matter of technical evaluation and reform. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
numerous states hired the Kansas City-based CSG to perform similar evaluations and quell the 
political turmoil created by prison scandals. Robert Buchanan, the leading figure in this firm, 
previously worked in the Illinois Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
and he subsequently authored numerous evaluations of classification models and security 
procedures for the National Institute of Corrections.1615 The firm specialized in inmate 
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classification and prison management, which made them obviously well-positioned to review 
Maryland’s problems. The poor, sometimes publicly hostile, relationship between the current 
leadership of the Maryland Division of Correction and the General Assembly also made it 
imperative to have a set of outside experts perform this work. Despite this, the secretary of 
corrections publicly disputed many of the report’s findings and resigned under pressure within 
a few weeks.1616  
The evaluation team from the CSG believed that Maryland’s classification system 
needed to be drastically changed. Because of pervasive problems they noticed, the CSG 
boasted, not unreasonably, that their report represented “the most comprehensive study of a 
state's total classification system as of that date.”1617 As such, the report generated a lot of 
interest among academic researchers and practitioners in other jurisdictions, including 
Pennsylvania. One of the areas addressed by the CSG in the Maryland study was population 
management, dealing with an unprecedented influx of prisoners and limited inmate bed 
capacity at varying levels of custody. This aspect of the study alone was ample reason for 
Pennsylvania officials to show interest in the CSG’s work.  
In addition, an emerging trend in judicial intervention into prison operations by the early 
1980s centered on either problems with poorly functioning classification systems or 
substandard prison conditions that the courts felt could be ameliorated through state-of-the-
art classification systems. Pennsylvania was one of the few well-populated states in the country 
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that had a large increase in its prison population, which had not yet attracted additional judicial 
attention over problems like this. Despite entering into a consent decree over many aspects of 
prison operations, senior officials in the Thornburgh administration believed that the state’s 
mounting overcrowding problem was likely to invite further federal attention soon.1618 They 
closely monitored developments in the federal judiciary, the Department of Justice and other 
jurisdictions. Since federal judges had ordered other states to implement new classification 
systems, having a state-of-the-art system already in place would possibly avert costly judicial 
intervention in the state’s prison operations.  
The leadership of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction had been pursuing this strategy 
for several years already. During the 1970s, the Bureau of Correction standardized certain 
aspects of their classification practice, which made the reforms of the early 1980s 
comparatively less extensive than the experience of other states, like Maryland. The Bureau 
published a system-wide classification manual for the first time in 1973 that was used by every 
diagnostic and classification center.1619 At the time, the state operated six such centers. The 
standard manual was an attempt to bring the practices of all these centers into alignment.1620 
While it appears that Pennsylvania staff considered this a temporary improvement, designed to 
                                                          
1618 Strategies for Mandatory Sentencing, Harold Miller to Rick Stafford, March 24, 1981, box 264, folder 30; Crime 
Announcement on April 28, Rick Stafford to Governor, Jay Waldman, Paul Critchlow, Bob Wilburn and attached 
Confidential Crime Paper, box 264, folder 31; Alfred Blumstein to Richard L. Thornburgh, March 24, 1981, box 264, 
folder 41; Fact Sheet on the Proposed New Prison in Montgomery County, box 265, folder 2. Dick Thornburgh 
Papers; Sam McClea to John White, House Bill 1645, P.N. 1924, June 23, 1981, box 265, folder 17. Dick Thornburgh 
Papers, UPASC. Fear of judicial intervention and trying to pre-empt it was a common concerns of prison 
administrators across the United States by the early 1980s. For a study of this phenomenon as it was emerging see 
James B. Jacobs, Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). The 1978 
consent decree Pennsylvania entered into grew out of litigation by the Imprisoned Citizens Union. This is discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 2. 
1619 Correctional Service Group, Pennsylvania Classification Plan, 6. 
1620 Ibid., 6, 25; Bureau of Correction, 30th Anniversary Commemorative History: The Bureau of Correction and Its 




make way for a more thoroughly objective system, certain aspects of the federal model 
remained influential in the reforms later proposed by the CSG.1621 In 1980, the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Correction implemented a classification system developed by the federal Bureau of 
Prisons during the late 1970s, which constrained discretionary decision-making with an additive 
checklist system that produced a series of numerical scores for the security risks presented by 
new inmates. These scores corresponded to a scale of ascending security requirements.1622 
Corrections officials were not very satisfied with this method and considered it more of a stop-
gap, more a way to forestall judicial intervention and negative media attention than to properly 
manage prisoners.1623  
The Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction may have avoided judicial attention during the 
1970s partly because of these changes. Additionally, the size of the state’s inmate population 
remained within the prison system’s official rated capacity. However, between 1980 and 1981, 
the crowding situation in the state’s prisons deteriorated and finally exceeded its system-wide 
capacity. Projections produced by the Pennsylvania Commission of Crime and Delinquency 
(PCCD) and the Bureau of Correction indicated that persistent overcrowding was likely worsen 
and last into the 1990s.1624 While the PCCD sought to address this issue by locating the origin 
cites of the prisoner influx in the multiple agencies and branches of government, officials within 
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the Bureau of Correction believed that improved classification procedures would enable them 
to better manage the consequent difficulties. The General Assembly and Gov. Thornburgh were 
also likely to pass several pieces of new sentencing legislation that would actually worsen 
overcrowding even further. The Bureau of Correction staff and senior policy advisers in the 
governor’s office were already planning new prison construction for most of 1981.1625 In such a 
situation, the desire to efficiently manage classification’s custody assignment process and its 
related staffing aspects exceeded treatment concerns in classification reform. 
Prison officials saw an opportunity to improve classification practice after obtaining the 
Maryland classification study in the spring of 1981. In March, Harry Smith, the Director of 
Programs for the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, contacted the CSG and applied for a grant 
from the National Institute of Corrections to fund a study similar to the one completed for the 
Maryland Division of Correction.1626 Once the funds were approved, Buchanan and several 
other researchers from the CSG met with senior staff in the Program Division and the Central 
Office in Harrisburg to develop a research plan. The subsequent project entailed a major 
research effort into the current classification system and the state of the prisons. The project 
included: a workshop with classification staff; extensive interviews with senior officials, 
classification staff at both the state’s reception prisons (the diagnostic and classification 
centers) and the major placement prisons; the distribution of surveys to these staff plus 
custodial staff and a sampling of inmates; direct observation of the classification process; and a 
review of relevant documents and inmate files. This process also involved tours of most of the 
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state’s prisons to assess their security, custody, and program capacities. Donald Stoughton, a 
former prison official in New York, conducted the security and custody assessments, which 
formed a separate report.1627 The entire project commenced in the September 1981, with the 
final report appearing in late February 1982.  
The CSG staff noted early in their final report that they considered the current practices 
in Pennsylvania to be superior to most of the jurisdictions they had worked with in the past. 
Pennsylvania already had a comprehensive, standardized classification system, based on 
considerations, and supported by data, which the CSG deemed essential for the proper 
classification of inmates. Thus, the consultants recommended a “fine tuning” of what it felt was 
an already sophisticated classification practice.1628 Despite being tainted with crisis through 
their association with rehabilitation, the well-established presence of these classification 
practices and their dedicated spaces in the prisons enabled the CSG’s research project, 
providing them with the tools and language to complete their research. The shared methods, 
assumptions, and technical language between the CSG and Bureau personnel shaped the 
process of negotiating and creating a set of new practices.  
While some social theorists have argued that comparison and commensuration are 
deeply, if implicitly, interwoven into all social scientific methods, the research methods used by 
the CSG explicitly foregrounded comparison in a number of different ways, which is perhaps 
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unsurprising given the deeply comparative nature of inmate classification itself.1629 This was 
especially apparent in the final report’s frequent citation of the practices and experiences of 
classification staff in other jurisdictions within the United States. In addition to Maryland, the 
CSG had also performed consulting work for the states of Arkansas, Missouri, Georgia, and 
Oklahoma. From the text, it was also evident that the consulting group’s researchers were well-
informed on the practices elsewhere in the country, especially in Alabama, California, New 
York, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, as well as research produced by organizations like the 
National Institute of Corrections and American Correctional Association. Much of the appeal of 
the CSG’s expertise was their familiarity with this diversity of examples and practices 
throughout the nation. 
More significantly, however, these jurisdictional boundaries - as fulcrums of penal policy 
and knowledge development - underwrote the formation of CSG’s expertise and their 
comparative perspective. They provided them with multiple venues to research and experiment 
with new classification practices and eventually to develope one of their own, integrating 
aspects of several different systems. As a private consulting group, they had professional 
connections and experience that transcended state boundaries in a way that most prison 
administrators did not, including even those senior staff members who took jobs in several 
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states over their careers.1630 By producing knowledge about strengths and weaknesses of 
different classification models and offering reform advice,1631 the CSG also deeply affected the 
practices they studied, catalyzing an integration process as local actors incorporated this 
knowledge and sometimes even adopted the model developed by the CSG.1632 
Based on this knowledge base, the CSG outlined several basic methodical models that 
informed numerous iterations of classification practices across the country.1633 The report’s 
authors felt that some classification models, especially those that relied largely or exclusively on 
the clinical evaluation and structured psychological tests (like the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Test—MMPI) were too costly and possibility vulnerable to judicial challenge.1634 
Other models they surveyed were far more uniform in their procedures. The additive model 
that Pennsylvania experimented with prior to contacting the CSG was a good example of type. 
This model consisted of a uniform checklist of questions about all prisoners, which were to be 
answered by choosing a numerical value on a limited scale. For example, a question might ask 
for prior convictions or imprisonments: none would be scored 0; one to two priors would be 
scored 1; three or more would be scored 3. At the end of the inventory, all these numerical 
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values would be tallied, then compared to a range of custody levels demarcated by numerical 
cutoff points.1635 Another basic model was referred to as a “decision tree” whereby “the 
response to an initial question or factor determined the next question to be asked.”1636 This 
method would channel subjects into different custody paths by how they answered a 
standardized list of questions. A consequence of this procedure, however, was that many 
prisoners would not be asked the same questions depending on the trajectory of prior answers. 
The report’s authors suggested using a procedure they developed, which combined the best 
qualities of the additive and decision tree models (explained more below).1637 
The fine tuning of the Bureau’s existing classification practice envisioned by the CSG, 
involved explicating the knowledge of staff (and to a lesser extent prisoners), learning how they 
evaluated cases and arrived at their classification decisions. The project’s goal was to 
recommend a path toward greater standardization, which would check the exercise of 
discretionary decision-making, increase uniformity, and as a result enhance the efficacy and 
productivity of the classification process. These were all qualities that the Bureau’s leadership 
identified as crucial for managing the rapidly expanding penal apparatus and avoiding or 
mitigating the damage of lawsuits. The CSG’s work in Pennsylvania exemplifies an unfolding 
shift in penology in the late 1970s and 1980s toward a greater emphasis on “objective” 
classification methods in lieu of the previously dominate “subjective” practices. These were the 
actual terms advocates used to describe (and classify) classification practices. The consultants 
from CSG readily admitted that no classification system was truly objective, but they employed 
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the distinction to highlight their difference from previous practices.1638 Subjective in this sense 
referred almost exclusively to clinical reasoning and judgment associated most clearly with 
psychological interview and unstructured professional assessment of test results, which were 
hallmarks of the postwar, therapeutic rehabilitation model. Objective models, like the additive 
and decision-tree, were objective because they set forth explicit, invariant criteria that could be 
applied to all prisoners. This constrained and structured professional judgement, rather than 
eliminating it, a prospect that the consultant knew was an impossibility. The key to 
accomplishing this, according to the CSG, rested on developing a standard classification tool 
that incorporated some of the classification knowledge of staff in Pennsylvania. 
 To build such a tool, the CSG used a series of comparative social science methods to 
analyze how classification worked in the Bureau of Correction. In one of their first 
interventions, they tried to determine the capacities of each state prison. The consultants 
interviewed staff and prisoners, asking each to rank institutions according their ability to handle 
inmates of certain security and custody ratings or people with certain types of medical, 
addiction, or mental health problems. The CSG researchers then conducted their own analysis. 
They looked especially for discrepancies between, on the one hand, how different groups of 
staff and prisoners viewed the capacities of certain prisons, and on the other, how their 
evaluations aligned with the analysis produced by CSG researchers. Classification staff, 
especially those working in diagnostic and classification centers, were also asked to evaluate 
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anonymous, but actual, inmate files and assign the prisoners to appropriate prisons.1639 These 
surveys and exercises, thus, incorporated the comparative vision of prison staff and 
incarcerated people based on their practiced working knowledge. While the eventual 
classification instrument incorporated many of the results of this work, some of them worried 
the CSG researchers because they indicated an unacceptable degree of inconsistency between 
different interview subjects.    
The best example of this problem emerged in the initial assignment exercises that asked 
Bureau classification staff to evaluate anonymous inmate files and recommend placement 
prisons for them. The CSG reported overall rates of agreement in this exercise in the 75 to 80 
percent range, but noted that the variation was exceptional for some inmate files.1640 The CSG 
speculated that these discrepancies reflected philosophical differences among staff members, 
probably indicating that some staff were more treatment-oriented than others who placed 
greater emphasis on security.1641 The files used in these specific instances contained 
information and concerns about prisoners that was a somewhat ambiguous guide for 
placement. Multiple, uncontroversial, assignment options were not just possible, but likely. The 
authors did not elaborate on the specific content of most of these cases. They did, however, 
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uniform custody levels at every institution. Correctional Service Group, Pennsylvania Classification Plan, 113-116, 
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highlight one because they felt that some of the placement decisions were absolutely 
unacceptable. A few staff members assigned a person with a record of institutional adjustment 
problems, drug use, and serious violence to a couple of low security prisons that the CSG 
believed were completely incapable of handling such a person.1642 Beyond this exception, the 
CSG researchers did not explicitly advocate any penological position (e.g. rehabilitation, 
security, etc.) as the basis for the decision-making process. They were also not interested in 
whether their exercises revealed pre-existing or differing penological values among staff 
members or even whether these values were enacted in the research process. Inconsistency 
troubled them more than anything; as long as decisions were consistent enough and 
considered the same set of explicit criteria for each inmate, the actual penological philosophy 
informing them was less concerning.1643 The actual diversity of opinion the exercise revealed 
concerned the CSG researchers because, unless checked in some way, it would lead to 
inconsistent placement decisions based on divergent and implicit criteria. 
These assignment exercises accentuated the comparative work of staff in the course of 
routine duties, but they also provided a way for the consultants to evaluate the staff’s 
assessment and decision-making knowledge by comparing their answers, and implicitly, the 
staff as well. The CSG was apparently untroubled by methodological questions about whether 
these survey and exercise answers actually reflected the staff’s work dispositions. The 
simulations were treated simply as adequate representations of what the staff did or would do 
in the process of making initial assignment decisions. The exercises provided scenarios for the 
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deployment of acquired classification skills that were real enough for the researchers’ 
purposes. While the report mentions at the beginning that the CSG observed actual 
classification decisions, the substantive chapters relied on surveys, interviews, and exercises. 
Whatever evidence direct observation produced, its absence in the analysis and the heavy 
reliance on other these other methods highlighted the preference for this form of knowledge 
production by the CSG and the major audiences of the report—the Bureau of Correction, senior 
policy-makers in the Thornburgh administration, state legislators, the large correctional 
research community, and similar bureaucratic personal in other jurisdictions. The results from 
surveys and exercises were quantifiable and easily compared to other sets of similar data. 
Statistical rates of agreement across such data sets could be the basis for disciplining practices, 
potentially even across multiple jurisdictions.1644  
Central administrative staff, initial classification staff (diagnostic and classification 
centers), institutional classification staff (placement prisons), and security staff completed 
additional questionnaires, explicitly asking them about which criteria they felt were crucial for 
classification and how they would rank them in order of importance.1645 Unsurprisingly, 
variation appeared across these groups as it did in the placement exercises. Since the 
consultants were designing a tool that would control this type of variation, they were more 
interested in determining the primary criteria staff currently used in this process. After they 
identified the ten most important criteria for each personnel grouping, they then arranged 
these items in order of importance by statistically weighting the survey answers (regression 
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analysis). In this way, they produced a checklist of the most relevant criteria for classifying 
inmates according to the assembled views of the various groups of prison staff. Of course, since 
the CSG demarcated the most frequent answers as the only criteria to be used in future 
classification decisions, many of the criteria they discovered disappeared in the production of 
the checklists.  
These criteria were subsequently divided into two categories: one reflecting risk to the 
public, the other risk to the institution:  
 
PUBLIC RISK FACTORS: 
1. Extent of Violence in Current Offence 
2. Weapon Used in Current Offense 
3. Escape History 
4. Prior Commitments 
5. Violence History 
6. Holds or Detainers 
7. Time to Expected Release 
8. Community Stability 
 
INSTITUTIONAL RISK FACTORS: 
1. Community Stability 
2. Prior Institutional Adjustment 
3. Protection Considerations 
4. Psychological Stability 
5. Adjustment While on Probation/Parole 
6. Alcohol/Drug Use 
 
 
Each item had a sublist of numerical options that a classification staff member would select to 
score that particular item. An example of these options for the first item looked like this: 
 
PUBLIC RISK FACTORS: 
 






1 = None 
2 = Minor Sexual Offense 
3 = Attempted Rape 
4 = Forcible Rape 
5 = Forcible Rape Where Death or Injury Resulted 
 
Violence 
1 = None 
2 = Threat or Minor Injury 
3 = Serious Injury or Death - Provoked 
4 = Serious Injury or Death - Unprovoked 
 
After tabulating scores for each item, the classification staff member would then 
produce an “overall custody score,” which would be the highest score on any of the items on 
each lists.1646 This score was then located in a matrix of the custody levels used in the state’s 
prisons, which would determine the necessary level of security needed for a particular prisoner. 
Higher end scores automatically ruled out some institutions for certain inmates. At the time, 
Pennsylvania used a five-tiered custody system: 
 
I.  Maximum (Restricted Housing Unit) 
II.  Close (Restricted Housing Unit or Diagnostic and Classification Center) 
III.  Medium (Inside enclosure) 
IV.  Minimum (Outside enclosure) 
V.  Pre-Release (Community)1647 
 
Once staff determined the custody requirements, a series of other considerations would come 
into play to determine the exact placement prison. These included Medical Needs, Mental 
Health Needs, Educational Needs, Vocational Needs, Work Skills and Drug and Alcohol Needs. 
Again, based on the capabilities of each prison to address these needs, the range of placement 
options was further narrowed based on a similar process of scoring each prisoner according to 
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the listed items. Staff determined the scores for some of these items, like Mental Health for 
instance, based on more extensive testing than they used for scoring custody factors.  
The CSG recommended created an entirely new summary sheet that contained the basic 
scores for each item as a way to centralized all the information produced about a newly-
admitted person. The new form replaced a similar standard document, the Classification 
Summary (JBC-1A or JBC-1B), which the CSG disliked because they felt it contained far too much 
space for narrative commentary.1648 This was simply an entry point for subject evaluations and 
needed to be removed. Classification staff in the diagnostic and classification centers, who 
conducted the initial classification, and custodial staff in the prison system generally agreed 
with this assessment. The older form also required access to a lot of prior information about 
the prisoner, which was often unavailable. 
The classification personnel in the placement prisons, who served on the Program 
Review Committees and spent more time learning about the prisoners in detail, disagreed with 
the CSG’s objective methods, which they felt were far too rigid. They argued that such methods 
undervalued their professional competence and judgment, which they claimed produced a 
more nuanced appreciation of inmates and their personal circumstances based on interviews 
and direct interactions with them over extensive periods of time. The brevity and efficiency 
demanded by diagnostic and classification center staff and the straightforward designations 
demanded by the guard force conflicted with the more therapeutic penological views of 
classification staff at the placement prisons who often also conducted and supervised various 
treatment, educational, and vocational programs for inmates. The objective classification 
                                                          




procedures, not only de-emphasized clinical reasoning in the initial classification process, but 
also made deep inroads in the routines of program staff in the placement prisons, refashioning 
the already limited rehabilitation options and infusing them with uniformity and risk 
management priorities. If the views of these staff members were already in decline, the new 
objective classification practices only furthered that process.   
The new document that the Bureau eventually adopted incorporated most of the CSG’s 
suggestions (See Figure 6:1). Of all the items on the Initial Classification Score Sheet (BC-45A), 
the central grid—the Correctional Classification Profile, stood out as both the most important 
device for trying to enforce this desired level of consistency. Developed by the CSG and John 
Irion, a staff member with Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation, the Correctional 
Classification Profile was the most original contribution of the CSG.1649 By the mid-1980s several 
different states, all of whom contracted the services of the CSG, had adopted it in their 
classification procedures. It became one of the most influential classification tools in the 
country during the 1980s and circulated abroad as well.1650 The CSG’s report repeatedly 
championed the advantages of their tool and recommended its adoption.1651  
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Figure 15: BC-45A - Initial Classification Score Sheet 
Figure 15. The Initial Classification Score Sheet (BC-45A), circa 1984. Source: adapted from 
Rehabilitation Research Foundation (Carl B. Clements), Offender Needs and Assessment: 





The Correctional Classification Profile consisted of eight columns each containing the 
numbers 1 through 5, with 1 being at the bottom of each column and 5 at the top. From left to 
right the columns were labeled: Medical Needs, Public Risk Needs, Institutional Risk Needs, 
Mental Health Needs, Educational Needs, Vocational Needs, Work Skills, Drug and Alcohol 
Needs. If used as intended by the CSG, a classification decision could not be formally finalized 
until all the items in the Correctional Classification Profile were scored and doing so entailed 
scoring some—but not all—of the items in other boxes on the Initial Classification Score Sheet. 
Thus, the Correctional Classification Profile acted as a checklist of necessary considerations that 
had to be completed to properly classify any inmate. Yet, each item in the profile was not of 
equal value; its criteria ran left to right in order of consideration and, to some degree, of 
declining importance as well. The structure drew from decision-tree models whereby the first 
item, in this case Medical Needs, had to be considered before any other item; the resulting 
answer could drastically limit options and channeled the decision-making process down specific 
paths. A high score severely delimited placement options regardless of the scores on the rest of 
the following items.1652 
 
                                                          





Figure 16: How to complete the Correctional Classification Profile 
Figure 16. How to complete the Correctional Classification Profile. Source: Correctional Service 
Group, Pennsylvania Classification Plan, 218. 
 
A classification officer scored each item in the Correctional Classification Profile by 
circling the appropriate number. After all the items were scored a line was drawn between each 
one, from left to right, creating a segmented curve, which varied between inmates (See Figure 
6:2). A completed curve indicated that the entire set of items and their sub-criteria had been 
addressed - or at least gave the appearance that all of these things had been considered. The 
technique visually resembled children’s connect-the-dots drawings, and like them, it also 
exercised an intense, micro-level discipline, which guided the classification process as much as 
the hand of the officer completing the form. The curve also graphically represented the 
classification testing and scoring in a manner that could be read at a glance by someone who 
worked with these materials. It was an abstraction of an already abstract scoring system, which 




abstractions for the purposes of comparison. The Correctional Classification Profile created a 
certain aesthetics of segmented risk and needs curves, with broadly similar curves indicating 
either the presence of troublesome characteristics and histories or conversely less worrisome 
information. Of course, there were many ambiguous curves that could be read in different 
ways, but these still tended to cluster around a limited set of placement options for the inmate. 
Beyond the picture of an inmate, which was affixed to this form, these segmented curves would 
have been the most visually striking standardized aspect of any particular dossier. 
There were a few seemingly anomalous items in Correctional Classification Profile. The 
Work Skills column was inverted in the sense that higher scores indicated a high skill level 
rather than a serious deficiency or problem like high scores on the other items.1653 Perhaps, 
most perplexing, Drug and Alcohol Needs was the last item, despite the serious suffering these 
problems caused and the difficulty some inmates had with these problems in prison. The 
seemingly odd choice to place drug and alcohol abuse last on the profile stemmed partly from 
the fact that these issues were already included as one of the major sub-criteria for determining 
Institutional Risk scores. It would also appear that treatment for these issues was not as 
specialized as other problems. Mental health workers usually provided services in this area.1654 
To acclimate staff to the use of the new forms, the CSG recommended a broad training 
initiative, which would further emphasize the need for decision-making based on objective 
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criteria and methods. Even before the CSG finalized its report, Commissioner of Corrections 
Ronald Marks indicated to Harold Miller, the director of Gov. Thornburgh’s Office of Planning 
and Policy, that the Bureau planned to adopt many of the report’s recommendations, which he 
felt would “nicely compliment” existing practices.1655 The new classification system was 
declared operational on January 1, 1983.1656  
Of all the things the CSG study produced, it may that the refashioning of consensus 
through the renewal of classification rituals and the displacement of discretionary authority 
were the most important. These two things are deeply interwoven. However, I must add an 
immediate clarification: by “consensus” I do not mean that everyone involved in the 
classification study agreed with the assessment of existing practices by the CSG or their final 
recommendations. On the contrary, there was plenty of evidence of substantial disagreement 
in the survey results. By highlighting the role of consensus, I mean to draw attention to two 
ways this figured in the project and classification in general. First, as I discussed in the last 
section, the history of psycho-social science classification involved an ever-greater level of 
negotiation and conflict with other penal workers and sources of penal authority. The 
classification committees that appeared in numerous jurisdictions after World War II became 
contact zones for these different sources of authority and their personnel. In many 
jurisdictions, the deliberations were so tilted toward custodial concerns that it’s hard to 
describe these committees as part of anything approaching a therapeutic model.1657 
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In many other jurisdictions, members of classification committees reached their 
decisions by consensus. In Pennsylvania, committee members evaluated a prisoner’s 
standardized test results, criminal and institutional history, court documents and along with 
numerous other sources of information and often interviewed the subject as a group. They 
then conferred before reaching a unanimous decision, which of course, included varying 
degrees of disagreement and misgivings. Senior members of the committee settled deadlocked 
positions and the deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Correction could override all decisions 
if he disagreed with them.1658 The CSG felt that these clinical committee deliberations were far 
too time consuming, which became more of a problem with the greater influx of prisoners in 
the 1980s. They were also subjective, according to the consultants, because they lacked any 
mechanism to ensure that all the relevant classification criteria were considered for each 
inmate. There was not even any formal agreement on what the relevant criteria should be for 
all prisoners. This opened a space, the CSG feared, for too great a role for “bias” by committee 
members who might react negatively to any particular inmate in ways that were never made 
explicit.1659 The CSG hoped to pre-empt these lengthy deliberations, disruptions produced by 
disagreements, and the effects of bias as much as possible through the introduction of a 
standardized, objective classification tool. 
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 Secondly, the CSG could not simply dispense with the benefits of this consensus-
building. Multiple areas of authority and their personnel remained in the penal system and 
attended to the classification process. Whatever their shortcomings or illusory qualities, 
committee deliberations managed these competing factions within prisons, especially among 
the more elite staff members who participated in these committees. The CSG was well aware of 
this. So, they tried to retain some of the qualities of this representative forum and its conflict 
management fucntions by shifting where consensus would be located in the new classification 
process. The research process that the CSG used to create the structured assessment device 
mobilized the penological values and favored criteria from a diverse body of employees, many 
of whom disagreed. They even drew upon the views of prisoners, who helped rate the 
capacities of the state’s various prisons. This resembled a number of the other classification 
models discussed in the report, including the one developed by the federal Bureau of Prisons in 
1977, which was widely considered the gold standard for consensus-building techniques of 
classification reform and tool-construction.1660 The CSG had also previously used this technique 
in evaluations they completed for Arkansas, Maryland, and Missouri.1661 The CSG intended the 
device they created to be an artifact of correctional pluralism in Pennsylvania at the time, 
hopefully representing the assembled views of staff enough to gain legitimacy in their eyes.  
It is unknown if staff members actually agreed with this particular political theory of 
inclusion embedded in the social scientific methodology. There was undoubtedly some 
disagreement and resentment on the part of some staff members. The CSG noted early in the 
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report that “some of our findings and recommendations are contrary to the beliefs and 
opinions of some Bureau staff. Indeed, some of the major recommendations will be seen by 
many staff as radical departures from current practices.”1662 Many staff members, especially 
those on the program review committees in all the prisons, did not hold objective methods in 
high esteem. Even among personnel who worked in custody, central administration, and the 
diagnostic and classification centers, the CSG still encountered a substantial minority who did 
not want classification to be more objective and felt there was still much wisdom in the 
longstanding procedures.1663  Consensus, in other words, concealed a lot of disagreement and 
simply ruled out competing views as illegitimate in the emerging political environment of prison 
overcrowding, judicial oversight and scandal avoidance. 
The resulting consensus might be more productively thought of along the lines of what 
sociologist Saul Halfon has called a “structured disunity.”1664 Halfon examined the highly 
contentious process of developing international population agreements. Consensus emerged in 
this field primarily through commitments to a socio-technical network in which widely shared 
epistemic assumptions were tied deeply to knowledge-making practices, like social science 
survey techniques, common data sources, bureaucratic formations, and sources of funding. This 
socio-technical network was highly elastic and permitted substantial disagreement among 
members with competing interests and agendas. Halfon argues that the knowledge practices of 
this epistemic community created a “constrained space of contestation.”1665 Viewed in this 
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light, the conflicting views of Bureau of Correction staff members about the usefulness of 
creating new classification practices remained enmeshed in a network of classification and 
knowledge practices that both enabled and limited the range of disagreement. Even taking into 
consideration the enforced nature of the reform program and the risk of reprimand (or worse) 
that awaited employees who disagreed too much, no one questioned the need to classify 
prisoners upon reception and throughout their stay.   
The CSG transferred much of the subjective evaluation and consensus-building work 
that routinely took place in the existing practices to newly crafted tool—the objective 
classification instrument. Once deployed in classification routines, these tools could be revised 
at a later date if needed without drastically affecting the refashioned decision-making rituals. 
This tool had numerous time-saving qualities over the current practices and eliminated the 
need for extensive deliberations.1666 Decisions could always be overridden by the Deputy 
Commissioner who had the final say in all classification matters. If the knowledge practices and 
penal arrangements sustaining classification created a structured disunity during the CSG study, 
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then the final product incorporated the disputes and views developed in the constrained space 
of contestation into the objective numerical scoring mechanisms and graphics. 
 The difficulty in seeing these disagreements was, of course, very useful. Aside from 
whatever practical benefits the Bureau of Correction accrued from the new classification 
system, the minimization of political and legal risk was one of the primary reasons the Bureau 
of Correction pursued this project. As the CSG advised in its final report, “the lack of an 
objective means of classifying inmates has been shown to be, and is likely to remain, the 
seminal aspect of an unconstitutional prison system.”1667 The disagreements and differing 
penological views among staff remained embedded in the new objective tools in a way, 
resembling how Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star describe information technologies as 
embodying the “arguments, decisions, uncertainties, and processual nature of decision making” 
like Marx’s much older characterization of technology as frozen labor.1668  
The disputes would periodically re-emerge and become more visible, especially during 
disagreements over specific cases or in conflicts between differently positioned classification 
staff, like those in the diagnostic and reception centers and members of the program review 
committees. Yet, as long as this was suspended in the formal process and quietly frozen, if 
unresolved, in the objective tool, it would have been hard to challenge or question. This made 
the entire process (and by extension the Bureau) less vulnerable to judicial intervention, 
adverse media attention, political attacks from opponents, and public scandals surrounding 
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unchecked authority and arbitrary decision-making. The Correctional Classification Profile, 
provided a “legally supportable” practice that appeared, not only comprehensive and non-
arbitrary, but also uniform.1669 The lack of obvious indicators of subjective reasoning, especially 
an over-reliance on narrative presentation, meant that individual classification staff and 
decisions receded behind objective visuals and numerical scoring.   
 The first big political test for the new system developed during the research for the 
project, before the Bureau had a chance to fully evaluate the consultant’s work. A day after the 
CSG held a workshop for 25 classification staff,1670 a botched escape attempt at SCI Graterford, 
the state’s largest maximum security prison, turned into a highly publicized, week long standoff 
in which a group of armed inmates held several hostages in a barricaded kitchen. The standoff 
eventually ended peacefully, and the prison authorities transferred the people involved to 
other prisons, including some to the federal system. The subsequent media coverage as well as 
investigations by the police, the Bureau and an independent inquiry appointed by Gov. 
Thornburgh all highlighted the problem of inadequate classification and custody for particular 
inmates. The escape attempt occurred in the evening of October 28, 1981, but some of the 
prisoners had clearly planned it for at least several weeks with some accounts even suggesting 
that the preparation among a few may have extended back three years.1671 Kenneth Robinson, 
the Bureau of Correction’s press spokesman, identified one inmate in particular as the 
ringleader early in the standoff, and this man’s institutional life became both a central theme of 
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the event’s narrative and a reminder of the immediate danger and discrediting scandal that 
poor classification decisions could unleash.1672 The CSG’s preliminary report, intended for 
specialized classification staff in the Bureau’s headquarters, was soon before an independent 
investigation, trying to determine the cause of the Graterford hostage crisis. 
The man that Robinson named as the ringleader was a notorious central figure in the 
security crackdowns of the mid-1970s. Joseph “Jo-Jo” Bowen had been convicted in the death 
of a Philadelphia policeman in 1971 and later the 1973 killings of the warden and deputy-
warden of Holmesburg Prison, Philadelphia’s largest county prison.1673 His first term of 
imprisonment at Graterford occurred in the mid-1960s.1674 By the time Bowen, and his 
associate Fred Burton, were accused of killing Warden Patrick Curran and Deputy Warden 
Robert Fromhold at Holmesburg, they were both powerful inmate leaders and members of a 
Sunni Muslim organization, which had splintered away from the Nation of Islam group within 
Philadelphia’s county prison system.1675 After the 1973 killings, Philadelphia County transferred 
Bowen and Burton to state custody and after their convictions each were in turn sent to 
different prisons and held in indefinite administrative segregation, i.e. solitary confinement. 
Bowen, who was in held in the Restricted Housing Unit at Graterford, claimed that guards 
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severely beat him by on several occasions following his transfer.1676 Bowen’s history easily 
made him the centerpiece of renewed calls to reinstate the death penalty.1677  
During their years in segregation, both Bowen and Burton were convicted of the 
Holmesburg murders and sentenced to additional life terms.1678 If Pennsylvania had still used 
capital punishment at the time each of them would certainly have been sentenced to die in the 
state’s electric chair at SCI Rockview.1679 Both men pressed for their release from segregation 
through the federal courts, claiming that their continued isolation status was unconstitutional. 
The courts eventually agreed, noting that the Bureau of Correction either did not periodically 
review these prisoners’ classification status or did so in an inconsistent and subjective manner. 
In Burton’s case, the U.S. District Court for Western Pennsylvania held that the Commissioner of 
Corrections William Robinson, Superintendent James Howard, and the Program Review 
Committee at SCI Pittsburgh, where Burton was being held in the Behavioral Adjustment Unit, 
had simply failed to provide Burton with any criteria for returning to the general population.1680 
The court ordered the classification staff at SCI Pittsburgh, and by extension the entire Bureau, 
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to develop consistent regulations with objective criteria for governing the use of segregation 
units. In the court’s reasoning, Burton’s case accorded with an earlier ruling of the same year 
regarding Stanley B. Hoss, a prisoner who also killed a senior corrections officer in 1973. In 
Hoss’s case, the court ordered the Bureau and the Program Review Committee at SCI 
Graterford, where Hoss was isolated, to produce objective evaluation criteria for reviewing the 
status of people held in segregation.1681 In Bowen’s case, the state Attorney-General (and the 
governor’s office) agreed to enter a consent decree, releasing Bowen from isolation after the 
Philadelphia Community Legal Services challenged Bowen’s prolonged confinement in federal 
court.1682 Commissioner of Correction William Robinson repeatedly objected to this decision, 
claiming that Bowen posed an extreme security risk, but he ultimately complied with his 
superior’s order. 
The Bureau of Correction’s Planning and Research Division began the process of 
developing the objective criteria ordered by the courts and disseminating it to all the Program 
Review Committees.1683 While these orders only addressed the criteria for continued 
segregation and involved only specific prisoners, they nevertheless demonstrated that the 
courts viewed subjective reasoning or inconsistent practices on the part of classification staff 
with great suspicion. These rulings may not have targeted the Bureau’s entire classification 
system, but their legal reasoning could have easily been applied to it. Long before the Bureau 
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contacted the Correctional Service Group, in other words, the legal, political and security 
liabilities of the current classification system were becoming apparent. 
Once released into SCI Graterford’s close security general population, Bowen began 
planning to escape.1684 Graterford’s superintendent, Julius Cuyler, attempted to have Bowen 
transferred several times, citing four incidents of escape preparation, his “propensity for 
instigating others” to join such conspiracies, and his reputation for confrontation with staff 
members.1685 However, the Bureau’s central office denied these requests, arguing that they did 
not believe Bowen’s behavior would improve elsewhere and that Graterford’s staff, who knew 
him well, was the best suited to manage him.1686 Despite these concerns, the Program Review 
Committee granted Bowen permission to work in the institution’s kitchen, which lacked 
sufficient supervision and provided him with an opportunity to gather contraband items, 
including firearms that were smuggled into the prison. While accumulating these items, Bowen 
and several other inmates crafted an elaborate plan to scale Graterford’s high walls at dusk 
when the light was poor and just before the guard towers had been manned.  
The investigating panel appointed by Gov. Thornburgh believed that the escape attempt 
was prematurely executed by the inmates who feared that an institution-wide search was 
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imminent based on increased escape rumors circulating in the prison.1687 On the evening of 
October 28, 1981, Bowen and his associates subdued several staff members in the kitchen and 
locked them in an adjacent storage room. They then drove a truck across the prison’s grounds 
to the wall and began scaling it. Unfortunately for them, they miscalculated when the guard 
towers would be manned due to the change in daylight saving time.1688 Guards in Towers 6, 7 
and 8 spotted the inmates and alerted the control center, which dispatched teams of guards 
batons inside the walls to intercept the escapees and another team armed with firearms to the 
outside of the wall in case they prisoners succeeded in scaling it. After Bowen and several other 
prisoners fell while trying to scale the wall, they exchanged gunfire with the tower and 
approaching teams of guards. The escape party then retreated from wall with most heading 
back to the kitchen, where they proceeded to hold six staff members and possibly up to 31 
inmates as hostage.1689 After a tense standoff lasting five days, Chuck Stone, a Philadelphia 
journalist respected in the city’s African-American community, helped negotiate a peaceful 
surrender on November 2, 1981. Bowen and six other inmates were immediately transferred to 
the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons at Lewisburg Penitentiary in central Pennsylvania. 
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Graterford remained on lockdown for over a week while guards conducted a massive cell 
search.1690 
Gov. Thornburgh appointed a panel to investigate the hostage incident within a few 
weeks.1691 The panel held public hearings, toured Graterford, and interviewed numerous 
people involved, hostages and captors included. The final report, submitted to the governor in 
August 1982, praised the peaceful resolution of the incident and the leadership of Graterford’s 
staff and the governor’s office. However, the panel was highly critical of classification decisions 
regarding Bowen. First, they pointed out that the Attorney-General willingly agreed to the 
consent decree releasing Bowen from segregation.1692 The court did not order them to release 
Bowen and it was clear that correctional officials objected to the decision. Second, they 
criticized the decision to let Bowen work in the prison’s kitchen, citing both the area’s loose 
supervision and Bowen’s long record of participation in violence, prison conspiracies and 
escape plots as sufficient reason to have denied his request.1693  
The panel reviewed the Bureau’s classification system as well as the CSG’s report. The 
panel also interviewed the consultants, who told them that Pennsylvania’s classification 
practices compared favorably with seven other state systems they had observed. The panel 
respected the consultant’s views and also stated that the Bureau’s overall system of initial 
classification was sound and only needed small recommended refinements. However, they 
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believed that the subsequent classification process, conducted by the Graterford’s Program 
Review Committee was inadequate and contributed to Bowen’s ability to plan the escape 
attempt. In some cases, it appeared that decisions pertaining to Bowen’s custody status, like 
work assignments, were not properly communicated to the committee or Bowen’s case worker. 
The panel noted that even if a prisoner had not acted aggressively in the immediate past and 
warranted placement in some form of segregation, a person with Bowen’s criminal and 
institutional history, nevertheless, should not have been placed in the prison’s general 
population. The recommended creating “a special secure facility(ties) for the housing of this 
type of inmate.”1694  
The hostage crisis highlighted several series lapses in classification, but the investigating 
panel determined these to not be reflective of the Bureau of Correction’s overall practice. 
Moreover, the presence of the Correctional Service Group, which the panel described as “a 
consulting firm nationally recognized for its expertise in the area of inmate classification 
systems,” provided a reassuring and authoritative assessment of the state’s practice. In 
addition to highlighting the failures on the part of the previous administration in releasing 
Bowen into the general population and the unwarranted risk of permitting him to work in the 
kitchen, the panel noted that Bowen spent only a minimal amount of time in segregation after 
he was discovered with escape materials in 1978 and 1979. The main reason for this was that 
Graterford did not have many segregation cells and they were needed for more serious cases, 
especially containing the growing number of mentally ill prisoners at Graterford. 
 
                                                          




“It’s a Heavy Thing These Farview Cases”: The Mentally Ill Prisoner in the Late 1970s and 
1980s 
 
While much of the public discussion and administrative deliberation during the 
Graterford standoff and subsequent investigation centered on Bowen’s status, the growing 
presence of severely mentally ill inmates within the state’s prisons and the problems this posed 
for classification and placement was a major subtext of the investigation and the journalism 
surrounding the hostage incident. The mentally ill prisoner emerged as one of the most vexing 
categories of inmates in prison management discourse during the late 1970s and 1980s. The 
subject of numerous administrative plans, legislative investigations, classification refinements 
and newspaper stories, incarcerated people suffering from mental illness posed unique 
difficulties for other people working or living in prison who were ill-equipped to deal with these 
prisoners and often unsympathetic to their plight. It was often an open and unresolved 
question whether someone or some behavior actually fit this description. At times, these 
ambiguous cases raised uncomfortable questions about the nature of mental illness and sanity 
itself. On a more practical level, prison staff, and even other prisoners, tried to develop better 
ways to identify mental illness among prisoners and create a set of practices and designated 
places to better manage the problems created by mental illness given the inadequacy of 
existing practices.  
As will become clear, there was a broad spectrum of people and behaviors that fell 
under this rubric, but most of the contemporary commentary dealt with severe cases of mental 
illness. Most of the people identified as mentally ill in these representations rarely spoke for 




irrational, many such people behaved in ways that made communication difficult. While the 
relationship between prisoners and staff was extremely tense and conflictual at Graterford in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the problems presented by mentally ill prisoners pointed to the 
often unacknowledged degree of mutual understandings shared by most staff and inmates 
concerning prison order and routines. Mentally ill prisoners often behaved in ways that 
departed from this implicit knowledge. Prison officers faced great difficulties in managing these 
inmates who were also often the object of fear, ostracism and abuse by other prisoners. 
The inability to survive in prison, to know the many informal customs needed to 
navigate life in a maximum-security facility, often meant that mentally ill inmates became the 
center of disputes, victimization and disruptive outbursts. Often described by other inmates 
and staff as wearing soiled clothing and muttering to themselves, inmates suffering from 
different forms of mental illness usually lived solitary lives inside prison as other prisoners 
simply avoided them. Leroy Gause, an inmate at SCI-Pittsburgh, behaved in just this fashion. A 
fellow prisoner, Robert Allen Ray told a reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer that, "Inmates 
were afraid to approach Leroy, although he was not known to be violent…In his sad mental 
state he had to help himself as best he could. He walked alone, ate alone and generally stayed 
in his cell."1695 Such behavior marked Gause as irrational, separate from more emotionally-
reserved, rational prisoners and staff members. May 7, 1979, Gause jumped from the highest 
tier of the prison cell block to his death.1696 
                                                          





Media interviews with some of the hostage-takers at Graterford revealed that they were 
deeply aggrieved by the presence of mental ill inmates. Jo-Jo Bowen and Calvin “Pepper” 
Williams, another one of the inmate conspirators, both mentioned that the increasing numbers 
of mentally ill inmates at Graterford, and how prison staff handled them, caused a lot of strain 
for other inmates. Williams described the prison as more of a "mental institution" full of 
“screamers.”1697 Bowen also complained to Chuck Stone during the negotiations about the 
disruption and tension caused by the presence of mentally ill inmates at Graterford. Recalling 
these conversations with Stone a few weeks later, Bowen told a journalist that the presence of 
mentally ill inmates created a serious, intolerable crisis of order within the prison: “I told him 
[Stone] the state is disintegrating.” Bowen claimed that “There is a deep Farview thing" 
affecting the social order of the prison, referring to Farview State Hospital, which as 
Pennsylvania’s only maximum-security forensic hospital, usually held inmates suffering from 
the severest psychological disturbances. Bowen claimed that: 
 
They won’t take people at Farview, so they bring them to Graterford. When I 
made that move [the escape attempt], there were maybe 40 to 50 dudes on my 
block. They don’t let them out. They stand in front of cells and mumble all day. 
They’d fall out from medication. It’s a heavy thing these Farview cases.1698  
 
 
These “Farview cases” became increasingly evident in state prisons and county jails during the 
late 1970s, much to the displeasure of many people living and working in prison. Victor Hassine, 
who began serving a life sentence at Graterford shortly before Bowen’s escape attempt, noted 
that many older or experienced inmates disliked the influx of “nuts” into the prison because 
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“their special needs and peculiar behavior destroyed the stability of the prison system.”1699 
Since the topic of mental illness formed only a small part of state’s training curriculum for 
guards, most staff were not adept at identifying mental illness until it became acute or a 
disruptive incident occurred.1700 
However, even if staff felt that an inmate was suffering from mental illness, they had 
few options for dealing with the situation. Often unable to control or simply communicate with 
disturbed inmates, guards locked them in their general-population cells, or in more severe 
cases, placed them in the various control units at the state’s higher security prisons. The latter 
practice became so common that it appears that staff at some prisons attempted to informally 
subdivide these control units by grouping mentally ill inmates in adjacent cells or on the same 
cell block, leaving the other isolation cells for difficult or protection prisoners who were not 
psychologically disturbed. Psychiatrist Frank Rundle described such an arrangement in 
Graterford’s U-shaped Behavioral Adjustment Unit during a consultation visit and interview 
with a particular prisoner.1701 Staff reserved the east wing (“Siberia”) for mentally ill inmates 
and housed non-mentally ill segregated inmates on the west wing (“Death Row”1702). Dr. Rundle 
noted the lack of shouting and comparative peacefulness of the west wing: “Clearly the 
difference was that there were no psychotic inmates housed on this side.”1703  
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Jo-Jo Bowen spent much of his time at Graterford in the institution’s Behavioral 
Adjustment Unit, but would have also encountered mentally ill inmates in other sections of the 
prison. The final report of the Graterford hostage panel noted that the prison’s treatment staff 
claimed that there were forty-one “seriously mentally-ill” prisoners at Graterford who posed 
“severe management problems to prison administrators.”1704 Additionally, the panel members 
learned that there were over 150 inmates in the general population who suffered from mental 
illness, but whose symptoms were less serious.1705 Graterford’s staff housed these inmates in 
multiple places within the prison: the psychiatric infirmary (“D Ward” or “D Rear”), the 
Restricted Housing Unit,1706 the classification center (“E Gallery”), and simply general 
population. Dr. Melvin Heller, a psychiatrist who worked with both the Bureau of Correction 
and the Department of Public Welfare, told the Philadelphia Inquirer that beyond the many 
severely mentally ill prisoners in control units, “Others are getting along marginally on tightly 
controlled cell blocks. Others are just drifting through the prisons, waiting to explode.”1707 
Graterford’s superintendent, Julius Cuyler, acknowledged in his testimony before the inquiry 
investigating the hostage-taking that the integration of disturbed inmates in the general prison 
population had led to "a great deal of problems."1708 
Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives and the administrations of Gov. Milton Shapp 
(1971-1979) and Gov. Dick Thornburgh (1979-1987) each conducted large inquiries into the 
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issue of mentally inmates in state and county correctional and mental health systems between 
1977 and 1981, all of which concluded that such inmates were not receiving adequate care or 
management.1709 Ronald Marks, the new Commissioner of Correction, admitted as much to the 
Graterford hostage inquiry, telling them that such mentally ill inmates “require better 
treatment than I’m able to offer them now” and that they needed to be hospitalized rather 
than imprisoned.1710 The Correctional/Mental Health Task Force, created in September 1980, 
summarized many of the findings of these inquiries, noting that despite being a relatively small 
proportion of the total inmate population, many mentally ill prisoners had “problems which 
substantially disrupt residents and correctional staff. No correctional programs now exist for 
this population.”1711 These inquiries confirmed that the default management strategy for 
dealing with such inmates involved segregation in various units and cells and sedation with 
psychotropic medications.1712 The Bureau of Correction used to transfer disturbed inmates to 
the custody of the Department of Welfare, which operated the state hospital system, including 
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Farview. However, a series of lawsuits, scandals and reforms to the state’s legal code curtailed 
this practiced by 1977.  
Farview State Hospital, located in the far northeast corner of the state, received the vast 
majority of such inmates prior to the mid-1970s. Often feared as a place of last resort for both 
severely disturbed civil state hospital patients and criminal offenders,1713 Farview gained an 
exceedingly bad reputation during the 1970s from several adverse court cases and a major 
scandal involving the suspicious deaths of patients. Part of this reputation stemmed from the 
fact that people sent to Farview often never left or did so decades later.1714 The criteria for 
improvement, and hence transfer to a different hospital, to the prison system or to court to 
stand trial were often arbitrary and never explained to inmates.1715 During the 1960s, when 
courts demonstrated a greater willingness to consider claims by inmates in state institutions, 
practices like those at Farview became susceptible to litigation. In 1971, former patients 
succeeded in challenging parts of Pennsylvania’s involuntary commitment statute that had led 
to their prolonged confinement at Farview. While this case was still being litigated, the state 
undertook a review of Farview’s patients with the aim of releasing as many as possible. After 
the court’s ruling, Farview’s population dropped dramatically throughout the 1970s.1716 The 
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hospital held over 1400 patients in 1962 and as many as 1,170 patients as late as 1969, but its 
population fell to 477 by 1972.1717 
Farview was also the subject of several well-publicized inquires, scathing media 
coverage, several critical books and personal memoirs and a NBC made-for-television film 
about the institution’s arbitrariness, brutality and lack of therapeutic programming.1718 Much of 
this publicity centered on the revelations of severe abuse of inmates by staff and other 
inmates, including several murders and a decades-long conspiracy by Farview’s staff to hide 
these incidents from public view.1719 After hearings by a Select Committee of the State Senate 
and several investigations by the state police and Wayne County Coroner, a grand jury indicted 
numerous current and past Farview staff members in relation to the abuse allegations between 
1977 and 1978.1720 In 1976, the state’s General Assembly also passed the Pennsylvania Mental 
Health Procedures Act (Act 143), which limited the ability of courts, psychiatrists, physicians 
and other professionals to involuntarily commitment people to the state mental hospital 
system. Significantly, these restrictions also hindered the ability of prison officials to transfer 
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inmates from the prison system to Farview or smaller forensic units in other mental 
hospitals.1721  
These changes affected Farview’s operations, but the hospital still functioned as a 
bridging institution, spanning the state mental health and prison systems.1722 This ambiguous 
position often led to bureaucratic infighting between the welfare and corrections agencies, but 
at a deeper level it also reflected the blurred and unresolved boundaries separating the two 
institutional forms—the hospital and the prison—and their respective wards—the mad and the 
bad. As the revisionist social histories of incarceration from the 1970s illustrated, these broad 
distinctions are longstanding, having informed the creation of prison and hospitals in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1723 Yet, it was often later, in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries that political and professional groups settled, if not completely 
resolved, this broad classification problem of how to manage these two seemingly separate 
groups.1724 One can see the intensity of this debate in the Prison Journal, the official 
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professional publication of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, which featured numerous articles 
about the insane offender at the end of the nineteenth century. Most articles and editorials 
advocated the creation of a separate facility for the criminally insane and their removal from 
prisons.1725 This publication trend subsided, however, after the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
passed legislation authorizing the establishment of Farview in 1905 (the hospital opened in 
1912).1726  
This arrangement consequently affected how the norms and routines of prisons 
developed in subsequent decades because prison officials, staff and researchers oriented their 
regimes, programs and knowledge production toward presumptively sane inmates.1727 Sub rosa 
prison subcultures, the kinds that that attracted the attention of sociologists, also lacked well-
defined categories or argot roles for the insane offender.1728 The legislation not only created a 
                                                          
1725 “Insane,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 4 (January 1865), 40-47; “The Insane,” Journal of Prison 
Discipline and Philanthropy, 5 (January 1866), 240-245; “Proposed Matters: House of Correction,” Journal of Prison 
Discipline and Philanthropy, 6 (January 1867), 68-71;“Criminal Lunatics,” Journal of Prison Discipline and 
Philanthropy, 9 (January 1870), 68-69; “Insane Criminals,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 11 (January 
1872), 118-120; “The Insane,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 14 (January 1875), 50-51; “Insanity,” 
Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 15 (January 1876), 41-44; “Insanity: Criminal Insane,” Journal of 
Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 16 (January 1877), 98-105; “Ninety-Eighth Annual Report of the Philadelphia 
Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 24 (January 
1885), 9-58; “Separate Institutions for Insane Criminals,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 26 (January 
1887), 50-51; R. M. Bucke, “How to Regard Insane and Criminal,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 31 
(January 1892), 74-77; H. E. Allison, “Criminal Insane: Remarks Upon Insanity and Crime,” 38 Journal of Prison 
Discipline and Philanthropy, (January 1899), 12-20; Morel, Julius, “The System of Separate Imprisonment: Insanity,” 
Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 38 (January 1899), 20-27; “One Hundred and Thirteenth Annual 
Report of the Pennsylvania Prison Society," Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 39 (January 1900): 7-28; 
Oluf Thesen, “Classification of Criminal,” Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy, 55 (March 1916), 41-43. 
1726 Barnes, Evolution of Penology in Pennsylvania, 344. 
1727 Of course, this same point could probably be made to some degree about then norms and routines of certain 
hospitals. 
1728 My point is not that mid-century prisoners, participants in these subcultures, would not have labelled a 
seriously psychotic prisoner as insane or crazy, but that the typologies of the different argot roles (Sykes) or 
criminal identities (Irwin), which to some degree oriented social behavior among prisoners, did not include the 
disturbed offender. This person often resided beyond these patterns of inmate sociality. See Sykes, Society of 
Captives, 84-108; John Irwin, The Felon (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 7-35. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that the return of the insane prisoner came at roughly the same time that inmate subcultures, or the 




separate facility, but administratively placed it under the direct authority of the mental health 
bureau in the state’s public welfare bureaucracy, thus, keeping it separate from the prisons.1729 
While some inmates passed back and forth between the penal and welfare systems under this 
arrangement, this phenomenon was far less common prior to the 1960s than it would become 
later. Pennsylvania’s involuntary commitment laws permitted the long-term, indeed indefinite, 
hospitalization of criminal offenders determined to be insane by several psychiatrists.1730 
Because of this institutional arrangement, the state’s prisons did not often deal with insane 
inmates or did so for only a short time before they transferred them to a small forensic unit in a 
state hospital or Farview.   
This arrangement deteriorated in the late-1960s and early-1970s, and with it, the 
category of the insane offender returned as a problem of prison order. As a history of the 
Pennsylvania Prison Society noted in 1987, “For a number of decades, there was little in the 
Journal about the insane in our prisons. Once again, in the 1960’s, attention [was] focused on 
this topic.”1731 The first single topic issue of the Prison Journal concerning the mentally ill was 
the Spring-Summer 1969 issue: “Law and Psychiatry: Systematically Identifying and Providing 
for the Mentally Disturbed Offender.”1732 The initial classification process usually diverted 
seriously mentally ill prisoners away from the prison system, but after problems arose at 
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Farview and the state began reducing its population, the threshold of diversion began to 
tighten. Once the state’s involuntary commitment procedures changed in 1976, this shift 
changed abruptly. Thereafter, candidates for commitment had to be considered both 
dangerous to themselves and others and exhibiting clear signs of mental illness or strange 
behavior.1733  
The revised regulations also usually limited an inmate’s stay at Farview or other forensic 
units to ninety days; committing an inmate for longer periods required meeting a higher legal 
and medical threshold.1734 After ninety days elapsed for most commitments, the hospital 
returned inmates to prison.1735 These changes meant that the category of legally-committable 
mental illness shrank, covering fewer inmates who previously would have been diverted to 
hospitals. These inmates, many suffering from serious psychological disturbances, ended up in 
prisons and were simply not disturbed or violent enough in most cases to warrant costly 
involuntary commitment. Treatment staff attempted to stabilize mentally ill inmates who could 
not meet this new medico-legal requirement, usually with a combination of first generation 
antipsychotic drugs and segregation. “The irony of this,” according to Dr. Ray Belford, a Bureau 
of Correction psychiatrist, was “that if we do a good job protecting a mentally ill inmate from 
hurting himself or others, then we can’t transfer him under Act 143 to a mental facility.”1736 
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Nevertheless, staff often mentioned that some people, whose symptoms had been 
controlled through medications, became increasingly difficult and psychotic once they began 
refusing treatment.1737 Many prisoners, both mentally ill and not, saw these medications simply 
as control devices that required little effort on the part of staff and forestalled the development 
of a better way to deal with severe mental illness in prisons. For many inmates, this disciplinary 
use of medications had little to do with treatment: the “brake-fluid” or “chemical shackles” was 
simply part of the “’medicate-and-forget-them” system of modern prison management.”1738 
Inmates, like Bowen, wanted the state to reassert the older classification system and have this 
class of offender sent to forensic hospitals. Moreover, the accounts of some inmates indicate 
that psychotropic medications provided a far more flexible tool for staff; they could be 
prescribed—sometimes forcibly—to any particular inmate, especially those the staff deemed 
troublesome, regardless of whether that inmate had a history of mental illness or not.  
The increased use of these kinds of medications also provided some prisoners with an 
additional option for dealing with life behind bars. Although, it was not always entirely clear 
whether many prisoners consented to using these drugs. As psychologist Hans Toch has noted, 
prisoners deal with the emotional stress and turmoil of imprisonment in very different ways, 
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usually deploying long-standing, idiosyncratic, coping patterns that in many cases are ill-suited 
for institutional life.1739 Those who could not easily adapt often turned to psychiatric help and 
medications or such was imposed on them with varying degrees of persuasion and force. The 
report of the Graterford hostage investigation noted that in addition to the severely mentally 
ill, Graterford contained a much larger group of inmates who could not adapt well to prison, 
were prone to more serious behavior breakdowns, and were buttressed by the prison’s 
psychopharmacological management regimen.1740 In some cases, stressful breakdowns 
occurred without warning to those appearing well-adapted to life inside. Victor Hassine 
described with disbelief meeting a friend of his in Graterford’s Special Needs Unit while working 
as a nurse’s aide distributing psychotropic medicines.1741 The man, Hassine claimed, was a 
jailhouse lawyer, well-adapted to prison life to whom he had spoken to earlier that morning in 
the prison’s general population, but he sat motionless before him, drooling and deeply sedated. 
The nurse informed Hassine that she responded to reports about him earlier, finding him 
“mumbling gibberish and repeating that he couldn’t do the time.”1742 She told Hassine that this 
was in fact a common occurrence and that most inmates recovered, but often remained on 
some sort of medicine.  
While some prisoners were sympathetic to people suffering from psychological 
problems, many others had little patience for their bizarre behavior and outbursts. Numerous 
commentators, from politicians to inmates, noted that mentally ill inmates were especially 
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vulnerable to predation and retribution from other prisoners.1743 These concerns about the 
victimization of mentally ill prisoners pointed out clearly some of the ways that gender infused 
this issue, but also the larger prison order as well. For many prisoners, the mere fact of having 
psychological or emotional difficulty in adjusting to prison was unmanly and a sign of weakness. 
While most other prisoners avoided or ostracized the mentally ill people as best they could, 
seriously troubled inmates also presented opportunities for others to distinguish themselves as 
normal, stable, tough and formidable. The performance of masculinity in this way has long been 
a feature of descriptions of inmate subcultures in the highly stressful and competitive context 
of maximum security prisons.1744 As many people noted at the time, the inmate subcultures of 
the mid-century prisons transformed rapidly in the 1970s, as racial divisions, violence, drug 
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abuse and gang formation among prisoners increased.1745 As these changes reshaped inmate 
social relationships, more mentally ill prisoners also began appearing behind bars more 
frequently. Many, if not all of, these prisoners settled to the bottom of these new hierarchies. 
In some cases, describing them as being outside of these relationships may in fact be more 
fitting.           
In addition to the gendered aspects of interactions among inmates, sociologists Eamonn 
Carrabine and Brian Longhurst have argued that gender distinctions inform the production of 
prison order and management practices.1746 An obvious example was how the Bureau of 
Correction used psychotropic medication. While they extensively administered these 
medications in men’s prisons, they did so to a much greater degree in Pennsylvania’s only 
prison for women, SCI Muncy.1747 It appears that at least a fourth of the inmate population at 
Muncy was on a psychotropic medication regimen in the late 1970s and 1980s.1748 During 
hearings on overcrowding held by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 1983, Carol 
Gray of the Pennsylvania Prison Society Women’s Program accused the Bureau of Correction of 
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deliberately overmedicating women as a management strategy.1749 Acting Commissioner of 
Corrections Glen Jeffes responded to this charge by pointing out that women had greater rates 
of psychotropic drug use in the community, were more likely to seek out this type of help than 
men, and suffered more anxiety than men due to familial separation while in prison.1750 The 
House committee rejected Commissioner Jeffes’s explanation in their final report but failed to 
clarify their reasons for doing so.1751 
Jeffes comments, however, resonate with the findings of historians and sociologists who 
have noted that penal authorities have often considered female offenders to be intrinsically 
more reformable than their male counterparts and often attribute criminal acts to mental 
illness rather than deviance.1752 Ironically, this gendered discourse of crime, criminality and the 
malleability of the female criminal’s “soul”1753 often authorized drastic paternalistic, 
reformative interventions that were more controlling than practices directed at male prisoners. 
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Jeffes also clearly believed the incidence of medication use was justified because women were 
more vulnerable to the emotional pain of family separation than their male counterparts. In 
other words, the pains of imprisonment1754 for female prisoners negated their normative social 
role and emotional commitments in a way that exceeded the pain inflicted on men. Prison, 
even a women’s prison, was in essence a masculine space that hurt women in specific ways that 
elicited mental health problems, which according to Jeffes, explained SCI Muncy’s mental 
health treatment practices. My point here is not to dispute Jeffes’s contention, but to highlight 
the point that views like his informed how prison authorities differentially constructed 
management regimes. The distinction between sanity and insanity in prison and the methods 
used to address it ran through gendered assumptions for both inmates and staff that often did 
not explicitly register in the formal inmate classification system and mental illness screening 
tools. 
Another noteworthy aspect of the gendered distinctions in this area was that Farview 
did not accept women. Thus, the discussion about how to best manage the criminally insane 
almost always implied male prisoners and patients.  Even if mental illness in some of its 
manifestations feminized certain prisoners in the penal system, the forensic hospitals where 
many of them ended up, if for briefer periods, was nevertheless a masculine treatment or 
control intervention, off limits for female prisoners with similar mental health problems. The 
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lack of forensic units in both the prison and state hospital system for women was acute.1755 
Female inmates needing treatment either received it at SCI Muncy the state’s only secure 
women’s prison or at Danville State Hospital. However, the latter facility did not have a secure 
forensic unit for women. 
While extremely serious cases of insanity still met the new legal threshold, disputes 
nevertheless arose over whether some prisoners would be better managed or treated in 
hospitals or prisons. The relatively short periods of involuntary commitment at Farview created 
difficulties for inmates returning to prison. As numerous investigations discovered, most of the 
state’s prisons could not ensure that returning inmates would follow treatment regimens that 
stabilized them at Farview.1756 Once returned to the more restrictive and hostile prison 
environment, these inmates deteriorated, often resulting in severe mental breakdowns, crisis 
intervention and re-commitment to Farview, thus, restarting the cycle of what became known 
nationally as a problem of “bus therapy” in reference to the amount of time certain prisoners 
spent in transit.1757 With neither hospital nor prison staff wanting to deal with particularly 
troubled-troublesome inmates, they began transferring them back and forth between prison 
and the forensic units with increased frequency. Some descriptions of practice referred to it as 
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a circuit or “revolving door” that existed between Farview and several maximum-security 
prisons.1758  
Bus therapy condensed many of the disputes between these two state agencies, 
highlighting divergent institutional philosophies, disparate classification procedures and the 
practical frustrations of staff in each bureaucracy. The struggle rested on whose account of 
these prisoners would prevail and where these people would ultimately be placed. Significantly, 
these divergent classificatory accounts did not aim to incorporate or lay claim to these people. 
Rather, they sought to exclude them and maintain the institutional boundary-marking functions 
of their respective classification systems. The Bureau of Correction and the Office of Mental 
Health within the Department of Welfare each argued that the certain kinds of mentally ill 
inmates were inappropriate for their respective institutions. Correctional officials claimed that 
they were not equipped to adequately treat or manage any mentally ill inmates, while the 
Office of Mental Health argued that most mentally ill inmates should be treated within prisons 
rather than transferred. Thus, mental health diagnosis and classification focused on identifying 
problems, determining their legal status and if possible, immediately excluding those exhibiting 
these characteristics. 
At the center of all of this was, of course, the man on the bus, in transit between control 
units, one operated by mental health authorities, the other by penal authorities. This person 
rarely spoke in the public representations of this problem. Even when scandals erupted at 
Farview earlier in the 1970s, most of the patients who made public statements were not these 
men, the subjects of bus therapy. The reasons for this are no doubt multiple and surely simple 
                                                          




repression would be one. The difficulty some of these men had in communicating would be 
another, whether from illness or its pharmacological treatment. However, the effects of the 
discourse of social control and the deep historical legacies of classification also rendered these 
men inscrutable in many ways, a conundrum of representation as much as of discipline. They 
were both serious mentally ill and willfully difficult and violent, in the often-used shorthand, 
both mad and bad, but not clearly more one than the other. Writing in the early 1980s, Hans 
Toch argued that these prisoners, whom he referred to as “disturbed-disruptive inmates,” 
revealed the inadequacies of classification systems in prisons and forensic hospitals and their 
attendant management practices. Each system structured regimes and routines to deal 
exclusively with either a disturbed (irrational) patient or a disruptive (rational) inmate, but not 
with both categories, especially when certain people appeared to embody both categories and 
when the authorities could not determine whether a prisoner was one or the other.1759 In terms 
of classification, management and treatment, these inmates had “no theoretical standing,” 
according to Toch; the disturbed-disruptive inmate was a discursive and practical blind spot, “a 
non-concept.”1760  
It appears, given the wide latitude of mental health authorities earlier in the century, 
that these people would have been considered more “disturbed” than “disruptive” and would 
have been incarcerated at Farview. Forensic psychologists Terrence Thornberry and Joseph 
Jacoby, who studied and participated in the deinstitutionalization process at Farview, noted 
that until the legal changes in 1970s the state’s involuntary commitment statute “provided the 
                                                          





broadest possible selection criteria. It did not designate Farview as the place of confinement for 
any particular class of persons.”1761 Commitments came directly from the court, other civil 
mental hospitals, and the prison system. By the mid-1960s, Thornberry and Jacoby argue that 
Farview constituted, “an institution of last resort, where individuals who could not be handled 
in other state institutions were sent.”1762  
Farview’s reputation as a disciplinary terminus, albeit for the broadly-conceived 
irrational, informed other control strategies pursued by the state’s prison authorities.1763 
Following the killing of three prison employees in 1973, Gov. Milton Shapp and the Bureau of 
Correction proposed the creation of a “maxi-maxi” control unit at the hospital to deal with 
assaultive prison inmates considered to be too dangerous to safely house in any of the state 
prisons.1764 The unit was to be operated by the Bureau of Correction rather than the Office of 
Mental Health, and Bureau officials acknowledged that the inmates they wished to transfer to 
this unit were not mentally ill, but simply disruptive and violent. However, its planned location 
in a wing of Farview signified the growing proximity of the categories and subjects of penal and 
mental health control. Prisoner advocacy organizations, like Philadelphia’s Prisoners’ Rights 
Council, opposed this plan, decrying, among other things, the lack of selection criteria for 
identifying the target group of prisoners.1765 They feared that this unit would expand and 
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become a way to isolate politicalized prisoners.1766 Although the administration scuttled this 
plan after rumors of wrongdoing at Farview began to surface in late 1974 and 1975, the facility 
retained its reputation for control in the penal imaginaries of state officials, who periodically 
revisited the idea of locating a new penal institution or unit there.1767 The hospital’s remote 
location in the sparsely-populated, mountainous area of northeastern Pennsylvania no doubt 
enhanced this reputation for isolation. 
During the 1970s, the range of mental illness categories that Farview accepted and 
treated shrank and its reputation as a terminus also withered. In addition to the higher degree 
of disturbance and dangerousness needed for involuntary commitment, staff at Farview also 
rejected many patients they deemed to have personality disorders. Farview staff thought such 
people were not mentally ill in a medical sense, but rather expressed “character defects.” 
People diagnosed with personality disorders accounted for the vast majority of mentally 
disturbed prisoners. One court, reviewing the conditions of SCI Pittsburgh in the late 1980s, 
claimed that the prison’s staff diagnosed nearly 80 percent of the institution’s mentally 
disturbed inmates with personality disorders.1768 However, the court noted that, “Although 
these inmates appear to be mentally ill, they are in reality extremely immature.”1769 SCI 
                                                          
Gilbert, Ren Davis, Stan Schmulker, Leodus Jones, August 9, 1974; RE: Meeting, August 16, 1974 – 9:00 A. M., 
Graterford Prison, Margery Velimesis et al. to Residents of Graterford Prison, August 9, 1974; Bureau of 
Corrections Maximum-Maximum Security Facility at Waymart, Pa., Coalition to Reduce Prison Violence to 
Governor Milton J. Shapp, August 28, 1974; Meeting with Stewart Werner et al., Coalition to Reduce Prison 
Violence to Members of Coalition to Reduce Prison Violence, n.d.; Margery Velimesis to Members of Coalition, 
September 3, 1974; [report on interviews with 15 Graterford inmates], Coalition to Reduce Prison Violence, 
September 3, 1974; Meeting of Coalition – 9 September 1974, minutes. Papers of the Prisoners’ Rights Council, box 
11, folder 7: Behavior Modification Project, Farview. TUUA. 
1766 See all documents cited in last note. 
1767 “Kane Scoffs At Farview Deaths Story,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (April 17, 1975); “Farview Prison Held Up By 
‘Suspicious Deaths,’” Pittsburgh Press, (January 12, 1975). 





Pittsburgh’s chief psychiatrist, Dr. Herbert E. Thomas, said that his staff nevertheless struggled 
at times to determine “who requires limiting and restricting and who requires nurturing and 
care.”1770 When an inmate committed a seriously violent act and behaved in what appeared to 
prison staff to be an abnormal manner, disagreement often arose over whether this indicated a 
treatable, if incurable, mental illness such as schizophrenia, which could best be dealt with 
through medical means, like anti-psychotic drugs; or if instead, such behavior emanated from a 
personality disorder. The latter condition implied rationality, albeit from a person who staff also 
believed was immature, manipulative or simply wicked. Staff at Farview drew a sharper 
distinction between those they considered mentally ill and those considered to have 
personality disorders, in other words mad and bad. This, of course, made it far easier to reject 
many transfer requests or return people to prison as soon as possible. 
Farview and other state hospitals used security classification systems and diagnostic 
schemes which differed from the corresponding systems in prisons. In 1977, the Governor’s 
Task Force on Maximum Security Psychiatric Care noted the “urgent need for the creation of a 
common language or set of standards” to be used by both agencies in an effort to minimize 
conflicts over inmate placement.1771 These differences extended to stated purposes of each 
system.1772 This even occurred in situations where the classification system was nominally the 
same. Numerous studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s noted that psychiatrists and 
psychologists working in prisons diagnosed inmates primarily for identification and referral, not 
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treatment, which was more common in mental hospitals.1773 Yet, they used the same diagnostic 
manuals for the identification of disease entities and disorders.1774 Correctional and welfare 
personnel referred to these “rival diagnostic efforts” as “ping ponging,” with staff from each 
agency proposing the best label, and hence place, for the inmate.1775 As Dr. Thomas stated, it 
was often hard to determine if some inmates were either mentally ill, deviant or both. These 
were the people on caged buses. Staff in both the prison and the hospital had a managerial 
interest in classifying an inmate for placement in the other’s custody. 
Even after the new commitment law came into effect, the Office of Mental Health 
further restricted Farview’s role. Citing overcrowding at Farview and inappropriate admissions 
from the prison system, Dr. Scott H. Nelson, the Deputy Secretary for Mental Health, place a 
moratorium on all new admissions in February 1980 until the facility’s population fell below 225 
inmates, a figure which would also be the new legal capacity ceiling.1776 Dr. Nelson also stated 
that the hospital would not accept transfers without accompanying psychiatric histories or 
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inmates from prisons if they were committed under Section 302 of Act 143, which had the 
lowest criteria threshold.1777  
This policy shift effectively suspended the actual physical transfer of prisoners 
regardless of their legal commitment status. Within a year, there were numerous inmates 
legally committed to Farview who were still residing in prison, often in control units.1778  Even 
when space opened up at Farview, only the most serious cases could be transferred. During the 
meetings of the Correctional/Mental Health Task Force in 1980, senior officials from the 
welfare and corrections agencies negotiated how to provide for mentally ill inmates, eventually 
reconciling their difference on the transfer process, but without altering Farview’s strict 
capacity limit. Both agencies crafted a plan to enhance short-term treatment in prisons with 
extra staffing and capital expenditures for the construction of better mental health units. Senior 
staff members in the Bureau of Correction were not very pleased with this option, hoping that 
more mentally ill inmates would be removed from the state’s prisons.1779 However, one of Gov. 
Thornburgh’s clear priorities upon assuming office in 1979 was to drastically reduce the size 
and scope of the Department of Welfare and its programs.1780 This included closing as many 
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state hospitals as possible and reducing the operations of the remaining ones. However, 
Thornburgh opted to keep Farview open, but with a much reduced role than it had only a 
decade before.1781  
The dramatic increase in mentally ill inmates was not unique to Pennsylvania. Numerous 
states in the country also reported large influxes of mentally ill prisoners along with similar 
difficulties in providing for them. The most common explanation was summed up succinctly by 
Alfred Blumstein, the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency: 
“We’ve really emptied the mental institutions, and a lot of those people are winding up in 
prison.”1782 This phenomenon, occurred with greater frequency in the 1970s, even though the 
populations in state hospitals had been declining since the late 1950s. It also occurred in many 
other countries around the world, although there is evidence to suggest that happened at 
different times.1783 Since state mental hospitals usually held people who were not likely to end 
up in prisons, it is likely that the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill only became a 
prominent issue for state prison systems after state hospitals began releasing more seriously 
mentally ill, young, male patients who could not be easily managed beyond direct institutional 
controls. As a number of critics of deinstitutionalization have argued, plans for community 
mental health treatment were never adequately developed to deal with many of the severely 
mentally ill people whom the state simply abandoned during the 1970s and early 1980s.1784 As 
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restrictions on involuntary mental health commitment grew, minor offenders with mental 
health problems were also not absorbed by the state hospital system as they would have been 
a few years earlier.1785 These minor offenders not only did not receive treatment that may have 
prevented or controlled their illness, but they also accumulated lengthier criminal records, 
which made them more susceptible to incarceration in state prisons later.  
Despite the attention that Pennsylvania’s General Assembly and the administrations of 
Gov. Thornburgh and later Gov. Robert Casey directed at the mental health services during the 
1980s, many mentally ill inmates remained in the state’s prisons, suffering unnecessarily and 
precipitating numerous difficulties for staff and other prisoners.  Nearly a decade after the 
Graterford hostage crisis and the inquiries into forensic mental health services in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, numerous investigations and exposes of the prison system and specific 
institutions—from court opinions, riot inquires, journalistic accounts--noted that there were 
still many mentally ill inmates in the state’s prisons, that their numbers were increasing and the 
concomitant management problems remained unresolved.1786  
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Although care for these people improved in some areas, the Bureau of Correction, and 
its successor agency the Department of Corrections, did not follow through on the construction 
of many of the planned special units for the mentally ill or sufficiently increase psychological 
support staff.1787  The onslaught of new prisoners entering the prison system consumed 
resources and cell space to the detriment of the mentally ill as well as other inmates who had 
certain problems or attributes that distinguished them from the normative, general-population 
prisoner. Such “special needs” prisoners, as they were often referred to at the time, included 
the elderly, physically disabled, developmentally or intellectually disabled, the young (late teens 
or early twenties), and non-English speakers. Discussions of the dilemmas of special needs 
prisoners sometimes included women as well, but more often reports on the need for 
differential programs or units dealt with women separately. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania’s 
prison population began to register greater diversity among the inmates during the 1980s and 
this was reflected in many publications and media representations of prison issues.1788 
Accompanying the growing visibility of such diversity was the awareness that Pennsylvania 
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prisons often did not alter practices to accommodate such people. This became a focal point of 
penal politics during the 1980s and 1990s as the prison system developed programs or units to 
address this diversity. 
Charles Goldblum, an inmate at SCI Huntington, wrote to prominent state politicians in 
November 1989 in the wake of a series of major disturbances in several prisons across the 
state.1789 He included a lengthy analysis of the prison system that he and another inmate, 
Charles Busbee, wrote, offering explanations of the violence and recommended reforms. 
Among the issues they mentioned was the persistent disruptive presence of mentally ill 
inmates who they felt should not be in the prison system but could not be transferred to 
Farview. They decried the state’s inaction on this issue by pointing out that “Other states have 
alternative housing for prisoners who are mentally ill. Pennsylvania needs to come into the 
twentieth century.”1790  
Although, as the twentieth century neared an end, the prison system created more 
dedicated mental health spaces within prisons, Pennsylvania moved further away from the 
policy it adopted at the beginning of the twentieth century, which hinged on a greater 
distinction between the categories of criminal and insane. A critic of deinstitutionalization, 
author Ann Braden Johnson argued in 1990 that closing state hospitals disrupted certain 
distinctions, adhering to certain people and institutions: 
 
One thing deinstitutionalization has done is to deprive us of a handy device for 
sorting out deviants. In the old days, crazy people went to the hospital, while bad 
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people went to jail. By the same token, people driving by a mental hospital could 
be pretty sure it housed crazy people; if they chanced to see a jail or prison, they 
could safely assume bad people were inside. Now, though, it’s a lot less clear 




In the aftermath of the disturbances of 1989, the administration of Gov. Robert Casey 
accelerated a plan they had proposed earlier for creating a drug treatment unit for the 
Department of Corrections in some of the buildings at Farview.1792 By 1995, the entire facility, 
renamed as the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, came under the control of the penal 
bureaucracy.1793 The Pennsylvania State Hospital for the Criminally Insane,1794 later called 
Farview State Hospital, became another prison within the Department of Corrections, albeit 
one with specialized programs for the mentally ill and drug dependent 
 
Penal Classification and the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons 
 
By the mid-1970s, the prisons of New South Wales were in deep turmoil. Several large 
disturbances had occurred since the late 1960s and there were plenty of indications to the 
public that prison staff had used extreme force in subduing prisoners after these events and to 
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maintain order more generally. Yet officially, the state’s penal agency proclaimed that 
educating, training and rehabilitating prisoners was its primary mission, symbolized perhaps 
most clearly by the decision in 1970 to change the Department of Prisons’ longstanding name 
to the Department of Corrective Services. The incongruence of these accounts and the 
mounting confusion and tensions among prisoners and within the ranks of prison staff, was 
equally apparent in the operation of the classification system and the categories it used. The 
senior management of the Department wished to change numerous aspects of the 
classification system, but their plans were poorly conceived and implemented in a haphazard 
fashion at best. They also encountered resistance from the unionized guard force, which was 
heavily invested in how the existing classification system supported their security concerns. The 
crisis in the states' prison system culminated in a massive riot and fire that destroyed most of 
Bathurst Gaol in February 1974. The destruction prompted numerous calls for an extensive 
investigation, which could only be effected by a royal commission with wide-ranging terms of 
reference. After stalling for nearly two years, the sitting Liberal-Country coalition government 
formed a royal commission in 1976, just prior to their defeat at the polls. The new Labor 
government, led by Premier Neville Wran reduced the number of Royal Commissioners from 
three to one, but otherwise retained the very broad terms of reference, which required the 
Royal Commission to examine the entirety of the Department of Corrective Services and its 
operations. Supreme Court Justice John F. Nagle, the sole Royal Commissioner, convened the 
first sitting of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Prisons on April 14, 1976. 
 After discussing how the investigation would proceed and who would have standing to 




complexes and received a statement from Walter McGeechan, the Commissioner of Correctives 
Services, which summarized the Department’s current operations. McGeechan’s statement 
described the workings of the classification system at length, but he repeatedly qualified it with 
explanations of how Department personnel departed from stated policy and failed to meet the 
standards he hoped were possible.1795 The prison regulations established under the Prisons Act 
of 1952 mandated Inmate classification in Regulation 10, which listed ten broad categories 












After this initial sorting by a reception officer, a new prisoner spent weeks, often months, at a 
reception center during the second phase of classification, which involved interviews, a medical 
screening, psychological testing and an evaluation of an inmate’s educational and vocational 
aptitude. The central Classification Committee reviewed all prisoners serving sentences over 
twelve months before deciding where to place them.  Despite the accumulation of information 
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about prisoners during the second phase of classification, McGeechan conceded that the 
primary considerations for most placements were the availability of space and security.1797 
Penal authorities in New South Wales had always deployed some form of inmate 
sorting,1798 however the classification scheme elaborated in the Regulation 10 and the workings 
of the Classification Committee formed part of a postwar prison reform project undertaken by 
the then head of the Department of Prisons, Comptroller-General Leslie Nott. According to John 
Morony, who served as Comptroller-General of Prisons from 1960 to 1968, Nott was especially 
influenced by American penological thinking and practice, particularly the work of Frank 
Loveland, the Assistant Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons and author of an authoritative 
manual on classification.1799 Between April and July 1947, Nott travelled extensively in the 
United Kingdom and United States, speaking with penal administrators and observing practices 
in numerous prisons.1800 Nott also forged new collaborative relationships with representatives 
of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission and the American Prison 
Association.1801 Nott’s research on institutional practices overseas underscores the 
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multijurisdictional and transnational aspects of postwar penal change. Previous administrations 
had avoided similar studies for nearly 50 years, since the time of Frederick Neitenstein study 
tour.1802 Based on the wealth of literature and information from interviews and observations, 
Nott ordered the creation of a centralized Classification Committee in 1950, which included an 
education officer, a psychologist, industries officer and a medical officer in addition to custodial 
staff and the Deputy Comptroller.1803 With minor changes, this structure remained in place until 
the 1970s.  
Nott and his staff drew heavily upon the therapeutic language and expertise in vogue 
immediately after World War II, which emphasized the individualized assessment and 
separation of prisoners into homogenous groups as well as training and if possible, treatment. 
Nevertheless, Nott’s reforms retained significant custodial aspects in practice. Security was the 
primary concern of the Classification Committee. He also significantly translated some overseas 
models to fit prevailing regimes in New South Wales. Certain aspects of therapeutic practices 
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more prominent overseas, like various forms of group or individual counseling and artistic 
programs, were not as prominent in New South Wales, although they started to gain inroads at 
certain prisons in the Sydney area by the mid-to-late 1960s.1804 Training in industrial or 
agricultural work retained a greater presence in postwar prison regimes to the degree that 
certain prisons, set aside specifically for “remediable” prisoners were rebranded as Training 
Centres. 
 
Categorical Adequacy and (In)Flexibility: The Classification Process in Transition 
 
Walter McGeechan, admitted that during his time as the Commissioner of Correctives 
Services (since 1968), classification staff had abandoned several classification categories from 
Nott’s scheme that he felt were either obsolete, unworkable or ironically worked too well as 
description of certain people. McGeechan, in fact, introduced the section on classification by 
mentioning these significant departures from established regulations: 
 
It might be stated however that the classifications of “intractable" and 
"homosexual" are no longer used by the department. 
 
The reasons are that in the case of "intractables" the classification is archaic and 
tends to impose upon the prisoner a title which will become an irreversible 
description. 
 
With regard to ''homosexual", the position has arisen where the tests for 
ascertaining whether a person is homosexual have proved to be unsatisfactory. 
Again this classification tends to impose an irreversible description upon a 
prisoner. 
 
                                                          




Maintenance confinees have almost ceased to exist because of the provisions of 
the Family Law Act. 
 
Since the abolition of imprisonment for debt, "debtors" are a rare classification, 
but the position can occasionally arise when a person is committed for contempt 
of court for disobedience of civil process.1805 
 
McGeechan claimed that the usefulness of the categories under Regulation 10 had 
either declined over the decades or became highly controversial and were now more of a 
hindrance than a useful tool for prison management. Some categories were clearly attached to 
sentencing practices, like imprisonment for failing to pay maintenance support for ex-spouses 
and children, which no longer existed.1806  
During testimony, Justice Nagle and David Hunt, counselor for the Royal Commission, 
both pressed McGeechan to clarify why he abandoned the categories of intractable and 
homosexual and asked him about two new, semi-formal categories, which appeared to be their 
replacements. McGeechan claimed that the categories of intractable and homosexual each 
carried profound labeling effects, which adhered to prisoners more than other categories, 
permanently affecting how prison staff treated them and limiting their opportunities for 
program participation and placement. Ideally, a person could progress through different 
categories and custody levels during their imprisonment. In practice, the categories of 
Intractable and homosexual were far less flexible and tended to remain affixed to a person 
regardless of their behavior and security status. 
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 Intractable prisoners were always held in very secure institutions or units. Many of the 
segregation sections in the state’s prisons were known among prisoners and staff as “trac 
sections,” “trac cells” or simply “the tracs” in reference to this classification status. The term 
“trac” became a description of a person so classified as well. Prison authorities reserved the 
state’s most severe and physically brutal regime, at Grafton Gaol, only for prisoners classified as 
intractable, although, intractable prisoners were placed in other prisons as well. By the 1970s, 
the category had become highly controversial because staff used it to contain and punish prison 
activists who, as McGeechan correctly assessed, could never fully shed the distinction in their 
remaining time in prison. On occasion, prison guards blocked some formerly intractable 
prisoners from participating in programs against the wishes of the Department’s 
administration. For instance, prison staff refused to accept Bernie Matthews into the work 
release program at Silverwater because of his past status as a trac and previous confinement at 
Grafton and Katingal.1807 Activists often charged that prison staff applied the status in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner that had far more to do with squashing criticism by certain 
prisoners and repressing their political organizing efforts.1808 During the Royal Commission, 
prisoners and activists repeatedly aired these criticisms in formal submissions and public 
testimony, propelling the intractable status and the process of dispensing it into a very public, 
political forum. As prisons became a more contentious topic, the status also began to confer 
additional meanings to a wider audience. The term always denoted a certain level of respect 
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and fear for those who had it among the prison population, but this reputation grew during the 
1970s as the Royal Commission’s work publicized the abusive way prison authorities used the 
designation and treated people who had it. Thirty years after many of these events, Bernie 
Matthews titled his well-received memoir Intractable, about his experiences in prisons and 
units set aside for intractable prisoners.1809 
McGeechan told the Royal Commission that he had abandoned the use of the 
intractable classification category. Prisoners who would have had this title were now held in 
administrative segregation under the provision of Section 22 of the Prisons Act of 1952. As the 
Royal Commission pointed out, this latter status was temporary and needed government 
approval if prison authorities wanted to keep the inmate in isolation for extended periods. It 
did not exactly correspond to intractable as a formal classification category in their view. 
McGeechan agreed, stating that he had “abolish[ed] a class of prisoner” and that designation 
for administrative segregation was not tantamount to the old category.1810 David Hunt 
questioned whether this new policy actually changed much; inmates held in isolation in the 
name of “administrative segregation” often remained there indefinitely, and they still carried a 
similar negative reputation as those previously labeled intractable. In fact, many inmates would 
have earned both labels during their time in prison. McGeechan disagreed with Hunt’s 
suggestion, citing how difficult it had been:  
 
…to persuade the system generally that a prisoner with a classification of 
intractable could be other than intractable; it is a branding or a labeling effect 
which tends to continue. I think there is a great deal of difference between an 
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administrative segregation prisoner who may have an ordinary discipline 
classification and one whose papers are stamped intractable.1811 
 
Whether Hunt was correct or not about the continuity of exclusion and dangerousness in the 
two categories, this issue pointed up the fact that the power of penal classification could easily 
escape the control of the specialized classification staff and senior management of the 
Department. Members of the guard force and their union exercised as much and perhaps more 
authority in the enforcement of classification decisions. Moreover, their definitions of 
intractable (among other categories) and the criteria of inclusion departed from the formal 
classification system despite utilizing its language and some of its procedures and psychical 
spaces of confinement. 
McGeechan also insisted that “homosexual” was no longer a useful category for prison 
management because of the difficulty in establishing a prisoner’s sexual orientation.1812 Yet, 
McGeechan admitted after questioning that a new category of “non-associates,” or “N.A.s,” 
covered people who would have fallen under the old category of homosexual.1813 Although 
McGeechan tried to convince the Royal Commission that heterosexual inmates could also 
potentially be considered non-associates and that the category was more for “aggressive 
homosexuals,” he agreed that all current non-associates were homosexual and they were kept 
in specially dedicated wings or at Cooma Gaol, a prison set aside for non-associates, some 
others convicted of sexual crimes and those needing protection.1814 McGeechan insisted, 
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however, that this status was an “internal classification” category at the disposal of prison 
superintendents and not formally part of the classification system.1815 Much like the fate of the 
intractable category, McGeechan claimed that the non-associate category did not replace 
homosexual in the list of available categories in Regulation 10. The task of determining who was 
homosexual/non-associate no longer rested with the reception officer or even the centralized 
Classification Committee. Rather, it fell largely to the superintendent of the prison where the 
inmate in question was placed. A superintendent designated inmates as non-associates based 
on the inmate’s reputation or accusations by prison staff or other inmates.1816 
 During subsequent testimony, McGeechan also indicated that there were problems with 
some of the other categories in Regulation 10. The line separating remediable and recidivist, for 
instance, was basically “arbitrary,” according to McGeechan.1817 The main criterion for 
determining who was a recidivist was evidence of past imprisonment, except if the time served 
in the previous episode was less than three months. Finding a record of a short sentence, near 
this mark, a reception officer was left with a choice: was this prisoner best classified as 
remediable or a recidivist? The reception officer based his decision mainly on his professional 
judgment and impressions of the specific offender.1818 Much like the decision to label someone 
as intractable, this decision had profound implications for the prisoner because there were 
many more program opportunities available for remediable inmates and the greater possibility 
of being placed in a lower security prison. Recidivist, it seemed, was likely to become as much 
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an irreversible description as intractable or homosexual, conferring with it the presumption of 
habitual criminality. 
Throughout the section on classification, McGeechan noted the numerous difficulties 
and obstacles hindering what he termed the more “ideal” goal of addressing the individual 
needs of inmates through classification.1819 This was in fact how the Department’s official 
publications presented classification. The Department’s annual report for 1971-1972, for 
instance, stated that the Classification Committee evaluated inmates’ “natural abilities and 
aptitudes, and capacity to benefit from trade training or educational opportunities,” then 
assigned them to appropriate establishments. Only after these rationales, did the report 
mention that officials also considered security concerns.1820 The department’s descriptions of 
classification in other annual reports leading up to the Royal Commission in 1976 echoed similar 
therapeutic and reformative purposes of classification and concerns with a “prisoner's progress 
and well being.”1821  However, during questioning before the Royal Commission, McGeechan 
admitted that the decisions of the Classification Committee hinged largely on available space 
and resources at state’s various prisons and that the department unnecessarily held far too 
many people in maximum-security institutions. He also conceded that the lack of facilities for 
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women meant that classifying female inmates was virtually impossible. There was not enough 
space for adequate differentiation.1822 McGeechan stated that these problems were hardly 
unique to New South Wales: “Presently, I doubt whether any penal system in the world has a 
completely effective functional system for the classification of convicted offenders, ideals 
notwithstanding.”1823 
The Royal Commission’s final report noted the difficulty they had in understanding the 
Department’s classification system, which they finally attributed to the confusion and 
inconsistency that marked the system in in actual practice.1824 Official submissions by the 
Department and many of its officers, as well as direct questioning, left Justice Nagle and his 
staff perplexed about how the Department’s classification actually worked and what 
procedures they followed. McGeechan’s admission that in practice he did not follow all of the 
provisions of Regulation 10 only exacerbated the mysterious nature of the process. As a result, 
the Royal Commission examined over 100 inmates files, checking for evidence of consistent 
procedures and trying to understand what type of work went into the routine assessment of 
inmates.1825 
The picture that emerged from this investigation revealed inconsistently followed rules, 
the duplication of work among different committees all performing classification work, the ad-
hoc nature of membership on these various committees, serious deficiencies in the quality of 
evaluations especially in regards to scoring for various standardized tests and written 
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assessments, which were often simply absent from the files.1826 The final report stated bluntly 
that, “Whatever the procedures, they can only be effective if they are carried out.”1827 The 
Royal Commission agreed that reforms introduced in mid-1975 were an improvement over past 
practice, especially in regard to the composition of the Classification Committee and how its 
recommendations were carried out. However, they still concluded that “no consistent and 
regular procedure was followed for the classification of prisoners.”1828 The Department’s 
classification system had “many merits in theory,” but was ultimately “unsatisfactory” because 
many policies were never actually implemented.1829  
 Beyond this criticism, which echoed their overall assessment of McGeechan’s 
leadership, the Royal Commission also lamented the current state of classification knowledge in 
general. While acknowledging the merits of separating certain groups of prisoners, they 
nevertheless, held a dim view of its record in practice. The Royal Commission drew this 
conclusion after evaluating past classification practices and current systems in other Australian 
states and several foreign countries. Like Leslie Nott thirty years before, their research effort 
involved extensive study tours and interviews with experts and practitioners from different 
jurisdictions. David Hunt, the Royal Commission’s chief counsel, visited numerous reception and 
diagnostic centers in the United Kingdom and the United States, and the full Commission 
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reviewed professional literature and historical documents, especially reports from past 
inquiries, some dating to the nineteenth century.1830    
In the final report’s chapter devoted to classification, Justice Nagle drew upon this 
comparative knowledge while evaluating practices in New South Wales. Despite laudable 
reasons for separating inmates into different groupings, Justice Nagle surmised that the best 
method for actually accomplishing this task remained unclear. His description of the 
inadequacies and unmet expectations of numerous expensive “reception and diagnostic 
centres” abroad complimented the disillusionment evident in penological literature about 
classification.1831 Nagle quoted the prominent University of Chicago criminologist Norval 
Morris, who argued that many experienced prison staff could make classification decisions on 
par with highly specialized classification personnel without the need of extended periods of 
quarantine following reception or the armature of social scientific testing.1832 
Despite such dismal prospects, Nagle readily conceded that classification was a 
necessary aspect of prison management. Yet, he cautioned that no reforms would provide a 
solution to all the inherent problems of classification. To enhance the simplicity and efficiency 
of the process, Nagle recommended that the primary purpose of any classification system 
should be security; all other concerns had to be secondary. He recommended a new series of 
categories drawn from an earlier inquiry in New South Wales, which in turn adapted them from 
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British practice. In 1973, a working party investigating the state’s prison operations had 
criticized the existing ten category system. The working party’s chairman, Justice John 
McClemens recommended adopting a three-tiered system, which they adapted from the report 
of a recent prison inquiry led by Lord Mountbatten in the United Kingdom.1833 The inquiry, 
which followed the escape of several high security prisoners, recommended a simple security-
based, four-tiered system running from category (a) for highest risk category to category (d) for 
low-risk, open institutions. McClemens and Nagle both believed that the size of New South 
Wales’ prison system necessitated reducing this system to three security-based categories:1834 
 
Category A—Prisoners whose escape would be highly dangerous to members of 
the public or to the security of the State. 
 
Category B—Prisoners who cannot be trusted in conditions where there is no 
barrier to their escape. 
 
Category C—Prisoners who can be trusted in open institutions.1835 
 
The main benefit of the proposed reform, according to the final report, was its simplicity in 
comparison to the previous system. In addition to using fewer categories, Nagle hoped that the 
centralization of the process in a permanent Classification Committee with dedicated staff 
would create clearer lines of decision-making authority and eliminate the unnecessary 
duplication of classification work among various committees. Nagle argued that classification 
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would “have a better chance of working efficiently” if the Department adopted these 
changes.1836 
Who Decides and Why?: The Politics and Dispersal of Classification 
 
While classification in prisons is as old as the institution itself, the fluctuation of the practice in 
the 1970s demonstrated that in certain periods the process becomes a major point of 
contention between different groups and individuals. Nagle’s criticism of the Department’s 
classification practice highlighted many problems, but because he framed these issues in largely 
administrative terms or as examples of implementation failure, a lot of the discord surrounding 
the system was episodic at best or remained obscured. These disputes and the breakdown in 
certain aspects of classification related to the overall changes in the status and activities of 
inmates and guards in New South Wales during the 1960s and 1970s. As McGeechan indicated, 
some of the classification categories no longer aligned with new sentencing laws or prison 
regimes, which rendered them meaningless, like the archaic category of debtor. 
 More significant, however, was the changing status of prisoners and guards in relation 
to one another and the senior management of the Department. Over the course of the 1960s, 
the Department of Prisons introduced a number of variations in prison routines, programs and 
amenities for inmates framed in therapeutic language, that were intended to make the 
conditions and opportunities in prison more closely resemble life beyond the institution’s 
walls.1837 The extent of such changes can be easily overstated, but they nevertheless laid the 
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basis for greater changes and expectations among many prisoners for better treatment. Many 
imprisoned people became much more willing to protest discrepancies they saw between 
reformative policy statements and actual practices in the prisons as well as differences between 
various institutions, especially concerning varying degrees of strictness and laxity. Criminologist 
John Pratt has argued that the amelioration of prison conditions after World War II often made 
regimes more conducive to self-expression, self-respect and assertiveness among prisoners.1838 
In some cases, this enabled the construction of solidarity among prisoners over common 
grievances in forums like writing classes and theater programs.  
The state’s guard force resented these changes, especially in the way that it both closed 
some of the social distance between them and prisoners and the concomitant changes this 
meant for their work duties. During the successive administrations of John Morony (1960-1968) 
and Walter McGeechan (1968-1978), the Department tried to craft a new role for guards that 
brought them into a closer relationship with the people in their custody.1839 In retrospect, the 
degree of actual change in this regard might appear relatively minor, but at the time, guards 
worried that it heralded even greater change and the demise of the unchallenged authoritarian 
rule that they used to maintain institutional discipline. While the Department still maintained 
harsh discipline at several maximum security prisons and a brutal punitive regime at Grafton 
Gaol, they also loosened routines and discipline at some of the lower security facilities. 
Cessnock Corrective Centre, a medium-minimum security facility opened in 1972, experimented 
                                                          
similar accounts from New York, the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand, in addition to New South Wales 
and Victoria.  
1838 Ibid. 
1839 For an overview, see Statement by Mr. D. Grant, Deputy Chairman, Corrective Services Commission, in Relation 
to an Inquiry Concerning Prison Officers, Pursuant to Section 35(1)(o) of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 vol. 1 




with a new prisoner management regime based on greater interaction between staff and 
inmates and increased work opportunities and time out of cells.1840 Coupled with other new 
programs, like work release, the growing variation in conditions and amenities meant that for 
prisoners and guards alike ever more rested on classification and assignment decisions as well 
as periodic reclassification decisions by Programme Review Committees at each institution. 
Reforms by Morony and McGeechan gradually placed less emphasis on the 
authoritarian disciplinary duties that defined the role of a prison officer up to that point.1841 
Their reforms created confusion in the status and expectations for guards, and this soon 
developed a major organizing issue for their union, which became much more active and 
militant at this time.1842 In 1971, the union petitioned the Industrial Commission for a 
reassessment of established pay rates arguing that the job duties of their members had 
changed considerably since the last award in 1951. The Industrial Commission agreed, noting 
that: 
Through the policy of the Department of Corrective Services …various aspects of 
change have occurred in the work of Prison Officers. It is difficult to pinpoint 
when this change really began to occur but it is apparent from the evidence that 
the emphasis is now placed on the need to rehabilitate prisoners, a lessening of 
the formerly strict standards of discipline, and the need to have an individual 
approach and act as a counsellor to prisoners.1843 
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As the Royal Commission later revealed, the Department’s commitment to rehabilitation was 
ill-informed and poorly implemented at best. McGeechan’s incoherent rehabilitative policy 
statements often confused staff and prisoners alike. According to David Grant, a senior 
corrections official in the 1980s, a fundamental change in the status of prisoners occurred 
between the late 1950s and 1980s, but there was not a clear corresponding transformation of 
the role of prisoner officer.1844 Instead, their new duties often developed in a contradictory and 
piecemeal fashion; guards retained all their custodial duties, which emphasized their distance 
from inmates, but their superiors gradually expected them to develop more supportive, 
counseling roles with inmates.1845 The guards’ union objected to almost all attempts to reduce 
their direct authority over prisoner management and staged numerous walkouts over the 
course of the 1970s.1846 Michael Berstern has estimated that there were at least 38 strikes 
between 1968 and 1984, in addition to many more industrial disputes that never escalated into 
actual strikes.1847  
Disputes often erupted over the security classifications of specific inmates, particularly 
when prison officers were concerned about inmates they believed were potentially violent or 
prison activists. The officers’ union organized strikes over the reclassification of certain 
prisoners and changes in their placement. Such job actions were usually local, targeting specific 
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prisons, but sometimes triggered sympathy strikes by guards at other institutions. Just the 
threat of drastic actions like these influenced the willingness of the Classification Committee to 
make certain placements. Commissioner McGeechan also occasionally overruled the decisions 
of the Classification Committee to avoid a confrontation with the guards’’ union. While some of 
the guards’ anger was certainly directed at McGeechan personally, industrial strife over 
classification decisions continued during the administrations of subsequent Commissioners of 
Corrective Services. 
In his prison journal, Ray Denning recounted several instances of guards considering 
strike action because his classification status was about to change.1848 Denning had been 
convicted of maliciously wounding a prison officer, Willy Faber, at Parramatta Prison in a 1974 
escape attempt. Faber died of his injuries four years later. Denning spent years in control units 
after the 1974 attach, but protested his innocence and became a cause célèbre among prison 
activist groups outside the walls who tried to expose his mistreatment.1849 When the senior 
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leadership of the Department tried to reclassify Denning and move him to normal discipline or 
a new prison, prison officers threatened to block the changes. Denning recalled in his diaries 
that the superintendent of Grafton Gaol personally told him that officers at Parramatta Prison 
would strike immediately if he was ever assigned to that prison.1850 
The Sydney press reported a similar week-long event in March 1981. Guards refused to 
permit the reclassification of a particular inmate (who remained anonymous in media accounts) 
for normal discipline at the maximum security Metropolitan Reception Prison within the Long 
Bay complex. Nearly 500 prison officers at Long Bay Prison Complex south of Sydney walked off 
the job, leaving executive officers and police to staff the prison’s critical posts while inmates 
remained locked in their cells.1851 The inmate in question had been classified as intractable in 
the early 1970s and sent to the disciplinary section of Grafton Gaol. He later testified to the 
Royal Commission about the beatings he endured at Grafton.1852 As part of the concessions that 
eventually ended the strike, Tony Vinson, the Chairman of the Corrective Services 
Commission,1853 proposed to have a panel of three psychiatrists re-examine the prisoner to 
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determine his placement, in effect offering the guards the reassurance of an unusual and 
intensive form of classification.1854  
Both Denning’s writings and the March 1981 industrial dispute highlight the controversy 
surrounding the high end of the security-based classification categories. Whether considered 
“intractable” or on “administrative segregation,” the official result was solitary confinement, 
which also often included physical punishments, from exposure to extreme temperatures to 
beatings. Most guards believed that people assigned to such categories were unchangeable and 
always posed a threat to their safety. If many prisoners could progress (or regress) through 
different classification categories and security levels, these people, at the terminus of the 
classification system, could not. Many guards were either willing to defy their superiors to 
enforce their classification views concerning intractable prisoners or unwilling to defy their 
union and more vocal colleagues.1855 The majority of classification decisions were 
uncontroversial, but these examples illustrate that most guards believed they had a vested 
interest in classification decisions, especially those that directly endangered their safety or 
threatened their occupational privileges and purview. Decades earlier, the formal classification 
process respected their interests more, but this influence waned during the 1960s and 1970s - 
at the same time that the administrations of Morony, McGeechan and Vinson expected (in 
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different ways) a more supportive, if paternalistic, role for guards towards the people in their 
custody. Conceding their prerogatives regarding how certain, high-risk or politicized prisoners 
were classified and managed risked losing more power vis-à-vis the administration over their 
occupational duties and direct authority over prisoners. Guards were fighting, in effect, their 
own reclassification into a different form of penal employee.1856  
In the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, classification became a much more contentious 
practice reflecting the contemporary divisive politics within the penal bureaucracy itself. It 
became increasingly difficult for the Classification Committee or the central administration to 
impose its view of the security risks associated with a particular prisoner or to plan their time 
and activities while incarcerated. This should be seen not so much as the failure of 
classification, but rather an indication that the power to classify and the resources flowing from 
it became less subordinated to the established formal procedures. Increasingly from 1970 
onward, it circulated within the penal bureaucracy in highly antagonistic ways, both animating 
and reflecting disputes between and among guards, their union, specialized professional staff, 
the central administration and, of course, prisoners themselves. The people subjected to this 
form of classification and placement were often lost in such struggles even though they sat at 
the center of them. Much like the prisoner in the March 1981 struggle between the staff at 
Long Bay and the Corrective Services Commission (which replaced the single Commissioner of 
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Corrective Services), these people often remained nameless or voiceless in these disputes. Even 
when public forums named such people, they portrayed them as notorious, dangerous, 
intractable prisoners.  
In activist publications, memoirs and their testimony before the Royal Commission or 
the Ombudsman, prisoners often claimed to be perplexed by the decision to classify them as 
intractable. Certain acts of violence or a history of such behavior clearly invited such a 
designation by either centralized Classification Committee, one of the many institutional 
Programme Review Committees, or the head of the Department. Yet, prisoners complained 
about many instances where the decision to classify a prisoner as intractable or the isolate 
under administrative segregation appeared questionable or confusing. Staff usually did not 
explain classification decisions, or did so in very general terms. For instance, the state’s 
Ombudsman investigated numerous complaints by inmate Barrie Levy who claimed that he 
never understood why he was placed at the intractable section of Grafton Gaol prior to its 
closing and why the authorities subsequently sent him to the Katingal unit. Ian Sanders, the 
Director of Special Security Units, did little to clear up this confusion when he explained Levy’s 
classification and placement in Katingal to the Ombudsman: 
 
The reason why Levy was classified to Katingal S. S. U., was that when he was 
reclassified for ordinary discipline in maximum security from being an 
“intractable prisoner” the Commissioner [McGeechan], after due consultation, 
considered that Levy would not have fitted into any prison community in any 
other maximum security establishment at that point in time. Levy has been told 
this on a number of occasions.1857  
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Levy disagreed with Sanders’s statement, telling to Ombudsman that he never received an 
answer to why he was held at Katingal.1858  
Levy’s experience also pointed up the fact that he sat between categories, which were 
also in transition: previously considered intractable, Levy was now classified for normal 
maximum security discipline (potentially as either remediable or recidivist, according to 
Regulation 10). However, McGeechan still held Levy in isolation, presumably under 
administrative segregation, which in part replaced some of the functions of the previous 
intractable category, but as McGeechan insisted, did not constitute an official classification 
category on par with the remaining operable categories of Regulation 10. What was the “due 
consultation” that McGeechan sought in making his decision about Levy? Did he confer 
informally with the superintendents of the various maximum security prisons, canvassing the 
possibility of Levy being accepted by the guard force and other prisoners? If a formal 
classification committee cleared Levy for ordinary discipline, another classification process, 
centered on McGeechan, but presumably including others, intervened to keep Levy at Katingal 
after gauging the suitability and tolerance of the receiving institution. 
Such negotiations normally occurred within the formal Classification Committee and 
Programme Review Committees as well. It would be a mistake to see such negotiations as 
deviations from the classification system or as simply manipulations of an otherwise consistent, 
valid procedure. Disagreement, negotiation and consensus building were at the very heart of 
the process, and classification also provided a bargaining tool that could be deployed in 
                                                          




numerous situations. In his memoir, Clyde Paton, a prison chaplain at Long Bay, described 
Classification Committee meetings during the 1960s as contests over professional competence, 
expertise, masculinity, and appearing realistic or pessimistic about the possibilities of inmate 
rehabilitation.1859 Paton noted that committee members often knew one of the inmates, whose 
case was before them, and would often make special pleadings on their behalf.1860 This was not 
a procedural departure, but an expected part of the format. Each committee member 
presented a short summary of their assessment of an inmate based on their particular field of 
experience.1861 This summary provided the opportunity for personal testimonies about a well-
known inmate, which of course, could range from good to bad. Paton noted that presenting a 
case favorably risked one’s reputation; poor subsequent behavior by an inmate reflected back 
on the committee member, proving them wrong, naïve or soft on crime.1862  
The American prison official, Frank Loveland, whose work greatly influenced practices in 
New South Wales, noted that the approval of prison superintendents and the inclusion and 
active participation of different prison staff with varied expertise was crucial to the eventual 
success of mid-twentieth-century inmate classification procedures.1863 The competition 
described by Paton tempered such success. An inmate’s behavior in prison and criminal record 
usually outweighed all other sources of information in classification decisions, according to 
Paton. Psychologists also often carefully framed their case assessments in ways that minimized 
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risk to themselves and their expertise: “Another secret to a good report, from the 
psychologist’s viewpoint, was to make sure you had it both ways, to cover yourself in the event 
of the prisoner rehabilitating himself or returning as a recidivist.”1864 Such behavior, also 
common among some psychiatrists Paton knew, indicated the tenuous status of psychology 
and psychiatry in Classification Committee meetings and the postwar prison in New South 
Wales in general.1865 
If such expertise seemed defensive to Paton and came across as ineffective to Nagle, it 
appeared quixotic, arbitrary and authoritarian to many incarcerated people. Inmate Bernie 
Matthews, who spent the much of his time in prison in segregation, was struck with disbelief 
upon seeing the assessments in his prison file. With the help of other inmates, Matthews 
managed to steal his file and copy it following a parole hearing. He returned the file in a few 
hours without being detected. Matthews noticed that the first entry, his initial classification, 
followed a pattern resembling Patton’s description of having it both ways. The psychologist 
wrote that Matthews was: “Inclined to be hostile and with a big chip on his shoulder” and “He 
has quite good potential and with a bit of guidance could definitely make something of his 
life.”1866 An escape early in his sentence channeled him toward higher security classification and 
similar institutions and units upon his recapture. Matthews soon gained a reputation as a 
notorious prisoner during these years, building a greater density of intractable attributes and 
descriptions in later entries in his file.1867 Initial assessments of his potential disappeared.  
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By the end of the Royal Commission in 1978, the Department of Corrective Services 
closed both Grafton and Katingal and transferred inmates like Matthews to normal discipline in 
maximum security prisons, like Parramatta.1868 Matthews’s behavior improved and the views of 
his classification status shifted. The Classification Committee eventually assigned him to the 
minimum security work release program at Silverwater. Yet, the prison officers there disagreed 
with his classification and placement and refused to accept him.1869 The Department shifted 
Matthews to a different minimum-security facility until the dispute was resolved. Matthews 
admitted to often being difficult with prison staff, but also claimed they treated him worse. His 
behavior, intractable or otherwise, may have had as much to do with where he was imprisoned 
at any given time than any consistent disposition he displayed. 
At times, various classification committees used the available sorting and placement 
options to achieve ends other than those formally acknowledged in official statements. Yet, 
these too should be seen as part of the normal functioning of classification. Prison staff 
sometimes pried information from inmates, ensured compliance with certain agreements, 
bought silence or simply punished inmates with favorable or negative classification decisions. 
Such instances, of course, easily slid into illegal or corrupt activities. For instance, Ray Denning 
recounted in his prison diary how Grafton’s deputy-superintendent, Clyde Piggott, told him that 
he could possibly have his security classification lowered enough for assignment to a prison 
farm if he dropped assault charges against several Grafton guards who attached him.1870 
Likewise, inmate Stephen Lewis, who claimed to have witnessed guards at Long Bay severely 
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beating another inmate in 1978, told a Sun Herald reporter that prison staff harassed him for 
months because he was threatening a lawsuit about the beating and had secured twelve 
witnesses.1871 Lewis claimed that “a senior officer” approached him at Long Bay and, after 
indicating that he was in fact being targeting by staff, said that if he agreed to drop his planned 
case against the officers he would speak favorably about him to the committee regarding his 
pending classification review and reassignment.1872 
 Perhaps the most glaring examples of this abuse of the classification system became the 
subject of the Royal Commission’s interim report (covered in more detail in Chapter 5). The 
report detailed the activities of Paul Genner, a veteran, low-ranking administrative clerk who 
served on the central Classification Committee and oversaw prisoner movements, and Arthur 
Stanley “Neddy” Smith, a widely-feared and respected professional criminal. After Smith was 
released from prison in 1975, he contacted Genner, who had supported his parole case, and 
eventually conspired with him to sell minimum-security assignments to other prisoners. 
Genner, who was at the center of the bureaucratic machinery that actually authorized 
placements, began accepting bribes and performed the work of classification by often 
completely bypassing his superiors on the committees. It appears that some senior prison 
officers checking on the classification of certain prisoners stumbled upon evidence of the illicit 
arrangement at about the same time that accusations from former prisoners and their families 
                                                          





began to surface. The scandal eventually led to greater controls being placed on the procedures 
for authorizing prisoner movements and reviewing the classification status of prisoners.1873 
 The Royal Commission, the prison warder strikes and the pervasive publicity 
surrounding the state’s prisons, thrust more knowledge about the internal operations of the 
penal apparatus into public view in a way that it had not been since the nineteenth century. 
This included the formal classification process, which became the target for a number of claims 
by residents living near penal institutions that had relatively porous boundaries, like the 
minimum-security penal farms. For example, some residents who lived near the Mannus and 
Leslie Nott Afforestation Camps opposed their expansion because they claimed that recent 
changes in classification, sentencing and community corrections programs resulted in more 
serious offenders being held at – and escaping from –the penal farms. New sentencing options, 
like periodic detention, and programs, like the state’s two work release schemes, had altered 
the profile of the prisoners who were now being sent to the camps.1874 People who had 
previously spent time at the camps were now redirected to these alternatives instead. This 
meant, according to a press account, that a greater percentage of the new prisoners “tended to 
be ‘hard core’” offenders who had spent a lot of time in maximum-security before being sent to 
Mannus and Leslie Nott.1875 These prisoners would not have been sent to the camps before. 
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The change in the penalty and custody options realigned the classification status of the camps 
and the increase in the number of escapes represented the presence of more dangerous, 
desperate men in the camps. 
 Several escapes from the Kirkconnell Afforestation Camp, near Bathurst, New South 
Wales, in 1981 and 1982 also occasioned the formation of an oppositional community group, 
which demanded changes in the prison farm’s operation. Two of the demands presented by the 
Meadow Flat and District Prison Action Committee echoed similar complaints by residents living 
near other prison farms in the state. First, the group wanted the Department of Corrective 
Services to compensate property owners for any damaged caused by escapes; and second, they 
wanted the Department and prison farm administrators to tighten security and establish a 
better warning system to alert the community in the event of an escape. Interestingly, 
however, they also wanted to directly participate in decisions determining which prisoners 
would be sent to Kirkconnell in the future. As the Western Advocate reported on Monday, 
January 4, 1982:  
 
The State Member for Bathurst, Mr. Mick Clough, said yesterday that the 
Minister for Corrective Services (Mr. Rex Jackson) had now agreed to have talks 
with him on the possibility of Meadow Flat people being represented on the 




During the February 17, 1982 meeting, members of the group asked for representation on the 
Classification Committee. As one of the group’s leaders, Alec Deutscher, explained to the 
Western Advocate a few days prior to the meeting, having a voice in the selection process was 
                                                          




“the only acceptable long-term guarantee that prisoners with a record of violence will not be 
placed in low security institutions in the region."1877 Rex Jackson listened to the deputation’s 
concerns, but informed them that the current prisons act did not permit their inclusion on the 
Classification Committee.1878 He also told them that Corrective Services was reviewing prison 
operations in general as part of a reorganization project and that the future of the state’s 
prison farms was in question, including Kirkconnell.1879 MP Mick Clough lamented the fact that, 
with the possibility of participating in classification eliminated, the next public meeting on 
March 19th was only about a third of the size of the previous meeting. Less than fifty people 
showed up, according to the Western Advocate.1880  
In many respects, the concerns of residents living near these three afforestation camps 
resemble those frequently raised in literature about NIMBYism and prison siting.1881 Unlike 
most cases explored in that literature, however, the Kirkconnell, Mannus and Leslie Nott Camps 
were not facilities that altered the community in some defining way, but had in fact existed for 
decades. Most residents near these penal farms, including the activists, realized that they 
provided local benefits; very few people favored their closure. Instead, residents worried about 
the increase in escapes and many expressed fears about possibilities of riots and guard strikes, 
like those they saw elsewhere in the state. They believed that the best way to prevent 
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problems coming from the camps was for the administration to communicate more with the 
local community or to permit local people to have a greater role in how the camps operated. 
Since both activist groups claimed that the problems stemmed from the type of prisoners the 
camps received, they wanted the administration to revisit the classification process. In the case 
of Kirkconnell, the locals actually wanted to partake in the decision-making. They saw the 
power to evaluate and screen inmates, to decide which of them would be sent to Kirkconnell or 
similar establishments and which of them would be sent to more secure confinement, as the 
best way of redressing their grievances with the penal bureaucracy while also maintain their 
support for the Kirkconnell farm.  
It is unlikely that many of Kirkconnell’s neighbors knew how the Classification 
Committee performed is tasks in detail. Yet, it clearly presented a symbolically powerful nodal 
point, a pivot in the flow of penal power that affected numerous activities, risks, and 
potentialities. It appeared as a deliberative forum, functioning in some ways like a town council, 
court, or other form of public authority and therefore open to the claims and rights of liberal 
representative democracy. A previously internal, technocratic tool directed by certain senior, 
prison staff became the target of community resistance to the management of a penal farm, a 
means for their enfranchisement as penal decision-makers on par with existing members of the 
Classification Committee. 
Unit Management, Classification and Carceral Citizenship 
 
During the Royal Commission, David Hunt, the inquiry’s chief counsel, led a study tour to 




system, the U.K., Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland between June and 
August 1977. The study group observed routine operations in dozens of prisons and control 
units, trying to gauge common trends shared across these jurisdictions and how they compared 
with practices in New South Wales. The construction of this comparative vision and knowledge 
aided the inquiry’s evaluation of the Department of Corrective Services and the formulation of 
their recommendations. In many cases, the study tour revealed remarkable similarities, which 
were the product of previous connections and many shared beliefs about punishment. 
For instance, the team noted repeatedly how the U.S. federal prison at Marion 
resembled maximum-security prisons in New South Wales. Marion’s control unit had in fact 
greatly influenced the design of Katingal. Other prisons, like the maximum-security Ringe State 
Prison in Denmark, were so different as to defy easy comparisons. Ringe permitted male and 
female inmates to cohabitate, purchase groceries and cook their own meals in separate 
apartment-style units. Even minimum-security camps in New South Wales appeared harsh by 
comparison. Such comparisons showed the limits of the penal imaginary informing the inquiry. 
The Prisoners’ Action Group noted a similar experience in the way the Royal Commission 
addressed their submissions on prison abolition. Justice Nagle rejected their arguments without 
much engagement or commentary. It became apparent during the study tour that many of the 
penal policies practices in continental Europe differed so significantly from those in New South 
Wales that the majority of information the Royal Commission found useful came from the U.K. 
and the U.S. 
Hunt’s team devoted a lot of time to assessing a practice that originated in the U.S. 




juvenile institutions in the American federal system in the 1950s and gradually spread to most 
federal prisons by the late 1970s. It involved breaking down large groups of prisoners and mass 
institutions into small, self-contained living units, with a dedicated interdisciplinary staff 
assigned to them on a permanent basis. In theory, this provided greater attention to inmate 
concerns and fostered more personal relationships between staff and prisoners, both of which 
enhanced overall security and safety. Most administrative authority in prisons operating with 
unit management devolved from the superintendent and senior officers to the lower level unit 
managers. Senior officers oversaw institution-wide policies, budgets and major areas of 
security. This type of prison order required guards to interact with prisoners in a far more direct 
way than had traditionally been the case. Since unit management stressed dispersing larger 
groups of prisoners, guards now managed far fewer people with whom they also became more 
familiar with since they were permanently assigned to a unit. Advocates of this approach 
claimed that it reduced the friction and hostility between staff and prisoners by eroding the 
harsh barriers separating the two belligerent groups.  
At the time of the Royal Commission, the relationship between staff and prisoners was 
probably at its worse in many decades. Prison officer strikes and prisoner rebellions had 
become increasingly common. Guards used firearms with live ammunition on prisoners several 
times during the 1970s and 1980s, and prisoners were far more politicized and confrontational 
than they had been since at least the 1940s. Katingal, the newly-designed high security unit that 
the Department opened in 1975, perhaps symbolized this state of affairs the most. The new 




and various access gates electronically from behind secure barriers. Few opportunities existed 
for any direct contact. 
Justice Nagle’s final report condemned the abuses by prison guards and the 
mismanagement of McGeechan. The Royal Commission’s report included 252 specific reform 
recommendations, many of which focused on prisoners’ rights, disciplinary procedures, 
prisoner management, the relationship between the Department and the officers’ union and 
the overall management structure.1882 Nagle noted that unit management provided one way of 
addressing a number of problems with the routine operation of secure prisons.1883 It could 
reduce the endemic low morale among officers by making their jobs more meaningful and 
professional. Nagle also argued that the benefits seen overseas in terms of reducing tension, 
distrust, misconduct and violence could also be expected if the Department made a major 
commitment to the unit management concept going forward.  
The reform of penal space was a key aspect of unit management. The examples of the 
management system that David Hunt and his team observed were based in small, self-
contained units not the much larger wings, which had long corridors and multiple tiers of cells. 
This smaller space, often arranged in a semi-circular or triangular pod structure, meant that 
staff could observe all the cells from a central point with much greater ease. In other words, 
unit management renewed the spatial component of Bentham’s panopticism, albeit in a much 
different design than envisioned by Bentham himself. During the Royal Commission the 
Department revealed that they envisioned building at least one new prison in the near future in 
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the Sydney area. Justice Nagle suggested that this new facility, referred to as the M90 
maximum-security prison, be designed with unit management principles in mind. He also 
recommended that the reconstruction of Bathurst, which had been destroyed by fire in the 
1974 riot, also employ unit management designs in the new cell blocks.  
Shortly after the completion of the Royal Commission, the Department of Corrective 
Services conducted its own study tour of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Denmark and Sweden to collect more detailed information on unit management and prison 
design.1884 Unit management or similar decentralized management practices were apparent in 
many of these places, but most fully articulated in the U.S.1885 The level of security in the 
American prisons they visited impressed the team, led by Superintendent A.N. Cerinich, 
especially at the federal penitentiary at Marion, which Cerinich saw as “operat[ing] on lines not 
dissimilar to those used in N.S.W.”1886 Cerinich noted that unit management appeared to be 
very costly because of the personnel it required compared with contemporary practices in New 
South Wales.  Despite this, he argued that “a modified form should be considered that would 
not be so costly in terms of staff and at the same time, would facilitate more control and 
security.”1887 When the Department finally began construction on both the M90 project (later 
renamed Parklea Prison) and the new Bathurst Correctional Centre in the early 1980s, they 
abandoned the use of long wings in favor of smaller partitioned units, which accommodated 
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roughly 20 prisoners.1888 At Bathurst, construction workers installed huge barriers in several 
(but not all) of the existing wings, breaking them up into eight separate three-tiered units 
holding up to 20 prisoners with the ground floor consisting of a community room.1889  
The Department planned to hold prisoners of a similar classification status in these new 
units, but they also envisioned an entirely new pattern of interaction between prisoners and 
officers, which necessitated additional screening for both groups. By 1982, this emphasis on 
developing a new prisoner management model shifted solely to Bathurst, with the relationships 
between staff and inmates at Parklea operating more like existing prisons, such as Cessnock, 
albeit in smaller units rather than wings. All of the prisoners who were included in the new 
management experiment held a classification status of “B” or what in many other systems 
would be considered a “medium” security risk. The Department decided that the rebuilt 
Bathurst would no longer hold prisoners in need of high security.1890 In other words, the 
Classification Committee placed those classified as “A” elsewhere. 
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The new Bathurst Management Plan resembled the Justice Model of prison 
management, which had become increasingly common in many American states.1891 
Superintendent Gerry Hay, who led Bathurst’s management team, developed the plan based on 
observing similar prison management practices at facilities operated by the U.S. Bureau of 
Prisons in North Carolina.1892 Like other iterations of the Justice Model, Bathurst’s plan 
disavowed rehabilitation and identified punishment as the sole purpose of imprisonment.1893 
Moreover, this punishment only involved the loss of liberty. In all other aspects, Bathurst was to 
resemble outside conditions as much as possible. The plan emphasized that the prisoners were 
rational like any other person, capable of responsible decision-making and needed to be 
treated with dignity and respect. Accordingly, the management plan also called for the 
participation of prisoners in much of the operation of the units, usually through community 
meetings and voting membership on committees. This last feature of the plan proved to be 
contentious in many instances, and revealed the continuous operation and power of the 
classification work performed by prisoners themselves.  
Shortly after the reopening of Bathurst, the officers assigned to one of the new units, 
called C4, selected the first four prisoners to be housed in the experimental units. The officers 
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selected these first four people because they were “fairly stable” and provided a good basis for 
new unit. These new members then joined the officers in interviewing other prisoners for 
inclusion into the unit. Some broad parameters soon emerged.1894 For instance, unit members 
had to be serving at least six months or have six months left to serve to be admitted. This would 
ensure greater stability and investment in the unit community by the new members.1895 The 
prisoners on the committee voiced their opinions on the compatibility of new applicants and 
“selected prisoners of about the same age and having similar interests.”1896 Soon after unit C4 
was established, another unit C3 began recruitment following a similar procedure. 
    Before both units attained a full complement of residents, disagreement arose 
between the unit officers and prisoners participating on the selection committees because the 
latter rejected certain potential candidates they identified as either “dogs” or “rock spiders.”1897 
In the local prison argot, a “dog” was an informer and to be “put on the dog” was to be labelled 
such by other prisoners. Persons convicted of sexual crimes against children were known as 
“rock spiders.” Both groups were detested by most prisoners and extremely vulnerable when 
housed in the general population. Such categorization, especially in regards to dogs, was also 
potentially polluting; other prisoners associating with these marginalized inmate status groups 
ran the risk of also being labeled as such. The prisoners participating on the selection 
committees refused to admit people they perceived to be either dogs or rock spiders. When it 
became clear that either management team might force the inclusion of people with these 
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labels, existing members of the unit threatened to leave. The existing unit prisoners also 
worried about potential problems flowing from their participation in selection decision-making. 
They could unknowingly admit dogs and rock spiders who might be well-known as such to 
others. This could suggest that they also knew and preferred to live with such people. Prisoners 
also worried about creating enemies among other applicants who were turned down for other 
reasons. Perhaps frightening for all the people in the new units, there were signs that the larger 
prison population at Bathurst was beginning to perceive the new units as protection units for 
dogs and rock spiders. Rumors such as these were potentially deadly. Several prisoners left the 
units rather than take this risk, and some applicants withdrew their candidacy after these issues 
were raised. 
The structure of the units also created other situations where these categories surfaced. 
The designers of the Bathurst Management Plan hoped that participatory decision-making and 
conflict resolution through the use of community meetings along with community decisions on 
things like unit decorating and recreation would foster a “unit identity” among the residents 
(and staff) that would become a model for responsible citizenship.1898 Senior staff encouraged 
the use of community meetings, but these became less frequent as the units stabilized. 
Researchers suggested that in many cases, after the initial conflicts and uncertainties were 
resolved, there was less need for formal meetings.1899 However, the inmate code also appeared 
to reassert itself over time, making many prisoners less willing to interact as much with unit 
guards in meetings. Some prisoners worried that the meetings were simply new manifestations 
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of the rehabilitative group therapy or soon could become such. Others feared the label of 
“screw lover” for wanting to call meetings.1900 Such perceptions could easily lead to becoming 
known as a dog. In some cases, certain factions developed among prisoners in the units around 
these pressures even though the officers tried to prevent the formation of such groups. In unit 
C2, this pattern appeared after the unit filled up quickly due to transfers from elsewhere in the 
prison system. The level of screening in C2 fell short of the process in C4 and C3. The result was 
that half of the unit’s members avoided the communal areas because they feared the 
“Parramatta Gaol heavies” who gathered there.1901 These “heavies” were intimidating prisoners 
who had recently arrived from the maximum-security Parramatta Prison after reclassification. 
They brought with them a more traditional view of the lines separating guards and inmates and 
remained distant from staff. Other members avoiding interacting with these intimidating 
prisoners and surely worried about the consequences of appearing friendly with staff members 
as well. 
After the longest prison officers’ strike in the state’s history occurred between February 
and March 1984, the Bathurst unit management system deteriorated.1902 The 35-day walkout 
left many prisoners locked in their cells for extended periods of time. The meager rapport 
established between guards assigned to the new units and the prisoners evaporated. The 
morale of officers was close to its nadir after the government refused to concede to their 
demands. The primary cause of the strike was the guards’ objection to the state’s decision to 
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reclassify Principal Prison Officers as Assistant Superintendents, which made them Executive 
Officers by fiat and removed them from the ranks of the guard’s powerful union, the Prison 
Officers’ Vocation Branch of the Public Service Association.1903 In the aftermath of their defeat, 
many officers left the services, most retreated professionally. At Bathurst, this meant far less 
engagement with prisoners and a de facto withdrawal of support for the new management plan 
by many, if not most, officers.  
While the system remained in place for many years afterward, it never met the 
expectations of reformers in the Department of Corrective Services. Although intended as a 
pilot program, the Bathurst model never spread to other institutions and was superseded by 
later plans.1904 The published research evaluations of the unit management experiment 
stopped short of calling the practice a failure. In fact, much of the interview data collected 
demonstrated that most prisoners in the new units preferred them to traditional wings. 
Nevertheless, the problems encountered were significant enough to make implementing the 
plan more broadly difficult at best. It is clear from the research and the manner in which both 
officers and prisoners were selected for the experiment that they were far more open to the 
project than most of their peers would have been. This was in fact a key part of the additional 
classification criteria that the designers established at the outset. In addition to selecting many 
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prisoners who were more stable and mature, the fact that the entire institution only accepted 
prisoners with a B security classification meant that the Department did not trust piloting this 
sort of experiment in a maximum-security setting. Perhaps most significantly, the project 
designers’ focus on finding ways to counter the hostility of the normal prison-guard relationship 
seemed to overlook the problems the prison code presented for relationships among prisoners 
when unit residents were empowered to make decisions about their peers. The confluence of 




“Classification is a word, which has come, like democracy, to mean very much what the user 
wants it to mean.”  
   
 Sir Lionel W. Fox1905 
 
“In prisons, the magic wand of classification has long been held out as the key to a successful 
system. If only those who mess up the regime could be weeded out (sent to special prisons, 
units or isolation centres), the system could go ahead with its business. All that has changed 
over the last century is the basis of the binary classification. It used to be ‘moral character’, 
sometimes it was ‘treatability” or ‘security risk’, now it appears to be ‘dangerousness’.” 
 
        Stanley Cohen1906 
 
As rehabilitation deteriorated during the 1970s and early 1980s, the prison systems of 
New South Wales and Pennsylvania entered a period of rapid transition and instability. 
Numerous commentators in each state and broader criminal justice circles noted the lack of 
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direction, purpose and even competency that appeared to characterize much of the penal 
bureaucracy and their public statements. Classification systems registered this crisis in a 
particular stark form because unlike many other practices, they were explicitly oriented to the 
future of prisoners, how to treat them and how to securely manage them. Classification had 
always placed a major emphasis on security concerns, but the postwar reforms coupled with it 
also sought to individualize treatment plans for prisoners and follow their lives behind bars. 
Penal authorities periodically reevaluated such plans, changing them to suit new circumstances. 
This entire process involved articulating a clear statement of goals, spelling out the kinds of 
interventions that would take place and their rationales. In this sense, classification systems 
continuously produced normative statements about the ideal law-abiding citizen-subject that 
prisoners should become by evaluating their normative deficits and proscribing interventions to 
close this gap. Thus, these plans, and the differentiated programs supporting them, had to be 
flexible enough to accommodate a wide variation in the prisoner population and the numerous 
changes that might occur in any particular prisoner’s time in custody.  
More importantly, the claims, actions and forms of address embedded in rehabilitative 
classification practices managed to speak to multiple audiences and provide them with an 
adequate guide or map to the carceral environment, how to live and work in it, and ultimately, 
how to leave it. Classification played a crucial part in crafting these accounts. It provided staff 
with a way to differentiate and operationalize various penal spaces and interventions and gave 
them a guiding purpose in general and individualize plans in particular. It also communicated to 
prisoners what they had to do to, not just to avoid trouble behind bars, but also to get out. 




fulfilled obligations. In this respect, classification resembled a sort of contract, heavily weighted 
against prisoners, but one that, nevertheless, involved them in a conversation about their 
future. Of course, prisoners often complained that treatment plans were ambiguous or that the 
programs were useless. They also frequently criticized the seemingly arbitrary, opaque and 
discriminatory decisions of parole boards. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, many prisoners 
and activists argued that the language of rehabilitation masked an enormity of abusive 
practices, including forms of torture. At the same time, many penologists and prison officers, 
some of whom never accepted rehabilitation wholeheartedly in the first place, also rejected its 
claims and prognoses. Nevertheless, during the first few decades after World War II, 
rehabilitation created a much broader conversation between the keepers and the kept and 
furnished prison regimes with a range of new programs and activities that, to some degree, 
ameliorated the prewar, spartan prison conditions.  
Rehabilitation lost credibility by the mid-1970s, but, classification has always been a 
supple practice, deeply implicated in the enterprise of imprisonment since its inception.1907 It 
may have been central to the postwar rehabilitation reforms, but it did not originate with them 
and it survived their downfall, albeit in a different form and in service of different ends. As the 
events in New South Wales and Pennsylvania indicate, penal authorities gradually departed the 
conversation with prisoners that had been a central aspects of classification in the treatment 
era. This was not necessarily always done deliberately, although in some cases it certainly was. 
Rather, it reflected the emergence of other concerns that classification addressed. In 
Pennsylvania, for instance, the need to reduce discretion, increase uniformity and accelerate 
                                                          




decision-making in the classification process clearly responded to the growing presence of the 
federal judiciary in regulating penal policy and practice. Likewise, the reforms suggested by 
Justice Nagle in New South Wales were intended to simplify classification and increase its utility 
for management. Nagle believed that rehabilitation was both ineffective and harmful and 
stated that classification should prioritize security above everything else. Prisoners could 
certainly benefit from such reforms. A vulnerable prisoner, for instance, might have been much 
better protected when security became paramount. However, the changes in classification in 
both New South Wales and Pennsylvania deemphasized the conversation with prisoners about 
their future. As the authorities used classification to address immediate management 
problems, like resource allocation, legal liability and security, they became less likely to 
proscribe normative goals for prisoners, what they were supposed to do reform their lives, 
favorably impress the parole board and earn their way out. Rehabilitation programs still 
existed, but their funding and availability did not keep pace with increases in prison 
populations. By the 1980s, prison authorities had largely decoupled classification from 
rehabilitation even if evaluating prisoners’ needs and deficits still remained as one of its tasks. 
Over the course of the 1980s, classification in both states underwent multiple changes. 
Revisions to the classification system became both more frequent and more fundamental. 
Pennsylvania further refined the work of the Correctional Service Group, but by the late 1980s 
it was clear that overcrowding had become so severe that available space became the 
unspoken, but major, determinate for inmate placement. The sheer number of people 
committed to the prisons overwhelmed other purposes served by the classification system. 




in prioritizing anything other than available space and security. Even the latter concern became 
secondary in many cases. After a massive uprising at SCI Camp Hill in late 1989, investigators 
and legislators found numerous deficiencies in the exiting classification procedures and 
recommended a complete overhaul of the system.1908 Regardless of the merit of their 
criticisms, it is hard to imagine that the classification system would have ever been able escape 
criticism. It had become the central mechanism in population management and resource 
allocation. Thus, a major disturbance like Camp Hill, in which overcrowding and staffing levels 
clearly played a large role, soon implicated the classification system.  
In New South Wales, the three tiered classification system suggested by Justice Nagle 
was adopted, but soon expanded, with subdivided categories. Thus the simple A, B, C ranking of 
security needs later included subdivisions A1, A2, B, C1, C2, and C3, which corresponded to 
graduated security levels in isolation units to work release programs.1909 Arguably this process 
corresponded somewhat better to the fine gradation in program and institutional security, but 
it began to reintroduce some of the unnecessary complexity that Nagle worried about. By the 
mid-1980s, some officials within the Department of Corrective Services began producing 
extensive evaluations of the current classification system and reviews of systems in other 
jurisdictions, especially those in the United States.1910 Classification in New South Wales 
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retained its use of clinical or subjective methods much longer than Pennsylvania did. I believe 
that two major differences between the events in each jurisdiction account for this. First, New 
South Wales did not experience the same looming presence of federal judicial intervention that 
motivated prison officials in Pennsylvania to reform their practice. Since the federal courts in 
the U.S. specifically targeted areas of unchecked discretionary power, an obvious solution for 
states like Pennsylvania was to abandon an overreliance on clinical classification models. The 
absence of this outside legal threat in New South Wales meant that prison officials did not need 
to move as abruptly concerning this form of correctional expertise. In fact, one of the main 
differences between the two states was the greater centralization and use of discretionary 
authority in many aspects of routine governance in New South Wales. Its presence in prison 
classification, therefore, was not as unusual as it was in the Pennsylvania.  
Secondly, the use of psychiatric and psychological evaluations in classification was more 
extensive and longstanding in places like Pennsylvania. These forms of expertise were especially 
attached to the clinical model of evaluation and decision-making. By comparison, penal 
authorities in New South Wales implemented the use of such psychological knowledge much 
later. It was not as extensive in classification decision-making in New South Wales and did not 
require the same level of reform. Nevertheless, prison officials evaluated the utility of 
incorporating greater objective criteria and decision-making models into New South Wales. 
Since 1990, both states have revised their classification procedures several times, 
including several major conversions. The short-life span of these systems, and the constant 
revision of them while they are in place, are indicative of a more basic problem besetting 




harnessed to a flexible narrative of prison reform that can address many audiences at once and 
coordinate their actions. For all their fundamental problems, the postwar rehabilitation reforms 
were able to do this for about two or three decades. Since then, classification, has become a 
crucial, pragmatic, management tool in prison operations. Constantly subject to revisions, it 
seems unlikely now that it will be linked any time soon to a penological account capable of 


































Postscript: Incapacitation, a New Carceral Narrative? 
 
 
On Wednesday, October 25, 1989 an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill in 
central Pennsylvania assaulted a guard while prisoners were being moved back into the cell 
blocks after a recreation period. As the assault occurred, hundreds of inmates surrounded the 
other guards in the yard, and stormed several cellblocks, overpowering the staff inside. Inmates 
set kitchens on fire and destroyed building fixtures for the next several hours, until the prison 
staff and the state police forced them back to their cells shortly after midnight. The institution 
remained on indefinite lockdown. However, during the disturbance earlier in the day, several 
prisoners discovered a way to automatically disengage all of the cell locks in the institution 
from within their cells by reaching between the bars and stripping off a metal panel covering 
the locking mechanism above the cell doors.  
The following day, several prisoners simultaneously unlocked all the cells in what 
investigators later determined to be a planned uprising. Superintendent Robert Freeman told 
David Owens, the Commissioner for Corrections, that, "Inmates exiting the blocks in Group II 
and III were heard to scream, "This is another Attica. Last night we gave you a riot. This night 
we're giving you a war!"1911 The inmates destroyed several buildings before the state police 
quelled the uprising with force. By the end of the day, 123 people were injured. Miraculously, 
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no one was killed. Staff morale plummeted, as Superintendent Freeman warned Commissioner 
Owens, "Problems with staff are increasing. There are staff who are becoming rebellious and 
creating problems as the Deputies attempt to coordinate the institutional operation."1912 The 
administration transferred most of the institution’s inmates to other prisons since SCI Camp Hill 
was no longer secure. 
Less than a year later, on September 13, 1990, prisoners at the Parklea Correctional 
Centre in New South Wales destroyed toilets and sinks in cells and began pelting the staff with 
debris. A few days after that, prisoners overpowered guards and seized several cell blocks, 
torching eight kitchens and smashing electronic surveillance equipment throughout the 
prison.1913 The damage was so extensive that after order was restored, the staff had to hold 
inmates four to a cell designed for one occupant. Many inmates, guards and administrators 
believed the peace following the retaking of prison was exceedingly fragile. The Chairman of 
the Prison Officers' Association, Dick Palmer, said that inmates were being issued buckets lined 
with plastic bags in the absence of working toilets, "but the prisoners are throwing used plastic 
bags out of their cell windows, which is becoming a major hazard."1914 He accused the state 
administration of pursuing policy changes that directly jeopardized the safety of staff without 
consulting them beforehand. By mid-October, the Department of Corrective Services 
downgraded Parklea's security classification from maximum to medium because of the damage. 
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They dispersed many of the institution’s prisoners to other maximum security prisons in the 
state. 
Several months before the major riots at Camp Hill and Parklea, many other minor 
disturbances occurred at prisons in each state. However, they did not initially receive the same 
level of publicity. In Pennsylvania, small uprisings occurred at the Rockview, Huntington, and 
Graterford state prisons, as well as Holmesburg Prison in the Philadelphia Prison System. 
Violence at all state institutions had increased throughout the year. A similar pattern occurred 
in New South Wales. In addition to Parklea, violence erupted at Bathurst, Long Bay, Cessnock, 
Emu Plains, Maitland, and Parramatta. These smaller uprisings took on greater significance as 
indicators of a general problem in the prison system after the larger riots at Camp Hill and 
Parklea a few months later. These events led to several inquiries and public assessments of 
each the state’s prison system and the dramatic changes that had occurred in each of them 
over the previous twenty years. Similar themes emerged in these assessments: unprecedented 
levels of overcrowding, harsher sentencing and discretionary release procedures, increased 
violence and drug trafficking, deteriorating living conditions, obsolete physical structures, low 
staff morale, changing inmate demographics, long waiting lists for underfunded programing 
and confusion about the overall purpose of imprisonment.  
Each state's prison system underwent massive changes in the preceding twenty years. 
Both systems had records levels of new commitments to prison by the time of the Camp Hill 
and Parklea riots that had resulted in serious overcrowding problems. Each state also built at 
least one new prison before 1989 to try to cope with the influx. However, a decade or two 




and judicial officials believed then that incarceration damaged people. The therapeutic model 
of rehabilitation, with its emphasis on reforming inmates under expert guidance, came under 
attack by people from across the political spectrum. The only place where rehabilitation 
programs had a chance at succeeding, many officials believed, was “in the community.” Even at 
a time of rising crime, judges sentenced many offenders to non-custodial punishments and 
penal authorities used parole liberally to reduce actual time spent behind bars. Each state 
recorded large declines in their postwar prison population during this same twenty year period. 
Pennsylvania's prison population fell in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In New South Wales, the 
prison population dropped drastically about a decade later in the mid-1970s and again in early 
1980s. There were indications that these declines might be more significant and long-lasting 
than the periodic fluctuations in prison populations that occurred throughout most of the 
postwar period. Many penologists hoped to shift most of the population under their control to 
community-based programs and leave incarceration for only the few dangerous offenders who, 
they argued, required greater control. They hoped that they could then “normalize” prison 
conditions, making them resemble the outside world as much as possible.  
By the mid-1980s, however, prison had become anything but the penalty of last resort. 
After a decade of failure, prison re-emerged as the central focus of an effective response to 
crime. Many public officials admitted that prisons could not convincingly rehabilitate offenders. 
Instead, they argued, prisons should only be used to quarantine threats to the social order and 
punish lawbreakers. This view paralleled shifts in party politics and political contention in each 
state. As the older political appeals of class and social provision welfare waned, politicians in 




harsh punishment as elements for a reformulated political message that straddled party lines. 
Such messages said little about the internal order of prisons other than that they should be 
harsh and unforgiving. 
More importantly, however, the issues of crime and punishment and the way they 
mobilized constituencies established, or accentuated, lines clearly demarcating criminals and 
prisoners from the rest of society.1915 Almost a decade before this became commonplace in 
campaigns for public office, it had begun to appear in depictions of prisoners, especially in 
stories about changing prison regimes and prisoners’ rights. Law and order framings emerging 
from the cellblocks, often from officers and their unions, positioned the revolutionary prisoner, 
the black nationalist and the incorrigibly violent prisoner on the wrong side of this demarcation. 
These forms of social othering and exclusion were stark and precluded a way back for the 
wayward. Prolonged isolation in control units appeared to be the only recourse for dealing with 
the prisoners in these representations.1916 Of course, prisoners who would have fit these 
descriptions were not representative of most people behind bars, and many guards would have 
readily conceded this point. Nevertheless, as Jonathan Simon has argued, images of incorrigible 
prisoners and serial killers played a large role in the constitution of a new “penal imaginary” 
conducive to prolonged incapacitation.1917 It helped guard unions obtain concessions from 
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administrations on security and posting matters and it blocked or reversed the loosening of 
some routines that reformers like Allyn Sielaff or Tony Vinson proposed in the name of 
prisoners’ rights. 
In most, if not all, crime control proposals of the 1980s, leaders in each state did not 
offer publics a narrative of how penologists could reform their wards. Nor, did they reflect on 
how offenders could redeem themselves in prison. It was almost as if political leaders and 
senior penal officials felt that after the claims of rehabilitation had been discredited, there was 
little reason to eschew explicit exclusion as a penological goal. For most offenders, 
assimilationist or inclusive policies resembling rehabilitation seemed politically toxic or naïve. In 
some respects, this paralleled other areas of social policy. Gov. Thornburgh’s assault on welfare 
in Pennsylvania, for instance, occurred at the same time that he proposed mandatory minimum 
sentencing. If public officials repositioned prison as an effective response to crime, then it was 
mainly through its default incapacitation functions.  
Prison populations and incarceration rates in both New South Wales and Pennsylvania 
grew steadily from the mid-1980s onward. This increase was much more pronounced in 
Pennsylvania (and the U.S. in general) than in was in New South Wales and began about a 
decade earlier. Nevertheless, current levels of imprisonment in New South Wales far exceed 
the norms of the 1970s. The demographic profile of the inmate population became racially "less 
white" in both states as the proportion of racial minorities and immigrants grew in each prison 
system. After the riots of 1989 and 1990, a number of critics called for a greater use of 
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alternatives to imprisonment as a way to limit this population growth. Alternatives, like parole, 
work release, drug treatment, community service orders, still existed, but they rarely 
functioned as true alternatives. Instead, they had become adjuncts to the prison, integrated 
into a wider system of sanctions that often cycled the same people through several levels of 
penalties. For both inmates and prison staff, the purpose of punishment and how it related to 
the organization of prison regimes remained ambiguous at best after rehabilitation declined. 
The incapacitation of criminal offenders reigned as the primary justification for imprisonment. 
A large volume of criminological research in the 1980s focused on trying to ascertain the best 
way to use the state’s incapacitation capabilities and figure out who was most in need of 
prolonged confinement. Such policies were politically popular outside and among many prison 
officers, but they offered little direction on how to organize prison regimes other than to 
continuously emphasize risk and security. According to Jonathan Simon, this new prison, which 
he refers to as the waste management prison, is one that simply “lacks an internal regime, 
whether based on penitence, labor, or therapy (or something else), and increasingly relies on 
technological controls on movement and violent repression of resistance.”1918  
The riots of 1989 and 1990 marked a turning point in this crisis. The authorities did not 
resolve the problems besetting the prisons since the 1970s. Instead, much like the earlier 
decarceration movement, they displaced them.1919 After the riots, leaders from all major 
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political parties committed each state to unprecedented prison building programs. If 
incapacitation had become the primary purpose of “corrections”1920 during the 1980s, then its 
implementation emphasized creating ever more space to contain subject populations. Multiple 
investigations into the riots all recommended new prison construction, but this was in fact 
already the direction the penal agencies were pursuing prior to the riots.  
The prison building industry itself had undergone a major revolution in the 1980s as 
prison populations grew. New prison designs proliferated, many of which were based on the 
unit management concept. Smaller “pods” with enhanced visibility replaced the older tiered 
cellblock with poor sightlines. These new prisons would be easier to control in the event of a 
riot as the effected pods could easily be cordoned off from the rest of the prison. Prison 
building firms also developed numerous time and cost-saving innovations, including a 
standardized set of different prison layouts, which linked pods that were in many cases 
indistinguishable among the different prison plans.1921 The standardization of prison design in 
this manner also meant that it circulated easily. The New South Wales Department of 
Corrective Services sent a group of senior officers to the U.S. to investigate prison construction 
innovations, especially in California.1922 
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The leadership of both states also explored the possibility of contracting private 
companies to operate existing prisons or build and operate new ones. This policy began to gain 
more adherents in the United States in the 1980s and soon several major private prison 
operators, like Wackenhut and the Corrections Corporation of America, dominated the 
industry. This policy met with an enormous amount of resistance in Pennsylvania, which 
eventually only privately contracted minimum-security facilities offering drug and alcohol 
treatment.1923 New South Wales, however, opted to contract Australasian Correctional 
Management, a subsidiary of the American company Wackenhut (now called the GEO Group), 
to build and operate a medium-security prison, the Junee Correctional Centre. Junee’s first 
superintendent was a retired American who had previously been a prison superintendent in 
Massachusetts. Within the first year of operation, Junee experienced several incidents of 
disorder, culminating in a major riot in November 1994.1924 Since then, the state has renewed 
its contract with the GEO Group for the operation of Junee. Prison privatization has received a 
lot of attention, both critical and positive, but the debate has had very little to say about the 
vacuum of purpose left in the wake of rehabilitation’s decline. It has become yet another 
example of the managerialism of prison professionals that has grown in recent decades.  
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From Opening to Closure: Can the Prisoner Speak? 
 
In April 2009, I attended a large demonstration held by prison officers in front of the 
New South Wales Parliament House in Sydney. Over a thousand officers had walked off the job 
in protest over the Labor government’s plan to privatize several prisons and curtail overtime 
wages. For several weeks leading up to this protest, a standing committee of the state’s 
Legislative Council held often raucous hearings, collecting evidence about privatization and the 
state’s prison operations from a broad spectrum of witnesses, including officers and other 
correctional staff, a few former prisoners, activists, citizens who lived near prisons and 
academic researchers. The hearings were frequently acrimonious, especially after the press ran 
a series of scandalous stories about prison officers manipulating overtime wages. Such disputes 
provided plenty of interesting material for journalists, but they often overshadowed deeper, 
unresolved conflicts, lingering since the 1970s, about who would control the normal, everyday 
practices in the state’s prisons. Whose version of order would prevail and what exactly 
constituted this order?  
In many respects, the strike and the hearings only displayed the views of the 
Department of Corrective Services’ leadership and the prison officers’ union, the Prison Officers 
Vocational Branch. Several prison activists testified at the hearings, including Brett Collins, a 
veteran in the prison movement who had spent time at Bathurst, Grafton and may other 
prisons during the 1970s and later joined the Prisoners’ Action Group. The committee 
conducting the hearing did not make arrangements for currently-serving prisoners to testify. 
Their views, which are varied on the issue of prison privatization, were mainly absent from the 




descendant of the Prisoners’ Action Group) discussed some of the concerns prisoners had 
communicated to them. Even though their views were not featured prominently and they could 
not attend the hearings, the question of how best to manage and discipline them was at the 
heart of the dispute. Officers accused the Department of risking their safety by streamlining 
their working routines and refusing to post a personnel complement large enough to maintain 
control. The administration insisted that the prisons were properly staffed and that many 
officers, emboldened by their union, were simply abusing overtime wages and refusing 
practical reforms to prisoner management. Perhaps surprisingly, the ex-prisoners among the 
activists who appeared at the hearings unanimously agreed with the officers. They stated that 
the lack of supervision, which accompanied reductions in personnel, jeopardized the safety of 
many prisoners. 
The Department cited global examples in stating their case to the legislators, drawing 
especially on the experience of prison privatization in in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and several other Australian jurisdictions. Yet, the targets of this strategy were especially local; 
the Department only threatened to privatize prison operations at two prisons, which had the 
strongest, most vocal union locals. Many witnesses supporting the Department argued that 
privatization was cost-efficient and would enable other reforms designed to ameliorate living 
conditions and promote less conflictual relationships between staff and prisoners. Other 
witnesses, however, decried what they saw as profit-driven exploitation of Australian public 





Recurrent questions about the appropriateness of comparisons with overseas models 
emerged during the hearings. For instance, the Department argued that certain prisoner 
management models were universally valid and were easily transferrable. Their opponents 
retorted that the local situation was simply incommensurate with overseas models. The 
participants often switched their positions on the significance of the local and universal 
depending on the specific comparison or topic being discussed. American examples dominated 
the discussion, being either state-of-the-art or dystopian. Many people opposed to the 
Department’s plan raised Pennsylvania’s “Kids for Cash Scandal” as evidence of the dangers of 
corruption and profiteering inherent to privatized corrections. The scandal, which erupted in 
2008, involved two Pennsylvania judges who accepted kickback payments from a private 
juvenile prison operator in exchange for sentencing hundreds of children to confinement in a 
private facility. Attendees at the hearings repeatedly mentioned this scandal when I introduced 
myself as a researcher studying prisons in both Pennsylvania and New South Wales. 
These hearings demonstrated the interwoven nature of the global and the local, how 
local knowledge, problems and disputes were at the same time connected to transnational 
penological trends and practices. Much of the dispute involved work practices in the prison 
wings at Cessnock Correctional Centre and Parklea Correctional Centre and during specific 
shifts. For instance, the Department and the union spent hours discussing the best way to 
release prisoners from their cells in the morning, how best to supervise them and what the 
ideal number of officers should be for this task. The Department contended that global 




In many ways, it demonstrated how far the parameters of penal debate had changed 
since the 1950s. Not only did it showcase the power of the officers’ union and difficulties the 
administration had in managing the prisons, it also took place in a public hearing in Parliament 
with a full audience and news media in attendance. The participants spent hours debating the 
merits and pitfalls of importing penological practices from other jurisdictions, including some 
from overseas. Yet, an attendee might not be aware that several decades ago, an inquiry like 
this might have made more of an effort to gauge the views of the people who would ultimately 
be subject to the policies in question, namely the prisoners. One of the main merits of the Royal 
Commission into New South Wales Prisons was the inclusion of testimony from prisoners and 
the credence Justice Nagle gave to prisoners’ views. He did not dismiss their views by imputing 
that prisoners, by their very status, could not speak truthfully. The prisoners were missing from 
the prison privatization inquiry in 2009 even though all the participants repeatedly mentioned 
them and often tried to represent their collective views. Did the technocratic nature of the 
discussion simply preclude their participation? 
This difference was also apparent in the eclipse of rehabilitation and the waning of the 
prisoners’ rights movement during the 1970s and 1980s, albeit in different ways. Rehabilitation 
and the prisoners’ rights movement were distinct, each arising from separate concerns and 
constituencies. Yet, at certain points they converged on some issues in jurisdictions like New 
South Wales and Pennsylvania. Rehabilitation, and the much older notion of prisoner reform, 
often authorized abusive interventions. At times, however, it also provided a space for 
prisoners to engage more directly with their own reform or at least to frame their own activities 




drama clubs and prison newspaper production allowed prisoners to voice their concerns even if 
they had to do so within very restrictive parameters. Of course, a lot of prisoners participated in 
these practices in disingenuous or subversive ways. They learned how to narrate their lives and 
attitudes in the language of reform, even if this meant trying to “con” the parole board. 
Nevertheless, these practices “worked” precisely because they were flexible enough to 
accommodate the range of different concerns and motivations among prisoners and staff 
members. They articulated a claim that offenders could rejoin society, that they could be 
productive citizens once again or for the first time, if they “bought in” to the programing and 
the normative ideals that sustained them. This is the kind of regime that Jonathan Simon refers 
to as missing in the current moment, one that can incorporate multiple groups through penal 
rituals and sustain itself even when faced with evidence of its failure.   
In this respect, rehabilitation partly influenced the emergence of the prisoners’ rights 
movement during the 1960s, although the latter had other sources as well. Many prisoners 
used the practices of the rehabilitation regimes, like inmate education and publishing, to 
criticize their captors and advocate radical change. Many of the people who became prisoners’ 
rights activists in New South Wales and Pennsylvania participated in debate societies and 
newsletter production. They wrote articles for activist newspapers and corresponded with 
radical and reformist groups beyond prison walls. Prisoners, like Bernie Matthews and Sylvester 
Lockhart, turned the affordances of rehabilitation back on the institution. This proved to be one 
of the sources of rehabilitation’s instability. 
Of course, the prisoners’ rights movement also originated within a more general 




twentieth century. It shared many aspects of the civil rights movements in both Australia and 
the United States and drew upon examples from decolonization conflicts from Kenya to 
Vietnam to Northern Ireland. It often overlapped with similar movements advocating the rights 
of other confined people, like mental health patients. It was a highly plural movement in that 
prisoners often pursued multiple strategies in the name of prisoners’ rights, from filing petitions 
with courts to open rebellion. The activism of prisoners compelled greater attention and 
intervention by outside authorities, like courts and inquiries, which led to many improvements 
in prison conditions. Beyond subverting some programs, prisoner resistance also directly 
contributed to the demise of rehabilitation. By 1970s, many prisoners openly criticized the 
hollow promises and abuses of rehabilitation practices and demanded greater respect as 
citizens with rights that were not extinguished by the act of incarceration.  
As rehabilitation waned, it became increasingly unable to address multiple audiences, 
and the penal estate fragmented. It became abundantly clear after the violence in 1989 and 
1990 that the innovations in classification and the partitioning of penal space did little to 
address the effects of large increases in penal populations and the disappearance of a 
hegemonic carceral narrative orienting accounts of penal life. Without a flexible, yet coherent, 
way of organizing the social relations of prisons, the task of getting imprisoned people to “buy 
in,” to go along, and to find a place for their concerns and desires within the regime was all the 
more difficult. In its absence, prison administrators and staff fell back on custodial solutions, 
like prolonged isolation, new prison construction and in many cases, ceding ever greater 




The conversation between the public, penal authorities, officers and prisoners, once 
sustained by rehabilitation, now shrank and transformed, as the voices of prisoners once again 
disappeared. Unlike earlier periods of crisis, however, it seemed to many people that the two 
hundred year project of prison reform itself may have reached a point of exhaustion. The rituals 
of control remained, morbid symptoms of an institution dedicated more to containment than 
anything else. Perhaps this transformation says as much about broader social trends since the 
1970s, especially concerning declining public confidence in social science expertise and a 
growing unwillingness to recognize and address the wayward as people. Such beliefs 
underwrote the postwar reforms, while the prisoner’s rights movement drew more on the 
latter notion. “Skepticism and despair seem to have outstripped hope.”1925 This is fertile ground 
for policies stressing incapacitation. 
Gresham Sykes famously described prisons as authoritarian communities, resembling 
mid-twentieth-century dictatorships.1926 He counseled reformers that this was unlikely to 
change in the near future, but he added, “There are…many possible authoritarian communities 
and some are preferable to others.”1927 As he conducted his research, penal systems in many 
parts of the world instituted a set of practices that attempted to mitigate many of the 
destructive aspects of these dictatorships. The convergence of these reforms with 
democratizing forces, emanating from within and without the prisons over the next two to 
three decades, took this even further, turning prisons into highly contentious places in many 
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parts of the world. The terrain of the prison, and punishment, transformed into contested 
ground in a way that it had not been in more than a century. In this respect, it registered many 
of the contemporary struggles for civil rights, racial equality, greater participation and 
recognition. It also became a site for constructioning new comparative projects and 
transnational connections. 
Since the 1970s, the visibility that these earlier movements brought to the penal estate 
has remained. Prisons and punishment have a greater public presence now than they did fifty 
years ago, but the regime of visibility surrounding it, much like the internal prison regime, 
transformed in such a way that it is now hard to see or hear prisoners, whether on their own 
terms or expressed in the language of reform.1928 Prisoners are often portrayed solely as 
threats and racially black, images that both rose to prominence in the 1970s. By the 1980s, 
penal authorities no longer addressed the people sent to prison in forums, practices and 
accounts that allowed these people to buy in or talk back. Prisoners were rarely granted the 
same access to more public venues, like the media. While penological and media accounts were 
almost always skewed against them, imprisoned people lacked even the ability to participate in 
these rituals of representation. This denial of what David Brown has called “discursive 
citizenship” reduced their status even more and played a prominent role in the growth of the 
penal estate since then.1929 
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Figure 17: Minister Haigh casts out newspapers 





If the regimes of the postwar, treatment era were able to bring multiple constituencies 
and audiences to order, the current prison cannot. Its order is predicated on security and 
excluding certain audiences that the penal authorities no longer wish to address. 
As this trend emerged in the 1980s, some people were keenly aware of its consequences for 
how the larger public would know about and understand prisons and punishment.  
In June 1981, a prison activist writing an editorial for the newsletter, Jailprint, lamented the 
recent banning of several publications by the New South Wales Department of Corrective 
Services. This decision directly contradicted Justice Nagle’s recommendation that prisoners be 
allowed to have publications available in the wider community. The anonymous writer also 
criticized the Department’s decision to place further restrictions on prisoners’ ability to contact 
outside media organizations. The writer knew that prisoners faced hurdles in getting people 
beyond prison walls to listen to them. Yet, it was the disappearance of the ability to even begin 
this conversation that worried the author. “Not that the media treat prisoners fairly, but at 
least a greater contact between prisoners and the media would allow more versions of the 
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